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THE 


PRESENT  STATE 


ENGLAND 


IN  REGARD  TO 


AGRICULTURE,  TRADE,  AND  FINANCE? 


WITH  A 
COMPARISON  OP  THE  PROSPECTS 


0* 


BNCMAirD     AND     FRANCS. 


By  JOSEPH  LOWE,  Esq 


NEW-YORK : 
PUBLISHED  BY  E.  BLISS  AND  E.  WHITE,  BROADWAY. 

J.  SEYMOUR,  PRINTER* 

1824. 


HClSr 

18  W: 


TO 

WILLIAM  MANNING,  Es<*.  M.  P. 

AND   A   DIRECTOR  OF   THE   BANK  OF   ENGLAND, 

THIS    VOLUME, 

APPROPRIATED  TO 

OBJECTS  INTIMATELY  CONNECTED  WITH 

THOSE  OF  HIS  PUBLIC  LIFE, 

WITH  SENTIMENTS  OP  THE  GREATEST  REGARD, 
BY 

THE  AUTHOR. 


INTRODUCTION- 


No  subject  can  present  a  higher  interest  than  an 
inquiry  into  the  state  and  prospects  of  the  produc- 
tive industry  of  England.  Whatever  tends  to  correct 
error,  or  introduce  improvement  into  the  operation 
of  that  industry,  must  affect  the  comfort  of  so  large 
a  population,  that  no  research,  bestowed  on  such  a 
subject,  can  be  accounted  too  minute,  no  labour  too 
long. 

Fruitful  as  has  been  the  present  age  in  changes,, 
military  and  political,  there  has  occurred  an  almost 
equal  degree  of  revolution  in  the  value   of  money 
and  the  productive  power  of  labour  and  capital,  de- 
partments in  general  so  tranquil  as  hardly  to  attract 
the  notice  of  the  historian.     Those  of  our  readers 
who  are  of  an  age  to  recollect  the  peace  of  1783  can- 
not have    forgotten    the    general    discouragement 
caused  by  the  relinquishment  of  our  American  Colo- 
nies, followed  as  it  was  by  a  season  of  great  financial 
difficulty.     They  will  remember  with  more  satisfac- 
tion the  revival  of  our  commercial  activity  in  the 
years  preceding  the  French  Revolution,  and  the  dis- 
cussions whether  we  were  indebted  for  so  beneficial 
a  change  to  the  natural  course  of  circumstances  or 
the  conduct  of  Mr.  Pitt.     This  was  followed  by  the 
war  with  France — a  period  subversive  of  all  previous 


Vlll  INTRODUCTION. 

calculation  in  finance,  since,  after  experiencing 
pecuniary  difficulty  during  a  few  years,  our  resources 
appeared  to  expand  with  our  wants,  and  continued 
so  long  abundant,  that  we  had  no  little  difficulty  in 
anticipating  the  possibility  of  a  recurrence  of  em- 
barrassment. 

That  which  took  place  at  the  close  of  the  war 
(1815  and  1816)  was  altogether  unexpected,  and  the 
public,  accounting  pecuniary  straits  incompatible 
with  our  brilliant  success  in  the  field,  clung  to  the  ex- 
pectation that  their  distress  would  disappear  as  soon 
as  peace  should  be  firmly  established.  This  hope 
was  confirmed  by  the  revival  of  our  commercial 
activity  in  1817  and  1818,  but  the  succeeding  years 
dispelled  the  illusion,  and  taught  us  that  the  evils  of 
transition  were  not  yet  at  an  end. 

During  the  last  and  present  year  circumstances 
have  become  more  favourable,  and  our  lower  orders, 
in  particular,  enjoy  a  larger  share  of  comfort  than 
they  have  known  for  a  long  period.  Still  it  might  be 
going  too  far,  were  we  to  flatter  ourselves  that  our 
embarrassments  had  reached  their  close.  The  un- 
fortunate coincidence  between  the  relief  of  the  con- 
sumer and  the  distress  of  the  producer  of  corn, 
joined  to  the  portion  of  uncertainty  always  attendant 
on  a  commerce  of  export,  convey  a  warning  that  a  sea- 
son of  difficulty  must  yet  elapse,  ere  our  circumstan- 
ces become  thoroughly  adapted  to  our  new  and  more 
natural  state.  There  exists  in  some  branches  a 
want  of  employment ;  in  others,  a  remarkable  dis- 
proportion in  the  rate  of  wages  and  salaries  to  the 
earnings  of  the  employer; — the  whole  affording  a 
painful  lesson  how  little  either  the  public  or  our 
rulers  foresaw  the  consequence  of  lavish  expenditure, 


INTRODUCTION  IX 

and  how  few  among  those  who  undertook  to  enlight- 
en them,  either  in  parliament,  or  through  the  medium 
of  the  press,  were  acquainted  with  the  circumstan- 
ces of  former  periods  of  transition  from  war  to 
peace. 

To  elucidate  by  a  careful  survey  of  facts  and 
documents,  the  obscurities  of  the  past,  and  to  offer 
suggestions  which  may  perhaps  tend  to  facilitate  our 
transition  to  a  more  safe  and  steady  state  of  things, 
is  the  object  of  this  volume.  We  shall  begin  by 
endeavouring  to  account  for  our  financial  prosperity 
during  the  war,  and  to  explain  the  causes  of  the 
reverse  that  followed  the  peace.  No  one  has  yet 
attempted  to  show  how  far  our  increase  of  wealth 
during  the  war  was  real,  and  how  far  nominal — a  dis- 
tinction, which,  if  subversive  of  a  part  of  the  flatter- 
ing picture  with  which  we  gratified  our  imagination 
during  our  long  contest,  has  the  consoling  accompani- 
ment, that  the  decrease  of  our  wealth  since  the  peace 
will  be  found,  by  following  up  a  similar  reasoning,  to 
be  far  less  than  is  commonly  apprehended. 

This  inquiry  will  be  necessarily  connected  with 
researches  into  the  intricate  topics  of  Money  and 
Exchange.  How  far  did  the  substitution  of  paper  for 
metallic  currency  prove  an  addition  to  our  resour- 
ces ?  At  what  period  did  that  hazardous  experiment 
cease  to  afford  relief,  or  become  productive  of  loss  ? 
And  do  not  the  public  at  present  labour  under  a 
general  misapprehension  in  regard  to  the  effect  of 
the  resumption  of  cash  payments,  attributing  to  the 
act  of  1819,  commonly  called  Mr,  Peel's  Bill,  that 
fall  of  prices,  that  recovery  of  the  value  of  money 
which  ought  to  be  traced  to  a  more  powerful  cause  ? 


INTRODUCTION. 


Our  next  topic  shall  be  the  state  of  our  agricul- 
ture, and  the  causes  of  the  distress  that  has  assailed 
this,  the  most  flourishing  during  the  war  of  all  the 
branches  of  our  industry.  Here  also,  the  attentive 
observer  will  find  much  miscalculation  to  correct, 
and  misapprehension  to  remove.  In  attempting  this 
we  shall  draw  a  comparison  of  the  charges  attendant 
on  British  and  Continental  agriculture,  and  venture 
on  the  more  difficult  inquiry  how  far  our  produce  is 
likely  to  continue  at  its  present  rate ;  also  how  far  a 
low  price  of  corn  is  or  is  not  conducive  to  the  exten- 
sion of  our  productive  industry. 

A  more  cheering  theme  will  be  opened  to  us  by 
the  increase  of  our  population,  the  adequacy  of  our 
produce  to  its  support,  and  the  refutation  of  the  dis- 
couraging theories  circulated  on  this  subject  during 
the  war.  An  intimate  connexion  evidently  prevails 
between  increase  of  numbers  and  increase  of  wealth ; 
particularly  in  a  town  population,  among  whom 
labour  is  subdivided,  and  the  possession  of  capital 
gives  assurance  of  profitable  employment. 

These  and  similar  topics  will  occupy  the  greater 
part  of  our  volume :  the  remainder  shall  be  appro- 
priated to  the  discussion  of  propositions  for  the  re- 
lief of  our  suffering  classes,  founded  on  the  evident 
tendency  of  our  resources  to  increase. 

To  objects  such  as  these  any  attachment  to  party 
politics  would  evidently  be  unsuited.  A  writer, 
thoroughly  impressed  with  the  importance  of  his 
subject,  and  animated  by  the  hope  of  rendering 
service  to  his  countrymen,  will  consider  as  a  second- 
ary object  the  notice  either  of  men  in  office  or  their 
opponents.    While  he  speaks  with  commendation  of 


LNTRODUCTlOxN.  XI 

measures,  which  bear  the  stamp  of  good  intention  or 
laborious  exertion,  he  will  animadvert  without  re- 
serve on  such  as  are  indicative  of  hasty  or  imperfect 
views.  It  is  on  this  ground,  far  more  than  on  de- 
ficiency of  zeal  for  the  general  good,  that  our  public 
men  are  vulnerable.  "  In  retirement,"  said  an  emi- 
nent public  character,  "  I  became  sensible,  that, 
when  in  place,  I  had  been  deficient  in  almost  every 
thing  but  diligence."*  The  functions  of  our  heads 
of  office  are  often  ill  distributed :  the  assistance  af- 
forded to  them  in  the  higher  and  more  difficult  de- 
partments is  apparently  very  imperfect ;  and  their 
minds,  engaged  from  day  to  day  in  devising  expedi- 
ents to  meet  a  temporary  urgency,  become  less  and 
less  accustomed  to  long-continued  reflection  on  one 
subject,  and  to  the  conclusions  for  which  such  re- 
flection is  indispensable.  Without  an  admission  of 
this  nature,  how  can  we  account  for  their  delaying  so 
long  the  adoption  of  a  decisive  course  in  regard  to 
Ireland ;  or,  their  postponing  in  this  country,  till  the 
eighth  year  after  the  war,  the  financial  measures 
which  were  called  for  by  a  state  of  peace  ? 

An  equal  disposition  to  impartiality  will,  it  is 
hoped,  be  traced  when  we  carry  our  views  abroad, 
and  speak  either  of  that  nation  which  hereditary 
feeling  still  represents  as  our  rival  in  Europe,  or  of 
that  which  contests  of  recent  date  have  brought 
forward  as  our  opponent  on  the  farther  shore  of  the 
Atlantic.  A  personal  residence  of  several  years  in 
France  has  given  the  author  occasion  to  mark  the 
national  character,  to  study  the  political  resources, 
to  calculate  the  prospective  power  of  our  once- 
dreaded  neighbour.     It  has  satisfied  him  that  though 

*  Huskisson  on  the  Bullion  Question,  1810. 


\11  LVi'RODUCTUKN. 

France  is  still  the  greatest  of  continental  states,  yet 
that  England  may  soon  dismiss  the  apprehensions 
entertained  by  our  forefathers,  and  rest  tranquil  in 
the  assurance  of  the  more  rapid  increase  of  her 
population,  wealth,  and  power.  May  we  not  add, 
that  these  views  receive  confirmation  from  the  con- 
duct of  our  rulers,  who,  when  France  was  in  a  man- 
ner at  the  disposal  of  this  country  and  of  allies  ready 
to  join  in  any  project  of  partition,  accounted  it  im- 
politic either  to  weaken  her  frontiers  by  the  reten- 
tion of  fortresses,  or  to  cripple  her  trade  by  the  im- 
position of  restrictions?  How  different  then  our 
present  situation,  from  that  of  former  years,  when 
we  were  obliged  to  seek  security  in  foreign  alliances, 
and  to  postpone  the  correction  of  domestic  abuses 
from  a  dread  of  exciting  discontent !  The  most 
sincere  well-wisher  to  his  country  may  now  speak 
with  freedom  of  past  transactions,  viewing  them 
merely  as  historical  facts, — as  events  which,  though 
not  remote  in  date,  may  be  boldly  scrutinized  with- 
out any  prejudicial  effect  on  our  present  situation. 

The  disposition  of  the  public  is  fortunately  in 
coincidence  with  this  state  of  things.  During  the 
war  events  followed  in  too  quick  succession  to  admit 
of  deliberate  reflection,  or  to  afford  a  basis  for  in- 
structive conclusions : — all  was  absorbed  in  the 
bustle  of  action,  in  an  expectation  of  change.  At 
present  the  public  may  be  compared  to  those  who, 
retired  from  active  life,  pass  their  transactions  in  re- 
view with  the  advantage  of  leisure  and  experience, 
— a  situation  far  more  favourable  than  the  ardour  of 
a  contest,  for  appreciating  both  the  extent  of  our 
sacrifices,  and  the  results  of  which  they  have  been 
productive. 


INTRODUCTION.  Xlll 

In  attempting  to  elucidate  these,  we  shall  proceed 
with  a  scrupulous  reference  to  facts  and  documents: 
but  though  such  details  must  necessarily  form  the 
body  of  the  book,  Ave  shall  hop  3  to  introduce,  oc- 
casionally, considerations  of  a  higher  kind.  Those 
who,  from  their  time  of  life,  have  been  enabled  to 
follow  the  course  of  occurrences  since  the  early  part 
of  the  French  revolution,  have  witnessed  an  age  of 
vicissitude,  a  succession  of  events  which,  whether 
military  or  political,  were  often  ill  calculated  to 
favour  the  belief  that  justice  and  moderation  form 
the  true  basis  of  national  prosperity.  But  time  alone 
was  wanting  to  complete  the  evidence  and  assert 
the  truth  of  that  doctrine.  The  triumph  of  military 
usurpation  was  arrested  in  the  wilds  of  Russia,  and 
received  its  overthrow  in  the  plains  of  Flanders. 
Since  then  our  southern  neighbours  have  been  awa- 
kened from  their  dream  of  continental  dominion. 
We,  without  having  trespassed  equally  in  point  of 
aggression,  had  also  our  exclusive  creed; — our  system 
of  vigour;  our  jealousy  of  neutrals ;  our  notion  that 
war  was  a  source  of  national  wealth.  How  far  these 
impressions  have  been  corrected  by  recent  events, 
by  our  experience  during  the  years  that  have  elapsed 
since  the  peace,  will  remain  to  be  explained  in  the 
following  pages. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Events  of  the  War  viewed  in  Connexion  with  our  National  Resources. 

Page 

Sketch  of  military  events  from  1793  to  1801  25 

Our  situation  at  the  peace  of  Amiens    -  32 

War  of  1803     -------  34 

Alternations  of  success              -----  37 

/ 

CHAPTER  II. 

Magnitude  of  our  Expenditure  and  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies. 

Expenditure  during  the  war ;  its  progressive  increase  42 

How  far  defrayed  by  loans,  how  far  by  taxes    -  45 

Comparison  with  former  wars  -----  ib. 

What  were  the  sources  of  these  great  supplies  ?  46 

Was  it  our  foreign  trade  ?-----  47 

Was  it  our  colonial  acquisitions,  or  the  suspension  of  foreign  competition  ?  49 
All  these  means  overrated ;  the  chief  source  of  our  supplies  were  the 

Increase  of  employment  during  the  war             -  50 

Consequent  increase  of  our  revenue    -  52 

Increase  of  our  population         -----  53 

Increased  productiveness  of  our  excise  duties   -            -            -  ib. 

Estimate  of  our  taxable  income  at  different  periods,  from  1792  to  1814  54 

Proportion  of  our  burdens  to  our  resources        -            -            -  55 
Farther  causes  of  increase  of  revenue  during  the  war :  our  taxes,  in  a 
great  measure,  a  circulation  of  money,  a  repayment  of  government 

expenditure  -------  56 

Absence  of  foreign  competition             -  59 

Exemption  from  cash  payments            -  60 

The  public  not  aware  of  the  reaction  to  be  apprehended  at  a  peace  ib. 

CHAPTER  III. 

General  Rise  of  Prices  during  the  War. 

The  causes  specified     ------  62 

The  demand  of  men  for  government  service      -            -            -  ib. 

Proportion  of  the  force  in  arms,  to  the  population  at  large          -  63 

Annual  expense  of  our  army,  navy,  and  ordnance,  from  1791  to  1815  65 

Effect  of  this  expenditure  on  the  price  of  commodities    -             -  ib. 

Taxation,  its  effect  on  house-keeping    -            -            -             -  66 

Comparative  expense  of  house-keeping  in  1792  and  1813          -  69 

How  far  effected  by  the  rise  of  price  in  labour  -             -             -  72 

How  far  by  the  rise  of  corn       -             -             -            -  73 

Combined  result  of  all  these  causes       -            -             -             -  ib. 

Exemplified  by  the  rise  of  lands,  houses,  and  other  real  property  ib. 

How  far  was  this  rise  nominal  ?              -             -            -             -  74 

The  case  of  money  property,  such  as  loans  on  mortgage  75 

"  Change  in  the  value  of  money ;"  this  expression  defined          -  76 

Prices  on  the  Continent  since  1792       -  77 


XVI  CONTENTS. 

file 
Rise  of  prices  apparently  indicative  of  prosperity  -  -  80 

Evil  of  high  prices  when  peculiar  to  a  country ;  opinions  of  Mr.  S. 

Gray,  and  of  Mr.  Ricardo     -  -  -  -  81 

Effect  of  a  rise  of  prices  on  our  public  burdens  -  84 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Our  Currency  and  Exchanges  since  1792. 

Historical  sketch  of  our  exchanges  since  1792 ;  and  of  the  effects  of  our 

corn  imports  and  subsidies     -----  85 

Tabular  statement  of  these  imports  and  subsidies  93 

Our  inconvertible  bank  paper ;  contradictory  opinions  on  that  subject    96 
Our  money  system  previous  to  1797      -  -  -  -  97 

The  bank  restriction  act  -  -  -  -  99 

The  opinion  of  the  bullion  committee  on  that  act  -  -  100 

Effects  of  that  act  in  augmenting  the  disposable  funds  of  bankers,  faci- 
litating discounts,  and  preventing  the  rise  of  interest  -  101 


The  question  of  depreciation  and  over-issue  : 
Difference  between  an  addition  to  the  stock  of  bank  paper,  and  an 

increase  of  metallic  currency            -            -            -            -  104 

Discounts  ;  their  increase  during  the  war          -            -            -  105 

tended,  in  some  respects,  to  retard  the  rise  of  prices  106 

greatly  facilitated  by  the  exemption  from  oash  payments  107 

Effect,  in  a  political  sense,  of  that  exemption    -            -            -  109 
Depreciation ;  distinction  between  depreciation  of  bank  paper,  and  a 

diminution  in  the  value  of  money  generally              -            -  ib. 

Mode  in  which  depreciation  was  incurred  abroad          -            -  110 

The  degree  of  such  depreciation            -            -             -             -  ill 

Effect  of  a  rise  of  prices  abroad  on  prices  at  home         -             -  ib. 

Extent  of  such  effect  previous  to  1809                -             -            -  112 

The  same  after  1809     -            -            -            -            -            -  ib. 

Summary  of  the  preceding        -            -            -            -            -  113 

Considerations  addressed  to  the  advocates  of  the  Bank  -            -  114 
to  the  supporters  of  the  Bullion  Committee  115 


The  Exemption  Act  viewed  in  connexion  with  the  events  of  the  \var  118 
Would  the  exemption  from  cash  payments,  if  not  resorted  to  in  1797, 

have  been  adopted  at  a  subsequent  period  ?   -             -             -  ib. 

How  far  was  it  a  source  of  financial  aid  ?           -             -             -  120 

Mr.  Peel's  bill ;  its  effect  overrated      -            -            -            -  1 22 

CHAPTER  V. 

Our  Agriculture. 

Section  I. 

Historical  Sketch. 

Our  corn  trade  previous  to  the  Revolution  of  1 688          -            -  1 23 

Bounty  on  export  in  1689          -            -            -            -            -  124 

Prices  stationary  during  the  reign  of  George  II. ;  rise  after  1764  126 

Act  of  1773      -------  ib. 

The  late  Wars               ------  127 

The  peace  of  1814         -             -             -             -             -             -  128 

Fluctuations  since  1792,  divided  into  periods:  from  1793  to  1800  ;  from 

1800to  1809;  from  1809  to  1814        -             -             -  129 

From  1814  to  1819  ;  from  1819  to  the  present  year        -  131 

Tabular  statement  of  our  crops,  and  average  prices  since  1790  -  133 


CONTENTS.  XV11 

Page 

Causes  oi  these  fluctuations;  the  effect  of  our  corn  laws  greatly  over- 
rated           ._----.-  134 
Causes  of  rise  after  1763           -            -            -             -             -  135 

during  the  war  -----  ib. 

Causes  of  fall  since  the  peace    -----  136   - 

Additional  hands  employed  in  tillage     -             -             -            -  137 

Section  II. 
Situation  and  Prospects  of  our  Agriculturists. 

Annual  produce  and  rental  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland            -  140 

Magnitude  of  the  depression  since  the  peace     -            -            -  141 

Present  situation  of  our  landlords  and  farmers  -             -             -  '  142 

Consequence  of  a  general  deduction  of  farming  charges             -  144 

Comparison  of  our  present  prices  with  those  prior  to  1793         -  145 

Effect  on  the  price  of  corn  of  increasing  population     -            -  147 

Consumers  may  increase  without  raising  prices              -            -  149 

Effect  of  a  bad  season              -             -             -             -             -  150 

Less  felt  in  peace  than  in  war  -            -             -            -            -  151 

Reaction  of  the  market  price  of  corn  on  the  cost  of  its  production  152 

Mode  of  such  reaction  in  war    -             -             -             -             -  153 

in  peace              -  154 

How  far  understood  by  land-surveyors ;  by  farmers  ;  by  the  Agricul- 
tural Committee  of  1821       -----  ib. 
Prospect  of  prices;  circumstances  conducive  to  a  rise              -  155 
Circumstances  which  render  a  low  price  probable          -             -  158 
Prospect  of  relief  to  farmers ;  tithe ;  poor-rate               -             -  160 

Section  III. 
A  protecting  Duty. 

A  populous  country  not  necessarily  expensive    -             -             -  lti2 

Comparative  burdens  on  French  and  British  agriculture          -  164 

Comparative  rentals  of  the  two  countries           -             -             -  168 

Are  our  manufactures  benefited  by  protecting  duties  ?             -  ib. 

Danger  of  an  over-extension  of  tillage              -            -             -  171 

The  Corn  Committee  of  1813 ;  fallacy  of  their  arguments          -  172 

Objections  to  a  high  import  duty            -             -             -             -  173 

Tendency  of  our  legislation  to  ultimate  freedom  of  trade             -  174 

Physical  advantages  of  particular  countries       -             -             -  175 

of  England            -  ib. 

A  free  import  of  corn ;  arguments  for  and  against  it      -             -  1 76 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Poor-rate. 

Origin  of  our  poor-law  system  -            -            -            -            -  179 

Its  progressive  extension           -             -             -             -             -  181 

The  late  wars  -------  182 

Amount  of  poor-rate  in  the  different  years  from  1813  to  1822    -  184 

Reduction  since  1818  -            -            -            -             -            -  185 

Workhouses     -            -             -             -            -            -            -  186 

Management  of  the  poor  in  Scotland  and  France        -            -  187 


Poor-rate  considered  as  a  tax     -             --          -             -            -  190 

Its  amount  estimated  in  corn     -            -            -             -            -  ib. 

Comparative  number  of  paupers  since  1688        -             -             -  191 

Wages  paid  by  poor-rate            ..-..-  ib. 

Particularly  in  agricultural  districts     -             -             -            -  1 93 

Computed  amount  of  the  rental  of  land  and  houses  assessed  to  poor-rate  194 

3 


XV111  (JONTENTfc. 

Page 

Comparative  comfort  of  the  labouring  classes  at  different  periods  195 

Is  our  poor-law  system  beneficial  to  the  lower  orders  ?              -  196 

Repeal  of  taxes  on  the  necessaries  of  life           -            -            -  197 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Population. 

Penury  of  early  ages    -             -             -             -             -             *  201 

Effect  of  increasing  population              -  202 

Gradual  transition  from  penury  to  comfort         -             -             -  203 

Is  the  amount  of  subsistence  limited  by  physical  causes  ?             -  205 

Average  increase  of  population                          -             -             -  206 

Comparison  of  the  present  with  former  periods  in  history            -  208 

Leading  ideas  of  Mr.  Malthus  and  Mr.  S.  Gray            -             -  210 
Progressive  increase  of  population  in  Europe; — effects  of  climate  and 

soil  --------  211 

Effect  of  easy  communication  -             -             -             -             -  212 

Effect  of  the  Protestant  Religion         -                          -             -  213 

Population  per  square  mile ;  Holland  and  England        -             -  214 

Austria,  Prussia,  and  Poland ;  France-             -             -             -  215 

Chief  towns  of  France  and  England ;  their  comparative  population        217 

Ireland ;  Italy ;  Spain               -  ib. 


Connexion  between  the  increase  of  population  and  increase  of  na- 
tional wealth             -            -            -            -            -            -  219 

Effect  of  increasing  population  on  the  wealth  of  individuals       -  220 

Comparison  of  public  burdens  in  different  parts  of  Europe      -  222 

Rural  population ;  its  stationary  condition         -  223 

Wealth  of  town  population     -----  224 

Subsistence  more  easy  of  acquisition  as  society  advances            -  226 
Cultivation  becomes  extended  throughout  a  diversity  of  soil  and  climate  228 

Progress  of  agricultural  improvement  -  ib. 

The  comforts  of  the  lower  orders  increase  as  society  advances  229 

Population  ought  to  be  left  to  its  natural  course            -             -  230 
Statistical  table  of  Europe  in  1823,  viz.  the  comparative  taxation  and 

population  of  different  countries         -            -            -            -  23 1 

Their  surprising  increase  since  the  16th  century           -            -  234 

Prospect  of  continued  increase  on  the  Continent           -            -  235 

In  England  a  still  greater  prospect        -  236 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

On  the  National  Revenue  and  Capital. 
Property  annually  created  in  Great  Britain  and  Ireland             -  237 
Table  of  our  present  taxable  income    -  238 
Its  increase  since  1792             -  240 
Connexion  between  the  increase  of  our  numbers,  and  that  of  our  na- 
tional income           -            -            -            -            -            -  241 

How  far  is  the  former  a  basis  for  the  computation  of  the  latter?  242 

Fluctuations  of  income  since  1792        -  243 

An  estimate  of  them  attempted              -  244 

Tabular  statements  of  our  national  revenue  since  1792              -  246 

Our  public  burdens ;  their  proportion  to  our  resources  since  1792  247 

France ;  her  national  income  compared  with  that  of  England    -  249 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Effect  of  the  War  on  Property,  individval  and  national. 

Difference  of  opinion  among  political  economists          -            -  2^ 

Mr.  J.  B.  Say,  JYIr.  S.  Gray,  Mr.  Ricardo        -            -            -  «,. 


CONTENTS.  XIX 

Pagft 

Losses  to  our  productive  industry  in  the  beginning  of  the  war  -  254 

Burdens  incurred  during  the  war          -            -            -            -  256 

Deduction  from  the  apparent  amount  of  these  burdens  -            -  ib. 

Taxation  of  other  countries      -----  ib. 

Our  war  taxes ;  tithe ;  poor-rate           -  257 

The  national  debt        ------  259 

Effect  of  a  state  of  war  on  the  habits  of  individuals  ib. 

Losses  on  the  transition  from  war  to  peace          -  260 

Magnitude  of  the  change           -            -            -            -            -  261 

Similar  distress  in  foreign  countries      -  263 

Temporary  revival  of  activity  in  1818  -  ib. 

Our  probable  situation  had  peace  been  preserved          -            -  264 

The  late  wars  examined  by  moral  considerations            -            -  265 


Comparative  estimate  of  our  taxable  income  in  1813  and  1823  -  269 

Explanatory  remarks  on  this  estimate               -  270 

Reduction  of  income  since  the  peace    -             -            -             -  272 

Comparative  pressure  of  our  burdens  in  war  and  peace               -  273 

Effect  on  our  public  debt  of  the  rise  in  the  value  of  money        -  i6. 


Have  our  public  men,  since  1793,  understood  our  financial  situation  ?    275 

Mr.  Pitt           -------  276 

The  successors  of  Mr.  Pitt      -----  278 

The  Opposition             ------  280 

Strictures  on  the  education  of  our  public  men  -  ib. 

Their  conduct  of  the  late  wars  -----  283 

of  our  internal  affairs     -            -            -            -  284 

CHAPTER  X. 

lvalue  of  Money. 

Section  I. 

Fluctuations  in  the  Value  of  Money. 

Tracts  published  on  this  subject            -            -            -            -  286 

Historical  sketch  of  such  fluctuations   -            -            -            -  287 

Effects  of  a  state  of  war            -----  288 

Can  fluctuations  be  prevented  in  future  ?                       -            -  290 

Causes  which  affect  the  value  of  money            -            -            -  29 1 

Supply  of  specie  from  the  mines            -            -            -            -  ib. 

Circulation  of  bank  paper         -----  292 

Supply  of  agricultural  produce              -            -                          -  293 

Probable  effects  of  a  state  of  war           -            -            -            -  295 

Injurious  consequences  of  these  fluctuations      -  296 

Particularly  on  annuitants       -----  297 

Section  II. 

Plan  for  lessening  the  injury  from  Fluctuation,  and  giving  a  uniform  Value 
to  Money  Incomes. 

A  table  of  reference  for  time  contracts              ...  300 

Effect  of  the  proposed  plan  on  the  labouring  classes        -            -  302 

Effect  of  such  a  plan  on  agriculture       -  304 

on  tithe     -----  305 

on  the  public  funds  and  government  annuitants  307 

Objections  answered    ------  308 

Concluding  remarks     -  -  -  -  -  -310 


XX  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Our  Finances. 

i*age 

The  national  debt        ------  312 

Fluctuations  in  the  price  of  stock  since  1720  -            -            -  313 

Mr.  Pitt's  administration           -             -             -             -             -  314 

Reduction  of  the  five  per  cents.             -            -            -            -  316 

Our  other  financial  measures  since  1815           -            -            -  317 

The  sinking- fund  ;  its  limited  operation               -             -             -  318 

Compound  interest  a  delusion    -----  321 

Advantages  of  a  low  rate  of  interest  of  money  •             -            -  322 

Objections  to  a  large  sinking  fund         -  323 

Estimate  of  our  annual  expenditure       -  324 
Stockholders ;  distinction  between  permanent  and  temporary  depositors  326 

Comparative  taxation  of  England  and  France  -             -             -  329 

Section  II. 

Our  prospects  in  Commerce  and  Finance. 

Probability  of  continued  peace              -             -             -             -  331 

Causes  of  war  that  no  longer  exist        -  333 

Our  prospect  of  augmented  resources    -  335 

Computed  increase  of  our  national  income         -             -             -  337 

Its  surprising  increase  in  the  course  of  last  century        -             -  338 

Parallel  of  the  resources  of  England  and  France            -            -  340 

Section  III. 

Views  of  Finance  suggested  by  our  Situation  and  Prospects. 

How  far  is  taxation  a  cause  of  embarrassment  ?              -             -  344 
Tabular  statement  of  our  taxes              -  346 
Examples  of  injury  from  taxation ;  in  the  distillery ;  insurance  ;  ship- 
building       -                       .  -             -             -             -  347 

Relief  that  would  arise  from  a  reduction  of  taxes             -             -  349 

Objections  answered     -             -             -             -             -             -  351 

M.  Neckar ;  his  plan  of  finance             -  353 
The  question  of  a  small  annual  loan  in  lieu  of  taxes  : 

State  of  the  monied  interest  -----  355 

Transmission  of  capital  to  foreign  countries  -             -             -  356 

Would  the  proposed  loan  affect  the  rate  of  interest  ?  -            -  359 

Would  it  affect  the  price  of  stocks  ?  -             -             -             -  360 

Limitation  to  borrowing        -----  352 

The  bill  for  transferring  half-pay  and  pensions  into  long  annuities       363 

Mr.  Pitt ;  his  ability  in  finance          ....  354 

The  period  from  1784  to  1793  365 


Conclusion ;  a  summary  of  the  work     -  367 

Subjects  which  remain  to  be  treated     -  -  -  -  369 


CONTENTS.  XXJ 


CONTENTS  OF  THE  APPENDIX. 


CHAPTER  II. 

The  late  Wars. 


Page 
Our  war  expenditure  in  the  form  of  taular  statements    -            -  [1  ] 
The  war  of  1 793,  distinguished  from  that  of  1 803          -            -  [3] 
A  simliar  statement  of  our  exports,  and  an  explanation  of  the  custom- 
house term,  "  official  value"              -  [4] 
Our  exports  greater  since  1814  than  during  the  war    -            -  [5] 
Decline  in  the  price  of  manufactures  since  1818           -             -  [7] 
The  present  prices  of  manufactures  compared  to  those  of  the  reign 

of  King  William      ------  ?'&, 

Taxation ;  its  effect  on  trade  -----  [8] 

CHAPTER  III. 

Rise  of  Prices  during  the  War. 

Lower  orders:  table  of  their  family  expenditure  since  1792; — the 

country  labourer     ------  [9] 

The  town  mechanic    ------  ib. 

The  middle  and  higher  classes ;  similar  fluctuations  in  their  family  ex- 
penditure    -            -            -            -            -            -            -  [10] 

Proportion  borne  by  each  head  of  expense,  (food,  clothing,  and  lodg- 
ing,) to  the  total  of  family  expenditure          -            -             -  [11] 

Comparative  situation  of  the  lower  orders  in  war  and  peace      -  [12] 

Effect  on  housekeeping,  of  a  rise  in  the  price  of  corn   -            -  ib. 

-— in  the  rate  of  labour  -             -  [13] 

of  a  depreciation  in  our  paper  cur- 
rency          -------  j£# 

Annuitants  on  mortgage           -            -            -            -            -  [14] 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Currency  and  Exchange. 

On  the  amount  of  Bank  of  England  notes  in  circulation            -  [15] 

Uncertainty  of  inferences  from  such  amount    -            -            -  [16] 

Fluctuations  in  the  circulation  of  Bank  of  England  Notes        -  [17] 

Circulation  of  country  banks  -----  $# 

The  exemption  from  cash  payments ;  its  effects            -             -  [lg] 

The  time  of  its  operation          -            -            -             -            -  [191 

Discounts ;  their  increase  explained    -  ib. 

The  rate  of  interest ;  its  rise  prevented  by  the  exemption  act  -  [20] 

This  act  considered  as  an  economizing  expedient         -            -  ib. 

Remarks  on  the  Bullion  Committee     -  [21] 

Questions  at  issue  between  their  supporters  and  opponents        -  [23] 
Connexion  between  the  circumstances  of  our  agriculturists  and  the 

circulation- of  country  banks             -             -             -             -  [£4] 

The  power  of  banks  overrated              -  [25] 

Inefficacy  of  an  exemption  from  cash  payments  in  peace          -  ib. 

Mr.  Peel's  Bill             -            -            -            -            -            -  [26] 

Publications  on  the  subject  of  exchange :  Mr.  J.  R,  M'Culloch  ib. 


X3B1  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  V. 
Our  Agriculture. 

Page 

Effect  of  increasing  population  on  the  price  of  corn    -            -  [29] 

Not  understood  by  the  Agricultural  Committee  of  1821             -  [30] 

National  disadvantage  of  a  high  price  of  corn  ib. 

Subsistence  not  enhanced  by  increase  of  population     -            -  [32] 

Uncertainty  of  speculative  opinions      -  ib. 
Arguments  in  favour  of  a  free  trade  in  corn,  by  Mr.  Bannatyne, 

Colonel  Torrens,  and  Mr.  M'Culloch           -  [33] 

Computation  of  Poor-rate  and  Tithe    -  [35] 

Connexion  between  increase  of  population  and  increase  of  tithe  [36] 

The  same  in  regard  to  rent  of  land      -  ib. 

Comparative  burdens  on  British  and  foreign  agriculture           -  [39] 

A  protecting  duty ;  evidence  of  Mr.  Tooke    -  ib. 

Reasons  in  support  of  that  evidence     -  [40] 

Competition  of  Continental  agriculturists         -            -            -  [41] 

Probable  limitation  of  our  corn  imports  in  peace  ib. 

Opinion  of  Mr.  Ricardo           -  [43] 

A  protecting  duty ;  ought  it  to  be  suspended  in  a  dear  season  ?  [44] 

Observations  of  Mr.  S.  Gray  on  the  Corn  Trade          -            -  [45] 

The  case  of  Tenants  on  lease,  and  of  Debtors  on  mortgage     -  ib. 

The  question  of  inference  by  courts  of  justice  -  [46] 

Dr.  Smith  on  agricultural  improvers    •                         -            -  [47] 

Value  of  land  during  last  century                     -            -            -  ib. 

Price  of  wheat  on  the  continent  and  in  England  previous  to  1793  [48] 

Average  prices  of  our  corn  in  1822      -  [49] 

Exports  of  corn  since  1697     -----  ib. 

The  Agricultural  Report  of  1821 ;  abstract  of  its  contents        -  ib. 

Remarks  on  that  Report           -            -            -            -             -  [51] 

Corn-law  of  1822;  abstract  of  its  provisions     -            -             -  [53] 

AdditionaHabour  bestowed  on  tillage  since  1814          -              -  [55] 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Our  Poor-rate. 

Tabular  statements  of  poor-rate  for  England  and  Wales           -  [57] 

The  same  for  the  metropolis    -----  [58] 

Highway,  church,  and  county  rate       -  [59] 

Report  of  15th  July  1822,  on  the  poor-rate  returns      -             -  to. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Population. 

Employment ;  its  subdivision  as  society  advances          -            -  [60] 
Its  minute  division  in  a  great  city                       - 

National  income  apportioned  among  different  classes     -            -  [62] 
Population ;  ratio  of  its  increase  in  different  stages,  as  society  advances  [63] 

The  mercantile  or  manufacturing  stage            -  [64] 

Effect  of  the  enlargement  of  farms        -  [65] 

Effect  of  machinery     ------  ib. 

Great  increase  of  population  in  the  present  age 

Proportion  of  marriages  to  the  whole  population           -            -  [67] 

Deaths ;  decrease  in  their  proportion  -             -             -             -  ib. 

Counties  of  England  and  Wales ;  their  comparative  extent 

productive  power       -             -  [69] 

— their  rank  in  density  of  population  [70] 

Census  of  1821 :  the  increase  since  1811,  exhibited  by  counties  [71  ] 


CONTENTS.  XX111 

Page 

Increase  of  our  principal  towns            -            -            -  [72] 
Distribution  of  our  population  into  classes,  and  comparative  numbers 

of  each        -------  ib. 

Superior  increase  of  town  population   -  [73] 
In  what  manner  do  population  returns  indicate  an  increase  of  na- 
tional wealth  ?          -            -            -                          -            -  [74] 

Census  of  England  in  1377      -----  ib. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Our  National  Revenue. 

Ts  our  consumption  equal  to  our  production,  or  how  far  is  there  an 

annual  addition  to  national  income  ?              -  [75] 

A  table  of  our  annual  consumption        -  [77] 

Proportion  of  national  income  exempt  from  taxation     -            -  [78] 

Case  of  Ireland            ------  ib. 

of  France            ------  [79] 

National  capital ;  estimate  of  it  in  1792,  1812, 1822     -            -  [82] 
Public  burdens  in  the  present  year  (1823)  discriminated  into  taxes, 

poor-rate,  and  tithe  -            -             -            -                          -  [85] 

CHAPTER  X. 

Fluctuation*  in  Money. 

Abstract  of  Sir  G.  Shuckburgh's  table'             -            -             -  [85] 
Comparison  by  Arthur  Young,  of  the  prices  of  the  17th  and  18th 

centuries     -------  [86] 

Progressive  prices  of  several  articles  of  manufacture ;  of  horses  and 

cattle           -------  [87] 

General  progression  of  prices  since  the  13th  century  -            -  [88] 

Annual  consumption  of  gold  and  silver  computed         -            -  [89] 

Comparative  rate  of  prices  in  France  and  England      -             -  [90] 

M 'Culloch,  (Mr.  J.  R.)  on  the  price  of  corn  throughout  Europe  [92] 
Expense  of  a  country  labourer's  family,  and  of  one  of  the  middle 

classes         -                          -             -             -            -            -  [93] 

Constituents  of  a  table  of  national  consumption            -            -  [94] 

Farther  remarks  on  a  table  of  consumption      -            -            -  [95] 

The  table  adapted  to  farmers  on  lease  -  [97] 

1    ■ — ■ to  the  lessees  of  mines          -            -            -  ib. 

to  clergymen            ...            -  £983 

Objections  answered  ------  ib. 

Letter  from  a  Hampshire  farmer          -  [99] 

Mr.  Tooke  on  "  high  and  low  prices  since  1792"          -            -  [101] 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Sinking  fund ;  the  supplies  which  constitute  it             -            -  [101] 

The  nominal  sinking  fund        -            -            -            -            -  [102] 

Comparison  of  our  present  burdens  with  those  of  1792              -  [103] 

The  malt  tax  -            -            -            -            -            -            -  [104] 

Price  of  commodities  a  century  ago    -  ib. 

Backward  state  of  France  as  described  by  Mr.  S.  Gray           -  fl05l 


/ 


CHAPTER  I. 

Events  of  the   War  viewed  in   Connexion  with  our  National 
Resources, 

In  appropriating  a  portion  of  our  volume  to  mili- 
tary events,  our  object  is  to  direct  the  reader's  atten- 
tion to  the  effects  produced  by  them  on  our  finances 
and  national  industry: — to  enlarge  on  the  occur- 
rences of  a  campaign  or  on  the  policy  of  cabinets, 
would  be,  in  a  great  measure,  foreign  to  our  purpose. 
In  some  respects,  however,  the  two  departments 
of  inquiry  are  connected,  the  effect  of  our  military 
operations  having  been  repeatedly  felt  by  our  ex- 
chequer, and  requiring  of  course  frequent  notice  in 
the  subsequent  pages.  It  seems  advisable,  conse- 
quently, that  our  reasoning  should  be  preceded  by  a 
brief  sketch  of  the  events  of  the  war ;  an  outline  to 
which  reference  may  be  made  from  the  subsequent 
chapters,  whenever  we  shall  have  occasion  to  allude 
to  the  connexion  between  the  state  of  our  finances 
and  the  aspect  of  a  campaign.  Such  a  narrative, 
however  cursory,  will  necessarily  lead  us  over  beaten 
ground ;  but  we  are  not  without  hopes  of  introducing, 
particularly  in  regard  to  France,  occasional  remarks 
that  are  not  altogether  familiar  to  the  public. 

War  of  1793. — Nothing  would  have  induced  Mr. 
Pitt  to  take  part  in  the  coalition  against  France,  ex- 
cept a  hope  that  the  contest  would  have  been  brought 
to  an  early  conclusion,  and  himself  left  at  liberty  to 
pursue  those  measures  of  finance  which  had  begun  to 
wear  so  promising  an  aspect.  His  apprehension  of 
France  could  be  only  of  apolitical  nature  ;  a  dread  of 
the  example  of  insubordination  gaining  ground-,  and 
of  rank  and  property  becoming  endangered.  In  a 
military  sense,  France  was  far  from  formidable  :  her 

4 


26  War  of  1793. 

army,  in  1792#,  did  not  exceed  the  usual  peace  esta- 
blishment of  130,000  men,  and  its  strength  was  great- 
ly impaired  by  the  emigration  of  its  principal  officers, 
as  well  as  by  the  general  relaxation  attendant  on  a 
continental  peace  of  thirty  years.  Her  navy  having 
occupied  the  attention  of  goverment  during  and  after 
the  American  war,  was  in  a  better  state  than  usual ; 
but  its  efficiency  was  impaired  by  the  general  disor- 
der of  the  country,  and  its  aspect  was  certainly  far 
from  offensive. 

Under  these  circumstances  our  government,  though 
in  intimate  communication  with  the  powers  that  had 
taken  up  arms  against  France,  delayed  for  some  time 
joining  the  coalition.  The  recall  of  our  ambassador 
from  Paris  was  postponed  till  the  insurrections  of 
autumn  1792,  and  the  subversion  of  the  royal  authori- 
ty ;  nor  did  our  prepartions  for  war  commence  till 
towards  the  end  of  the  year.  This  caution  on  our 
part,  and  the  impetuosity  of  the  ruling  faction  in 
France,  caused  the  declaration  of  war  to  proceed  in 
the  first  instance  from  Paris,  and  created  a  general 
belief  in  this  country  that  the  French  were  the  ag- 
gressors. A  speedy  termination  in  favour  of  the  al- 
lied powers  was  promised  as  well  by  general  appear- 
ances as  by  the  early  events  of  the  war,  the  French 
being  soon  repulsed  from  the  Dutch  frontier,  and  some 
time  after  from  the  Netherlands,  while  their  intestine 
divisions  rose  to  a  height  that  threatened  the  downfall 
of  the  republican  system.  A  short  time,  however, 
sufficed  to  show  the  fallacy  of  judging  from  appear- 
ances, and  of  listening  to  representations  so  partial 
as  those  of  the  emigrants.  The  great  majority  of 
the  nation,  without  cherishing  either  personal  hos- 
tility to  the  Bourbons  or  schemes  of  foreign  conquest, 
were  strongly  attached  to  the  Revolution.  They  had 
long  felt  the  want  of  a  representative  assembly,  and 
regarded  themselves  as  checked  in  the  career  of 
honourable  ambition  by  the  preference  shown  to  the 
privileged  classes.     Without  any  distinct  conception 

*  .fomirii  suV  le^grandes  Operations  Militaircs.  Vol.  V. 


War  of  1793.  27 

of  the  checks  requisite  to  good  government,  they  en- 
tertained a  sanguine  hope  that  the  revolution  was 
about  to  prove  a  remedy  for  all  their  grievances. 

In  such  a  state  of  national  feeling,  the  resistance 
to  invasion  would  probably  have  been  equal,  what- 
ever had  been  the  result  of  the  intestine  divisions  of 
France.  Had  the  Jacobin  party  been  kept  under  by 
the  Girondists,  the  strength  of  the  country  would  still 
have  been  called  forth ;  the  property  of  emigrants 
confiscated ;  circulation  given  to  the  assignats,  and 
military  levies  enforced  on  a  large  scale.  It  was  in 
the  autumn  of  1793,  and  in  the  early  part  of  1794,  that 
these  potent  levers  were  made  to  display  all  their  en- 
ergy. They  sent  forth  armies,  which,  without  being 
so  numerous  in  the  field  as  was  generally  imagined, 
were  assured  of  an  ample  supply  of  recruits ;  an  assu- 
rance that  justified  the  new  plan  of  rendering  a  cam- 
paign a  reiteration  of  attacks,  on  the  calculation,  that, 
whether  successful  or  not,  the  country  which  should 
be  able  to  call  the  greatest  numbers  into  the  field, 
would  eventually  triumph.  Such,  with  a  few  qualifica- 
tions, were  the  operations  of  1793  and  1794  :  opera- 
tions in  which  the  national  impetuosity  was  called  into 
full  display ;  but  the  command  being  frequently  plac- 
ed in  unskilful  hands,  the  lives  of  men  were  exposed 
with  unexampled  rashness.  The  result  of  continued 
sacrifices  on  the  one  side,  and  of  feeble  generalship,  of 
deficient  concert,  on  the  other,  was  that,  in  the  early 
part  of  1795,  a  total  change  took  place  in  the  aspect 
of  the  war.  By  that  time,  France  had  acquired  both 
the  Austrian  Netherlands  and  the  Dutch  provinces, 
was  on  the  point  of  concluding  peace  with  Prussia 
and  Spain,  and  reckoned  only  Austria  and  England 
as  her  opponents. 

From  this  time  forward,  we  may  believe  with  con- 
fidence, that  Mr.  Pitt  deeply  regretted  that  France 
had  been  attacked,  and  the  nation  driven  to  exertions 
so  pernicious  to  its  assailants.  He  saw  that  revolu- 
tionary contagion  was  no  longer  to  be  dreaded ;  the 
credulity  of  the  French,  their  absurd  extremes,  their 
repeated  changes,  their  sacrifice  of  one  party  to  the 


28  War  of  1793. 

other,  having  brought  complete  discredit  on  their 
politics.  His  objections  to  peace,  very  different  from 
those  of  1792,  were  now  of  a  military  character: — to 
negotiate  with  France  would  have  been  to  acknow- 
ledge inability  to  resist  her ;  to  leave  the  Netherlands 
in  her  hands,  would  have  been  to  concede  that  against 
which  we  had  contended  for  a  century.  He  deter- 
mined, therefore,  to  continue  the  war,  with  the  aid  of 
Austria;  and  the  exertions  of  France  might  have 
been  equalled,  perhaps  surpassed,  by  the  two  allied 
governments,  had  they  possessed  the  knowledge  they 
afterwards  acquired  ;  had  England  directed  her  chief 
resources  to  continental  warfare,  and  had  the  Aus- 
trians  opened  their  eyes  to  their  errors  in  tactics. 
The  numbers  of  the  French  were  now  less  over- 
whelming than  in  the  time  of  the  assignats ;  but  their 
efficiency  was  greatly  increased,  their  soldiers  had 
become  well  disciplined,  and  a  number  of  intelligent 
officers  had  been  formed.  Their  system  of  reiterated 
attack  was  continued ;  the  national  ardour  was  kept 
in  full  exercise ;  and  to  the  audacity  of  the  first  years 
of  the  revolution  was  added,  under  the  command  of 
such  men  as  Bonaparte,  Moreau,  Kleber,  Hoche,  De- 
saix,  the  advantage  of  scientific  combination.  It  is  to 
superiority  of  generalship  more  than  to  superiority 
of  numbers,  that  we  should  attribute  the  reverses  of 
the  Austrians  in  1796  and  1797,  followed  by  a  peace 
(Campo  Formio)  of  which  the  preliminaries  were 
signed  when  three  armies  were  in  march  to  their 
capital. 

What  in  these  early  years  of  the  war  was  our 
situation  in  regard  to  financial  supplies?  A  state 
of  war  creates  a  sudden  demand  for  money,  by 
superadding  what  may  be  termed  the  mercantile 
operations  of  government  to  those  of  individuals. 
The  call  for  arms,  clothing,  and  military  stores, 
forms  a  new  demand  on  the  manufacturing  industry 
of  the  country,  while  the  drain  of  men  for  the  public 
service,  enhances  both  wages  and  salaries.  On  the 
part  of  individuals,  there  takes  place  a  decrease  in 
certain  branches  of  industry,  a  relinquishment  of  un- 


War  of  1793.  29 

dertakings  which  can  be  carried  on  only  by  cheap 
labour,  or  a  low  interest  of  money ;  but  the  diminu- 
tion, in  one  sense,  is  by  no  means  proportioned  to 
the  increase  in  the  other.  Hence,  a  rise  in  the  rate 
of  interest,  and  a  difficulty  in  borrowing,  even  at  an 
advanced  premium.  Of  such  difficulties,  and  of  the 
expedients  adopted  to  meet  them,  we  have  had  re- 
peated examples,  in  our  history,  during  the  last  cen- 
tury and  a  half.  It  was  in  the  reign  of  king  William 
that  England  first  took  a  part  in  continental  war,  on 
a  scale  of  great  and  continued  expense ;  and  that 
reign  was  accordingly  the  era  of  the  imposition  of 
the  land-tax,  of  the  establishment  of  the  bank  of  Eng- 
land, and  of  the  first  currency  of  its  paper. 

It  unfortunately  happened  that  the  demand  for 
money  in  the  early  years  of  the  wars  of  the  present 
age,  was  coincident  with  unfavourable  seasons,  our 
crops,  both  in  1794  and  1795,  being  insufficient  for  our 
consumption.  Hence,  a  necessity  to  export  coin  for 
the  purchase  of  subsistence,  as  well  as  for  military 
purposes;  and  hence  those  embarrassments  so  se- 
verely felt  in  the  mercantile  world  during  1793,  4. 
5,  6,  and  from  which  we  were  not  effectually  relieved 
until  1797,  when  there  occurred  both  a  diminution  of 
our  continental  expenditure,  and  a  general  accept- 
ance, at  home,  of  bank  paper  for  coin. 

At  this  time,  England  stood  alone  in  the  conflict, 
and  the  state  of  our  finances  was  far  from  satisfactory; 
but  our  navy  had  in  the  course  of  the  year  (1797) 
achieved  a  double  triumph,  and  the  war  becoming 
strictly  maritime,  our  attitude,  like  that  of  France 
in  1794,  showed  all  the  advantage  possessed  by  a 
nation,  when  combining  its  resources  on  its  proper 
element.  The  confidence  thus  inspired,  and  the  spirit 
roused  by  the  extravagant  ambition  of  the  French  go- 
vernment, enabled  Mr.  Pitt  to  meet  our  pecuniary 
difficulties,  by  a  recourse  to  the  plan  which  we  shall 
develope  presently,  that  of  raising  supplies  within 
the  year ;  a  plan  to  which,  still  more  than  to  the  sub- 
stitution of  paper  for  coin,  was  owing  to  the  surpris- 
ing increase  that  took  place  in  our  financial  receipts. 


30  War  of  1793. 

The  year  1798  will  long  be  remembered  by  those 
who  distinguish  particular  epochs  in  a  great  contest, 
as  one  of  favourable  commerce,  of  improved  ex- 
changes, of  an  abundant  harvest,  and  of  relief  from 
the  dread  of  invasion.  The  French,  discouraged  by 
our  naval  array,  and  by  the  failure  of  their  expedition 
against  Ireland,  made  a  tacit  acknowledgment  of  the 
hopelessness  of  an  attack  on  England,  by  directing 
their  disposable  force  to  Egypt.  The  absence  of 
this  army,  and  our  victory  at  Aboukir,  revived  the 
hopes  of  the  Austrians,  who  regarded  the  existing 
peace  as  a  truce,  and  who  have,  throughout  the 
present  age,  shown  themselves  so  prompt  to  second 
our  efforts,  and  to  take  up  arms  against  France. 

The  year  1799. — We  come  now  to  what  is  termed 
the  third  coalition,  or  the  third  time  that  the  allied 
powers  commenced  operations  by  land  in  the  hope 
of  either  changing  the  French  government,  or  reco- 
vering a  portion  of  lost  territory.     In  adverting  to 
these  remarkable  eras  in  the  contest,  it  is  fit  to  recol- 
lect that  the  aggressions  were  not  on  the  part  of 
France,  and  that,  with  the  exception  of  1792,  Eng- 
land was  the  author  and  main-spring  of  every  suc- 
cessive coalition.     Had  this  been  openly  avowed,  it 
is  probable,  that  in  those  days  of  alarm  the  majority 
of  the  public  would  have  approved  of  an  offensive 
system  of  war ;  but  it  is  the  well  known  rule  of  cabi- 
nets, and,  of  course,  of  their  supporters,  whether  in 
parliament  or  connected  with  the  press,  to  avoid  such 
admissions,  and  to  throw,  as  much  as  possible,  the 
odium  of  attack  on  the  enemy.     At  present,  such  re- 
serve is  needless ;  the  question  is  to  be  viewed  his- 
torically, and  the  point  is  merely,  whether  there  ex- 
isted, on  the  ground  of  justice  and  policy,  sufficient 
reasons  for  calling  the  continent  to  arms,  and  for  en- 
countering the  hazards  of  a  conflict  by  land  ?   As 
usual  in  such  discussions,  we  shall  find  much  to  ad- 
vance on  either  side.     The  dread  of  revolutionary 
infection  had  by  this  time  disappeared ;  the  French 
themselves  had  suffered  cruelly  from  their  experi- 


War  of  1793.  31 

ments  in  government,  having  felt  all  the  instability, 
all  the  division  and  party  violence  attached  to  the 
republican  form.  But  while  the  majority  of  our 
countrymen  had  dismissed  the  apprehension  of  poli- 
tical contagion,  they  had,  in  a  military  view,  urgent 
motives  for  hazarding  an  appeal  to  arms ;  they  enter- 
tained the  hope,  that,  with  the  co-operation  of  Aus- 
tria and  Russia,  we  should  succeed  in  expelling  the 
French  from  Italy,  and  in  recovering  the  Netherlands. 

These  hopes,  whether  on  the  whole  justified  or 
not,  received  confirmation  from  the  events  of  the  first 
part  of  the  campaign  of  1799  :  the  Austrians  took  the 
field  with  augmented  numbers  and  an  improved  sys- 
tem ;  the  repulse  of  the  French  in  every  direction, 
in  Germany,  as  in  Italy,  proved  the  danger  of  neg- 
lecting their  military  establishment,  and  of  the  prac- 
tice which  had  begun  to  show  itself  for  the  first  time 
since  the  revolution,  of  appointing  generals  by  favour. 
But  in  the  autumn  of  the  year  new  levies  took  the 
field,  and  abler  chiefs  commanded ;  the  war  changed 
its  aspect ;  a  few  months  produced  the  defection  of 
the  fickle  cabinet  of  Russia  from  the  coalition,  and 
consolidated  the  executive  power  of  France  in  the 
hands  of  Bonaparte.  The  campaign  of  1800,  though 
opened  by  the  Austrians  with  confidence,  soon  showed 
their  inability  to  contend  with  their  antagonists ;  and 
on  the  conclusion  of  the  second  continental  peace, 
(Luneville,)  England  was  once  more  left  alone  in  the 
conflict. 

Few  periods  of  the  war  presented  a  more  gloomy 
combination  of  circumstances  than  the  early  part  of 
1801. — Austria  humbled,  Russia  hostile,  Denmark 
and  Sweden  following  her  example,  and  reviving  the 
menace  of  the  armed  neutrality ;  while  at  home  a 
double  failure  of  harvest  had  produced  a  scarcity  and 
rise  of  prices,  which,  in  some  parts  of  the  country,  re- 
sembled the  privations  of  our  ancestors  in  the  latter 
years  of  Elizabeth,  or  the  sufferings  of  France  after 
the  dreadful  winter  of  1709.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
value  of  our  paper  currency  was  but  slightly  affected, 
our  navy  possessed  the  undisputed  command  of  the 


32  Our  Situation  at  the  Peace  of  Amiens. 

sea,  while  our  army  had  improved  equally  in  strength 
and  numbers:  hence,  the  success  of  our  attack  on 
Copenhagen,  and  our  brilliant  exploits  in  Egypt.  Still 
the  expediency  of  peace  was  apparent ;  our  financial 
resources  had  been  stretched  to  the  utmost;  there 
remained  no  definite  object  of  warfare,  and  no  co- 
operation could  be  expected  from  the  continent. — 
These  considerations  were  felt  by  our  leading  mini- 
sters ;  and,  in  concurrence  with  an  apprehended  di- 
vision in  the  cabinet,  or  a  sense  that  the  same  ministry 
could  not  suitably  negotiate  with  a  government  so 
long  the  object  of  its  invective,  led  to  that  retirement 
of  Mr.  Pitt  from  office,  which  many  persons  still  good- 
naturedly  ascribe  to  his  difference  with  the  king  on 
the  Catholic  question. 

Thus  ended  the  first  great  contest  of  our  age,  a  con- 
test, of  which  the  most  remarkable  feature  was,  its 
placing  the  two  leading  powers  successively  in  oppo- 
sition to  a  confederacy,  and  baffling,  in  the  case  of 
each,  the  confident  calculation  of  politicians.  France, 
in  1793,  could  not,  in  the  opinion  of  these  persons, 
avoid  sinking  under  the  coalition;  England,  when 
left  alone,  in  1797,  had,  in  their  view,  no  alternative 
but  a  speedy  peace.  They  were  more  correct  in  as- 
serting that  no  war  had  afforded  an  example  of  such 
sacrifices ;  of  men  on  the  part  of  France,  of  money 
on  the  part  of  England.  The  losses  of  each  seemed 
of  a  nature  to  produce  exhaustion,  yet  each  conti- 
nued capable  of  prolonging  or  renewing  the  conflict. 
Each  had  obtained  brilliant  success,  and  added 
largely  to  its  territorial  possessions ;  but  the  acqui- 
sitions of  France,  at  least  in  the  Netherlands,  were 
more  compact,  and  more  calculated  to  add  strength 
to  the  state,  than  our  dazzling  but  insecure  conquests 
in  the  East  and  West  Indies. 

Our  Situation  at  the  Peace  of  Amiens. — What,  it  may 
be  asked,  were  the  chief  differences,  in  our  condition 
at  the  peace  of  1802  and  that  of  1814  ?  The  financial 
and  commercial  evils  that  have  since  pressed  so  hea- 
vily on  us,  existed  in  1 802.  but  in  a  very  mitigated 


Our  Situation  at  the  Peace  of  Amiens.  33 

ibrm.  The  interest  of  our  public  debt,  (£]  8,000,000,) 
was  great,  but  not  enormous ;  our  total  expenditure, 
had  peace  been  confirmed,  would  not  have  much  ex- 
ceeded £30,000,000  a  year.  The  value  of  our  cur- 
rency, though  shaken  at  a  particular  period,  (1800 
and  1801,)  had  been  reinstated  without  much  injury 
to  the  public;  and  our  customers  on  the  opposite 
shore  of  the  Atlantic,  though  affected  by  the  transition 
of  Europe  from  war  to  peace,  were  by  no  means  so 
disabled  from  paying  for  our  exports  as  at  the  peace 
of  1814.  Still  our  agriculturists  felt  the  sudden 
change  from  high  to  low  prices ;  our  merchants  were 
embarrassed  by  the  surrender  of  the  conquered  colo- 
nies, and  had  the  reduction  of  our  military  establish- 
ment been  permanent,  we  should  have  experienced, 
in  1 802,  no  small  share  of  the  embarrassment  of  late 
years :  it  would  have  been  similar  at  least  to  that  so 
faithfully  described  by  Sir  W.  Temple,  as  affecting 
the  productive  industry  of  Holland,  after  the  peace 
of  1648. 

These  complaints,  however,  had  hardly  assumed 
consistency,  when  the  public  were  roused  to  new 
alarms :  in  France,  a  ruler  whom  no  power  could 
satisfy ;  in  England,  a  ministry  who  followed,  instead 
of  leading  the  public  voice,  were  respectively  the 
authors  of  an  abrupt  renewal  of  war.  Seldom  has  an 
appeal  to  arms  been  made  with  less  of  a  direct  motive 
or  definite  object :  Malta  was  too  insignificant  to  form 
a  ground  of  war ;  the  real  cause  was  of  a  general  na- 
ture, and  to  be  sought  in  the  encroachments  of  Bo- 
naparte during  the  interval  of  peace,  in  the  resent- 
ment roused  by  his  aggression  on  Switzerland,  and 
the  obstacles  opposed  to  our  trade  with  France.  Our 
ministers  could  not  consider  the  moment  favourable 
for  attempting  to  recover  the  independence  of  the 
continent;  they  acted  in  concert  with  none  of  the 
great  powers,  and  the  experience  of  the  past  was 
altogether  adverse  to  hopes  founded  on  a  coalition. 
They  knew,  however,  that  our  financial  resources 
were  lara;e,  that  the  chances  of  a  naval  contest  were 


34  WarofmrX 

in  our  favour,  and  that  we  should  in  any  event  prevent 
the  increase  of  the  enemy's  marine. 

War  of  1803. — During  two  years  the  contest  was 
strictly  maritime,  and  the  demand  on  our  circulating 
medium,  for  subsidies  or  the  purchase  of  corn,  being 
slight,  our  paper  currency  maintained  its  credit. 
The  public  attention  was  closely  fixed  on  the  project 
or  pretended  project  of  invasion.  But  in  1805,  the 
growing  discontent  of  the  Russian  cabinet  with  Bona- 
parte, and  the  well-known  hostility  of  Austria,  in- 
duced our  government  to  form  a  new  coalition.  Our 
allies  began  the  war  with  sanguine  hopes,  but  found 
it  vain  to  attack  a  great  military  state,  conducted  by 
a  single  head.  The  result  would  have  been  alarming 
even  to  this  country,  had  it  not,  by  a  remarkable 
counterpoise  of  fortune,  been  coincident  with  a  na- 
val victory,  which  fairly  put  at  rest  the  question  of 
invasion. 

It  was  under  these  circumstances  of  alternate  dis- 
appointment and  success,  that  Mr.  Fox  began  at  Paris 
the  negotiation  of  1806,  a  measure  by  no  means 
sanctioned  by  the  majority  of  our  countrymen.  The 
offers  of  Bonaparte,  towards  the  close  of  the  confer- 
ences, would  perhaps  have  been  satisfactory  on  the 
score  of  territorial  cession,  had  they  not,  when  view- 
ed in  concurrence  with  his  other  projects,  appeared 
to  our  ministers  little  else  than  a  link  in  the  chain  of 
aggression ;  an  expedient  to  procure  not  a  peace,  but 
a  truce. 

War  was  accordingly  renewed,  and  by  land,  vic- 
tory continued  faithful  to  France :  the  events  of  the 
campaigns  of  1806  and  1807,  were  subversive  of  the 
remaining  independence  of  Germany,  and  by  giving 
France  the  co-operation  of  Russia,  seemed  to  leave 
her  without  a  rival  on  the  continent  Under  these 
circumstances,  our  only  safety  lay  in  our  naval  supe- 
riority, and  the  war  was  proceeding  without  any  de- 
finite prospect  or  favourable  opening,  when  Bonaparte 
committed  his  first  great  political  error.  Hitherto, 
in  his  successes,  he  had  shown  more  moderation,  at 


War  of  1805.  35 

least  apparent  moderation,  than  might  have  been 
expected  from  one  so  little  advanced  in  years,  and 
so  confident  in  his  general  calculations.  He  now. 
however,  forgot  the  dictates  of  caution,  turned  his 
aggression  to  an  unoffending  quarter,  and  by  his 
manner  of  inveigling  the  royal  family  of  Spain,  excited 
not  only  the  indignation  of  foreigners,  but  general 
surprise  and  dissatisfaction  among  the  French,  who 
were  heartily  sick  of  war,  and  coveted  no  possessions 
beyond  the  Pyrenees  or  the  Alps.  It  is  a  truth,  by 
no  means  sufficiently  understood  in  this  country,  that 
the  French  people  at  no  time  participated  in  the  rest- 
less ambition  of  their  ruler :  their  views  in  regard  to 
territory  were  limited  to  the  Belgic  provinces,  and 
those  they  desired  not  on  political  grounds,  not  from 
a  wish  to  overawe  Holland  or  threaten  Germany,  but 
from  considerations  chiefly  commercial,  from  simi- 
larity of  language  and  habits,  vicinity  of  position, 
and  the  non-existence  of  physical  barriers.  So  far 
from  being  animated  by  that  eagerness  for  war  which 
so  many  on  our  side  of  the  channel  ascribe  to  them, 
the  French  regarded  themselves  as  the  greatest  suf- 
ferers by  the  sanguinary  contest,  and  were  taught  to 
ascribe  its  prolongation  to  the  ambitious  views  of  our 
cabinet. 

The  war  in  Spain,  varied  as  was  its  success  during 
several  years,  proved  the  first  great  scene  on  which 
the  hitherto  victorious  armies  of  France  were  effec- 
tually resisted.  That  power  of  combination,  that  skill 
in  generalship,  which,  in  the  present  age,  has  been 
so  little  conspicuous  in  the  military  opponents  of 
France,  which,  in  the  long  struggle  of  the  Austrians, 
was  remarked  in  only  two  campaigns,  (1795  and 
1799,)  was  here  called  into  action,  and  directed 
against  the  enemy  both  the  discipline  of  the  British ,. 
and  the  national  antipathy  of  the  Spaniards.  This 
war  was  remarkable  as  the  first  in  which  Bonaparte 
did  not,  on  the  appearance  of  serious  resistance,  for- 
sake his  capitol,  and  bring  the  contest  to  a  decisive 
issue.  In  1810,  the  humiliation  of  Austria  and  Prussia 
left  him  at  iibertv  to  recross  the  Pyrenees ;  bu<  to  the 


36  War  o/1803. 

surprise  of  France,  as  of  the  continent  in  general,  he 
allowed  his  army  to  remain  long  in  an  indecisive  posi- 
tion before  our  lines  at  Torres  Vedras,  and  eventu- 
ally to  retreat. 

This  signal  repulse  was  followed  by  symptoms  of 
resistance  in  a  new  quarter.  Russia,  alarmed  for  her 
independence,  and  taught,  by  the  success  of  our 
Portuguese  campaign,  the  means  of  baffling  by  defen- 
sive operations,  an  enemy  hitherto  accounted  irre- 
sistible, no  longer  concealed  her  hostility  to  France. 
Bonaparte  passed  a  year  in  forming  his  gigantic  plan 
of  invasion :  it  failed,  as  is  well  known,  less  from 
direct  opposition  than  from  physical  causes ;  and  that 
over-confidence  on  his  part,  which  we  trace  on  so 
many  occasions,  and  at  such  different  periods  of  his 
career — at  Arcole,  at  Acre,  at  Aspern,  and  finally, 
at  Waterloo. 

The  loss  of  the  Russian  campaign  and  of  the  flower 
of  the  army,  however  disastrous  in  a  military  sense, 
did  not  give  so  great  a  shock  as  the  public  in  Eng- 
land anticipated  to  the  power  of  Bonaparte  in  the 
interior  of  France.  The  nation  was  in  affliction  at 
the  extent  of  the  bloodshed ;  but  this  feeling  was 
overborne,  at  least  in  the  middle  classes,  by  the 
dread  of  a  counter-revolution,  and  the  return  of  the 
old  abuses — the  privileges  of  the  noblesse,  the  ascen- 
dancy of  the  clergy.  During  1813,  the  general  wish 
was,  not  for  a  change  of  dynasty,  but  for  a  change  of 
system  under  the  existing  ruler.  No  insurrection 
took  place,  no  resistance  was  made,  or  even  attempt- 
ed, to  the  enormous  levies  of  men  and  money,  during 
that  year ;  nor  was  it  till  renewed  disasters,  and  the 
loss  of  all  Germany,  that  the  public  began  to  contem- 
plate the  possibility  of  the  return  of  the  Bourbons. 
Even  in  1814,  the  operations  continued  without  any 
rising  in  favour  of  that  family,  or  any  defection  of  the 
military  from  their  leader,  till  after  the  surrender  of 
Paris,  the  possession  of  which  has,  throughout  the 
whole  of  the  French  revolution,  enabled  one  party  to 
give  law  to  another. 

This  unconsciousness  of  the  real  character  of  Bo- 


War  of  1803.  37 

naparte,  this  credulity  in  hoping  a  pacific  system  from 
one  so  long  accustomed  to  war  and  usurpation,  must 
appear  not  a  little  singular  to  the  untravelled  part  of 
our  countrymen.  But  those  among  them  who  visited 
France  in  1814,  had  ample  opportunity  of  observing 
that  the  name  of  the  late  ruler  was  seldom  mentioned 
with  reprobation,  and  that  when,  from  the  decided 
royalists,  they  happened  to  hear  language  to  that  ef- 
fect, it  was  unaccompanied  by  any  knowledge  of  the 
secret  springs  of  his  policy,  or,  indeed,  by  any  attempt 
to  develope  his  character. 

This  was,  in  fact,  a  task  too  complicated  for  the 
reasoning  habits  of  our  southern  neighbours;  they 
knew  and  lamented  his  propensity  to  war ;  but  his  di- 
plomatic art,  his  Machiavelian  policy,  surpassed  their 
analysing  powers,  unaided  as  they  were  by  the  light 
of  a  free  press.  Nor  was  it  until  his  sudden  return  from 
Elba,  when  the  peace  so  long  desired  and  so  recently 
obtained,  was  wrested  from  them,  that  the  French  (we 
speak  here  not  of  the  military  nor  of  the  party  lea- 
ders, but  of  the  bulk  of  the  nation,)  gave  a  loose  to 
resentment,  and  connected  with  his  name  that  charge 
of  faithlessness,  that  suspicion  of  criminality  which 
we,  during  so  many  years,  had  accounted  insepara- 
ble from  it. 

The  reverses  of  the  French  arms  occurred  most 
opportunely  for  our  finances,  as  shall  be  shown 
when  we  treat  of  the  depreciation  of  our  currency ; 
but  before  proceeding  to  that,  the  proper  object  of 
our  research,  we  shall  bestow  a  few  sentences  on  the 
eventful  character  of  the  military  history  of  the  pe- 
riod. 

Alternations  of  success. — No  contest  was  ever  marked 
by  greater  variety  of  fortune,  or  more  chequered  by 
vicissitudes,  the  effect  of  which  was,  at  one  time,  to 
check  sanguine  expectation,  at  another  to  prevent  des- 
pair. The  Netherlands  recovered  in  1793,  were 
again  lost  in  1794;  the  successes  of  the  Austrians  in 
1795  were  more  than  balanced  by  their  disasters  in 
the  two  following  years.     In  1 799  the  revived  strength 


38  War  of  1803. 

of  that  power,  and  the  co-operation  of  Russia,  led  to 
a  brilliant  campaign,  producing  the  recovery  of  Italy, 
and  inflicting  severe  losses  on  the  French ;  but  for- 
tune once  more  forsook  the  allies,  and  obliged  them 
to  conclude  at  Luneville  a  treaty  on  conditions  which 
left  France  the  leading  power  on  the  continent. 

In  our  second   appeal  to  arms,  our  hopes  were 
raised  in  1805  by  the  co-operation  of  the  great  con- 
tinental powers ;  these  hopes  were  blasted  at  Ulm 
and  Austerlitz,  but  despondency  was  prevented  by 
our  victory  at  Trafalgar.     Next  year,  the  fatal  day 
of  Jena,  and  the  conquest,  rapid  beyond  example, 
of  the  Prussian  dominions,  would  have  excited  great 
alarm,  had  not  our  courage  been  sustained  by  a  suc- 
cessful resistance  at  Eylau,  and  by  a  confident  esti- 
mate of  the  power  of  Russia.     These  favourable  ex- 
pectations were  shaken  by  the  events  of  the  cam- 
paign, the  treaty  of  Tilsit,  and  more  than  all,  by  the 
increasing  connexion  and  community  of  purpose  be- 
tween the  French  and  Russian  cabinets.     The  close 
of  1 807  was  consequently  a  period  of  gloom ;  for  the 
capture  of  the  Danish  navy,  and  the  issuing  of  our 
Orders  in  Council,  could  afford  satisfaction  to  those 
only  who  were  incapable  of  appreciating  the  odium 
inspired  by  the  one,  and  the  disastrous  effects  likely 
to  result  from  the  other. 

A  more  substantial  ground  of  hope  was  afforded  in 
the  ensuing  year  by  the  attack  on  Spain,  the  general 
resistance  which  it  provoked,  the  still  more  general 
hatred  which  it  roused.  The  repulse  of  the  French 
from  the  southern  and  central  parts  of  Spain,  and  the 
success  of  our  troops  at  Vimeira,  the  first  general  ac- 
tion on  land  that  we  had  fought  during  the  war,  con- 
firmed these  flattering  impressions;  but  they  were 
unfortunately  clouded  by  the  repeated  defeats  of  the 
Spaniards  in  the  winter,  and  the  retreat  of  our  army 
to  Corunna.  Next  year  opened  with  the  arming  of 
Austria,  and  with  some  successful  operations  in  the 
Peninsula,  but  the  battles  of  Eckmuhl  and  Wagram, 
the  failure  of  our  Antwerp  expedition,  the  second 
retreat  of  our  army  from  Spain,  cast  a  gloom  over  the 


War  of  J  803.  39 

aspect  of  affairs,  which  continued  during  the  whole 
of  1810. 

At  that  time  the  contest  presented  no  expectation 
of  a  favourable  issue;  the  Spaniards  were  inefficient 
and  divided ;  the  northern  courts,  if  not  unfriendly, 
were  unable  to  hazard  co-operation  with  us ;  and  our 
bank  paper,  after  having  during  the  preceding  seven 
years  maintained  its  value  with  almost  all  the  stability 
of  a  regular  currency,  now  gave  way  before  the  triple 
pressure  of  corn  imports,  foreign  subsidies,  and  a  sus- 
pension of  our  accustomed  receipts  from  the  Conti- 
nent of  Europe  on  account  of  American  merchants. 
Our  exports  to  the  United  States  had  been,  for  the 
most  part,  paid  by  remittances  in  money  from  the 
Continent  of  Europe,  and  would,  had  we  allowed 
their  navigation  to  continue,  have  formed  a  fund  ca- 
pable, in  a  great  measure,  of  balancing  our  demands, 
whether  for  military  expenditure  in  the  south  of  Eu- 
rope, or  for  the  purchases  of  corn  in  the  north.     But 
this  truth  was  unfortunately  unknown  to  the  public, 
and  imperfectly  felt  by  ministers.     We  persevered  in 
stopping  the  American  trade,  and  thus  deprived  our- 
selves of  a  powerful  counterpoise  to  the  irregularity 
of  our  circulating  medium.     Our  situation  thus  be- 
came replete  with  anxiety :  from  invasion  we  were 
secured  by  our  fleet,  but  we  dreaded  to  make  peace, 
lest  an  interval,  turned  assiduously  to  account  by  our 
artful  enemy,  might  shake  even  this  last  stay  of  our 
independence.     On  other  grounds  also,  peace  seemed 
unadvisable,  for  by  this  time  Bonaparte  had  incorpo- 
rated a  farther  part  of  Germany  with  France,  and 
shown  himself  equally  blind  to  the  lesson  given  by 
the  resistance  of  Spain,  and  to  the  hazard  of  alarm- 
ing Russia. 

It  was  under  these  disquieting  circumstances  that 
we  passed  the  latter  months  of  1810  and  the  begin- 
ning of  1811.  The  necessity  of  abandoning  the  Pe- 
ninsula was  declared  by  many,  and  silently  anticipa- 
ted by  more,  when  the  scene  was  unexpectedly 
changed  by  the  retreat  of  the  French  army  from  Por- 
tugal, and  by  conflicts,  which,  if  not  altogether  deci- 


40  War  of  1803. 

sive  in  our  favour,  were  indicative  of  great  improve- 
ment in  our  army.     An  intimation  of  a  growing  hos- 
tility on  the  part  of  Russia  to  France,  now  raised 
hopes  of  a  higher  kind — hopes  which,  after  an  inter- 
val, were  confirmed  by  the  memorable  campaign  of 
1812.     Still  the  period  of  vicissitude  was  not  passed ; 
the  expectation  excited  by  the  advance  of  the  Rus- 
sians, and  the  zeal  of  their  Prussian  allies,  were  dis- 
appointed at  Lutzen,  Bautzen,  and  Hamburgh ;  while 
our  bank  paper  had  fallen  above  20  per  cent.,  a  fall 
involving  the  certainty  of  a  loss  to  that  amount  on  all 
the  contributions  we  might  make  to  the  cause  of  the 
Continent,  whether  in  Spain  or  Germany.     It  was. 
however,  no  time  to  pause ;  circumstances  had  pro- 
duced an  opportunity,  such  as  had  not  occurred  dur- 
ing the  whole  war,  of  restoring  the  equilibrium  of 
the  Continent :  Austria  had  joined  the  alliance,  and 
the  inefficiency  of  the  French  levies  was  shown  in 
their   actions  with   the  Prussians  in   Silesia.      Ger- 
many was  now  delivered,  and  the  French  territory 
invaded,  yet  even  then  there  occurred  an  interval  of 
suspended  hope ;  the  imprudence  of  Rlucher,  and  the 
prompt  decision  of  Bonaparte,  led  to  a  check  and 
partial  retreat,  which,  to  the  public,  assumed  a  se- 
rious aspect,  when  viewed  in  connexion  with  a  ne- 
gotiation at  Chatillon ;  but  the  apprehension  inspired 
by  that  real  or  ostensible  negotiation,  was  soon  dis- 
pelled by  the  evident  superiority  of  the  allies,  and 
by  the  result  of  a  movement,  remarkable  as  indica- 
tive of  the  over-confident  calculation  of  Bonaparte 
even  under  disaster ;  we  mean  his  march  to  gain  the 
rear,  and  cut  off  the  retreat  of  his  enemies — a  ma- 
noeuvre that  might  have  been  followed  by  success  if 
at  the  head  of  such  armies  as  he  commanded  at  Ulm 
and  Jena,  but  which,  with  the  feeble  means  at  his 
disposal  in  1814,  served  only  to  embolden  his  oppo- 
nents, and  accelerate  the  loss  of  his  capital. 


41 


CHAP.  II. 

Magnitude  of  our  Expenditure.      The  Sources  of  our 
Financial  Supplies. 

After  this  brief  sketch  of  military  events,  we  pro? 
eeedto  the  proper  object  of  our  inquiry,  the  expense 
incurred  by  the  war,  the  resources  by  which  it  was 
supported,  and  the  cause  of  our  financial  embarrass- 
ments since  the  peace.  In  this  we  are  aware  that  we 
venture  on  difficult  ground,  and  attempt  a  question  of 
more  than  usual  complexity.  War,  accounted  in  for- 
mer days  a  season  of  embarrassment  and  poverty,  as- 
sumed in  the  present  age  the  appearance  of  a  period 
of  prosperity.  It  closed,  indeed,  with  a  great  addition 
to  our  permanent  burdens,  but  with  an  increase  of 
national  income,  which  seemed  fully  to  counterbal- 
ance it,  and  to  confine  our  loss  to  that  of  our  brave 
countrymen  who  had  fallen  in  the  struggle.  Peace, 
we  thought,  was  about  to  bring  a  consolidation  of  the 
advantages  earned  in  battle  and  sanctioned  by  treaty, 
but  the  result  has  been  widely  different :  every  suc- 
ceeding year  has  discovered  some  financial  difficulty, 
some  fresh  defalcation  in  our  national  resources. — 
The  causes  have  as  yet  been  by  no  means  satisfacto- 
rily explained,  either  in  or  out  of  Parliament,  and 
the  contradiction  between  what  was  expected,  and 
what  has  actually  taken  place,  implies  the  prevalence 
of  much  popular  error,  as  well  as  the  necessity  of  an 
attentive  and  anxiously-balanced  inquiry. 

This  inquiry  we  may  hope  to  divest,  in  some  mea- 
sure, of  its  complexity,  by  proceeding  step  by  step, 
and  dividing  our  subject  into  separate  heads.  The 
first  point  is  to  form  a  distinct  idea  of  our  war  ex- 
penses, as  well  the  annual  charge  as  the  aggregate  for 
the  whole  contest ;  a  calculation  as  yet  familiar  to 
few  persons  on  account  of  the  magnitude  of  the  sums. 

6 


42  Magnitude  of  our  Expenditure. 

the  detached  manner  in  which  they  are  generally 
brought  before  the  public,  and  the  complexity  of  our 
finance  accounts,  which  have  hitherto  presented,  in 
the  sinking  fund,  an  apparent  surplus,  and,  under  the 
head  of  supply,  an  apparent  deficiency. 

In  the  early  years  of  this  memorable  contest,  minis- 
ters were  almost  as  little  aware  as  the  public  of  the 
extent  to  which  the  national  contributions  could  be 
carried,  and  the  increase  of  our  expenditure  was, 
consequently,  gradual.  Taking  the  total  money  raised 
by  loans  and  taxes,  but  deducting  from  it  18,000,000/. 
annually,  as  the  probable  expenditure  of  Great  Bri- 
tain and  Ireland,  had  peace  been  preserved,  we  find 

the  following  result : — 

( 

Sums  annually  raised  for  the  War  of  1 793. 


1793 

£  4,000,000 

1798 

£29,000,000 

1794 

10,000,000 

1799 

36,000,000 

1795 

18,000,000 

1800 

36,000,000 

1796 

26,000,000 

1801 

45,000,000 

1797 

35,000,000 

1802 

44,000,000 

These  sums  are  properly  the  amount  raised,  not 
the  amount  expended  in  each  year :  still  they  convey 
a  fair  idea  of  the  annual  cost  of  the  war.  Their  great 
increase,  in  the  latter  years,  was  owing  to  several 
causes ;  the  augmentation  of  our  establishments,  the 
depreciation  of  money,  and  consequent  rise  of  pay, 
stores,  &c. ;  and  finally,  to  the  accumulation  of  inte- 
rest on  the  expenditure  of  all  the  preceding  years. 

Such  was  the  war  of  1793,  a  war  exhibiting  an  ave- 
rage expenditure  of  27,000,000/.,  which,  though  nearly 
double  that  of  any  preceding  contest,  was  destined 
to  be  surpassed  both  soon  and  in  a  very  great  de- 
gree. 

Sums  raised  by  loans  and  taxes  for  the  war  of  1803,  after  deducting  the 
portion  appropriated  to  Ireland,  and  allowing  22,000,000/.  as  the  total  of 
our  probable  expenditure,  had  peace  been  preserved  in  1793. 

1803  -  -  ...  £29,000,000 

1804  -  -  -  -      -  40,000,000 

1805  -  -  ...  52,000,000 

1806  -  -  ...  50,000,000 

1807  -  -  -  *  56,000,000 


Magnitude  of  our  Expenditure.  43 

1808  -  -  ...  57,000,000 

1809  (War  in  Spain)    -  -  -  -  61,000,000 

18 10  (Ditto)-  ....  62,000,000 

1811  (Ditto)  .....  66,000,000 

1812  (War  in  Spain  and  Russia)  -  -  80,000,000 

1813  (Warm  Spain  and  Germany)         -  -  98,000,000 

1814  (War  in  the  French  territory)       -  -  89,000,000 

1815  -  -  -  -  -  86,000,000 

Here  also  the  increase  was  progressive;  so  ne- 
cessary was  it,  even  in  our  day  of  enthusiasm,  to 
wait  until  the  machine  of  circulation  became  adapted 
to  this  new  impulse.  At  last,  our  expenditure  reach- 
ed a  sum  unexampled  in  the  history  of  any  country, 
ancient  or  modern.  It  is  fit,  however,  to  keep  in 
mind  two  very  material  qualifications ;  first,  that  the 
sums  in  the  latter  years  are  greatly  swelled  by  the 
accumulation  of  interest  on  the  previous  expendi- 
ture; next,  that  after  1810,  a  large  sum,  fully  20  per 
cent,  on  our  foreign  disburse,  is  to  be  put  to  the  ac- 
count of  the  depreciation  of  our  bank  paper.  With 
these  deductions,  the  expense  of  the  unparalleled 
year  of  1813  may  be  stated  at  70,000,000/.,  and  the 
other  years  reduced  in  a  corresponding  proportion. 
But  after  every  subtraction,  the  amount  of  our  expen- 
diture was  surprising :  for  the  whole  contest  it  may 
be  thus  stated. 

Total  money  raised  in  Great  Britain  by  loans  and 
taxes,  during  the  23  years  that  elapsed,  between  the 
beginning  of  1793  and  that  of  1816;  (see  Appendix;) 
about  ......  £1,564,000,000 

Deduct  for  the  amount  of  our  peace  establishment  and 
charges  unconnected  with  the  war,  a  sum,  which,  from 
the  increase  of  our  population  and  the  necessity  of  en- 
forcing the  collection  of  the  revenue  in  Ireland,  we 
reckon  at  somewhat  more  than  the  average  expenditure 
of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  previous  to  1793;  making 
(see  Appendix)  an  amount  of  about        ...      £464,000,000 

Remainder,  constituting  the  charge  of  the  war,  £1,100,000,000 

The  next  question  is,  in  what  manner  did  govern- 
ment find  it  practicable  to  raise  these  unexampled 
sums  ?     Loans,  the  great  resource  in  former  wars. 


14 


Magnitude  of  our  Expenditure. 


were  resorted  to  during  the  early  years  of  the  con- 
test; thus — 

Money  raised  by  Loans. 

1794  -    £11,000,000  1796    -    £25,500,000 

1795  -     18,000,000  1797    -     32,500,000 

The  last  of  these  sums  being  great  beyond  exam- 
ple in  the  history  of  our  loans,  had  the  effect  of 
lowering  stocks  in  an  alarming  degree,  reducing  the 
3  per  cents,  in  1797,  below  48.*  Mr.  Pitt  now  felt 
the  necessity  of  altering  his  plan  of  finance,  and  was 
led,  as  well  by  his  characteristic  confidence,  as  by 
the  general  increase  of  individual  income  attendant 
on  the  war,  to  adopt  the  very  bold  expedient  of  war 
taxes,  or,  as  it  was  officially  termed,  "  raising  a  large 
proportion  of  the  supplies  within  the  year."  The 
success  of  this  plan  forms  the  grand  feature  of  the 
financial  history  of  our  age :  attempted  at  first  on  a 
limited  scale,  it  was  carried  by  the  imposition  of  the 
income  tax,  to  a  large  amount,  and  before  the  close 
of  the  war  attained  a  magnitude  almost  incredible. 

Supplies  raised  within  the  year,  being  the  net  produce  of  our  taxes,  after 
deducting  18,000,000/.,  as  the  computed  average  of  a  peace  establishment, 
and  excluding  all  loans. 

War  of  1 793. — During  the  first  four  years  the  war  taxes 
were  inconsiderable ;  and  in  1797,  they  were  carried  to 

only          -             -             -             -             -             -             -  £  3,000,000 

But  in  1798,  they  were  carried  to  12,000,000 

1799  -             -----  17,000,000 

1800  -'.:••'-             -             -             -             -  16,000,000 

1801  -             -             -             -             -             -  17,000,000 

1802  -             -             -             -             -             -  19,000,000 

War  of  1803. — The  produce  of  our  annual  supplies 
computed  as  above,  with  the  exclusion  of  loans,  but  after 
deduction  of  a  larger  sum  (22,000,000/.,  see  Appendix)  as 
the  probable  peace  establishment : 

1803  -        £16,000,000  1810  -        £45,000,000 

1804  -  23,000,000  1811  -  43,000,000 

1805  -  28,000,000  1812  -  41,000,000 

1806  -  31,000,000  1813  -  45,000,000 

1807  -  36,000,000  1814  -  48,000,000 

1808  -  40,000,000  1815  -  48,000,000 

1809  -  41,000,000 


*  Dr.  Hamilton  on  the  National  Debt.  p.  252. 


Magnitude  of  our  Expenditure.  45 

Respective  Proportion  of  Loans  and  Taxes. 

Of  the  total  sum  of  1,100,000,000/.  expended  du- 
ring the  war,  the  amount  added  to  our  permanent 
xlebt  was  460,000,000/.,  so  that  the  aggregate  of  the 
supplies  raised  within  the  year,  amounted  for  the 
whole  war  to  640,000,000/.,  a  surprising  sum  to  be 
obtained  by  a  mode  of  taxation  almost  unknown  in 
foreign  countries,  and  carried  in  former  wars  to  a 
very  limited  extent  among  ourselves. 

The  financial  history  of  the  war  may  be  divided  in- 
to three  periods : 

First,  the  four  years  previous  to  1797,  in  which 
our  treasury  was  conducted  as  in  former  wars,  with- 
out any  innovation  in  regard  to  war  taxes  or  paper 
money. 

Secondly,  the  interval  from  1797  to  1805,  in  which 
we  had  both  war  taxes  and  non-convertible  paper, 
but  without  greatly  depreciating  the  one,  or  carrying 
the  other  to  an  extreme. 

Thirdly,  the  period  from  1805  to  1815,  in  which 
the  amount  of  the  supplies  raised  within  the  year  be- 
came enormous,  and  the  depreciation  of  our  paper, 
particularly  after  1810,  formed  a  very  serious  addition 
to  our  difficulties. 

We  have  thus  exhibited  a  statement  of  our  expen- 
diture, which,  though  brief,  is,  we  trust,  perspicuous, 
all  complexities  of  redeemed  and  unredeemed  stock, 
all  distinctions  of  funded  and  unfunded  debt,  being 
excluded  from  our  calculation,  and  the  charge  of  the 
war  considered  only  under  the  two  great  divisions  of 
debt  contracted  and  expenditure  defrayed  in  the 
current  year.  Compared  with  these  sums,  how  in- 
significant were  the  additions  made  to  our  public 
burdens  by  former  wars.  That  of  1689,  under  King 
William,  cost  annually  between  3  and  4,000,000/. 
and  added  in  all  20,000,000/.  to  the  national  debt. 
Under  Queen  Anne,  the  flattering  hopes  inspired  by 
repeated  victories,  led  to  a  longer  contest  and  larger 
outlay,  carrying  our  annual  expenditure  to  5  or 
6,000,000/.  the  addition  to  the  public  debt  during  the 


46  The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies. 

war  to  somewhat  more  than  30,000,000/.  In  the  less 
successful  contest  of  1740,  our  expenditure  differed 
from  year  to  year ;  the  addition  to  our  public  debt 
amounted  to  nearly  30,000,000/.  In  that  of  1756,  the 
augmented  resources  of  the  country,  and  the  bold 
system  of  Lord  Chatham,  raised  our  annual  expendi- 
ture to  an  average  of  16,000,000/.,  the  addition  to  our 
debt  to  fully  60,000,000/.  The  unfortunate  contest 
with  our  colonies,  and  the  war  that  ensued  after  1778 
with  European  powers,  was  attended  with  an  average 
charge  of  17,000,000/.,  and  an  addition  to  our  debt 
of  somewhat  more  than  100,000,000/.  The  total  of 
public  debt  incurred  in  the  course  of  a  century  was 
thus  240,000,000/.,  a  sum  which,  however  large,  form- 
ed only  the  half  of  that  which  we  have  contracted  in 
the  present  age. 

The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies. — The  next 
and  by  far  the  most  important  step  in  the  progress  of 
our  inquiry  is,  by  what  means  and  from  what  sources 
the  nation  was  enabled  to  meet  such  unprecedented 
demands?  In  the  opinion  of  many,  the  means  were 
derived  from  the  extension,  or  as  it  is  commonly 
termed,  our  monopoly  of  foreign  commerce.  "  The 
French  revolution,"  said  the  late  Arthur  Young,# 
"  burst  forth  like  a  volcano,  and  laid  the  industry, 
manufactures,  and  commerce  of  France,  and  eventu- 
ally those  of  the  whole  Continent,  in  the  dust ;  Bri- 
tain became  the  emporium  of  the  world,  and  such  a 
scene  of  wealth  and  prosperity  filled  every  eye  in 
this  happy  country,  as  the  sun  before  had  never  shone 
upon."  The  belief  of  such  a  monopoly  has,  on  the 
part  of  a  merely  practical  man,  or  in  the  pages  of  a 
pamphleteer,  nothing  surprising,  but  we  were  little 
prepared  to  find  it  in  a  publication  of  large  circula- 
tion and  acknowledged  ability.f  The  fact  is,  that 
the  amount  of  our  foreign  commerce  was  not  greater, 
nor  so  great  at  any  time  during  the  war  as  since  the 

*  Inquiry  into  the  Value  of  Money  in  England,  1812  ;  p.  77. 
f  Edinburgh  Review,  No.  LXV.  p.  170.,  and  a^ain  in  No.  LXXTI. 
p  458. 


The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies.  47 

peace ;  a  point  which  may  at  once  be  ascertained 
by  a  reference  to  our  custom-house  return  of  exports 
and  imports.  These  documents,  however  unfit  to 
represent  the  balance  of  mercantile  payments  from 
one  country  to  another,  form  good  authorities  for  as- 
certaining the  comparative  extent  of  our  business 
from  year  to  year. 

Our  exports  according  to  the  official  value. — We  shall 
give  the  result  of  our  custom-house  return  of  exports 
in  two  modes ;  first,  by  the  official  value,  which  means 
(see  Appendix,)  the  value  computed  by  the  weight 
or  dimensions  of  merchandise,  and  at  a  uniform  rate 
of  price,  without  reference  to  the  fluctuations  of  the 
market. 

Total  Exports  from  Great  Britain,  computed  according  to  thefxed  official 
standard  of  the  Custom-house. 

Average  of  the  nine  years  of  the  first  war,  viz.  from  the 
beginning  of  1793  to  that  of  1802  -  -  £30,760,000 

Average  of  ten  years  of  the  second  war,  from  1 803  to 
1812,  both  inclusive,  leaving  out  1813,  the  records  of 
which  were  destroyed  by  fire,  and  considering  1802  as  a 
year  of  peace  ....  -  42,145,000 

But  if  we  compare  this  with  the  eight  years  of 
peace,  of  which  the  returns  have  been  made  to  Par- 
liament, we  shall  find  a  considerable  increase  since 
1814. 

Average  of  the  total  exports  from  Great  Britain  com- 
puted officially  for  the  eight  years,  from  1814  to  1821,  both 
inclusive.     (See  Appendix.)  ...  54,200,000 

These  custom-house  returns,  being  made  on  a  uni- 
form plan,  and  calculated  by  the  weight  or  dimen- 
sions of  the  package,  are  conclusive  as  to  the  quantity 
of  our  exports.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that,  in 
other  respects,  they  are  less  satisfactory ;  and  that 
although  the  bulk  exported  at  present  be  greater,  the 
value  is  less  in  consequence  of  the  general  reduction 
of  prices.  That  prices  were  much  higher  during  the 
war,  particularly  in  the  latter  years,  admits  of  no 
doubt,  but  in  whatever  way  the  calculation  be  made, 
the  advantage  is  on  the  side  of  peace,  thus : — 


48  The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies. 

Exports  from  Great  Britain  during  the  war,  computed  chiefly  from  the  de- 
claration of  the  exporting  merchants ;  or,  when  there  was  no  declaration, 
by  a  suitable  addition  to  the  official  value. 

Average  of  the  ten  years  from  1791  to  1801,  both  inclu- 
sive, -  ....  .  £48,890,000 
Average  of  the  ten  years  from  1801  to  1810          -           -        52,847,000 

In  peace,  our  exports  afford  an  average  considera- 
bly larger,  after  making  (see  Appendix,)  an  allow- 
ance for  the  reduced  value  of  merchandise. 

Average  of  our  annual  exports  during  eight  years  from 
1814  to  1821,  both  inclusive,  computed  chiefly  from  the 
declaration  of  the  exporting  merchants.     (See  Appendix.)        £63,787,000 

In  both  points  of  view,  therefore,  our  foreign  com- 
merce is  found  to  have  been  less  considerable  in  war 
than  in  peace :  it  is  equally  easy  to  show,  that  its 
profits  were  wholly  inadequate  to  the  support  of  any 
great  share  of  our  expenditure.  Mr.  Pitt,  on  propos- 
ing the  income-tax  in  1798,  computed  our  foreign  com- 
merce to  yield  to  the  various  persons,  merchants  and 
others,  engaged  in  it,  an  annual  income  of  12,000,000/., 
a  sum,  probably  not  under-rated  at  the  time,  but 
which,  for  the  sake  of  giving  those  who  differ  from  us. 
the  full  benefit  of  argument,  ought,  we  shall  suppose, 
to  have  been  doubled,  and  taken  during  the  war  at 
an  annual  amount  of  24,000,000/.  This,  be  it  ob- 
served, is  not  saving,  but  income,  out  of  which  are  to 
be  supported  all  the  persons  engaged  in  the  business : 
and  if  we  compute  the  clear  saving  in  a  proportion, 
which,  in  regard  to  most  other  branches  of  industry, 
would  be  more  than  sufficiently  liberal,  the  result 
will  be  a  clear  yearly  gain  of  three  millions  sterling. 
But  what  would  be  thought  of  that  sum,  or  of  double 
or  triple  its  amount,  as  a  counterpoise  to  such  expen- 
diture as  ours  during  the  late  wars  ? 

Of  all  the  branches  of  our  foreign  commerce,  the 
greatest  extension  took  place  in  that  with  the  United 
States :  but  that  outlet  was  closed  several  years  be- 
fore the  end  of  the  war ;  and,  however  productive  of 
work  to  our  manufacturers,  has  never  been  consider- 
ed a  source  of  pecuniary  aid,   accompanied  as  it 


The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies.  49 

necessarily  is,  by  long  credits  and  debts  difficult  of 
recovery. 

Our  Colonial  Acquisitions. — Our  other  sources  of 
imagined  supply  were  the  occupation  of  new  colo- 
nies, the  suspension  of  the  navigation  of  hostile  states, 
and  a  supposed  reduction  of  their  rival  manufactures 
Of  the  conquered  colonies,  the  principal  were  Trini- 
dad, Demerara,  Essequebo,  Tobago,  each  little  ad- 
vanced in  cultivation,  each  requiring  a  large  transfer 
of  capital  from  this  country,  and  each  yielding  little 
present  revenue.  Similar  disadvantages  character- 
ized, though  in  a  less  degree,  St.  Lucia,  Guadaloupe, 
Martinique.  As  to  the  East  Indies,  our  acquisitions, 
vast  in  point  of  territory,  and  considerable  in  regard 
to  internal  revenue,  have  been  as  yet  of  very  second- 
ary importance  in  respect  to  commerce,  though,  on 
the  continent  of  Europe,  there  prevails  an  opinion 
that  India  is  the  grand  source  of  our  national  wealth. 

Suspension  of  Foreign  Competition. — We  come  next 
to  a  very  plausible  argument,  the  benefit  supposed  to 
arise  to  us  from  the  suspension  that  took  place  during 
the  war,  of  the  navigation  of  France,  Holland,  and 
the  other  states  dependent  on  France.  The  fact 
doubtless  was,  that  the  flag  of  these  countries  could 
not  appear  on  the  ocean,  because  they  had  not  men 
of  war  to  protect  their  convoys ;  but  the  transfer  of 
navigation  was  made  less  to  British  vessels  than  to 
neutrals,  Americans,  Danes,  Swedes,  Prussians,  and  to 
Dutch  shipping  bearing  the  flag  of  the  petty  ports  in 
the  north-west  of  Germany.  Lastly,  in  regard  to 
manufactures,  those  of  France  have  undergone  no 
reduction  since  the  Revolution,  and  much  less  fluctu- 
ation than  is  commonly  supposed  :  during  the  last 
thirty  years  they  have  been  on  the  same  scale  of 
gradual  increase  as  before;  that  is,  they  have  all 
along  kept  pace  with  the  wants  of  a  country,  in- 
creasing progressively,  though  not  quickly,  in  popu- 
lation. 

Compelled  to  quit  their  favourite  ground  of  foreign 

7 


50  The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies, 

commerce,  to  what  do  these  calculators  resort  for 
the  purpose  of  explaining  our  prosperity  during  the 
war  ?  Government  loans  and  contracts,  however  pro- 
fitable in  vulgar  estimate,  are  obviously  out  of  the 
question  as  a  source  of  national  supply.  The  com- 
mand of  money,  given  by  the  adoption  of  a  paper  cur- 
rency, is  a  theme  confidently  urged,  to  use  a  parlia- 
mentary phrase,  both  "  in  and  out  of  doors :"  it  was 
certainly  of  great  importance,  but  enough,  we  trust, 
will  be  advanced  in  a  succeeding  chapter  to  show 
that  the  extent  of  supply,  derived  from  that  source, 
has  not  yet  been  distinctly  comprehended.  We 
dwell,  therefore,  no  longer  on  delusive  suppositions, 
but  proceed  to  what  appears  to  us  the  true  solution 
of  this  financial  enigma,  seeking  it  in  the  increase 
less  of  our  transactions  with  foreign  countries,  than  of 
our  productive  industry  at  home. 

Increase  of  Employment  during  the  War. — We  begin 
by  requesting  those  of  our  readers  who  are  of 
an  age  to  recollect  the  period  of  peace  prior  to  1793, 
to  recall  to  mind  the  circumstances  of  that  time  in  as 
far  as  regarded  the  employment  of  individuals,  the 
chance  of  favourable  openings  in  the  different  walks 
of  industry.  They  will  not  fail  to  remember,  that, 
though  by  no  means  an  unprosperous  season,  it  was 
marked  by  the  symptoms  common  in  an  era  of  politi- 
cal tranquillity,  complaints  of  overstock  in  the  genteel 
professions,  and  of  inadequate  payment  in  almost  all 
of  a  humbler  description.  In  a  season  of  peace, 
salaries  or  wages  are  adapted  with  scrupulous  nicety 
to  the  sum  necessary  for  personal  support,  and,  ex- 
cept in  the  case  of  the  inheritors  of  patrimony,  the 
portion  of  income  disposable  for  purposes  of  indul- 
gence, is  far  from  large.  Such  has  long  been  the 
case  in  France,  and  most  countries  of  the  Continent ; 
such,  at  various  intervals  of  the  last  century,  was  the 
case  in  our  own ;  a  state  by  no  means  unsound  or 
likely  to  engender  future  embarrassment,  but  leading 
by  very  slow  degrees  to  the  attainment  of  professional 
rank,  or  the  acquisition  of  property.     This  tranquil 


The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies.  51 

condition,  this  medium  between  activity  and  stagna- 
tion, was  entirely  altered  by  the  war;  the  army,  the 
navy,  the  public  offices  of  government  opened  a  ca- 
reer to  numbers  of  every  class,  and  by  absorbing  a 
very  large  proportion  of  the  candidates  for  employ- 
ment, created  a  corresponding  briskness  in  agricul- 
ture, trade,  and  professions  ;  increasing  the  wages  of 
the  lower,  and  the  salaries  of  the  higher  ranks. 

Capitalists  also,  a  class  retired  for  the  most  part 
from  active  pursuits,  partook  of  the  general  impulse ; . 
the  pecuniary  demands  of  government  were  large, 
and  the  rate  of  interest  experienced  a  general  and 
permanent  rise.  Occupation  was  thus  afforded  to 
individuals  of  every  age  and  of  almost  every" degree 
of  capacity;  many,  who  from  deficient  activity  or 
mediocrity  of  parts,  would,  in  a  state  of  peace,  have 
necessarily  remained  unemployed,  were  brought  by 
the  war  into  situations  attended  with  income  ;  some 
in  the  public  service,  others  in  private  employment, 
but  all  in  consequence  of  the  extra  demand  created 
by  government.  Several  departments  of  business, 
such  as  our  fisheries,  our  trade  with  the  Continent  of 
Europe,  and  that  with  our  West  India  colonies,  were 
exposed  to  heavy  losses,  and  the  whole  body  of  fixed 
annuitants  felt  severely  the  increased  expense  of  liv- 
ing. But  these  classes  formed  the  minority  of  the 
public:  and  even  they  felt,  more  or  less  directly, 
through  the  medium  of  their  connexions,  the  benefit 
of  that  impulse  which  for  a  time  improved  the  income 
of  almost  all  persons  in  active  life,  raising  to  the 
monied  men  the  rate  of  interest;  to  the  labouring 
class,  the  rate  of  wages;  to  the  manufacturer,  the 
merchant,  and,  in  particular,  to  the  farmer,  the  pro- 
fits of  stock. 

Such  was  the  activity  attendant  on  a  state  of  war, 
and  on  the  facility  with  which  extended  transactions 
were  managed  by  means  of  bank  paper.  If  to  some 
our  sketch  appear  too  highly  coloured,  we  have  mere- 
ly to  refer  them  to  a  comparison  of  the  average  rate 
of  wages  and  salaries  in  particular  periods,  such  as 
1792  and  1812;  to  the  increased  sales  of  our  manu- 


52  The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies. 

facturers  and  merchants ;  the  rise  of  rent  to  the  land- 
lord ;  the  increase  of  profit  to  his  tenant. 

Consequent  Increase  of  Revenue. — All  these  circum- 
stances, in  particular  the  increased  call  for  personal 
labour,  had  a  powerful  tendency  to  augment  the  rela- 
tive population  of  towns,  as  well  by  promoting  mar- 
riage as  by  drawing  to  them  an  extra  share  of  the 
country  population.  Now  what  is  the  effect  of  an 
increase  of  town  population  on  the  productive  pow- 
ers, or,  in  other  words,  on  the  taxable  income  of  a 
country?  To  form  a  due  estimate  of  this,  we  must 
point  the  reader's  attention  to  the  passages  in  our 
chapter  on  Population,  where,  in  treating  of  the 
comparative  revenue  of  different  classes,  we  contrast 
the  dexterity  and  dispatch  of  towns,  with  the  slow, 
inefficient  labour  of  the  country.  A  transfer  of  re- 
sidence from  country  to  town  leads  to  augmented 
ability  in  the  individual,  to  the  increase  of  the  quan- 
tity, the  amelioration  of  the  quality,  of  his  work ;  it 
raises  his  wages,  and,  by  enabling  him  to  live  better, 
extends  the  consumption  of  articles  productive  to  the 
exchequer.  Of  the  magnitude  of  the  amount  paid  by 
the  lower  orders,  and  the  increase  of  public  revenue 
attendant  on  increase  of  wages,  whether  in  war  or 
peace,  some  idea  may  be  formed  from  the  following 
table  : 


Abstract  of  Excise  and  Custom  duties  in  1820,  affecting  the  consumption  of 
the  labouring  classes. 

Malt             .......  £5,000,000 

Beer             .......  2,500,000 

British  spirits            .             .             .             .             .  3,000,000 

Salt               .......  1,500,000 

Tobacco  and  snuff  ------  3,000,000 

Soap             .......  900,000 

Leather       -------  600,000 

Candles        -------  300,000 

Tea               --..-..  3,000,000 

Hemp           --.....  200,000 

20,000,000 

To  wli  ich  may  be  added  timber                ...  1,000,000 

Coals  carried  coastwise  'nearlr                  -             -             -  1,000,000 

Total  £22,000.000 


The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies,  53  , 

The  progressive  increase  in  the  productiveness  of 
our  taxes  was  owing  partly  to  higher  wages,  partly  to 
augmented  population. 

Increase  of  our  Population. — We  shall  have  occasion, 
in  a  subsequent  chapter,  to  show  the  close  connexion 
that  exists  between  the  increase  of  our  numbers  and 
the  productiveness  of  our  taxes :  at  present,  our 
statement  shall  be  brief.  Our  population  returns  for 
the  last  twenty  years  indicate  an  increase  of  no  less 
than  one  and  a  half  per  cent,  annually;  but  to  avoid 
the  hazard  of  over-rating,  we  shall  suppose  that  pre- 
vious to  these  returns,  and  to  the  general  introduc- 
tion of  vaccination,  the  augmentation  was  less  rapid, 
and  shall  assume  eighteen  per  cent,  on  the  popula- 
tion of  1792  as  the  total  increase  during  the  fourteen 
years  that  followed  that  date. 

After  these  preliminary  remarks,  we  proceed  to , 
state  arithmetically,  the  increase  of  our  resources, 
beginning  by  a  table  of  the  amount  of  our  excise  of 
duties,  the  operation  of  which  affects,  as  is  well 
known,  a  great  variety  of  articles,  including  as  well 
the  wine  of  the  higher  orders,  as  the  malt  liquor,  the 
spirits,  the  tobacco,  consumed  by  their  humbler 
countrymen. 

Revenue* arising  from  the  Excise  during  the  following  years  of  war,  being 
the  gross  Income,  before  deducting  the  charges  of  collection. 

1805 £23,194,000 

1806  ......  24,081,000 

1807  ......  24,681,000 

1808  ......  25,593,000 

1809  (Orders  in  Council)     -  23,471,000 

1810  ......  25,796,000 

1811  -  -             -             .             -             -  26,078,000 

1812  (War  witk  America)    -  23,532,000 

1813  ......  25,272,000 

1814  .  .             .             .             .             .  26,471,000 

J  81 5  -             -             -                           .             .  27,207,000 


54  The  Sources  of  our  Financial  Supplies. 

Conjectural  estimate  of  the  total  taxable  income  of  Great  Britain,  at 
different  periods,  from  1792  to  1814. 

Money  of  the 
same  value  as 
in  1792. 
(Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland.) 
In  1792  our  taxable  income  may  be  computed  to  have 
been  ------  £125,000,000 

In  1806;  increase  calculated  in  the  ratio  of  the  increase 
ofthe  population,  viz.  18  percent.,  -  22,500,000 

147,500,000 
Probable  addition  to  national  income  from  the  higher 
wages  and  higher  profits  of  capital  in  a  state  of  war,  -  22,500,000 

Total  of  taxable  income  in  1806,  -  -  170,000,000 


We  shall  now  apply  this  mode  of  calculation  to  the  last 
year  of  the  war. 

In  1813  or  1814:  Increase  of  national  income  since 
1806,  calculated  in  the  ratio  of  the  increase  of  population, 
11  per  cent. 

National  income  in  1806  as  above,  -  -  147,500,000 

Add  11  percent.  .....  16,500,000 


164,000,000 


Probable  addition  to  national  income,  from  the  higher 
wages  and  higher  profits  of  capital  in  a  state  of  war,  -  24,000,000 

Total  of  taxable  income,  in  1813  or  1814,  in  money  of 
1792,  -  -  .  -  -  188,000,000 


By  taxable  income,  we  understand  the  aggregate  in- 
come of  the  individuals  accustomed  to  consume  tax- 
ed articles ;  and  our  estimate  is  founded  chiefly  on 
the  returns  made  under  the  property  tax,  with  the 
addition  of  the  computed  amount  of  wages  and  other 
incomes,  which,  though  exempt  from  that  charge, 
are  subject  to  taxes  on  consumption. 

(See  the  chapter  on  National  Capital  and  Revenue.) 
We  shall  explain  in  the  next  chapter  the  fluctuation 
in  the  value  of  money  since  1792 ;  meantime  by  ex- 
hibiting our  income  at  different  dates  in  money  of 
uniform  value,  we  simplify  the  estimate,  and  enable 
the  reader  to  mark  its  increase,  without  the  perplex- 
ity attendant  on  a  difference  in  the  value  of  our 
currency. 


Proportion  of  our  Burdens  to  our  Resources,        55 

.    A  comparative  Statement  of  our  Public  Burdens,  and  Taxable  Income. 

The  public  burdens  include  taxes,  (with  the  expense  of  collection)  poor-rate, 

and  lithe. 

The  same  reduced    Our  taxable  income 


Years. 

Annual  burdens 
in  the  money 
of  the  parti- 
cular year. 

to  a  uniform  stan- 
dard ;    viz.    mo- 
ney of  the  same, 
value  as  in  1792. 

computed  by  a  u- 
niform  standard; 
viz.  money  of  the 
value  of  1792. 

1792 
1806 
1814 

£22,000,000 
60,000,000 
80,000,000 

22,000,000 
46,000,000 
50,000,000 

125,000,000 
170,000,000 
188,000,000 

The  advantage  of  making  our  computation  in  mo- 
ney of  uniform  value  is  here  very  apparent.  To  judge 
from  the  numerical  amount,  our  public  burdens  would 
seem  to  have  been  more  than  tripled  in  the  course  of 
the  twenty-three  years  of  the  war,  but  when  reduced 
to  the  money  of  1792,  the  increase  is  found  to  be  lit- 
tle more  than  double. 

It  remains  that  we  bring  our  reasoning  to  a  point, 
by  ascertaining  "the  proportion  borne  at  different 
periods  by  our  burdens  to  our  means."  This  we  ac- 
complish by  a  calculation  founded  on  the  preceding 
tables,  but  modified  by  some  considerations  which 
shall  be  explained  in  our  chapter  on  National  Reve- 
nue and  Capital.  The  result  is  that  our  burdens 
bore  to  our  resources, 

(Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland.) 

In  1792  a  proportion  of  nearly  -  -  18  to  100 

1806  of  -  -  -  27  to  100 

1813  or  1814         of  -  -  -  27  to  100 

(See  Chap. VIII.) 

Such  was  the  proportion  of  our  burdens  to  our  re* 
sources,  after  including  in  the  latter  the  increase  aris- 
ing from  the  augmentation  during  the  war,  both  of  our 
numbers  and  our  pecuniary  means.  The  additional 
pressure  stated  arithmetically,  was  about  nine  per 
cent,  on  our  national  income,  a  charge  less  great 
than  is  commonly  attributed  to  our  taxes,  but  suffi- 
ciently large  to  call  for  some  farther  explanation  of 
the  remarkable  circumstances  that  enabled  us  to  de- 
frav  it. 


56  .  Proportion  of  our 

Our  War  Taxes. — The  amount  of  our  loans,  though 
very  different  in  different  years,  averaged,  on  the 
whole  of  the  war,  the  annual  sum  of  20,000,000/. 
This  bold  use  of  our  credit,  this  free  draught  on  our 
future  resources,  was  almost  all  expended  in  the  ex- 
tension of  bur  domestic  industry.  It  may  be  termed 
a  premium  given  to  the  existing  generation  at  the 
charge  of  posterity  :  it  may  be  compared  to  a  stream, 
which,  though  proceeding  from  an  unnatural  and  tem- 
porary source,  diffused  a  fertility  approaching  to  lux- 
uriance, so  long  as  it  continued  to  now.  Our  readers 
have  probably  little  difficulty  in  conceiving  the  ope- 
ration of  borrowed  money ;  in  comprehending  how 
individual,  and  consequently  public  income  may  be 
increased  by  giving  activity  to  the  present  age  at  the 
expense  of  the  next.  The  intricacy  lies  in  a  different 
question;  in  the  mode  of  accounting  for  our  taxes, 
and  for  the  ease  with  which  sums  of  unprecedented 
magnitude  were  raised  in  that  manner  during  the 
War.  To  solve  this  difficulty,  some  writers  adopt  the 
convenient  theory,  that  taxation  may  be  made  an  en- 
gine for  increasing  national  wealth,  as  if  the  money 
expended  on  an  indecisive  campaign  were  ultimately 
as  profitable  as  a  rate  imposed  for  the  improvement 
of  our  streets,  roads,  and  canals.  Without  becoming 
converts  to  this  singular  opinion,  we  have  no  diffi- 
culty in  regarding  taxation,  when  expended  at  home, 
less  as  a  privation  of  wealth  than  as  an  instrument 
of  circulation.  It  is  evidently  applied  to  the  exten- 
sion of  employment,  and,  by  increasing  the  incomes 
of  individuals,  enables  them  to  find  a  fund  for  answer- 
ing its  own  demand,  the  subsequent  visits  of  the 
collector. 

Taxation  considered  as  Circulation. — Imagine  the  case 
of  a  contractor  receiving  annually  1 00,000/.  from  the 
Treasury,  and  distributing  it  in  addition  to  the  wages, 
salaries,  and  profits  of  two  or  three  thousand  persons. 
Without  the  war,  these  individuals  might,  and  pro- 
bably would,  have  had  employment,  but  not  to  an 
equal  extent,  receiving  perhaps  60/.  annually,  instead 


Burdens  to  our  Resources.  )7 

of  the  70/.  or  80/.  given  them  by  the  war,  an  addition 
which  fully  enabled  them  to  pay  the  extra  charge 
imposed  in  the  shape  of  taxes.  Or  suppose  the  whole 
expenditure  of  the  nation,  in  other  words,  the  amount 
disbursed  on  articles,  which  directly  or  indirectly 
pay  taxes,  to  be  200,000,000/.  a  year,  and  that  in 
addition  to  former  burdens  new  taxes  are  imposed  to 
the  extent  of  20,000,000/.  The  effect  of  this  heavy  im  - 
post  is  a  correspondent  rise  in  the  price  of  the  articles 
consumed ;  but  as  the  amount  received  by  the  Trea- 
sury is  forthwith  circulated  among  the  payers  of  the 
taxes,  and  applied  to  remunerate  their  exertions,  the 
latter  are  enabled  to  indemnify  themselves  by  an  ad- 
dition to  the  charges  constituting  their  respective  in- 
comes, whether  in  the  shape  of  wages,  salary,  or  profit 
of  stock.  Possessed  of  this  power,  the  higher  price 
paid  for  articles  of  consumption  becomes  a  matter  of 
indifference,  particularly  when,  in  consequence  of 
the  government  demand  for  men  and  money,  the  in- 
crease of  their  incomes  exceeds  the  increase  of  their 
expense.  The  result  accordingly  is,  that  they  pay 
10  per  cent,  additional  on  their  consumption,  and  add 
as  much,  or  more,  to  the  charges  constituting  their 
incomes. 

To  what  amount,  it  may  be  asked,  did  the  circula- 
tion in  question  take  place,  in  consequence  of  taxes  ? 
To  a  sum  very  different  in  different  years,  and  in- 
creasing largely  after  1806,  but  forming,  on  an  ave- 
rage of  the  whole  period  of  war,  more  than  40,000,000/. 
a  year.  In  what  particular  mode  did  the  annual  ex- 
penditure of  that  sum,  and  of  the  farther  20,000,000/. 
supplied  by  loans,  chiefly  take  place  ?  In  recruiting, 
clothing,  and  victualling  our  militia,  army,  and  navy ; 
in  the  purchase  of  stores,  the  building  of  ships  of  war, 
the  repair  of  fortifications ;  in  contracts,  pay,  sala- 
ries, pensions.  Even  in  that  which  seemed  strictly 
foreign  expenditure,  our  subsidies  to  the  continent, 
and  the  maintenance  of  our  garrisons  abroad,  the  re- 
mittances took  place  less  in  money  than  in  article* 
of  British  manufacture. 

It  remains  to  add  a  few  remarks  on  tfee  manner  in 
8 


o8  Proportion  of  our 

which  these  large  sums  were  repaid  to  the  Treasu- 
ry. Of  our  taxation,  the  far  greater  proportion 
(40,000,000/.)  is  on  articles  of  consumption,  a  mode 
in  which  the  tax,  blending  itself  with  the  price  of  the 
article,  escapes,  in  a  great  measure,  the  observation 
of  the  consumer.  No  wonder,  therefore,  that  such 
imposts  were,  in  a  manner,  overlooked  in  the  general 
rise  of  wages,  salaries,  and  profits.  In  like  manner, 
the  increase  of  stamps,  heavy  as  it  became,  was  ac- 
counted a  secondary  object  after  the  great  augmen- 
tation of  price  obtained,  as  the  war  proceeded,  by 
the  venders  of  property.  The  assessed  taxes  and 
poor-rate  being  undisguised  burdens,  excited  more 
animadversion,  but  they  were  submitted  to,  as  well 
from  a  conviction  of  their  necessity,  as  from  the  gene- 
ral ardour  in  the  contest  with  France,  and  her  dread- 
ed ruler. 

Computed  Amount  thus  repaid  to  the  Treasury. — If  we 
go  a  step  farther,  and  endeavour  to  define  the  amount 
repaid,  during  the  war,  to  the  public  Treasury,  the 
plan  is  to  revert  to  the  estimate  we  have  already  made 
of  the  proportion  of  our  burdens  to  our  national  in- 
come. That  proportion,  (27  per  cent,  for  the  country 
at  large,)  was  greater  in  towns,  on  account  of  the 
more  general  consumption  of  exciseable  articles. 
Now  as  the  expenditure  of  government  for  the  war, 
or,  to  speak  more  correctly,  the  increased  expendi- 
ture of  individuals  consequent  on  government  dis- 
burse, took  place  almost  entirely  in  towns,  we  shall 
probably  not  exceed  in  calculating  that  it  returned 
into  the  Exchequer  a  proportion  approaching  to  33 
per  cent.,  or  a  third  of  the  amount  that  had  issued 
from  it.  This  estimate  justifies  the  following  in- 
ference : 

Total  of  expenditure  for  the  war         -  £1,100,000,000 

Of  which  a  third,  or  33  per  cent.,  paid  back  in  taxes, 

formed  a  sum  of  about  -  360,000,000 

n  sum  which  goes  far  towards   accounting  for  the 


Burdens  to  our  Resources.  f$ 

payment  of  our  war  taxes,  enormous  as  they  were ; 
or,  in  other  words,  towards  proving  that  those  pe- 
cuniary sacrifices  on  which  the  public  received  such 
eloquent  compliments  from  ministerial  orators  and 
newspaper  writers,  were  often  little  more  than  a  re- 
payment of  money  issued  from  the  Treasury. 

The  power  of  paying  taxes  during  the  late  war  is 
thus  to  be  sought,  not  in  retrenchment  on  the  part  of 
the  public,  but  in  an  increase  of  the  general  activity, 
and  still  more  in  that  which  a  writer  of  the  present 
age  (as  yet  little  known  to  the  public,  but  to  whose 
works  we  shall  frequently  have  occasion  to  refer,  Mr. 
S.  Gray)  terms  the  power  of  "  charging  and  counter- 
charging ;"  the  power  of  individuals  to  augment  those 
demands  which  constitute  their  respective  incomes ; 
and  thus  to  transfer  from  one  hand  to  another  the 
burden  of  a  new  tax. 

Absence  of  Foreign  Competition. — This  augmentation 
of  charge,  this  transfer  of  burden,  was  facilitated 
during  the  war  by  various  causes,  among  which  is  to 
be  included  the  existence  of  similar,  though  not 
equal  demands  from  continental  governments  on  their 
subjects.  These  demands,  in  conjunction  with  the 
obstructions  to  intercourse  attendant  on  a  state  of 
war,  had  the  effect  of  preventing  the  high  prices  in 
England  from  being  lowered  by  foreign  competition. 
Had  the  war  affected  only  France  and  England,  had 
the  rest  of  Europe  been  exempted  from  the  burdens 
of  great  military  establishments,  such  a  system  of 
increased  taxation,  or  in  other  words,  such  a  rapid 
augmentation  of  prices,  would  have  been  impracti- 
cable :  our  countrymen  would  have  emigrated ;  ca- 
pital would  have  been  sent  abroad ;  foreign  manu- 
factures would  have  been  smuggled  among  us ;  the 
supplies  for  the  United  States  and  other  distant 
markets  would  have  been  prepared  on  the  continent. 
But  Holland,  the  only  continental  country  possessed 
of  disposable  capital,  was  subjected  to  great  op- 
pression; while  Germany,  and  in  the  latter  years  of 
the  war.  Denmark  and  Sweden,  were  burdened  with 


60  Proportion  of  our 

heavy  military  charges.  British  capital  was  pre- 
vented from  finding  its  way  abroad,  as  well  by  dread 
of  Bonaparte's  despotism,  as  by  the  profitable  em- 
ployment afforded  it  at  home  Smuggling  was  con- 
tinued, but  only  in  articles  (such  as  spirits,  tea, 
laces,)  in  which  it  had  been  carried  on  in  peace  :  the 
number  and  activity  of  our  cruisers  prevented  its  ex- 
tension, notwithstanding  the  additional  temptation 
arising  from  our  augmented  duties. 

Our  country  was  thus  insulated,  commercially  as 
well  as  physically ;  and  an  amount  of  taxation,  a  rise 
of  prices,  which  at  other  times  would  have  been 
ruinous,  were  comparatively  innoxious  when  our 
neighbours  were  subjected  to  heavy  burdens.  As 
soon  as  this  point  is  clearly  comprehended  by  the 
inquirer ;  as  soon  as  he  becomes  satisfied  of  the  non- 
existence of  foreign  competition ;  he  will  find  much  less 
difficulty  in  the  solution  of  our  financial  problem. 

Substitution  of  Bank  Notes  for  Coin. — To  all  those 
causes  there  remains  to  add  the  exemption  of  our 
banks  from  cash  payments;  the  effect  of  which, 
though  less  great  than  is  vulgarly  supposed,  was  to 
make  money  almost  as  plenty  in  war  as  in  peace ;  and 
to  increase  the  amount  of  our  circulating  medium  in 
proportion  as  other  circumstances  led  to  a  rise  in 
prices. 


Thus  was  carried  on,  from  year  to  year,  a  most  ex- 
pensive contest,  without  much  pressure  on  any  part 
of  the  public,  unless  the  fixed  annuitant,  and  without 
a  depreciation  of  our  national  capital,  except  of  that 
portion  (such  as  the  funds,  or  loans  on  mortgage,) 
of  which  the  value  is  permanently  represented  by 
money.  To  many  persons,  and  in  particular  to 
those  interested  in  the  expenditure,  this  state  of  things 
bore  a  favourable  appearance ;  conveying  to  some 
the  idea  of  an  accumulation  of  national  wealth,  to 


Burdens  to  our  Resources.  6 1 

others  the  belief  that  we  defrayed  all  our  burdens  from 
funds  arising  from  the  war.  The  general  enhance- 
ment of  commodities  was  ascribed  to  an  abundance 
of  money,  and  deemed  a  symptom,  or  rather  a  proof, 
of  the  increase  of  our  national  wealth. 

These  explanations  enable  us  to  account  in  some 
measure  for  a  notion  very  prevalent  on  the  continent, 
and  which,  in  the  latitude  in  which  it  is  entertained, 
strikes  every  Englishman  with  surprise, — That  we 
prolonged  the  war  with  a  view  to  our  pecuniary  ad- 
vantage— as  if  a  charge,  which  may  be  true  in  regard 
to  particular  classes,  could,  with  any  degree  of  justice, 
be  applied  to  our  countrymen  at  large. 

The  temporary  stimulus  afforded  to  productive  in- 
dustry by  the  funding  system,  though  never  so  strik- 
ingly exemplified  before,  might  have  been  traced  in 
various  periods  of  the  history  of  Europe  during  the 
last  two  centuries.     Was  it  not  conspicuous  in  the 
long  contests  of  the  Dutch,  first  with  Spain  and  sub- 
sequently with  France,  as  well  as  in  every  war  that 
has  been  carried  on  by  England  since  the  revolution  ? 
In  none  of  these,  it  is  true,  did  the  amount  of  loans, 
and  still  less  the  amount  of  war  taxes,  bear  any  pro- 
portion to  those  of  the  present  age;  but  they  supplied 
facts  of  a  nature  to  suggest  serious  conclusions,  had 
studies  of  that  description  entered  into  the  habits  of 
our  legislators.     To  the  more  cautious  among  them, 
it  seemed  to  occur  that  our  situation  was,  in  some 
degree,  unnatural ;  that  the  great  expenditure  of  gov- 
ernment was  not  compensated,  on  the  part  of  the  pub- 
lic, by  economy,  or  by  any  great  share  of  extra  ex- 
ertion.    Hence  an  apprehension,  on  the  part  of  some, 
that  the  war  must  entail  a  burdensome  inheritance, 
but  at  what  time,  or  to  what  degree,  they  did  not  at- 
tempt to  calculate.     Of  the  reaction  to  be  expected 
at  a  peace,  no  one  appears  to  have  had  a  distinct 
conception.     To  foresee  its  extent  was,  we  admit,  im- 
possible ;  but  few  of  our  public  men  bestowed  a  se- 
rious thought  on  its  nature,  while  some  of  them  seem- 
ed hardly  aware  of  the  possibility  of  its  occurring ; 
so  limited  had  been  their  study  of  political  economv 


b'2  Causes  of  the  Rise  of  Prices 

as  a  science,  so  cursory  their  examination  of  corres- 
ponding periods  of  our  history. 


CHAP.  III. 

Effect  of  the  War  on  the  Price  of  Commodities. 

We  shall  now  fix  our  attention  on  that  general  rise 
of  prices  which  took  place  during  the  war,  and  con- 
tinued almost  without  interruption  from  1793  to  1814. 
As  this  formed  one  of  the  principal  changes  in  our 
situation,  both  individually  and  nationally,  it  is  fit  we 
should  investigate  it  with  minute  attention. 

Of  the  causes  of  rise  during  the  war,  the  principal 
were : — 

1.  The  great  demand  of  men  for  government  ser- 
vice, and  the  consequent  increase  of  wages  and 
salaries. 

2.  The  insufficiency  of  our  agricultural  produce, 
caused  partly  by  bad  seasons,  partly  by  the  drain  of 
labour  and  capital  for  the  public  service. 

3.  The  increase  of  taxation. 

4.  The  addition  to  the  cost  of  imported  articles, 
arising  from  the  greater  expense  of  freight,  insurance, 
and  other  charges  of  transport ;  and  still  more  from, 

5.  The  depreciation  of  our  bank  paper  after  the 
year  1809. 

Of  these  different  causes,  the  insufficiency  of  our 
agricultural  produce,  and  the  non-convertibility  of 
our  bank  paper,  are  reserved  for  separate  discussion : 
at  present,  we  proceed  to  the  effect  of  the  demand  of 
men  for  government  service. 

Proportion  of  our  Population  engaged  in  the  Public 
Service. — In  1792,  and  the  preceding  years  of  peace, 
the  demand  made  on  our  population  for  military  pur- 
poses was  very  limited.  In  1793,  our  levies  took 
place  on  a  large  scale,  and  in  1795,  the  numbers 


during  the  War.  03 

raised  in  three  successive  years  were  such  as  to  form 
a  very  large  establishment.  Recruiting,  however, 
continued  with  activity  during  the  whole  war,  until 
the  signature  of  the  preliminaries  of  peace,  in  the 
autumn  of  1801. — In  1803,  the  renewal  of  hostilities 
was  attended  by  a  call  on  our  population,  which  led, 
in  a  little  more  than  a  year,  to  a  more  numerous  es- 
tablishment than  we  had  ever  had  on  foot.  The  de- 
cisive victory  of  Trafalgar  removed  the  dread  of  inva- 
sion; but  the  continental  successes  of  the  French, 
the  aggrandizing  projects  of  Bonaparte,  were  such 
as  to  admit  of  no  reduction  on  our  part ;  and  after 
1808,  all  hearts  were  united  in  the  cause  of  Spanish 
independence.  Hence  a  continued  demand  for  re- 
cruits, an  increase  of  levy  money,  and  a  progressive 
addition  to  the  numbers  on  foot,  during  the  rest  of 
the  war. 

The  proportion  of  our  population  under  arms  saw 
larger  in  this  country  than  in  any  other  state  in 
Europe.  In  March  1804,  Lord  Liverpool,  then  Lord 
Hawkesbury,  declared  in  Parliament,  that  our  army 
and  navy,  including  militia,  but  exclusive  of  volun- 
teers, approached  to  the  number  of  400,000,  being 
more  than  one  in  ten  of  the  able-bodied  population 
(then  computed  at  3,800,000)  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland.  France,  he  added,  had  at  that  time  in  arms 
about  560,000  men,  or  one  in  fourteen  of  her  able- 
bodied  population.  Austria  had  on  foot  also  one 
man  in  fourteen ;  and  Russia,  if  any  dependence  was 
to  be  placed  in  the  loose  returns  of  her  population, 
nearly  the  same  proportion.  Prussia  was  the  only 
power  whose  military  force  (about  240,000)  bore, 
like  ours,  the  proportion  of  one  in  ten  to  her  able- 
bodied  males  :  but  it  was  with  her  a  season  of  peace, 
and  a  number  of  her  soldiers  were  permitted,  by  fur- 
lough, or  otherwise,  to  give  a  part  of  the  year  to  pro- 
ductive labour. 

It  is  usual  to  compute  the  proportion  of  able-bo- 
died men  in  a  country  at  a  fourth  of  the  total  popula- 
tion. The  war  of  1793  lasted  nine  years,  and  in  the 
middle  of  that  period,  (the  vear  1797  or  1798.)  the 


64  Came  of  the  Rise  of  Prices 

population  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  was  proba- 
bly about  14,000,000,  giving  for  the  able-bodied 
3,500,000. 

The  war  of  1803  lasted  twelve  years,  and  in  1809, 
the  medium  year,  our  numbers  appear  to  have  been 
somewhat  less  than  17,000,000,  giving  for  the  able- 
bodied  a  proportion  of  4,200,000.  The  year  1804 
was  in  the  middle  of  our  great  contest,  and  his  Lord- 
ship's computation  may  accordingly  be  taken  as  a 
fair  average  of  the  numbers  under  arms  during  the 
war. 

It  would  be  a  task  of  no  great  difficulty  to  compute 
and  place  in  one  column  the  number  of  our  able- 
bodied  population  for  each  year,  and  in  another  the 
number  of  soldiers,  seamen  and  militiamen  in  the 
public  service.  But  the  demand  of  war  on  popula- 
tion goes  considerably  farther,  and  extends  into  a 
field  admitting  of  less  accurate  calculation,  com- 
prising not  only  persons  in  public  offices,  dock- 
yards, &c,  but  a  number  of  individuals  unconnected 
with  government,  such  as  manufacturers  of  arms, 
clothing,  naval  stores,  builders  of  barracks,  contract- 
ors, and  others,  the  list  of  whom  is  too  diversified 
and  too  mixed  with  the  occupations  of  private  life 
to  admit  of  any  other  than  a  general  estimate.  This 
estimate  we  are  inclined  to  make,  in  the  proportion 
of  one  half  of  the  military  servants  of  the  public, 
taking  the  average  of  the  army,  navy,  and  militia,  at 
400,000  during  our  twenty-three  years  of  war,  and  at 
200,000  the  persons  deriving  an  indirect  employment 
from  the  war. 

The  number  of  men  thus  withdrawn  from  the  pur- 
suits of  private  industry,  appears  to  have  been  on  an 
average  600,000,  or  15  per  cent,  of  our  able-bodied 
population.  It  is  of  importance  to  remark,  that  they 
consisted  of  individuals  born  chiefly  between  the 
years  1770  and  1790,  a  time  when  our  population 
was  very  considerably  inferior*  to  our  numbers  in 
1800.     We  mention  the  year  1800,  because  in  the 

*  Hickman's  Preliminary  Observations  on  the  Population  Return  of  1 821 . 


during  the  War.  155 

event  of  any  contest  occurring  at  present,  our  re- 
cruits would,  in  general,  consist  of  individuals  born 
about  tbat  period,  and  the  abstraction  of  an  equal 
number  of  men  from  productive  industry  would,  of 
course,  be  less  felt  than  during  the  late  war.  The 
magnitude  of  the  change  which  it  at  that  time  pro- 
duced will  be  put  in  a  striking  light  by  a  reference 
to  our  annual  expenditure,  keeping  out  of  view  our 
payments  for  interest  of  debt,  or  the  civil  service  of 
government,  and  fixing  our  attention  on  a 

Statement  of  the  conjunct  expense  of  our  army,  navy,  and  ordnance,  from 
the  beginning  to  the  close  of  the  war,  taken  from  the  accounts  laid  before 
Parliament. 


1791 

- 

£  4,226,000 

Brought  up 

£287,333,000 

1792 

- 

8,750,000 

1804 

-■ 

30,854,000 

1793 

- 

13,511,000 

1805 

- 

36,219,000 

1794 

- 

20,247,000 

1806 

- 

37,706,000 

1795 

- 

28,751,000 

1807 

- 

36,176,000 

1796 

- 

30,165,000 

1808 

- 

39,778,000 

1797 

- 

27,606,000 

1809 

- 

42,073,000 

1798 

- 

25,982,000 

1310 

- 

43.246,000 

1799 

- 

27,257,000 

1811 

- 

47,968,000 

1800 

- 

29,613,000 

1812 

- 

49,739,000 

1801 

- 

26,998,000 

1913 

- 

54,872,000 

1802 

- 

23,121,000 

1814 

- 

60,239,000 

1803 

21,106,000 

1815 

43,282,000 

£287,333,000 

£809,485,000 

Total  exceeding-  800,000,000/. 

To  these  sums  there  remains  to  add  a  proportion 
of  our  subsidies;  we  mean  the  part  supplied  to  our 
allies,  not  in  money,  but  in  stores,  the  manufacture 
of  which  formed,  of  course,  a  farther  demand  on  our 
national  labour.  Combining  these  into  one  sum,  and 
dividing  it  by  the  number  of  years  of  military  expen- 
diture, (in  all  twenty-three,)  we  find  the  average  an- 
nual charge  for  the  army,  navy,  and  ordnance,  to  have 
been  thirty-six  millions,  instead  of  the  four  or  five 
millions  a  year  prior  to  1792. 

Observe  next,  the  difference  of  effect  on  prices  in 
a  sum  raised  for  a  military  purpose,  and  that  which 
is  levied  for  the  interest  of  the  national  debt.  The 
latter  bore,  like  all  taxation,  on  the  prices  of  com- 

9 


66  Cause  of  the  Rise  of  Prices 

modities ;  but  our  military  expenditure  had  a  double, 
or  rather  triple  effect  of  that  nature ;  first,  by  a  drain 
of  money ;  next,  by  a  drain  of  hands ;  and  thirdly,  by 
obliging  other  hands  to  work  for  those  so  withdrawn. 
It  is  only  thus  that  we  find  it  possible  to  explain 
either  the  extraordinary  rise  of  prices  in  the  war,  or 
their  no  less  extraordinary  fall  since  the  peace. 

Effect  of  Taxation  on  House-keeping. — The  result, 
or,  to  speak  more  properly,  the  avowed  tendency  of 
most  taxes,  is  an  augmentation  of  price.  Taxes  on 
commodities  are  always  imposed  on  the  calculation 
of  being  paid  by  the  consumer ;  the  supply  of  any 
article,  whether  a  luxury,  such  as  wine  and  sugar,  or 
a  necessary  of  life,  like  corn,  salt,  leather,  being  pre- 
sumed to  be  in  proportion  to  the  effectual  demand, 
and  the  tax  intended  not  as  a  burden  on  the  producer 
or  vender,  but  as  an  addition  to  the  price  paid  by 
the  consumer.  This  was  strikingly  exemplified  in 
the  enhancement  during  the  war  of  several  articles 
of  daily  use.  The  sugar  which  the  planter,  on  pay- 
ing a  moderate  duty,  could  have  afforded  to  sell  in 
England  at  60,9.  the  cwt.,  was  raised  by  the  effect  of 
new  taxes  and  war  charges  to  70s.  or  75s.  Tea 
which,  after  paying  half  its  original  cost  to  the  cus- 
tom-house, might  have  been  sold  at  5s.  or  65.  the  lb., 
was  raised,  in  consequence  of  being  taxed  100  per 
cent.,  to  Is.  or  8s.,  and  the  salt  which  (see  Sir  T.  Ber- 
nard's pamphlet  on  the  employment  of  the  labour- 
ing classes  in  1817)  might,  if  unburdened,  have  been 
afforded  at  1/.  a  ton,  was  made,  in  consequence  of  the 
duty,  to  cost  more  than  twenty  times  that  price. 

Holland  was  the  first  country  in  Europe  that  af- 
forded a  striking  example  of  the  enhancement  arising 
from  taxation,  her  long  and  expensive  struggle  against 
Spain  having  necessitated  very  heavy  imposts  so  far 
back  as  two  centuries  ago.  Sir  William  Temple, 
among  other  interesting  particulars  with  which  he 
has  diversified  the  graver  matter  of  his  Memoirs, 
takes  occasion  (Vol.  I.  Chapter  VII.)  to  insert  the 
following  remark :  "  The  excise  in  Holland  is  great, 


during  the  War. 


67 


and  so  general,  that  I  have  heard  it  observed  at  Am- 
sterdam, that  when,  in  a  tavern,  a  certain  dish  of  fish 
is  eaten  with  the  usual  sauce,  thirty  several  excises 
are  paid,  for  what  is  necessary  to  that  small  service." 
In  England  taxation  was  comparatively  light,  until 
we  became  ardent  anticipators  in  continental  war,  at 
first  under  King  William,  afterwards  under  Queen 
Anne.  A  long  peace,  and  the  prudent  administration 
of  Walpole,  lessened  for  a  time  the  pressure  of  the 
burden;  but  it  was  very  sensibly  increased  by  the 
wars  of  1740,  1756,  1775,  and,  above  all,  by  those  of 
the  present  age.  This  is  sufficiently  apparent  from 
the  following  table  of  taxes  which  affect  house- 
keeping. 


Taxes  on  the  necessaries 

or  com- 

forts  of  life. 

Taxes  on  Luxuries. 

Assessed  taxes  (previous 

Foreign  Spirits,  chiefly 

to  the  late  reduction) 

£6,500,000 

brandy 

£2,300,000 

Malt  and  Beer,  (since  the 

British  Spirits,    - 

3,000,000 

reduction  in  1822) 

6,500,000 

Wine 

1,600,000 

Sugar 

3,000,000 

Rum 

200,000 

Tea 

3,000,000 

Coffee  and  Cocoa 

300,000 

Coals  carried  coastwise 

900,000 

Raisins  and  other  fruits 

400,000 

Soap 

900,000 

Silk,  raw  and  thrown 

500,000 

Candles  and  Tallow 

400,000 

Cotton  Wool 

500,000 

Leather  (since  the  reduc- 

ductionin  1822) 

300,000 

Foreign  timber 

1,000,000 

Bricks,  tiles,  stone,  slate 

400,000 

Glass 

400,000 

Hemp 

200,000 

In  all,  above  32,000,000/.,  exclusive  of  stamp  duties 
and  postage;  also  of  taxes  on  foreign  articles,  such 
as  wool,  butter,  cheese,  linens,  drugs,  all  of  which 
have  an  effect  more  or  less  direct  on  house-keeping, 
and  were,  like  those  enumerated  above,  considerably 
increased  during  the  war. 

It  occasionally  happens,  that,  in  consequence  of 
over  Supply,  the  market  price  of  an  article  does  not 
rise  in  proportion  to  the  duty,  but  continues  as  low, 
or  nearly  as  low,  as  previous  to  its  imposition ;  the 
consequence  of  which  is  to  throw  the  new  burden  on 
the  producer.     Such  was  long  the  case  of  our  West 


68  Cause  of  the  Rise  of  Prices 

India  sugar  planters  during  the  war ;  such  is,  in  a 
great  measure,  their  case  at  present :  it  is  the  case, 
also,  of  a  far  more  numerous  class,  our  farmers,  who, 
in  1823  as  in  1815,  are  to  be  considered  as  paying 
a  large  share  of  their  taxes  out  of  their  capital.  In 
general,  however,  there  is  made  an  addition  to  the 
price  of  an  article,  not  merely  to  the  amount  of  the 
tax,  but  in  a  somewhat  increased  proportion.  Sup- 
pose a  custom  duty  paid  on  an  article  which,  on  im- 
portation, is  sold  to  a  wholesale  dealer  of  the  first 
class,  next  to  one  of  the  second  class,  and  lastly,  to  a 
retailer :  the  demand  of  a  profit  on,  or  rather  of  an 
indemnity  for  the  tax,  is  repeated  three  times ;  and 
although  these  demands  are  far  smaller  in  degree 
than  has  been  asserted  by  the  advocates  for  the  re- 
peal of  taxes,  they  form,  eventually  and  collectively, 
a  serious  addition  to  the  national  burdens ;  an  addi- 
tion which,  joined  to  the  charge  of  collecting  our 
taxes,  constitutes,  we  believe,  a  dead  loss  of  from  six 
to  seven  millions  sterling,  on  the  total  amount  paid 
by  the  public.  This  loss  will  be  effectually  lessened 
only  by  the  introduction  of  a  double  improvement ; 
a  farther  simplification,  on  the  part  of  government, 
of  the  process  of  collection,  and,  on  the  part  of  the 
public,  the  adoption  of  the  practice  of  ready  money 
payments,  so  general  in  Holland,  in  its  day  of  pros- 
perity. 

Next,  as  to  taxation  in -a  more  direct  and  undis- 
guised form,  such  as  the  assessed  or  the  property 
taxes.  In  what  manner,  it  may  be  asked,  do  indi- 
viduals in  general  meet  burdens  of  that  description  ? 
Is  it  by  self-denial  and  economy,  by  increased  indus- 
try, or  by  adding  the  amount  of  the  tax  to  the  charge 
which,  in  their  respective  lines  of  business,  they  make 
on  the  public  ?  Economy  is  practised,  we  may  be  as- 
sured, by  those  only  whose  income  admits  of  no  in- 
crease ;  augmented  exertion  is  more  natural  to  our 
countrymen,  and  was,  doubtless,  made  to  bear  a  con- 
siderable part  in  defraying  our  war  burdens ;  but  the 
latter,  whenever  it  was  at  all  practicable,  were  charg- 
ed by  the  payer  on  his  customers  or  connexions  ;  and 


during  the  War.  69 

the  result,  as  explained  in  the  last  chapter,  was  a  pro- 
gressive enhancement  not  only  of  commodities,  but 
of  salaries,  professional  fees,  and  labour  of  every 
kind. 

Collective  Effect  of  the  various  Causes  of  Enhancement. — 
The  total  rise  in  prices  during  the  war,  appears  to 
have  been  between  60  and  70  per  cent,  160  or  170/. 
being  required  in  1813  to  make  the  purchases, 
whether  for  the  necessaries,  comforts,  or  luxuries  of 
life,  which  were  made  in  1792  for  100/.  The  de- 
gree of  rise  was,  doubtless,  different  in  different  situ- 
ations, but  in  regard  to  the  public  at  large,  that  pro- 
portion will,  we  believe,  be  found  to  hold.  To  fa- 
cilitate the  comprehension  of  this  somewhat  intricate 
inquiry,  it  may  be  useful  to  descend  into  the  details 
of  domestic  life,  and  to  refer  the  reader  to  the  sub- 
joined table  of  family  expenditure. 

Comparative  Expenditure  of  a  Family  of  the  middle  class  in  England  in 
the  years  1792  and  1813;  discriminating  the  heads  of  expense  (by  JVos. 
1,  2, 3,  4,)  so  as  to  show  the  rise  produced  respectively  by  each  cause  of 
enhancement. 

1.  Taxation  was  evidently  the  chief  cause  of  rise  in  the  following-  heads, 
of  expense: 

1792.  1813. 
Assessed  taxes  and  poor-rate  -  -  -  £  1 8  47 
Wine  and  spirits  -  -  -  -  -16  35 
Tea,  sugar,  and  other  groceries  -  -  -  22  38 
Beer  (partly  from  taxation,  partly  from  enhance- 
ment of  com)             -             -             -             -  -711 

•2.  The  advance  of  labour,  the  occurrence  of  indif- 
ferent seasons,  and  the  difficulty  of  import  (from 
the  rise  of  freight,  and  depreciation  of  our  bank 
paper  after  1809,)  were  the  principal  causes  of 
enhancing 

Bread  --.-__ 

Butcher  meat  - 

Milk,  butter,  cheese,  vegetables  -  -  » 

3.  The  advance  of  labour  was  chiefly  instrumental 
in  raising 

Servants1  wages  -  -  -  -  -  18         22 

House  rent,   the  rent   of  houses  in  occupancy 

being  determined  by  the  expense  of  building- 

new  lieuses,  and  the  latter  by  the  price  of  la- 

60      i©6 


25 

50 

25 

45 

50 

85 

70  Cause  of  the  Rise  of  Prices 


1792. 

1813. 

Clothes            ...--, 

£60 

85 

Fuel              -                                      - 

24 

35 

Furniture ;  whether  we  consider  the  irterest  on 

the  money  vested  in  its  purchase ;  which  we 

calculate  at 

42 

63 

Or  annual  repairs  and  purchases,  estimated  at 

14 

24 

6 

10 

16 

25 

14 

22 

14 

20 

35 

55 

30 

50 

35 

60 

4.  The  rise  of  the  following-  can  hardly  be  referred 
to  any  particular  head,  but  appear  the  mixed  re- 
sult of  taxation,  enhanced  labour,  and  depreci- 
ated currency. 

Articles  of  leather  manufacture,  chiefly  boots 

and  shoes         - 
Candles  and  oil 
Washing-  - 

Education  - 

Medical  attendance         - 
Incidents,  such  as  postage,  stationary,  charity, 

pocket  disburse         - 
Expenses  of  a   less  necessary  character,  viz. 

travelling-,   and  temporary  residence  in  the 

country         - 
Expense  of  company      V  - 

Total         £540       900 

A  table  of  this  kind,  useful  as  it  in  some  degree  is, 
will  hardly  enable  us  to  ascertain  with  precision  the 
rise  proceeding  from  each  of  the  great  causes  of  en- 
hancement. But  as  on  so  interesting  a  topic  no 
inquiry  can  be  too  minute,  we  shall  endeavour,  by 
varying  our  plan  and  resorting  to  other  grounds  of 
calculation,  to  attain  the  desired  result. 

Effect  of  Taxation. — For  an  estimate  of  the  effect  of 
taxes  on  house-keeping,  we  are  in  some  measure  pre- 
pared, by  the  tables  in  our  second  chapter.  These, 
as  well  as  our  subsequent  calculations,  (see  the 
chapter  on  National  Revenue  and  Expenditure,)  ex- 
hibit the  proportion  borne  at  different  periods  (1792, 
1806,  and  1.813.)  by  our  burdens  to  our  resources. 
And  the  result  is,  that  the  increase  of  our  taxes, 
during  the  war,  amounted  to  a  charge  of  nine  per  cent, 
on  our  national  capital.  This,  the  arithmetical  re- 
sult, is  greatly  below  the  general  estimate  of  the 
taxes  imposed  during  the  war.  It  is  also  below  the 
addition  which  tliev  will  be  found  to  have  caused  t<* 


during  the  War.  7 1 

our  prices,  when  we  take  into  account  the  obstacles 
they  create  to  improvement  in  our  agriculture  and 
manufactures.  These  various  impediments,  unknown 
to  the  public,  but  severely  felt  by  the  persons  on 
whose  different  lines  of  occupation  they  bear,  all  tend 
to  keep  up  or  augment  prices,  and  their  collective 
effect  was,  we  believe,  such  as  amply  to  justify  our 
computing  the  addition  to  our  prices,  from  our  war 
taxation,  at  twelve  instead  of  nine  per  cent.  Of  this 
we  shall  treat  more  fully  in  our  concluding  chapter, 
when  we  come  to  urge  the  expediency  of  a  farther 
reduction  in  our  public  burdens. 

Substitution  of  Bank  Paper  for  Coin. — Here  we  in- 
troduce a  cause  to  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  great 
majority  of  the  public,  we  ought  to  ascribe  the  chief 
part  of  the  rise  of  prices  during  the  war.  This,  how- 
ever, is  a  very  complicated  question,  and  one  which 
will  require  all  the  elucidation  that  a  separate  dis- 
cussion can  confer  on  it.  At  present  we  shall  merely 
observe,  that  the  addition  to  our  prices,  arising  from 
the  fall  of  our  currency,  from  the  inferiority  in  value 
of  our  paper  to  coin,  appears  to  have  been  about  15 
per  cent,  during  the  latter  years  of  the  war. 

Rise  in  the  Price  of  Labour. — To  what  are  we  to  at- 
tribute the  remarkable  rise  in  the  rate  of  labour 
during  the  late  wars  ? — To  two  main  causes  :  the  de- 
mand of  men  for  the  public  service,  and  the  increased 
expense  of  provisions.  In  the  first  years  of  the  war, 
the  rise  was  caused  only  by  the  demand  of  men  for 
the  public  service,  and  provisions  had  very  little 
share  in  the  enhancement  during  1793  and  1794. 
But  after  1795,  and  still  more  after  1799,  the  addi- 
tional cost  of  provisions  became  such  as  to  oblige  the 
labourer  and  mechanic,  in  self-defence,  to  stipulate 
a  higher  money  payment  for  his  services. 

A  rise  of  wages  may  be  either  real  or  nominal. 
That  which  was  consequent  on  the  demand  for  the 
militia,  army,  and  navy,  proved  a  real  and  bona  fide 
addition,  the  mechanic  or  manufacturer  who  remain- 


72  Causes  of  the  Rise  of  Prices 

ed  at  home  being  in  greater  request,  and  receiving 
larger  pay  from  his  employer,  without  reference  to 
an  increase  in  his  expenditure.  But  a  rise  of  wages 
proceeding  from  a  rise  of  provisions  is  very  different : 
the  addition,  in  one  sense,  is  merely  a  balance  to  the 
addition  in  another,  and  the  augmentation  is  conse- 
quently nominal.  To  such  an  extent  did  this  hold  in 
the  case  of  our  labouring  classes  during  the  war,  that 
the  28s.  or  30s.  paid  them  weekly  in  our  provincial 
towns  in  1 812,  were  hardly  more  available  in  the  pur- 
chase of  the  necessaries  or  comforts  of  life,  than  15s. 
in  1792. 

Effect  of  a  Rise  in  the  Price  of  Labour  on  Housekeep- 
ing Expenses. — The  direct  effect  of  such  a  rise  is 
readily  seen  in  the  increase  of  servants'  wages  ;  but 
its  indirect  operation,  its  enhancement  of  work  per- 
formed out  of  doors,  is  of  much  more  consequence. 
This  will  be  at  once  apparent  on  our  analyzing  the 
component  parts  of  the  cost  of  manufactures.  In  cot- 
ton goods,  after  all  the  aid  derived  from  machinery, 
labour  still  constitutes  nearly  a  third  of  the  price ; 
while  in  woollens,  leather,  hardware,  linen,  and  per- 
haps in  silk,  its  proportion  is  more  nearly  a  half. 
Next,  as  to  a  very  different  head  in  family  expen- 
diture, that  of  house-rent,  the  chief  constituent  of 
charge  is  labour,  since  in  a  country  of  increasing 
population,  the  rent  of  houses  in  occupancy  is  regu- 
lated by  the  cost  of  new  buildings ;  and  in  regard  to 
these,  the  command  of  materials  being  unlimited,  the 
question  resolves  itself  into  a  calculation  of  the  ex- 
pense of  the  requisite  labour.  In  the  case  of  fur- 
niture, a  similar  remark  is  applicable ;  and  even  in 
services  of  a  higher  class,  such  as  teaching  or  medi- 
cal attendance,  the  influence  of  this  cause  (rise  of 
labour)  is  not  excluded. 

To  the  lower  orders  the  rate  of  labour,  in  a  direct 
sense,  is  of  little  consequence,  as  they  are  accustomed 
to  serve  themselves  ;  but,  in  an  indirect  sense,  by  en- 
hancing corn,  it  proves  of  the  greatest  importance, 


during  the  War.  73 

Effect  of  an  enhancement  of  Com  on  House-keeping. — 
A  return  of  the  ten  years  of  peace  preceding  1793, 
gave  as  the  average  of  the  quarter  of  wheat  in  the 
Windsor  market,  2/.  10.?.  9 J.     But  thirteen  years  of 
war,  from  1793  to  1805  (both  inclusive,)  gave  for  the 
quarter  of  wheat  an  average  of  3/.  17s.  2d. ;  in  other 
words,   152/.  were  required  to  purchase  the  same 
quantity  as  100/.  previous  to  the  war.     And  the  suc- 
ceeding eight  years,  from  1806  to  1813,  gave  the  still 
higher  average  of  5/.  Is.  8(/.,  for  the  quarter  of  wheat, 
denoting  that  no  less  than  200/.  were,  during  that 
period,  required  to  purchase  what,  previous  to  the 
war,  had  been  obtained  for  100/.     Such  was  the  rise 
in  wheat :  in  butcher  meat,  and  agricultural  produce 
generally,  the  enhancement  appears  to  have  been 
nearly  equal ;  but  for  these  and  other  details,  we  re- 
fer to  the  Appendix,  and  proceed  to  lay  before  our 
readers  a  statement  of  the  general  result. 


Summaj'y  of  the  Rise  in  House-keeping  at  the  close  of  the  late  Wars^ 
making  the  calculation  in  the  most  comprehensive  form,  so  as  to  be  appli- 
cable, not  to  particular  classes,  but  to  the  public  at  large. 

Proportion  of  rise  proceeding-  from  increase  of  Taxation  12  per  cent. 
from  rise  of  wages  and  labour  ge- 
nerally                            -                                                          20     ditto 
from  the  enhancement  of   provi- 


sions, (see  Appendix)  -  30     ditto 

Of  this  rise  in  provisions,  we  may  ascribe  perhaps  the  half 
(or  15  per  cent.)  to  the  rise  of  labour,  and  other  farming1 
charges  consequent  on  the  demand  of  men  for  the  public 
service  :  the  other  1 5  per  cent,  to  the  depreciation  of  our 
bank  paper,  enhancement  of  freight,  and  other  charges 
attendant  on  import. 
Proportion  of  rise  from  extra  charges  on  the  purchase  and 
import  of  other  articles  than  corn  ;  such  as  wool,  cotton, 
tobacco  ---__.  5      ditto 

Total  -  67  per  cent. 

Such  appears  to  have  been  the  operation  of  the 
different  causes  of  enhancement  during  the  war. — 
We  proceed  to  exemplify  that  rise  by  a  reference  to 
real  property. 

Land. — The  farm  which,  in  1792,  let  for  170/.; 
and  which,  in  1803,  (see  the  tabular  return  of  charges 

10 


74  General  Rise  of  Prices 

of  cultivation  in  the  chapter  on  Agriculture,)  afford- 
ed a  rental  of  240/.  let  in  1813,  for  320/. 

Houses. — The  house  which,  in  1792,  let  for  50/., 
and  in  1806,  for  65/.,  might  be  considered  in  the  lat- 
ter years  of  the  war,  as  worth  70/.,  the  rise  being  less 
great  in  houses  than  in  land.  Its  value,  as  a  purchase, 
originally  1000/.,  was  raised  towards  the  middle  of 
our  long  contest  to  1300/.,  and  eventually  to  1400/. 
or  1500/. 

To  define  the  amount  of  the  rise  of  prices  in  par- 
ticular commodities,  would  be  a  task  of  great  labour 
and  nicety :  the  only  person  who  attempted  it  was 
the  late  Arthur  Young,  of  whose  calculations  we  shall 
treat  afterwards.  If,  for  the  sake  of  conferring  some 
degree  of  precision  on  an  obscure  subject,  an  attempt 
be  made  to  divide  the  progress  of  enhancement  into 
periods,  we  may  consider  the  war  as  having  produced 
half  its  effect  towards  the  year  ]  806,  viz.  that  the 
rise  of  prices  taken  in  the  most  comprehensive  sense, 
whether  of  provisions,  clothing,  labour,  or  profes- 
sional charges,  was  in  that  year  somewhat  more  than 
30  per  cent,  above  the  prices  of  1792.  From  1806 
to  1813  the  rise  was  more  rapid,  in  consequence  of 
the  double  effect  of  a  non-convertible  currency,  and 
extended  military  operations,  so  that  in  1813  and 
1814  the  enhancement  was  30  or  35  per  cent,  on  the 
prices  of  1806,  or  about  67  per  cent,  on  those  of  1792. 

How  far  was  this  rise  of  prices  nominal? — It  is  incum- 
bent on  the  attentive  inquirer,  to  guard  against  the 
error  so  frequent  in  former  years,  and  at  present  by 
no  means  exploded,  of  considering  a  rise  of  prices  in 
the  light  of  a  bona  fide  addition  to  our  public,  wealth. 
The  reader,  on  referring  to  the  preceding  table  of 
house-keeping  expense,  and  considering  how  differ- 
ent trades  and  professions, are  linked  together,  will 
readily  perceive  the  manner  in  which  an  individual, 
on  the  occurrence  of  a  rise  of  prices  in  his  particular 
department,  indemnifies  himself  by  a  charge  on  the 
community.  If,  for  the  sake  of  illustration,  we  ad- 
vert to  articles  of  daily  consumption,   and   to   the 


during  the  War.  15 

tradesmen  who  are  most  familiar  to  us,  we  find  the 
baker  and  butcher  raise,  of  course,  their  demands 
on  their  customers,  in  proportion  as  the  prices  of 
their  articles  are  raised  to  them  by  the  farmer  or 
grazier.  In  a  similar,  though  not  equally  direct 
manner,  the  teacher  augments  his  charge  for  board 
and  instruction;  the  upholsterer,  the  price  of  his 
furniture ;  the  landlord,  the  rent  of  his  houses.  The 
whole  partakes  of  the  nature  of  circulation ;  or,  to 
borrow  an  expression  from  Mr.  S.  Gray,  of  "  charge 
and  counter-charge." 

But  a  rise  which  is  common  to  all  can  be  little  else 
than  nominal.  The  owner  of  a  house  or  land  was 
hardly  able  to  purchase  more  commodities  with  the 
increased  rent,  during  the  war,  than  with  the  limited 
sum  paid  to  him  in  1792.  He  found  130/.  in  1806,  or 
160/.  in  1813,  of  no  greater  value  than  100/.  at  the 
beginning  of  the  French  Revolution ;  and  the  correct 
mode  of  speaking  is,  that  land  and  houses  rose  in 
money  rent  in  proportion  as  money  declined  in  value, 
that  is,  they  maintained  a  nearly  uniform  value,  though 
the  sum  paid  was  very  different.  The  same  is  appli- 
cable, as  we  shall  see  presently,  to  the  far  greater 
part  of  income,  whether  arising  from  property  or 
labour:  from  capital  vested  in  trade,  manufacture, 
or  agriculture ;  from  wages,  salaries,  or  professional 
charges,  the  sum  paid  having  regularly  increased  as 
its  value  diminished. 

Money  Property,  such  as  a  Loan  on  Mortgage.— We 
here  advert  to  a  description  of  property  materially 
different  from  land  or  houses,  a  property  which  ex- 
periences neither  rise  or  fall,  whatever  be  the  fluc- 
tuations in  the  value  of  money.  Suppose  a  sum 
(3,200/.)  to  have  been  advanced  on  mortgage  in  1792, 
and  to  have  remained  on  that  security  during  the 
war,  it  will  hardly  be  denied  that  in  such  years 
as  1811  or  1812,  it  was  considered  a  property  of 
less  value  than  previous  to  the  war.  The  160/. 
which  the  owner  continued  to  draw  as  interest,  was 


76  General  Rise  of  Prices 

in  these  years  worth  to  him  little  more  than  100/.  iti 
1792. 

Proportion  of  national  Income  affected  in  this  Manner.— 
The  reader  on  referring  to  our  estimate  of  taxable  in- 
come, in  the  chapter  on  National  Revenue,  will  find 
the  sums  paid  to  annuitants,  whether  creditors  of  the 
public  or  of  individuals,  computed  at  50,000,000/.  a 
year,  or  one-fifth  of  the  total  national  income.  The 
receivers  of  the  other  four-fifths,  whether  landholders, 
farmers, merchants,  or  manufacturers;  whether  clerks, 
mechanics,  or  country  labourers,  obtained  in  their 
annual  income,  (in  the  form  of  rent,  salary,  wages, 
&c.)  an  addition  corresponding,  or  nearly  corres- 
ponding to  the  decline  in  the  value  of  money.  From 
this  benefit  were  excluded  the  annuitants,  to  the 
extent  we  have  mentioned ;  and  many  of  them  would 
have  felt  more  severely  the  diminished  value  of  their 
receipts,  had  it  not  been  indirectly  counterpoised  by 
the  activity  arising  from  the  war,  and  the  consequent 
facility  in  providing  for  their  connexions  in  the  public 
service. 

Since  the  peace,  the  relative  situation  of  these 
great  portions  of  the  community  has,  as  is  well  known, 
been  reversed.  Annuitants  have  found  their  incomes 
recover  their  value ;  while  the  other  classes,  above 
all,  the  agriculturists,  have  experienced  the  most  dis- 
tressing effects  from  the  fall  of  prices. 

Change  in  the  Value  of  Money. — Our  readers  will 
now  be  able  to  form  a  definite  idea  of  what  is  meant 
when  we  speak  of  a  fall  or  rise  in  the  value  of  money. 
The  fall  of  prices  since  the  peace  has  been  very  dif- 
ferent in  different  articles ;  for  while  in  the  produce 
of  the  soil  it  is  above  60,  and  in  several  branches  of 
manufacture  above  50  per  cent.,  in  the  case  of  house- 
rent,  or  the  wages  of  mechanics,  it  probably  does  not 
exceed  15  per  cent.  But  the  business  of  the  statis- 
tical inquirer  is  with  the  average,  which  is,  doubtless, 
not  less  than  30  per  cent,  on  all  payments  determined 
by  free  competition ;  in  other  words,  in  all  articles 


during  the  War.  ,    7? 

brought  to  open  market.     In  payments  of  a  different 
nature,  such  as  professional  fees,  salaries,  servants' 
wages,  the  decrease  is   as  yet  inconsiderable ;    be- 
cause in  these  there  exists  no  ready  appeal  to  com- 
petition, no  prompt  means  of  overcoming  the  oppo- 
sition to  reduction.     In  London,  journeymen  in  va- 
rious trades  are,  in  consequence  of  their  system  of 
combining,  still  in  the  receipt  of  5s.  or  6s.  a  day,  as  in 
the  season  of  war  and  expensive  living ;  but  such  a 
state  of  things  can  hardly  be  of  long  duration.     The 
fall  of  provisions,  the  example  of  other  countries,  the 
diminished  profit  of  capital,  all  point  to  the  necessity 
of  a  change,  and  will  eventually  overcome  resistance, 
whether  on  the  part  of  the  lower  orders,  or  of  the  re- 
ceivers of  pensions  and  salaries,  in  whom,  possessing 
as  they  do  better  means  of  information  and  compari- 
son, pertinacity  in  retention  would  be  more  repre- 
hensible.    As  such  reduction,  therefore,  will,  in  all 
probability,  become  general,  and  the  words,  "  fall  of 
price,"  are  too  limited  to  express  a  decrease  of  such 
incomes  as  arise  from  personal  exertion,  we  adopt  the 
more  comprehensive  phrase  of  a  "  rise  or  fall  in  the 
value  of  money." 

Prices  on  the  Continent  since  1792. — In  how  far,  in 
the  present  age,  have  the  other  countries  of  Europe 
participated  in  those  fluctuations  of  money  which 
among  us  have  reached  so  extraordinary  a  length  ? 
This  question  is  of  no  easy  solution,  as  well  from 
want  of  documents  in  countries  which  had  then  no 
representative  assembly,  as  from  a  depreciated  paper 
having  been  current  in  almost  every  part  of  Europe. 
France,  the  only  state  that  has  equalled  us  in  the  du- 
ration of  her  wars,  exhibits  a  remarkable  contrast  to 
us  in  the  extent  of  her  financial  burdens.  Her  taxa- 
tion, amounting  in  the  beginning  of  the  revolution,  to 
about  twenty-two  millions  sterling,  (see  the  Report 
of  Camus  to  the  National  Assembly,  in  July  1790,)  was 
never  increased  by  more  than  the  half  of  that  sum ; 
while  our  sixteen  millions  of  1793,  became  forty  five 
millions  in  1804;  sixty  millions  in  1808*  and  nearly 


78  General  Rise  of  Prices 

seventy  millions  in  1814.  In  fact,  in  the  early  part 
of  the  revolutionary  war,  the  collection  of  revenue  in 
France  was  (see  the  Due  de  Gaete  on  French  Finance,) 
considerably  under  twenty  millions ;  the  wants  of  go- 
vernment having  been  supplied  by  the  emission  of 
assignats  during  four  years  of  emergency,  (1792-3-4-5) 
and  afterwards,  in  a  considerable  degree,  by  contri- 
butions from  conquered  territories.  After  the  fervour 
of  the  first  years  of  the  revolution,  there  was  in 
France  no  legislative  body  capable  of  conferring 
credit  on  government  stock  :  no  exemption  from  cash 
payments  to  facilitate  to  the  payers  of  taxes,  the 
means  of  reimbursing  themselves  by  a  ready  addi- 
tion to  wages,  salaries,  or  professional  fees.  The 
amount  emitted  in  the  form  of  assignats  admits  of  no 
definite  calculation,  the  value  of  that  government 
paper  having  fallen  rapidly,  and  having  been  at  last, 
in  1796,  reduced  to  a  nullity.  But  if  we  compute  at 
two  hundred  millions  sterling  the  amount  of  public 
sacrifice  from  the  assignats,  and  if  we  add  for  the 
bankruptcy  committed  in  regard  to  two-thirds  of  the 
public  debt,  the  forced  loan  of  1797,  and  the  aug- 
mented taxation  of  the  latter  years  of  Bonaparte,  two 
hundred  millions  more  ;  and,  finally,  if  we  add  a  na- 
tional loss  of  one  hundred  millions,  consequent  on  his 
inauspicious  return  from  Elba,  and  the  invasion  of 
1815,  we  make  in  all  a  pecuniary  sacrifice  on  the 
part  of  France,  of  five  hundred  millions  sterling,  over 
and  above  the  twenty-two  millions  of  annual  expen- 
diture necessary  under  a  peace  establishment. 

But  the  political  strength  of  our  southern  neigh- 
bour lies  less  in  money  than  in  men,  and  that  forced 
annual  levy  which  would  be  so  indignantly  received 
among  us,  and  so  subversive  of  the  resources  of  a 
commercial  and  manufacturing  country,  proved  the 
most  effectual  means  of  drawing  forth  the  power  of 
France.  In  this  respect  accordingly,  her  sacrifices 
have  been  very  great,  the  number  of  men  who  fell  in 
the  long  struggle  from  1792  to  1815,  estimated,  on  a 
moderate  computation,  at  a  million  and  a  half,  being 
probably  more  than  three  times  the  number  lost  by 


during  the  War.  79 


r> 


our  country,  after  every  allowance  for  the  destructive 
effect  of  tropical  climates.  In  another  respect,  also, 
the  neglect  of  education  and  postponement  of  the 
choice  of  a  profession  attendant  on  the  Conscription, 
as  well  as  the  loss  of  time  to  those  who  escaped  the 
sword  and  resumed  a  pacific  occupation,  form  an 
amount  of  national  detriment  which  may  very  fairly 
be  put  in  the  balance  against  the  vast  loss  sustained 
in  this  country  by  the  transition  from  war  to  peace. 

The  Netherlands,  subjected  during  twenty  years  to 
the  sway  of  France,  and  during  a  part  of  the  time  to 
the  Conscription,  were  also  exposed  to  heavy  losses 
from  the  war.  If  less  great  than  those  of  France  in 
men,  they  were  larger  in  a  financial  and  commercial 
sense,  as  well  from  augmented  taxation  as  from  in- 
terrupted intercourse,  and  the  many  abortive  at- 
tempts made,  during  the  enforcement  of  the  pro- 
hibitory decrees,  to  produce  substitutes  for  coffee 
and  other  articles,  the  growth  of  a  tropical  climate. 

Of  the  other  European  powers,  the  chief  bellige- 
rent was  Austria,  whose  pecuniary  sacrifice  was  les- 
sened by  our  subsidies,  but  whose  loss  in  men  amount- 
ed perhaps  to  the  half  of  that  of  France.  Next  came 
Prussia,  Spain,  Russia,  Sweden,  in  whose  case  the 
duration  of  suffering  was  less,  but  who  were  all  doom- 
ed  to  feel  the  destructive  ravage  of  war  and  invasion. 
A  pressure  of  a  more  lasting  kind,  we  mean  that 
which  is  attendant  on  the  maintenance  of  a  large 
standing  force,  extended  to  every  state,  great  and 
small  on  the  Continent,  from  1793  to  1814.  Their 
taxation  consequently  increased,  and  the  general  de- 
mand for  men  was  followed  by  a  general  rise  in  the 
price  of  labour.  The  impractibility  of  effecting  loans 
prevented  that  stimulus  to  productive  industry,  that 
drain  on  the  future  in  favour  of  the  present,  which 
took  place  among  us  to  so  great  an  extent :  nor  was 
there  in  any  part  of  the  Continent  a  continued  in- 
adequacy of  agricultural  produce.  Accordingly, 
though  prices  on  the  Continent  became  higher  in  war 
than  they  had  been  in  peace,  though  during  the  one 
period  the  demand  for  labour  was  brisk,  in  the  oilier 


80  General  Rise  of  Prices 

languid,  the  degree  of  difference  was  much  smaller 
than  with  us.  This  topic  shall  be  more  fully  treated 
in  a  subsequent  part  of  our  volume,  (Appendix  to 
Chap.  IX.)  but  were  we,  for  the  sake  of  arriving  at  a 
definite  estimate,  to  hazard  a  conjecture  of  the  dif- 
ference between  the  present  prices  on  the  Continent 
and  those  of  1792,  we  should  pronounce  the  former 
about  15  per  cent,  higher,  being  half  the  enhance- 
ment that  we  find  in  England,  comparing  our  pre- 
sent prices  to  those  of  1792. 

This  excess  on  our  part  in  the  ratio  of  enhance- 
ment, added  to  a  nearly  similar  excess  in  prices  pre- 
vious to  1792,  makes  a  total  difference  between  this 
country  and  the  Continent  of  from  20  to  30  per  cent. 
The  leading  causes  of  this  are  our  heavy  excise  du- 
ties, the  larger  size  of  our  towns,  and  the  occasional 
operation  of  our  corn  laws.  The  balance  against  us 
would  be  still  greater,  were  it  not  in  a  considerable 
degree  counteracted  by  the  cheapness  of  fuel  and  of 
several  articles  of  manufacture,  in  particular  hard- 
ware, in  which  our  command  of  capital,  our  inland 
navigation,  and  our  machinery,  afford  us  a  consi- 
derable advantage  over  the  Continent. 

Rise  of  Prices  apparently  indicative  of  Prosperity. — 
An  increase  in  the  money  value  of  commodities,  of 
land,  houses,  and  stock  in  trade,  accompanied  by  a 
general  augmentation  of  salaries  and  wages,  suggest- 
ed during  the  war  the  idea  of  a  general  increase  of 
wealth  in  correspondence^  was  commonly  believed, 
to  the  increase  in  our  circulating  medium. 

We  have  already  shown  that  this  was,  in  a  great 
measure,  nominal:  the  augmented  price  of  commodi- 
ties, of  laud,  houses,  merchandise,  required,  to  repre- 
sent it,  a  larger  sum  of  money,  but  that  such  money- 
was  of  less  value.  Or,  if  we  admit  that  there  was  in 
several  respects  an  increase  of  property,  that  the 
general  briskness  caused  by  the  demands  of  govern- 
ment led  to  an  actual  rise  of  prices,  a  rise  over  and 
above  that  which  was  requisite  to  meet  the  alteration 
in  ihp  value  of  the  currencv,  it  is  fit.  on  the  other 


during  the  War,  81 


"5 


hand,  to  recollect  that  the  fixed  money  property  of 
the  country,  such  as  the  stocks  and  loans  on  mort- 
gage, all  underwent  depreciation,  because  in  these 
the  same  sums  represented  a  reduced  value.  What 
then  was  the  real  result  ?  That,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
national  property  was  lessened  by  the  great  addition- 
al charge  arising  from  the  war:  on  the  other,  it  was 
augmented  in  proportion,  not  to  the  rise  of  prices,  but 
to  the  progress  of  national  improvement  and  increase 
of  population.  No  such  limitations,  however,  were 
admitted  in  the  estimate  of  the  public,  or  as  far  as 
we  can  perceive,  in  that  of  ministers :  both  confident- 
ly inferred  prosperity  from  rise  of  prices,  and  appear 
never  to  have  suspected  that,  such  a  rise  was  decep- 
tive, and  might  take  its  origin,  in  great  part,  from  an 
increase  of  burden. 

What  a  train  of  misconception,  what  a  series  of 
sanguine  and  fallacious  notions  would  have  been 
prevented,  had  the  public  been  earlier  aware  of  these 
simple  truths  !  During  the  war,  the  rise  of  price  was 
so  regular,  and  of  such  long  continuance,  (from  1793 
to  1814,)  that  the  majority  of  the  present  generation 
took  for  granted  that  it  would  be  permanent,  ascri- 
bing it  less  to  the  war  and  the  demands  of  govern- 
ment, than  to  causes  likely  to  be  permanent, — such 
as  the  unknown  gains  of  our  foreign  commerce,  or  the 
influx  of  the  precious  metals  of  America.  But  in  this, 
as  in  other  points,  the  return  of  peace  has  undeceived 
us ;  it  has  shown  that  the  amount  of  our  commercial 
gains,  and  the  influx  of  specie,  were  both  over-rated ; 
and  that  the  origin  of  high  prices  is  to  be  sought  in 
less  welcome  causes.  Of  these,  the  demand  for  men 
for  the  public  service,  the  insufficiency  of  our  growth 
of  corn,  and  the  depreciation  of  our  bank  paper,  have 
all,  for  some  time,  ceased  to  operate,  but  their  effect? 
have  by  no  means  ceased ;  while  the  fourth  cause, 
we  mean  taxation,  continues  to  press  on  us  with  al- 
most undiminished  rigour. 

Evil  of  high  Prices  when  peculiar  to  a  Country. — The 
pernicious   tendency  of  fluctuation  in  the  value  of 

11 


82  General  Rise  of  Prices 

money  is  generally  admitted,  but  that  of  a  general 
rise  of  prices  is  less  understood :  it  is  even  the  notion 
of  a  number  of  writers,  and  of  a  still  greater  number 
of  practical  men,  that  taxation,  though  a  great  cause 
of  enhancement,  is  productive  of  no  injury  in  a  public 
sense,  because  the  money  thus  collected  is  almost  all 
expended  at  home.  This  idea  has  induced  the  writer 
already  mentioned  (Mr.  S.  Gray,)  whose  views,  sound 
and  liberal  in  several  respects,  are  in  others  greatly 
impaired  by  over-confidence,  to  give  our  national  debt 
the  convenient  name  of  "public  service  capital." 
"  The  payment  of  the  interest  is,"  says  Mr.  Gray,  in 
the  work  entitled, 6  All  Classes  productive  of  National 
Wealth,' (p.  136,)  "no  disadvantage:  the  public  is 
just  where  it  was  before :  they  have  had  thirty  mil- 
lions charged  on  them,  for  the  interest  of  the  national 
debt,  and  they  have  charged  thirty  millions  in  re- 
turn."— All  this  might  be  true  were  the  British  Islands 
a  distinct  planet,  or  were  they  separated  from  the 
rest  of  the  world  by  a  "  wall  of  brass  ten  thousand 
cubits  high:"  but  doomed  as  we  are  to  intercourse 
with  our  continental  brethren,  does  not  an  excess  of 
taxation  place  us  under  a  great  relative  disadvantage 
in  a  competition  with  foreign  manufacturers ?  And. 
before  the  fall  in  our  corn  market,  was  it  not  to  be 
apprehended, that  our  capitalists  might  transfer  to  less 
burdened  countries,  that  money,  that  machinery, and, 
in  part,  those  hands,  which  have  so  effectually  con- 
duced to  make  us  support  our  financial  pressure? 

A  writer  of  great  notoriety,  without  carrying  his 
doctrine  so  far  as  Mr.  Gray,  expresses,  in  more  places 
than  one,  an  opinion  that  high  taxation  imposes  on 
us  no  disadvantage  relatively  to  our  neighbours,  or, 
to  use  his  own  words,  that  "  a  generally  high  price 
of  commodities  in  consequence  of  taxation  would  be 
of  no  disadvantage  to  a  state."*  This  op  nion  Mr. 
Ricardo  repeats  in  another  passage  (p.  305,)  where 
he  says,  that  the  "  amount  of  taxes  and  the  increased 
price  of  labour  in  a  country  does  not,  according  to 

*  Ricardo  on  Political  Economy,  2d  edition,  p.  283. 


during  the  War.  8.3 

his  ideas,  place  it  under  any  other  disadvantage  with 
respect  to  foreign  countries,  except  the  unavoidable 
one  of  paying  these  taxes."  But  he  soon  after  makes 
a  highly  important  qualification,  by  admitting  that 
these  charges  render  it  the  interest  of  every  con- 
tributor to  "  withdraw  his  shoulder  from  the  burden, 
and,  in  many  cases,  to  remove  himself  and  his  capital 
to  another  country ;"  a  course  replete  with  the  most 
injurious  results. 

Were  we  to  suppose,  for  the  sake  of  illustration, 
that  the  whole  of  the  civilized  world,  the  whole  of 
the  states  who  carry  on  a  commercial  intercourse 
with  each  other,  were  simultaneously  involved  in 
war  and  obliged  to  impose  on  themselves  burdens 
which  bear  the  same  proportion  to  the  taxable  in- 
come of  each  : — the  consequence  would  be  a  concur- 
rent and  uniform  rise  of  prices ;  and  a  contest,  after 
lasting  twenty  years,  might  terminate  without  any 
relative  disadvantage  to  any  of  the  belligerents,  as 
far  as  regarded  their  finances,  or  the  state  of  their 
productive  labour.  But  in  every  war  there  are  cer- 
tain states,  whose  rulers  have  the  prudence  to  avoid 
participating  in  the  unprofitable  struggle,  and  who 
secure  to  their  subjects  the  advantages  of  neutrality, 
along  with  an  exemption  from  the  burdens  entailed 
on  their  neighbours.  Such,  in  the  present  age,  was 
the  case  of  Denmark  until  1807:  such  also  was,  for 
a  time,  the  case  of  Sweden,  Prussia,  and,  above  all, 
of  the  United  States  of  America. 

Holland,  a  country  particularly  inclined  to  a  pa- 
cific policy,  has,  from  her  geographical  position,  been 
unavoidably  involved  in  most  of  the  great  contests 
which  have  taken  place  since  she  became  a  power, 
so  that,  during  the  last  two  centuries,  her  history  ex- 
hibits hardly  any  period  of  exemption  from  them, 
except  in  the  war  of  1756.  We,  whether  from  ne- 
cessity or  belligerent  ardour,  have  so  seldom  enjoy- 
ed the  blessing  of  neutrality,  that  to  trace  it  in  our 
history,  we  are  obliged  to  recur  to  the  reign  of  James 
I.,  who,  whatever  might  be  his  weakness  in  other 
respects,   steadfastly  maintained  peace  amidst   the 


84  General  Rise  of  Prices  during  the  War. 

convulsions  of  Germany,  the  dissentions  of  France, 
the  prolonged  hostilities  of  Spain  and  Holland.  A 
striking  illustration,  not  indeed  of  neutrality,  but  of 
that  prudent  mode  of  warfare  which  secures  national 
independence,  without  aiming  at  foreign  acquisitions, 
is  to  be  found  in  the  troubled  reign  of  Elizabeth, 
and  the  wise  administration  of  Cecil.  How  different 
would  have  been  our  situation  in  regard  to  public 
burdens,  had  the  reins  of  government  in  the  present 
age  been  held  by  such  experienced  hands ! 

Effect  of  the  Rise  of  Prices  on  our  Finances. — This 
rise,  like  all  artificial  changes,  was  productive  of 
little  permanent  effect :  it  increased  the  numerical 
amount  of  the  revenue,  but  it  was  ultimately  followed 
by  an  equivalent  loss  in  augmented  expenditure ;  en- 
hancing stores,  salaries,  the  pay  of  the  army  and 
navy,  in  short,  almost  every  object  of  government 
disburse.  Unluckily,  the  amount  of  our  loans  was 
greatest  at  the  time  that  money  was  of  the  least  value. 
If  we  calculate  the  debt  contracted  since  1792  at 
460,000,000/.,  and  divide  that  period  with  a  reference 
to  the  value  of  money,  we  shall  find  that  the  smaller 
part  of  this  debt  was  incurred  when  money  was  more 
valuable  than  at  present,  the  larger  when  money  was 
more  depreciated.  Since  the  cessation  of  war,  money 
has  risen  progressively  in  value,  and  the  interest  of 
our  debt,  without  augmenting  in  amount,  has  in- 
creased in  pressure  to  a  degree  which,  coupled  with 
the  evils  of  sudden  transition,  has  unfortunately  borne 
hard  on  the  majority  of  the  public. 


85 


CHAP.  IV. 

Our  Currency  and  Exchanges  since  1792. 

Having  now  traced  the  fluctuation  in  the  price  oi 
commodities  during  the  last  thirty  years,  we  proceed 
to  a  topic  closely  connected  with  it,  the  variations  in 
our  continental  exchanges.  In  this,  one  of  our  chief 
objects  will  be  to  describe  the  operation  of  our  sub- 
sidies, and  of  our  purchases,  occasionally  to  a  great 
amount,  of  foreign  corn;  these  being  the  causes 
which  mainly  affect  our  exchanges,  and  are  pro- 
ductive of  great  and  rapid  fluctuation.  They  are,  in 
general,  demands  both  of  large  amount,  and  of  sud- 
den occurrence,  superadded  to  our  customary  dis- 
burse, and  requiring  to  be  paid  before  time  can  be 
given  to  our  merchants  and  manufacturers  to  prepare 
and  send  abroad  an  equivilent  amount  in  commodi- 
ties.    This  chapter  will  accordingly  comprise, 

An  historical  sketch  of  our  continental  exchanges ; 

The  effects  of  the  exemption  of  the  Bank  from 
cash  payments ;  and 

The  questions  of  depreciation  and  over-issue. 

Historical  Sketch  of  our  Exchanges. 

From  1792  to  1797. — In  the  first  year  of  the  war,  our 
participation  in  the  contest  produced  little  effect  on 
the  exchange,  in  consequence  of  our  aid  being  furnish- 
ed less  in  money  than  in  troops  and  military  stores. 
Next  summer  (1794)  a  sudden  depression  was  produ- 
ced by  the  remittances  commenced  for  the  Prussian 
susbidy ;  but  it  ceased  as  soon  as  it  became  known  that 
that  power,  a  far  less  zealous  ally  in  those  days  than 
subsequently,  was  not  likely  to  fulfil  its  engagements. 
In  1795,  circumstances  became  verv  different :  our 


&t>  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges. 

troops  had  been  withdrawn  from  the  Continent,  our 
contribution  to  the  allied  cause,  was  made,  in  a  great 
measure,  in  money,  and  an  unfortunate  deficiency  in 
our  harvest,  forced  us  to  make  large  importations  of 
corn.     A  balance  from  commercial  payments  began 
thus  to  be  added  to  the  remittances  of  government, 
and  the  result  was  a  considerable  fall  in  the  exchange; 
money  in  England  becoming  inferior  in  value  by  five 
per  cent,  to  the  money  of  the  Continent.     This  dif- 
ference  was  of  serious  moment  to  the  Bank,  and 
obliged  them  to  limit  greatly  the  discount  of  mercan- 
tile bills,  under  an  apprehension  that  the  notes  issued 
for  such  discount  would  be  presented  at  the  Bank 
for  specie,  and  the  latter  exported  to  the  Continent. 
Of  the  distress  caused  to  merchants  by  this  limitation, 
those  only  can  judge  who  witnessed  the  pecuniary 
difficulties  of  1795  and  1796,  or  who  have  had  access 
to  read  in  the  parliamentary  papers  the  anxious  cor- 
respondence of  that  date  between  Mr.  Pitt  and  the 
Bank  directors.     At  one  time  (November  1795)  the 
price  of  gold,  when  purchased  with  Bank  notes,  had 
risen  to  eight  per  cent,  above  its  value  in  coin,  and 
necessitated  a  farther  and  more  distressing  reduction 
of  bank  paper.     In  the  autumn  of  1796,   a   better 
harvest  delivered  us  from  one  cause  of  drain;  but 
towards  the  end  of  that  year,  and  the  beginning  of 
1797,  distrust  and  alarm  were  renewed  by  a  threat- 
ened invasion  from  France.     The  failure  of  several 
country  banks   having   unluckily  occurred   at  that 
critical  moment,  the  consequence  was  a  run  on  other 
country  banks,  and  a  great  demand  for  gold  from  the 
Bank  of  England.     In  vain  did  the  Directors  resort 
to  their  hitherto  unfailing  expedient,  a  reduction  of 
the  quantity  of  their  notes :  the  evil  was  new  and 
peculiar;  the  drain  continued  without  a  prospect  of 
abatement,   when,  after  bringing  down  their  circu- 
lation to  nearly. 8,600,000/.  and  communicating  their 
situation  to  ministers,  the  Directors  received,  on  the 
25th  of  February,  1797,  the  well-known  injunction 
from  the  Privy  Council,  to  suspend  all  farther  pay- 
ments in  cash. 


Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  87, 

This  order,  limited  at  first  to  a  few  weeks,  was 
soon  after  prolonged  to  the  end  of  the  current  session 
of  parliament,  and  eventually  to  the  opening  of  the 
succeeding  session.  In  the  interval,  circumstances 
became  more  favourable,  corn  was  abundant,  our 
continental  subsidies  drew  to  a  close,  our  exports 
of  merchandise  were  large,  the  exchange  rose,  and 
specie  flowed  into  the  country  from  causes  very 
similar  to  those  which  had  lately  made  it  flow  out. 
The  bank  was  now  in  a  state  to  resume  cash  pay- 
ments ;  but  parliament,  finding  that  no  inconvenience 
had  resulted  from  the  suspension,  determined  to 
adhere  to  it,  and  passed  resolutions  which  made 
exemption  from  cash  payments  be  considered  our 
settled  policy  during  the  remainder  of  the  war. 

From  1797  to  1802.— The  year  1798  was  more 
than  usually  prosperous,  being  marked  by  a  favour- 
able season  at  home,  an  exemption  from  the  burden 
of  subsidies  abroad,  and  distinguished  success  in  our 
naval  operations.  Confidence  being  now  restored, 
money  became  more  rapid  of  circulation,  and  com- 
paratively plentiful,  while  our  exchanges  with  the 
Continent  experienced  no  fall,  although  our  bank 
paper  was  no  longer  convertible  into  cash.  The 
succeeding  year,  however,  presented  a  very  different 
spectacle  :  Austria,  encouraged  by  a  British  subsidy 
and  the  co-operation  of  Russia,  took  the  field  against 
France,  and  hardly  did  intelligence  arrive  of  the 
formation  of  this  second  coalition,  and  of  an  engage- 
ment for  a  double  subsidy,  when  our  exchanges 
began  to  bear  the  mark  of  rapid  declension.  The 
summer  of  1799  was  wet,  and  it  unfortunately  hap- 
pened, as  in  1796,  that  large  purchases  of  corn  were 
necessary  at  the  time  of  the  greatest  pressure  of 
foreign  expenditure.  Such  continued  our  situation 
during  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1800,  when  the 
successes  of  Bonaparte  in  Italy,  and  of  Moreau  in 
Germany,  brought  our  subsidies  to  a  close.  Relief 
would  now  have  been  felt,  had  not  the  calamity  of  a 
deficient  harvest  taken  place  in  1800,  and  raised  the 


88  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges. 

price  of  corn  in  that  and  the  following  year  to  an 
unexampled  height.  The  total  value  of  our  corn 
imports  during  1800,  1801,  and  part  of  1802,  was 
declared  in  evidence  before  a  parliamentary  com- 
mittee to  be  no  less  than  15,000,000/.  sterling. 

Of  all  the  trials  our  money  system  had  jet  expe- 
rienced, this  was  the  most  severe;  and  it  was  ac- 
cordingly in  1800,  that  the  effects  of  the  non-contro- 
vertibility  of  our  bank  paper  became  distinctly  visible 
in  the  state  of  our  exchanges.  The  wants  of  the 
merchants  drove  them  to  the  bank  for  discounts, 
and  their  'demands  were  supplied  with  a  confidence 
which  the  Directors  would  not  have  ventured  to  ex- 
ercise, had  they  been  liable  to  pay  in  specie.  This 
accommodation,  though  far  from  beneficial  in  its 
remote  consequences,  served  at  the  time  to  lessen  to 
the  public  the  evils  arising  from  the  fall  of  the  ex- 
change, and  the  subsequent  depreciation  of  our  paper 
(between  three  and  five  per  cent.)  was  hardly  per- 
ceived, either  by  us  or  by  foreigners.  The  charge 
most  open  to  observation  was  in  the  materials  of  our 
currency :  our  guineas  had  now,  for  the  most  part, 
gone  abroad,  and  our  small-note  circulation,  insig- 
nificant during  1797,  1798,  and  part  of  1799,  became 
augmented  in  1800,  1801,  and  1802,  to  four  millions, 
exclusive  of  the  small  notes  of  our  provincial  banks. 

From  1803  to  1808. — The  peace  of  Amiens  was  too 
short  to  admit  of  the  repeal  of  the  Restriction  Act, 
and  on  the  renewal  of  war,  all  idea  of  repeal  was 
relinquished,  a  continuance  of  the  suspension  being 
considered  an  essential  part  of  our  policy.  Unat- 
tended by  continental  subsidies,  or  by  the  necessity 
of  corn  imports,  the  years  1803,  1804,  and  part  of 
1805,  passed  over  without  pecuniary  pressure ;  and 
when,  in  the  latter  part  of  1805,  the  formation  of  a 
new  coalition  produced  a  sudden  revolution  in  the 
exchange,  its  duration  was  momentary,  for  the  day 
of  Austerlitz,  so  disastrous  in  other  respects,  dis- 
pelled the  cloud  that  was  gathering  over  our  finan- 
cial horizon,  and  showed  in  the  distance  the  susper- 


Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  89 

sion  of  our  continental  remittances.  Next  year,  war 
ensued  between  Prussia  and  France,  but  that  contest 
took  place  at  a  time  when  we  had  a  ministry  (the 
Whigs  and  Grenvilles)  sparing  in  their  advances  to 
our  continental  allies ;  the  exchange  was  not  se- 
riously affected,  and  after  the  peace  of  Tilsit  (July 
1807)  began  visibly  to  recover. 

Four  years  of  the  war  had  thus  passed  without 
any  material  inconvenience  from  the  non-converti- 
bility of  our  bank  paper,  and  its  depreciation,  still 
unknown  to  the  public,  had  been  but  partially  inju- 
rious. We  are  now,  however,  arrived  at  a  different 
era ;  a  period  when  our  hatred  of  Bonaparte,  the 
confidence  inspired  by  our  decisive  superiority  at 
sea,  and  the  influence  of  enthusiastic  counsellors  at 
home,  made  us  forget  calmer  considerations,  and 
join  in  a  general  call  for  a  "  system  of  vigour."  The 
sufferings  of  several  great  branches  of  our  commerce ; 
the  stagnation  of  our  East  India  trade ;  the  pro- 
gressive sinking  of  West  India  property;  the  di- 
minished profit  of  ship  owning ;  misfortunes  arising 
chiefly  from  heavy  taxes  and  increased  charges, 
were  ascribed  by  many  of  the  distressed  parties  to 
the  competition  of  the  Americans.  Commercial 
jealousies  have  never  been  inactive ;  the  American 
navigators  had  become  in  our  eyes,  what  the  Dutch 
had  been  in  those  of  our  ancestors  under  Cromwell 
and  Charles  II. ;  and  our  merchants  had  no  great 
difficulty  in  persuading  a  ministry  elated  with  our 
success  at  Copenhagen,  and  little  versed  in  the 
sources  of  national  wealth,  that  when  neutral  naviga- 
tion should  be  controlled,  the  Continent  must  draw 
its  supplies  through  the  medium  of  England.  Hence 
our  Orders  in  Council  of  November,  1807,  orders 
issued  with  so  much  ardour,  with  such  confidence 
of  a  favourable  result,  that  our  government  paid  no 
attention  to  the  singular  fact,  that  the  intercourse 
they  were  so  anxious  to  control,  was,  in  the  opinion 
of  our  enemies,  highly  advantageous  to  us;  for  Bona- 
parte had,  almost  at  the  same  moment,  intimated  to 
the  American  ambassador  at  Paris,  his  intention  to 

12 


dO  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges. 

prohibit  it,  declaring  that  "  all  maritime  commerce 
tolerated  on  the  Continent,  whether  through  Ameri- 
cans or  others,  must  turn  to  the  advantage  of  Eng- 
land." These  remarkable  measures,  joined  to  an 
embargo  adopted  by  the  American  government,  pro- 
duced an  almost  complete  suspension  of  intercourse 
between  the  United  States  and  Europe,  during  1 808 ; 
the  first  time  that  such  had  been  the  case  during 
twenty-five  years. 

Our  stoppage  of  the  American  navigation  is,  we 
believe,  the  greatest  error  on  record  in  mercantile 
history.  Our  trade  with  that  country  which,  on  the  ac- 
knowledgment of  its  independence  in  1783,  we  consi- 
dered as  wrested  from  our  grasp,  had  proceeded  in  a 
ratio  of  continued  increase,  affording  both  advantage 
to  the  parties  engaged,  and  the  most  gratifying  les- 
sons to  those  who,  studying  in  the  closet  the  sources 
of  national  prosperity,  are  enabled  to  discover  how 
often  the  real  are  at  variance  with  the  apparent 
causes.  This  increase  showed  first  that  political  and 
even  national  antipathies  do  not  impede  commerce 
between  individuals,  and  that  it  is  perfectly  prac- 
ticable to  reap  benefit  from  countries  that  were  once 
our  colonies,  without  the  charge  of  defending  them. 
It  showed  further  the  still  more  important  truth,  that 
"  the  greater  the  freedom  of  the  trade  of  the  Ameri- 
cans, the  more  active  their  intercourse  with  France, 
Holland,  and  other  countries,  the  greater  was  the  ad- 
vantage arising  to  us." 

In  what  manner,  it  may  be  asked,  did  it  produce 
that  result ;  a  result  so  contrary  to  the  tenets  of  the 
mercantile  theory  and  of  the  colonial  system,  not  of 
this  country  only,  but  of  all  Europe  ?  From  a  cause 
of  which  the  explanation,  at  first  somewhat  compli- 
cated, becomes,  when  examined,  sufficiently  easy  and 
convincing — the  increase  of  American  capital  conse- 
quent on  unfettered  trade,  and  the  direction  of  a 
larger  share  of  it  to  the  purchase  of  our  manufac- 
tures. Our  exports  to  the  United  States  amounted  in 
1805,  1806,  and  1807,  to  the  very  large  sum  of  11  or 
12,000,000/.  sterling,  while   our  imports  from  that 


Our  Currency  and  Exchanges,  91 

country  (Seybert's  Statistical  Annals,  pp.  137.  155.) 
did  not  exceed  7  or  8,000,000/.:  the  remainder 
(Baring  on  the  Orders  in  Council,  p.  155,)  was  re- 
mitted to  us  in  money,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  in 
bills  of  exchange  from  the  Continent  of  Europe,  being 
the  proceeds  of  tobacco,  cotton,  rice,  and  other 
American  products  sold  there.  The  Continent,  feeble 
at  that  time  in  its  stock  of  manufacture  and  means  of 
giving  credit,  could  not  supply  the  Americans  with 
merchandise  equal  to  more  than  half  the  articles 
which  it  imported  from  them ;  and  the  result  was  the 
transmission  of  the  proceeds  to  this  country,  a  course 
which  supplied  us  with  funds  for  our  continental  ex- 
penditure as  regularly  as  the  packets  crossed  the 
narrow  seas.  Such  was  the  trade  stopped  by  our 
Orders  in  Council ;  a  measure  which,  persisted  in 
with  blind  pertinacity  from  year  to  year,  drove  the 
Americans  first  to  the  temporary  expedient  of  an  em- 
bargo, afterwards  to  the  establishment  of  manufac- 
tures in  their  own  country,  and,  eventually,  to  a  de- 
claration of  war. 

From  1808  to  1814. — This  stoppage,  sufficient  of 
itself  to  produce  a  rapid  fall  in  the  exchange,  was 
unluckily  coincident  in  point  of  time  with  a  heavy 
drain  of  money  to  Portugal  and  Spain,  in  support  of 
the  contest  with  France.  From  the  Appendix  to  the 
Report  of  the  Bullion  Committee,  (p.  232.)  it  appears 
that  nearly  three  millions  sterling  were  sent  in  spe- 
cie to  the  Peninsula  in  1808.  Next  year  neutral  in- 
tercourse was,  in  a  great  measure,  resumed,  and  the 
hazard  of  a  pecuniary  embarrassment  would  have 
been  less  serious,  had  we  not  unfortunately  been 
visited  by  the  other  great  cause  of  pressure  on  our 
foreign  exchanges,  a  deficient  harvest.  It  became 
indispensable,  therefore,  to  import  corn  at  an  unfor- 
tunate moment ;  at  a  time  when,  from  other  causes, 
our  bank  notes  were  at  a  depreciation  of  twelve  or 
fifteen  per  cent.  And  the  sum  paid  to  foreigners  for 
corn  in  1810  being  very  large,  exceeding  (see  the  re- 
turn to  Parliament  in  the  following  year)  seven  mil- 


92  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges. 

lions  sterling,  our  exchanges  fell  so  as  to  bring  our 
bank  paper  more  than  twenty  per  cent,  below  bullion. 
This  fall  took  place  some  time  after  the  public  atten- 
tion had  been  drawn  to  the  subject  by  the  Report  of 
the  Bullion  Committee ;  and,  great  as  it  was,  it  would 
have  been  still  greater,  had  not  the  abundant  harvest 
of  1810  come  most  opportunely  to  our  relief. 

The  autumn  of  1810  was  the  first  season  in  which 
the  decrees  of  Bonaparte  against  our  intercourse  with 
the  Continent  were  actually  carried  into  effect.  He 
had  then  brought  his  war  with  Austria  to  a  close,  se- 
cured himself  by  an  alliance  with  that  power,  and 
conceived,  from  the  fall  of  our  bank  paper  and  the 
multitude  of  our  mercantile  failures,  the  hope  that  a 
vigorous  enforcement  of  his  decrees  would  complete 
the  measure  of  our  embarrassment.  Hence,  in  the 
winter  of  1810,  the  general  seizure  of  British  ship- 
ping in  the  Prussian  harbours ;  hence  also  the  ridicu- 
lous measure  of  burning  quantities  of  our  merchan- 
dise in  his  sea-ports. 

In  1811  our  corn  imports  were  inconsiderable; 
but  the  operations  of  neutral  commerce  were  much 
cramped,  our  remittances  to  the  Peninsula  were  large, 
and  our  exchanges  extremely  low.  The  same  causes 
operated  with  increased  effect  in  1812,  the  year  that 
our  discussions  with  the  United  States  unfortunately 
terminated  in  war.  Happily,  towards  the  end  of  that 
year,  the  result  of  the  Russian  campaign  opened  a 
cheering  prospect  in  the  political  horizon ;  but  the 
result  was  remote ;  a  great  struggle  was  still  neces- 
sary, and  the  campaign  of  1813  required  exertions  in 
Spain,  and  aid  to  our  allies  in  Germany,  on  a  scale  of 
unparalleled  magnitude.  By  this  time  our  metallic 
currency  was  exhausted,  and  the  specie  bought  up 
for  the  cause  of  the  Continent,  was  paid  for  by  go- 
vernment in  bank  notes,  at  the  enormous  premium  of 
twenty-five  or  thirty  per  cent.  Such  continued  to  be 
the  difference  between  paper  and  coin,  until  the  over- 
throw of  Bonaparte  in  April,  1*814,  after  which  the 
difference  diminished  to  ten,  and  even  to  eight  per- 
cent.    His  return  from  Elba  in  1815.  and  the   vast 


Our  Currency  and  Exchanges. 


93 


preparations  forthwith  made  on  the  Continent  by  us 
and  our  allies,  again  lowered  the  exchange  to  twenty, 
and  even  twenty-five  per  cent. — a  fall  which,  after 
his  second  overthrow,  disappeared  with  a  rapidity 
that  seemed  destined  to  exemplify  the  arguments  of 
the  antibullionists  ;  of  those  who  maintained  that  the 
depreciation  of  our  notes  arose  not  from  over-issue, 
but  from  continental  demands. 


Tabular  Sketch  of  the  Principal  Demands  on  our  Currency  for  Continental 
Subsidies  and  Purchases  of  Corn  since  1792. 


Years. 


1792. 
1793. 


1794. 
1795. 


1796. 


Events  Political  and  Com- 
mercial 

Peace. 

Great  mercantile  failures ; 
limitation  of  our  paper  cur- 
rency. 

Confidence  reinstated. 

Subsidy  to  Austria. 


State  of  our  Exchange  with 
the  Continent. 

A  little  above  par. 
A  considerable  rise  in  the  Ex- 
change. 

Exchange  nearly  as  in  1792. 
A  fall  at  first  small,  afterwards 

considerable. 
Exchange  continues  very  low. 


Subsidy  continued,  and  an  im- 
portation of  corn. 

1797.  Reduction  of  our  paper  cur- 

rency ;    great   scarcity  of 
money. 
(The  Bank  was  exempted  from  cash  payments  in  Feb.  1797.) 

1798.  Neither  subsidy  nor  corn  im-     Exchange   continues    i 

port. 

1799.  Renewed    subsidies    followed 

by  a  deficient  harvest. 

1800.  Continuation    of    subsidy    to 

Austria;  great  importation 
of  corn. 

1801.  Subsidy  suspended,   but  corn 

import  continued. 

1802.  Peace. 
From  1 802  No  large  importation  of  corn, 

to  1808.         except  in  the  summer  of 

1805;    nor   any  subsidy  of 

magnitude,  except   in"  the 

autumn  of  that  year. 
From  1808  War  in  Portugal  and  Spain 
to  1814.         throughout  the  whole  pe- 
riod :    war  in  Germany  in 

1809;   in  Russia  in  1812, 

andinGermanvand  France, 

in   1813  and  "l  814.     Corn 

purchases  to  a  great  amount 

in  1810.     The   Americans 

excluded  from  intercourse 

with    the  Continent    after 

1808,  but  more  particularly 

after  1810. 


A  considerable  rise  in  the  ex- 
change ;  large  imports  of 
specie. 


favour. 
Fall    of  the    exchange    after 

Midsummer. 
Continued  depression. 


Continued  depression. 

Exchange  reinstated. 

The  exchange  little  affected 
during  these  six  years,  ex- 
cept in  the  autumn  and  win- 
ter of  1805. 

The  fall  in  the  exchange  great 
and  permanent,  beginning 
at  eight  or  ten  per  cent,  in- 
creasing to  twelve,  fifteen, 
twenty-fivo,  and  eventually 
to  nearly  thirty  per  cent. 


94  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges. 

YMr«  Events  Political  and  Com-  State  of  our  Exchange  with 

*e8,s'  mercial.  the  Continent. 

1814.  Peace  after  1st  April,  and  a    A  considerable  reinstatement 

great  increase  in  the  export  of  the  exchange,  leaving  it 

of  our  merchandise,  but  a  from  only  eight  to  ten  per 

continuance  of  remittances  cent,  against  England, 
for  subsidies  and  corn  im- 
ports. 

1815.  In  April,  May,  June,  renewal  Fall  of  the  exchange  twenty 

of  war.  and  twenty -five  per  cent. 

In   August    and    September,  The  exchange  recovered  and 

peace :    cessation   of  corn  brought  first  within  twelve 

imports ;  renewal  of  Ame-  per  cent.,  afterwards  within 

rican  intercourse.  five  per  cent,  of  par. 

1816.  No  subsidy  or  import  of  corn.  Exchange  nearly  at  par. 
1817, 1818.  Large  imports  of  corn.  Exchange  again  lowered  three, 

four,    five,    and    eventually 
six  per  cent. 
From  1819  No  import  of  corn  or  heavy     Exchange  recovers;   rises  to 
to  1823.         continental  charge.  par  in  1820,  and  has  since 

continued  somewhat  above 
par. 

Distribution  into  Periods  during  the  War. — The  years 
in  the  preceding  table  may  be  classed  into  periods, 
each  marked  by  distinct  features.  The  first,  from 
1793  to  1797,  preceded  the  exemption  act :  after 
that  act  came  an  interval  of  two  years,  during  which, 
from  a  concurrence  of  favourable  circumstances,  the 
non-convertibility  of  our  bank  paper  was  not  pro- 
ductive of  depreciation.  A  very  different  scene  was 
opened  by  the  transactions  of  the  three  years  between 
the  summer  of  1799  and  that  of  1802 ;  years  of  heavy 
continental  demand  and  of  great  pressure  on  the 
exchange.  It  was,  however,  reinstated  by  the  peace ; 
nor  did  it  experience  any  pressure  of  magnitude  or 
long  continuance  during  the  long  interval  that  elapsed 
from  the  autumn  of  1802  to  that  of  1808.  This  pe- 
riod of  six  years  is  perhaps  the  most  remarkable  of 
the  whole,  exhibiting  the  possibility  of  carrying  on  a 
war  of  great  expense,  without  a  material  derange- 
ment of  our  currency,  so  long  as  we  left  to  trade  its 
free  course,  and  abstained  from  great  continental  ad- 
vances. It  was,  doubtless,  this  long  enjoyment  of 
financial  ease,  this  apparent  stability  of  our  money 
system,  that  inspired  our  ministers  and  bank  directors 
with  over  confidence,  leading  the  former  to  their  m> 


Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  95 

fortunate  measures  against  the  American  trade,  and 
impressing  the  latter  (Evidence,  Bullion  Report,  pp. 
89.  96.  144.)  with  the  notion  that  their  issues  of  paper 
had  no  effect  on  the  exchange.  To  the  measures 
founded  on  these  views,  and  to  the  events  noticed  in 
the  preceding  table,  is  to  be  ascribed  the  depre- 
ciation that  prevailed  during  the  last  period  of  the 
war — the  five  years  from  1809  to  1814. 

Total  of  our  Corn  Imports  and  Subsidies. — In  com- 
puting the  former,  it  is  fit  to  bear  in  mind  that  we 
had  become  previously  to  1793,  a  corn  importing 
country,  and  that  a  certain  quantity  might  be  termed 
our  habitual  supply ;  an  import  not  affecting  the  ex- 
change, but  paid  by  a  corresponding  export  of  our 
produce  or  manufactures ;  our  coals,  our  tin,  our 
hardware,  our  cottons.  We  dwell,  therefore,  only 
on  the  years  of  scarcity  and  extra  import,  which, 
during  the  war,  were  1796,  1800,  1801,  1802,  1805, 
1810.  After  deducting  from  our  total  supply  in  these 
years  our  average  annual  import,  there  remains,  as 
extra  import,  a  quantity  of  which  the  cost,  in  the  six 
years  collectively,  was  not  short  of  25,000,000/. 

Next  as  to  the  amount  of  our  subsidies :  the  total 
during  twenty-one  years,  from  1793  to  1814,  was  be- 
tween 50  and  60,000,000/.,  forming  with  the  corn  pur- 
chases, an  aggregate  of  80,000,000/.  Of  this  great 
sum,  what  proportion  was  sent  abroad  in  the  shape  of 
specie  ?  Of  the  subsidies,  the  chief  part  was  sup- 
plied in  clothing,  arms,  stores ;  of  our  corn  pur- 
chases, the  larger  share  was  necessarily  paid  in 
money.  If,  without  attempting  nicety  of  calculation, 
we  assume  the  export  of  specie  for  these  purposes 
during  the  whole  war  at  30,000,000/.,  we  shall  be  at 
no  loss  to  account  for  the  disappearance  of  our  me- 
tallic currency,  and  of  such  supplies  of  bullion  as 
found  their  way  to  this  country. 

Our  Exchanges  since  the  Peace. — Since  the  peace, 
the  different  periods,  though  less  marked  by  extremes, 
have  been  equally  deserving  of  attention,  as  illustra- 
tive of  our  view  of  the  causes  of  fluctuation.     In  the 


96  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges. 

autumn  of  1814  our  war  charges  ceased,  our  exports 
had  free  access  to  the  continent,  and  the  exchange 
altered  from  twenty-five  to  ten,  and  even  eight  per 
cent,  only,  against  us  :  it  would  have  risen  farther, 
had  not  our  corn  imports  been  large.  But  no  sooner 
did  the  return  of  Bonaparte  from  Elba  revive  the 
alarm  of  war  and  subsidies,  than  the  exchange  fell 
to  eighteen,  twenty,  and  twenty-five  per  cent.;  a  de- 
pression from  which  it  recovered  as  suddenly  after 
the  battle  of  Waterloo,  and  the  prospect  of  a  speedy 
peace.  During  1816  there  was  neither  corn  import 
nor  subsidy ;  the  American  trade  with  the  Continent 
was  open,  and  the  exchange  returned  to  par,  at  which 
it  for  some  time  remained ;  but  the  deficient  harvest 
of  that  year  necessitated  in  1817  corn  imports  on  a 
very  large  scale,  reduced  the  exchange,  and  would 
have  completely  overset  it,  had  not  all  the  counter- 
acting causes  of  free  trade  been  in  operation.  By 
their  aid  we  were  enabled,  during  1817,  1818,  and 
the  early  part  of  1819,  to  pay  for  an  unexampled 
amount  of  foreign  corn,  (above  20,000,000/.  as  ap- 
pears by  the  Appendix  to  the  Agricultural  Report  of 
1821,  p.  396.)  without  a  greater  depreciation  than 
four,  five,  or  six  per  cent.  Since  1819,  these  drains 
have  ceased,  and  the  exchange  has  been  steadily  in 
our  favour. 

Our  Bank  Paper : — Contradictory  Opinions  on  the 
Subject 

We  have  now  brought  to  a  close  our  historical 
sketch,  and  shall  proceed  to  make  some  remarks  on 
the  Yery  opposite  doctrines  held  in  regard  to  our 
paper  currency,  by  the  adherents  of  ministry  and 
opposition ;  or,  to  speak  more  correctly,  by  the  ad- 
versaries and  supporters  of  the  Bullion  Committee 
of  1810.  The  former  are  still  unwilling  to  admit  the 
existence  of  depreciation  in  our  bank  paper,  even 
in  the  latter  years  of  the  war:  the  latter  equally 
unreasonable,  refuse  to  trace  such  depreciation 
to  the  extra  demands  made  on  us  for  subsidies  and 
corn  purchases,  and  insist  that  it  originated  in  over 
issue   on  the   part  of  our  banks.     A  singular  die- 


Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  97 

crepancy  this,  in  a  country  of  free  discussion,  after 
the  direction  of  so  much  reasoning  to  the  subject,  and 
the  lapse  of  so  many  years  replete  with  commercial 
and  political  information.  This  discrepancy  implies, 
we  apprehend,  more  than  the  absence  of  impar- 
tiality :  it  gives  cause  to  suspect  in  one  party,  an  in- 
adequate knowledge  of  the  principles  of  productive 
industry :  in  the  other,  an  insufficient  attention  to 
the  evidence  of  facts. 

In  attempting  to  point  out  the  manner  in  which 
both  have  deviated  from  impartial  inquiry,  and  ex- 
ceeded the  limits  of  fair  inference,  we  shall  proceed 
as  much  as  possible  by  a  reference  to  documents. 
We  shall  have  little  difficulty  in  describing  the  nature 
of  our  currency  previous  to  1797,  and  the  effect  pro- 
duced on  it  by  sudden  drains  for  continental  disburse 
our  more  intricate  task  will  be  to  define  the  results 
of  the  exemption  act,  the  operation  of  which,  has. 
from  very  different  views,  been  considerably  over- 
rated by  each  party.  The  bullionists  attribute  to  it 
the  whole,  or  nearly  the  whole,  of  the  enhancement 
of  commodities  during  the  war;  while  their  oppo- 
nents, regarding  it  as  no  less  potent  in  good,  than 
their  antagonists  in  evil,  are  accustomed  to  speak  of 
it  as  almost  the  sole  engine  of  our  financial  support. 
Both  sides  forget  that  these  effects  are  too  great  for 
the  cause,  and  that  the  exemption  act  was  coincident 
in  point  of  time  with  a  change  in  our  financial  system, 
of  still  more  powerful  operation ;  we  mean  the  in- 
crease of  our  war  taxes  and  the  reduction  of  our 
loans. 

Our  Money  System  previous  to  1797. — The  nature  of 
our  money  system  will  be  best  understood  by  a  com- 
parison with  that  of  the  neighbouring  countries.  The 
amount  of  money  circulating  in  France  was  compu- 
ted, or  rather  guessed  by  Necker  at  80,000,000/. 
sterling ;  the  amount  in  England  and  Scotland,  not 
ascertained  with  more  certainty  than  that  of  France, 
is  supposed  (Bank  Committee  Report,  May  1819,) 
to  be  between  50  and  60,000.000/.     The  currency  of 

13 


98  Our  Currency  and  JLxchcuigps. 

France  is  almost  entirely  metallic  :  there  are  in  that 
country  no  banks  of  circulation,  except  the  bank  of 
Paris,  and  none  of  its  notes  being  below  20/.,  paper 
forms  a  very  small  part  of  the  circulating  medium. 
A  foreigner  may  reside  many  years  in  a  provincial 
town  in  France  without  seeing  a  bank  note,  and 
may  occasionally  hear  the  natives  speak  of  having 
seen  them  as  of  a  circumstance  somewhat  unusual 
and  remarkable.  France  is  consequently  prevented 
from  saving  interest  on  40  or  50,000,000/.  of  metallic 
currency,  the  place  of  which,  were  the  banking  system 
general,  might  be  supplied  by  paper.  The  case  of 
France  is,  in  a  great  measure,  that  of  the  Continent 
at  large ;  while  in  this  country,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  saving  arising  from  bank  paper  has  been  en- 
joyed, in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  for  more  than  a 
century. 

In  what  manner  was  this  saving  accomplished  be- 
fore the  exemption  from  cash  payments  in  1797  ?  A 
bank  of  good  character  issued  notes  to  an  extent  of 
four  or  five  times  the  amount  of  the  gold  kept  in  its 
coffers,  a  circulation  of  100,000/.  being  maintained  in 
ordinary  times  without  a  greater  reserve  or  dead 
fund  than  between  20  and  30,000/.,  leaving  above 
70,000/.  to  be  vested  in  productive  securities,  such 
as  short-dated  acceptances,  exchequer  bills,  or  the 
public  funds,  all  possessing  a  characteristic  indis- 
pensable to  a  banker,  that  of  speedy  convertibi- 
lity into  cash.  Hence  an  income  to  the  banking- 
house  of  2  or  3000/.  a  year  arising  from  perfectly  fair 
sources ;  its  credit  and  the  superior  convenience  of 
paper  to  metallic  currency.  This  saving,  considered 
in  a  general  sense,  was  such  as  to  form  a  national 
object,  England  having,  even  previous  to  the  exemp- 
tion act,  economised  the  interest  on  a  sum  probably 
exceeding  20,000,000/.,  of  its  currency. 

Such  was  the  state  of  our  money  system  in  the 
early  years  of  the  revolutionary  war,  when  the  con- 
fident character  of  our  ministers  and  the  surprising 
exertions  of  France  led  to  an  unexampled  extension 
of  our  continental  expenditure.  It  became  parti  cu- 
larlv  heavv  in   179/).    and  unfortunately  a  deficient 


Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  99 

harvest  in  that  year  necessitated  in  1796  large  pur- 
chases of  foreign  corn,  augmenting  greatly  the  de- 
mand on  the  bank  for  metallic  currency ;  hence  a 
reduction  of  its  discount  to  merchants,  a  reluctance 
or  rather  inability  to  make  the  advances  required  by 
government,  and  a  general  embarrassment  in  the 
money  market.  Under  such  circumstances,  nothing 
could  be  more  natural  to  all  parties  than  to  look  for 
relief  in  exempting  the  bank  from  the  necessity  of 
paying  cash  for  its  notes  ;  a  measure  that  would  ena- 
ble it  to  continue  its  customary  accommodation  to 
trade,  while  government  should  meet  the  wants  of 
our  allies  with  our  spare  coin  and  bullion.  The  ex- 
periment, however,  was  too  bold  and  novel  to  be 
adopted  as  a  matter  of  choice ;  it  was  delayed  until 
the  continued  call  for  guineas  in  February  1797  left 
no  other  alternative.  Its  adoption  excited  both  sur- 
prise and  distrust,  but  was  divested  of  a  part  of  its 
alarming  character  by  the  known  solvency  of  the 
bank ;  and  the  acknowledged  discretion  of  those  to 
whom  the  new  privilege  was  to  be  entrusted.  A 
farther  source  of  confidence  was  afforded  to  the  few 
who  knew  the  regulations  of  the  bank,  by  the  fact 
that  the  personal  interest  of  a  director  is  very  slightly 
promoted  by  an  increase  of  the  income  of  the  estab- 
lishment. 

Effects  of  the  Restriction  Act. — This  decisive  measure, 
which  ought  rather  to  be  called  an  exemption  than  a 
restriction  act,  was  limited  at  first  to  a  few  months, 
and  the  exchange  being  favourable  during  1797,  the 
bank  made  ample  provision  by  the  autumn  of  that 
year  for  the  resumption  of  cash  payments.  But  that 
step  being  deemed  unnecessary  by  government,  the 
exemption  assumed  the  character  of  a  permanent 
war  measure,  and  enabled  the  bank  to  give  a  greater 
latitude  to  its  accommodation  both  to  merchants  and 
the  treasury.  What  were  the  chief  characteristics 
of  our  money  system  in  the  succeeding  years  ?  A  re- 
lief from  such  pecuniary  difficulties  as  those  of  1796  ; 
an  increase  of  our  paper  circulation,  at  first  small, 
afterwards  considerable,  and  eventually  very  large 


100  Our  Currency  and  Kxckangea. 

Next,  ia  regard  to  the  value  of  our  notes  compared 
to  coin  or  bullion,  there  was,  after  1759,  a  fall  (about 
four  per  cent.)  in  the  value  of  our  notes,  which  long 
remained  uniform,  but  was  followed,  after  1 809,  by  a 
new  and  much  greater  fall.  Lastly,  the  general  rise 
in  prices,  though  it  in  part  preceded  the  exemption  act, 
and  originated  consequently  in  other  causes,  conti- 
nued during  the  whole  period  of  the  non-convertibili- 
ty of  our  bank  notes,  and  became  greatest  during 
their  greatest  depreciation. 

These  facts  are  admitted  by  all  parties ;  the  diffi- 
culty is  in  tracing  them  to  their  origin,  and  in  dis- 
criminating how  far  the  exemption  act  was  or  was  not 
instrumental  in  producing  them. 

Opinion  of  the  Bullion  Committee. — The  writers  of  the 
Bullion  Report,  aware  that  the  amount  of  Bank  notes 
in  circulation  had  been  materially  increased,  as  well 
as  that  the  scale  of  discounts  (Report,  p.  26.)  had 
been  greatly  enlarged,  naturally  became  impressed 
with  the  idea  of  over-issue,  and  ascribed  to  it  almost 
exclusively  the  great  rise  in  our  prices  during  the 
war.  But  this  opinion,  when  given  in  the  unqualified 
terms  adopted  by  them  and  their  supporters,  is  liable 
to  serious  objections.  First,  the  amount  of  Bank  of 
England  notes  in  circulation  affords,  as  we  have  more 
fully  shown  in  the  Appendix,  no  satisfactory  criterion 
for  estimating  the  increase  of  our  whole  circulating 
medium,  as  a  part  of  the  bank  paper  may  be  a  sub- 
stitute for  coin  sent  abroad.  In  the  next  place,  the 
means  possessed  by  the  Bullion  Committee  of  appre- 
ciating the  effect  of  the  various  other  causes  of  en- 
hancement were  very  limited  :  no  evidence  was  given 
as  to  the  rise  of  prices  prior  to  the  exemption  act ; 
no  reasoning  attempted  in  regard  to  the  effect  of  war 
in  this  augmentation.  Neither  the  framers  of  the  Re- 
port, nor  those  who  wrote  and  spoke  most  confidently 
on  the  subject,  possessed  an  accurate  knowledge  of 
l he  increase  of  our  productive  industry  consequent 
on  the  war,  or  even  of  the  increase  of  our  population. 
Had  Mr.  Horner  or  Mr.  Huskisson  been  aware  of 
these  vital  truths. — had  they  known  how  material]) 


Our  Currency  and  Exchange*.  101 

prices  were  affected  by  causes  altogether  distinct 
from  our  paper  currency,  such  as  the  demand  for 
men  for  the  public  service,  and  the  insufficiency  of 
our  growth  of  corn  to  our  consumption,  the  conclu- 
sions of  the  Report  would  have  been  materially  dif- 
ferent. The  various  facts  and  arguments  adduced  in 
our  preceding  chapters,  show  how  large  an  addition 
to  our  currency  was  indispensable  to  transact  our  ex- 
tended business,  to  correspond  with  our  augmented 
prices.  And  when  to  this  is  added  a  reason,  differ- 
ent in  its  nature,  but  equal  in  its  operation — the  in- 
ducement after  1799  to  export  our  metallic  currency 
to  the  Continent,  we  shall  find  ample  means  of  ac- 
counting for  a  fact  which  we  admit  to  be  at  first  cal- 
culated to  excite  surprise,  the  increase  of  our  bank 
paper. 

What  then  were  the  results  distinctly  attributable 
to  the  exemption  act ;  and,  in  the  first  place,  what 
was  its  effect  on  the  rules  followed  by  the  Bank  of 
England  in  regard  to  discounts  ?  Its  effect  was  highly 
beneficial  to  that  Corporation :  the  Directors  were 
relieved  by  it  from  the  necessity  of  watching  conti- 
nental exchanges,  from  the  apprehension  of  a  drain 
of  metallic  currency  on  the  approach  of  a  subsidy,  or 
a  large  import  of  corn ;  the  rules  of  discount  became 
greatly  simplified,  and,  after  some  years  the  Direc- 
tors considered  themselves  at  liberty  to  issue  notes 
to  whoever  tendered  bills  possessing  the  requisite  of 
solidity,  and  the  less  easily  ascertained  characteristic 
of  being  for  a  bona  fide  transaction. 

Country  Banks. — In  regard  to  these,  the  provision 
made  by  the  act,  if  not  properly  an  exemption,  was 
an  accommodation  of  great  importance.  They  were 
relieved  from  the  necessity  of  paying  cash  if  they 
tendered  Bank  of  England  notes,  a  supply  of  which 
was  attainable  (Evidence  of  Mr.  Baring  before  the 
Committees  on  Cash  Payments)  without  the  uncer- 
tainty and  loss  so  frequently  attendant  on  the  acqui- 
sition of  coin.  A  stock  of  notes  could  be  procured 
at  very  short  notice  in  exchange  for  the  mercantile 
acceptances  or  other  securities  in  which  the  funds  of 


102  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges. 

country  banks  are  generally  vested ;  and  the  latter, 
thus  relieved  from  much  expense  and  anxiety,  were 
enabled  to  lessen  greatly  their  reserve  fund,  and 
consequently  to  extend  their  discounts. 

Such  were  the  effects  of  the  act  in  regard  to  banks : 
to  the  public  the  principal  result  was  a  relief  from 
scarcity  of  money. 

If,  for  the  sake  of  calculation,  we  assume  that  in 
1796  the  total  bank  paper  in  circulation  in  the  king- 
dom was  25,000,000/.,  and  that  7,000,000/.  of  coin 
were  kept  in  depot,  we  may  safely  infer  that  of 
those  7,000,000/.  two-thirds  became  in  the  course  of 
a  few  years,  disposable  for  the  purpose  of  discount. 
Now,  if  from  the  rapidity  of  our  transfers,  a  million 
of  money  suffice  to  circulate  merchandise  to  the 
value  of  twenty  or  thirty  millions,  the  change,  arising 
from  the  addition  of  four  or  five  millions  to  our  cur- 
rency, could  not  be  otherwise  than  great  in  its  de- 
gree, and  extensive  in  its  operation.  Continental  de- 
mands arose  in  1799,  and  were  carried  during  three 
years  to  an  unexampled  height :  these  the  exemption 
act  enabled  us  to  meet  by  sending  abroad  our  coin, 
exempting  us,  not  indeed  from  a  depreciation  of  our 
currency,  but  from  pecuniary  straits. 

The  act  had  another,  though  as  yet  unnoticed  re- 
sult— that  of  counteracting  the  tendency  of  our  pub- 
lic loans  to  raise  the  rate  of  interest.  What,  it  may 
be  asked,  was  the  current  or  average  rate  of  interest 
previous  to  1793?  If  we  form  our  computation,  not 
on  the  price  of  stocks,  which  from  artificial  causes 
fluctuated  greatly,  but  on  the  general  transactions  of 
merchants,  bankers,  and  capitalists,  we  shall  find  it 
to  have  been  between  four  and  five  per  cent. ;  and  if 
we  apply  a  similar  mode  of  calculation  to  the  war, 
we  shall  have  reason  to  fix  the  average  rate  of  inter- 
est between  five  and  six  per  cent.,  the  charge  of  com- 
mission, and  other  small  additions  familiar  to  persons 
in  business  (Evidence  to  the  Bullion  Report,  p.  124.) 
accounting  for  the  excess  above  the  statutory  limit. 
The  effect  of  a  war,  the  most  expensive  ever  waged, 
was  therefore  to  raise  interest  only  one  per  cent, ;  on 


7  he  Question  of  Depreciation  and  Over-issue.     10^ 

etfect  evidently  disproportioned  to  the  unexampled 
calls  made  on  our  national  capital,  and  the  cause  *  of 
which  is,  doubtless,  in  a  great  measure  to  be  sought 
in  the  reduction  of  the  charge  of  banking  consequent 
on  the  exemption  act 

The  Question  of  Depreciation  and  Over-issue. — We  are 
now  arrived  at  the  most  important  question  in  the 
history  of  our  currency;  a  question  in  which  the 
advocates  of  the  bank  and  those  of  the  Bullion  Com- 
mittee are  directly  at  variance.  The  former  main- 
tain that  the  public  possessed,  after  1797,  the  same 
power  of  limitation  as  before,  both  in  withholding 
bills  for  discount,  and  in  paying  over  their  notes  to 
the  Treasury,  an  absorbent  to  the  extent  of  1  or 
2,000,000/.  a  week.  Their  antagonists,  without 
denying  this,  which  in  fact  cannot  be  controverted, 
appeal  to  the  state  of  the  bullion  market  in  the  latter 
years  of  the  war ;  to  the  acknowledged  inferiority  of 
bank  notes ;  and  to  the  formidable  argument,  that  a 
contraction  of  the  amount  in  circulation  would,  at 
any  time,  have  raised  their  value,  and,  if  carried  suf- 
ficiently far,  have  brought  them  on  a  par  with  coin. 

Such  was  the  substance  of  the  reasoning  adduced 
in  the  various  speeches  and  publications  on  this  sub- 
ject in  1810  and  1811:  such  are  still,  in  a  great  measure, 
the  tenets  of  the  adverse  parties  ;  each  interpreting, 
in  conformity  with  their  own  theory,  the  fluctuations 
that  have  occurred  since  the  peace.  No  speaker  in 
parliament,  no  writer  on  trade  or  finance  has,  as  far 
as  we  are  aware,  endeavoured  to  reconcile  arguments 
at  present  so  strongly  in  contradiction,  or  sought  a 
solution  of  the  problem,  while  he  admitted  the  sub- 
stance of  the  allegations  on  either  side.  This  we 
shall  now  attempt ;  and  as  we  enter  on  the  discussion 
with  an  advantage  unknown  to  our  predecessors, — 
the  evidence  supplied  by  several  years  of  peace, — 
we  are  not  without  hopes  of  conducting  our  readers 
to  a  satisfactory  conclusion,  if  they  will  summon 
patience  to  accompany  us  through  an  inquiry  which 
ran  hardly  fail  to  be  both  long  and  intricate.     If  the 


104  The  Question  of 

narrators  of  military  events,  when  entering  on  the 
relation  of  complicated  movements,  deem  it  neces- 
sary to  make  a  demand  of  patient  attention  on  the 
part  of  their  readers,  much  more  is  such  a  warning 
required  when  we  venture  on  a  question  which  has 
been  a  source  of  perplexity  to  the  public  for  a  num- 
ber of  y^ars. 

Difference  between  an  Increase  of  Bank  Paper  and  an 
Increase  of  Metallic  Currency. — The  ease  with  which 
bank  notes  are  struck  off,  and  the  apparent  ease 
with  which  they  are  circulated,  impressed  the  public, 
long  before  the  late  wars,  with  a  notion,  that  banking 
operated  like  mining ;  and  the  general  rise  of  prices 
that  took  place  after  1764,  was,  by  many,  ascribed 
to  that  cause.  Fortunately,  Dr.  Smith  was  then 
alive  to  combat  prejudice  in  the  people,  or  error  in 
their  rulers :  he  undeceived  the  public  in  this  impor- 
portant  point,  and  showed  (Wealth  of  Nations, 
Book  II.  Chap.  II.)  that  bank  notes  formed  not  an 
addition  to  the  circulating  medium  of  a  country,  but 
a  substitution  for  coin  sent  abroad.  An  increase  of 
coin  and  an  increase  of  bank  paper  have  this  radical 
difference :  the  former  tends  to  lower  the  value  of 
money  throughout  the  world  at  large,  by  bringing 
forward  gold  and  silver,  commodities  of  undoubted 
acceptance  and  universal  circulation,  while  a  bank 
produces  an  article  current  only  in  a  particular 
country.  These  countries  are,  as  yet,  of  very  limited 
extent,  paper  money  being  hardly  known  in  France 
or  Holland :  while  in  the  rest  of  Europe  the  experi- 
ence of  its  effects  during  the  present  age  is  not  at  all 
of  a  nature  to  extend  its  circulation. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  are  the  causes  which  limit 
the  supply  of  gold  and  silver  from  the  mines  ?  Is  it 
a  monopolizing  spirit  on  the  part  of  any  government 
or  association,  a  deficiency  of  metallic  ore,  or  a 
limitation  in  the  demand  of  the  public  for  either  plate 
or  currency  ?  To  this  we  answer,  that  the  mines 
are  open  to  undertakers  of  any  nation;  that  the 
demand,  whether  for  plate  or  currency,  is  unlimited  : 


Depreciation  and  Over-issue.  105 

and  that  as  to  the  quantity  of  ore,  it  is  not  probable 
that  one-hundreth  part  of  that  which  is  in  existence 
has  yet  been  explored.  The  difficulty  lies  in  the  ex- 
pense of  mining ;  for  were  the  machinery  and  labour 
thus  employed,  to  be  rendered  more  effectual  or  less 
expensive,  we  should  soon  see  an  increase  in  the 
quantity  of  the  precious  metals  extracted  and 
brought  to  market.  How  far  does  a  similar  reason- 
ing apply  to  banks  ?  They,  like  mines,  are  subject- 
ed to  a  limitation  arising  from  expense  (in  salaries, 
rent,  stamps,  and  the  other  charges  of  an  establish- 
ment) ;  but  they  have  a  more  formidable  limitation 
in  the  hazard  attendant  on  over-issue,  a  hazard  which 
may  consist  either  in  the  discount  of  doubtful  bills, 
or  in  the  losses,  less  sudden,  but  eventually  as  serious 
which  are  inseparable  from  an  attempt  to  force 
paper  on  the  public.  How  imperiously  these  obsta- 
cles impede  circulation, — how  effectually  they  con- 
fine a  new  establishment  within  narrow  limits,  is  well 
known  to  all  who  have  endeavoured  to  overcome 
them. 

So  far  we  are  likely  to  have  the  assent  of  our  rea- 
ders, whether  bullionists  or  advocates  of  the  bank ; 
nor  need  we  enter  on  any  argument  to  show  that  the 
issue  of  bank  paper  adds  but  slightly  to  the  general 
stock  of  currency,  so  long  as  such  paper  is  demandable  in 
cash.  But  when  exemption  prevails,  the  case  appears 
very  different,  and  requires  a  close  and  attentive  in- 
vestigation. 

Discounts. — Increase  of  their  Amount  during  the  War.— 
Of  the  great  increase  during  the  war  in  the  issues  of 
bank  paper  for  discounts,  there  can  be  no  doubt, 
recorded  as  it  is  in  the  books  of  the  Bank  of  England, 
and,  we  might  add,  in  those  of  almost  every  provin- 
cial bank  in  the  kingdom.  On  this  the  supporters  of 
the  Bullion  Committee  found  their  grand  argument  for 
the  charge  of  over-issue,  but  in  their  eagerness  to 
attain  a  favourite  result,  they  overlook  several  mate- 
rial considerations. 

1.  The  increase  of  our  population  between  the 
years  1797  and  1810  (15  per  cent.),  was  necessarily 

14 


1 06  The  Question  of 

productive  of  a  certain  addition  to  the  quantity  of 
our  bank  paper;  an  addition  sufficient  to  balance 
the  saving  arising  from  economy  in  the  use  of  notes. 

2.  A  farther  and  more  powerful  cause  is  to  be 
sought  in  the  activity  arising  out  of  a  state  of  war,  a 
state  which,  by  holding  forth  the  prospect  of  large 
eventual  profits,  naturally  induced  individuals  to 
trade  beyond  their  capital.  Hence  that  multiplica- 
tion of  bills,  promissory  notes,  and  other  expedients 
for  raising  money,  so  well  known  to  those  who  have 
marked  the  course  of  mercantile  affairs  during  the 
present  age,  and  so  clearly  described  in  the  evidence 
(p.  124.)  appended  to  the  Bullion  Report.  At  that 
time  the  great  object  of  a  man  engaged  in  business, 
whether  as  merchant,  manufacturer,  or  farmer,  was  to 
gain  time  by  putting  off  a  payment  until  he  had  ac- 
complished a  sale,  or  otherwise  realized  an  advan- 
tage in  prospect.  But  in  a  season  of  peace,  business 
is  comparatively  stationary.  Our  currency  is  ade- 
quate to  our  transactions;  bills  are  less  numerous, 
and  payments  in  ready  money  or  at  short  dates  far 
more  frequent.* 

3.  Add,  farther,  that  in  a  state  of  war,  the  rise  of 
price  proceeding  from  the  various  circumstances 
enumerated  in  the  preceding  chapter,  (augmented 
taxation,  enhancement  of  labour,  insufficiency  of  our 
growth  of  corn),  made  a  larger  sum  requisite  to  cir- 
culate the  same  commodities. 

Yet  here  we  must  add  a  remark  which  we  do  not 
recollect  to  have  seen  advanced  by  any  writer  or 
speaker  on  the  subject,  viz.  that  an  increase  of  dis- 
counts is  likely  to  tend  as  much  to  lower  as  to  raise 
prices.  The  advances  of  that  nature  during  the  war 
were  made  to  classes  strictly  productive,  and  were 
evidently  instrumental  in  increasing  the  quantity  of 
our  farming  produce  and  manufactures.  If  the  dear- 
ness  of  our  farming  produce  was  owing  to  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  our  growth,  what  could  conduce  more  to 
retard  the  progress  of  enhancement,  than  to  give  our 
agriculturists  the  means  of  increasing  their  supply  ? 

'*  Tooke  on  Hi^h  and  Low  Prices.     Part.  I.  pp.  87.  k*seq. 


depreciation  and  Over-issue.  107 

AH  this  may  be  readily  admitted,  but  it  will  be 
urged  that  bankers  were  led  by  the  exemption  act, 
and  by  the  flattering  prospects  of  their  customers, 
during  the  war,  to  make  advances  which,  under  other 
circumstances,  they  would  have  withheld.  They 
were,  we  believe,  very  often  persuaded  to  discount 
bills  which  were  never  paid,  and  occasionally  to  de- 
part from  their  proper  province  by  making  advances 
on  such  securities  as  land  or  houses.  The  Bank  of 
England,  in  like  manner,  dispensed  on  various  occa* 
sions  with  a  rule  to  which  they  would  otherwise  have 
strictly  adhered ;  we  mean  the  conviction  that  the 
bills  tendered  for  discount  had  been  drawn  for  real 
or  bona  fide  transactions.  Such  relaxation  probably 
proceeded  from  commendable  motives  :  from  a  wish 
to  prevent  the  extension  of  bankruptcies  in  manufac- 
turing towns,  in  particular  Glasgow  or  Manchester, 
at  seasons  when  a  fall  of  prices,  or  the  failure  of  some 
eminent  house  threatened  to  involve  in  insolvency 
hundreds  of  persons  engaged  in  trade  with  inadequate 
capital.  We  admit,  however,  that  on  such  occasions 
the  bank  directors  went  beyond  their  province,  and 
that  the  results  were,  in  general,  either  unavailing  or 
unfortunate,  consisting  in  a  loss  to  the  bank,  or  in  a 
fruitless  postponement  of  bankruptcy  to  the  trader. 
But  these  advances  could  have  very  little  tendency 
either  to  overcharge  currency,  or  to  raise  prices. 
The  notes  issued,  whether  in  town  or  country, 
whether  on  good  or  bad  security,  soon  found  their 
way  into  hands  whose  interest  it  was  to  keep  them 
as  little  time  as  possible ;  and  any  temporary  over- 
issue was  of  short  continuance. 

Effect  of  the  Exemption  Act  on  our  Currency. — We 
must  thus  dissent  from  the  assertion  so  often  urged 
since  1810,  that  the  exemption  from  cash  payments 
gave  bankers  the  power  of  overcharging  the  cur- 
rency, or,  in  other  words,  of  causing  a  direct  rise  of 
prices.  But  in  regard  to  their  power  in  an  indirect 
sense,  we  mean  the  power  of  issuing  money  to  meet 
a  rise  of  prices  proceeding  from  other  causes,  such 
as  increase  of  taxes  or  insufficiency  in  the  supply  of 


108  The  Question  of 

corn,  we  consider  the  question  as  very  different,  and 
are  ready  to  make  a  very  simple  admission. 

So  long  as  the  currency  of  a  country  consists  of 
coin  or  of  bank  notes  for  which  cash  may  be  de- 
manded of  the  issuer,  the  export  of  a  large  sum, 
whether  for  military  purposes,  for  a  subsidy,  or  the 
purchase  of  corn,  is  necessarily  productive  of  a 
scarcity  of  money  at  home.  This  was  strikingly  ex- 
emplified in  1795  and  1796,  and  in  such  a  case  the 
money  price  of  commodities,  far  from  rising,  is  likely 
to  be  reduced  in  correspondence  with  the  reduction 
of  the  circulating  medium.  Had  such  continued  the 
case,  the  war,  we  may  be  assured,  would  never  have 
been  popular.  But  under  the  operation  of  the  ex- 
emption act,  circumstances  were  altogether  different; 
the  check  of  scarcity  was  removed,  money  was  to  be 
obtained,  as  in  peace,  by  whoever  was  able  to  offer 
good  bills  payable  at  short  dates,  and  the  amount  of 
these  was  in  a  state  of  progressive  increase  from  the 
various  causes  recapitulated  in  the  preceding  para- 
graph. 

Having  thus  admitted  the  principle,  the  next  point 
is  to  estimate  the  extent  of  its  operation.  And  here, 
if  we  cannot  agree  with  the  Bullionists  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  power  conferred  on  bankers  by  the  act  of 
1797,  we  shall,  we  doubt  not,  give  them  full  satis- 
faction by  our  view  of  its  results. 

All  parties  admit  the  fact  of  an  increase  of  currency 
during  the  war, but  the  Bullionists  ascribe  it  to  a  direct 
power  on  the  part  of  bankers  to  over-issue,  while 
we  account  that  power  strictly  passive  and  restricted 
in  its  duration  to  a  state  of  war.  We  consider  it, 
however,  to  have  been  of  very  comprehensive  opera- 
tion so  long  as  it  lasted,  and  if  we  were  asked  in 
what  manner  its  operation,  if  temporary,  proved  so 
extensive;  we  answer,  because  it  seems  to  have 
enabled  bankers  to  meet  a  rise  of  price  by  an  increase 
of  issue,  from  whatever  cause  that  rise  proceeded.  What 
then  was  the  result  during  the  war?  An  increase  of 
currency  in  proportion  to  rise  of  price,  whatever  was 
the  cause  that  produced  the  rise:   whether  taxes. 


Depreciation  and  Over-issue.  109 

scarcity  of  corn,  demand  of  men  for  government,  or 
the  additional  cost  of  articles  purchased  abroad. 

Effect,  in  apolitical  sense,  of  the  Exemption  from  Cash 
Payments. — The  exemption  act  was  in  part  productive 
of,  in  part  coincident  with,  a  great  change  in  our 
financial  situation,  a  change  from  embarrassment  to 
abundance,  from  a  state  of  disquietude  to  a  state  of 
confidence.  The  continuance  of  the  war,  the  subsi- 
dizing of  foreign  powers,  was  no  longer  checked  by 
pecuniary  difficulties,  and  our  rulers  were  induced  to 
take  several  measures  less  necessary  for  self-defence, 
and  partaking  more  of  an  aggressive  character,  than 
our  countrymen  in  general  are  aware  of.  Is  it  likely 
that,  without  the  confidence  thus  inspired,  we  should 
have  formed  against  France  the  coalitions  of  1799  or 
1805,  or  that  we  should  have  commenced  our  second 
war  so  early  as  1 803  ?  If,  on  the  one  hand,  the  pos- 
session of  the  Netherlands  by  France,  and  the  rest- 
less spirit  of  Bonaparte  would,  under  any  circum- 
stances, have  prevented  the  enjoyment  of  tranquil- 
lity, it  is  fit  to  add,  on  the  other,  that  the  scale  of  ex- 
pense on  which  the  war  was  conducted,  was  our  own 
act,  and  attributable  in  a  great  degree,  to  the  ex- 
emption of  our  banks  from  cash  payments. 

Distinction  between  Depreciation  of  Bank  Paper,  and 
Diminution  in  the  Value  of  Money  generally. — It  is  of  im- 
portance to  make  a  distinction  in  regard  to  the  ope- 
ration of  the  exemption  act  before  and  after  1809. 
During  the  twelve  years  that  followed  the  suspension 
of  cash  payments  in  1797,  our  bank  paper  had  given 
the  greatest  facilities  to  government  expenditure, 
without  incurring  any  depreciation  of  consequence, 
relatively  to  coin.  The  average  price  of  commodi- 
ties had  in  this  interval  experienced  a  great  rise,  (not 
less  than  40  per  cent.,)  compared  to  their  average 
price  in  1792.  But  as  the  causes  of  rise,  (taxation, 
insufficiency  of  provisions  of  home  growth,  demand  of 
men  for  government,  &c.)  were  distinct  or  nearly 
distinct  from  an  inferiority  of  paper  to  coiru  the  proper 


110  The  Question  of 

term  for  such  rise  of  prices  is  not  "  depreciation  of 
bank  paper,"  but  a  "diminution  in  the  value  of 
money."  In  1809  began  a  rise  of  prices  from  an  al- 
together different  cause ;  a  rise  proceeding  from  our 
bank  paper  not  being  payable  in  coin,  and  from  its 
being  exposed  to  a  trial  it  was  unable  to  bear.  This 
trial  consisted  in  the  concurrence  of  three  remarka- 
ble circumstances ;  the  expense  of  the  war  in  Spain ; 
the  necessity  of  purchases  of  corn ;  and  the  privation 
of  remittances  consequent  on  our  unfortunate  stop- 
page of  the  American  trade  with  the  continent  of 
Europe. 

Mode  in  which  Depreciation  was  incurred  abroad. — If 
we  take,  as  an  example,  a  campaign  in  the  peninsu- 
lar war,  and  suppose  that  in  a  year,  such  as  1811  or 
1812,   in    which    our  expenditure    there  exceeded 
10,000,000/.  there  was  supplied  to  the  extent  of  nine- 
tenths  in  clothing,  arms,  stores,  and  specie,  exported 
from  England,  leaving  1,000,000/.  to  be  defrayed  by 
bills  in  our  public  offices ;  in  what  manner,  we  ask, 
could  the  receivers  of  these  bills  in  the  Peninsula 
turn  them  to  account  ?     There  was  not  there,  as  in 
this  country,  an  excise-office,  a  custom-house,  a  re- 
ceiver for  the  country,  nor,  after  the  stoppage  of  the 
American  trade,  were  there  merchants,  to  whom  they 
could  be  transferred  at  par  or  at  a  slight  discount. 
If  remitted  to  England,  those  bills  could  not  pur- 
chase bullion ;  and  if  they   procured   English  mer- 
chandise without  a  perceptible  loss,  the  quantity  of 
such  was  beyond  the  demand  of  the  peninsular  or 
any  continental  market,  limited  as  it  was  in  these 
years  by  Bonaparte's  anti-commercial  decrees.    The 
unavoidable  consequence  was  a  fall  in  the  value  of 
our  bills,  in  other  words,  of  the  bank  notes  in  which 
these  bills  were  paid,  exemplifying  the  doctrine  of 
Dr.   Smith,   or   rather    the   self-evident    truth,  that 
"  whatever  causes  delay  the  payment,  or  restrict  the 
circulation  of  a  currency,  necessarily  produce  depre- 
ciation, the  ratio  of  which  must  increase  with  the 
pressure  of  these  causes." 

A  similar  reasoning  was  evidently  applicable  to 


Depreciation  and  Over-issue,  111 

our  continental  subsidies  as  far  as  paid  in  money.  It 
held  also  as  to  the  purchase  of  foreign  corn  whenever 
such  purchases  were  of  an  amount  to  surpass  our  ex- 
port of  merchandise. 

The  degree  of  such  Depreciation. — Of  the  degree  of 
inferiority  in  our  paper  to  the  metallic  currency  of 
the  Continent,  the  only  fit  index  was  the  rate  of  ex- 
change ;  and  on  referring  to  that  impartial  monitor, 
we  shall  find  an  ample  confirmation  of  the  preceding 
reasoning.  The  extent  of  fall  during  the  war  differed 
regularly  in  different  years  according  to  the  amount 
of  the  demands  of  the  Continent  on  this  country. 
Slight  in  years  such  as  1803  and  1804,  when  the  war 
was  merely  maritime,  it  was  more  considerable  in  the 
case  of  continental  operations,  as  in  1805  and  1806  ; 
— serious,  when  to  these  operations  was  joined,  as  in 
1 800,  the  necessity  of  corn  purchases  ;  and  greatest 
of  all  when,  as  in  the  years  following  1809,  there  ex- 
isted the  double  drain  of  subsidy  and  corn  import, 
without  either  a  metallic  currency,  or  a  free  neutral 
traffic  to  interpose  their  countervailing  effects. 

Effect  of  high  Prices  abroad  on  Prices  at  home. — What- 
ever enhances  corn  enhances  labour,  and  makes  itself 
felt  in  almost  every  department  of  our  productive  in- 
dustry. Now,  after  1809  the  quarter  of  wheat  rose 
from  80s.  to  100s.  in  consequence  chiefly  of  the  fall  of 
the  exchange,  of  the  necessity  of  paying  in  paper  a 
fourth  or  a  fifth  more  than  would  have  been  required 
had  not  that  paper  been  depreciated.  This  rise,  un- 
fortunately so  great  in  corn,  prevailed  in  other  foreign 
commodities ;  in  timber*  hemp,  tallow,  to  which  may 
be  added  a  few  articles  insignificant  in  amount,  but 
illustrative  of  our  proposition,  because  they  were 
wholly  supplied  by  the  Continent,  such  as  cork,  anti- 
mony, and  others,  the  price  of  which  rose  rapidly 
after  1809. 

How  far  were  the  effects  of  this  enhancement  ap- 
parent in  our  hardware,  cotton,  and  woollens,  the  cost 
of  which  was  less  directly  affected  by  the  price  of  our 
imports  ?■  The  cost  in  English  money  of  Spanish 
wool  and  American  cotton,  doubtless,  rose  in  come- 


112  The  Question  of 

quence  of  the  fall  of  our  paper ;  the  wages  of  our 
workmen  had,  likewise,  a  tendency  to  rise  with  the 
price  of  corn.  The  finished  article  was  consequently 
enhanced,  but  as  the  charges  we  have  mentioned 
formed  only  a  part  of  the  cost,  the  proportion  of  rise 
attributable  to  our  bank  paper  was  not  great  in  the 
case  of  our  manufactures. 

Extent  of  such  Effect  previous  to  1 809. — Having  now 
explained  the  mode  in  which  our  bank  paper  affected 
the  price  of  commodities,  it  remains  to  ascertain  the 
quantum  of  the  enhancement  thus  caused.  And  here 
when  computing  such  by  the  rate  of  exchange,  it 
would  evidently  be  unfair  to  draw  our  inferences  from 
a  short  interval,  such  as  the  latter  months  of  1805, 
when  our  exchanges  were  depressed  by  a  sudden 
continental  demand :  the  correct  and  impartial  mode 
is  to  class  the  years  of  the  exemption  by  periods.  If 
we  begin  with  the  twelve  years  that  elapsed  from  the 
early  part  of  1797  to  that  of  1809,  we  shall  find  that 
the  inferiority  of  our  bank  notes  to  coin  (see  Mr. 
Mushet's  Tables  and  Mr.  M'Culloch's  article  on 
Money,  in  Napier's  Supplement  to  the  Encyclop. 
Brit.)  may  be  reckoned,  at  an  average  of  the  whole 
period,  between  three  and  five  per  cent.  But  as  this 
inferiority  refers  to  continental  purposes,  and  as  a 
considerable  interval  elapsed  before  the  deprecia- 
tion became  so  great  in  regard  to  payments  at  home, 
it  will  suffice  that  we  assume  three  per  cent,  as  the 
average  rise  in  our  prices,  consequent  on  the  exemp- 
tion act,  until  1809. 

The  same  after  1809. — After  1809  we  enter  on  a  new- 
era;  our  financial  horizon  became  obscured,  and 
the  tone  of  the  calculator  must  be  altered.  If  after 
that  year  twenty-five  per  cent,  was  the  average  de- 
preciation of  our  bank  notes  abroad,  and  if  at  home 
we  make  the  same  allowance  as  before,  an  allowance 
founded  on  the  time  which  it  takes  to  adjust  prices 
generally  to  an  alteration  in  the  value  of  a  currency, 
particularly  where  that  alteration  is  not  apparent, 
we  shall  probably  find  fifteen  per  cent,  a  fair  represen- 
tation of  the  rise  of  prices,  as  far  as  caused  by  the 


Depreciation  and  Qver-iss at.  .    IlS 

nun-convertibility  of  our  paper,  during  the  five  last 
years  of  the  war;  in  other  words,  that  115/.  of  our 
bank  paper  was  required  to  make  those  purchases, 
or  transact  that  business  for  which  100/.  of  it  would 
have  been  sufficient,  had  there  been  no  exemption 
from  cash  payments. 

Summary  of  the  preceding. — If  we  proceed  to  make 
a  summary  of  the  various  facts  connected  with  our 
paper  currency,  and  of  the  conclusions  they  suggest, 
we  shall  find  them  nearly  as  follows : 

In  regard  to  Diminution  in  the  Value  of  Money  generally r, 
distinct  from  the  Fall  of  our  Bank  Paper. — 

1.  The  exemption  from  cash  payments  was  pro- 
ductive of  a  saving  to  our  banks  peculiar  to  this 
country,  and  enabled  them  to  make  advances  at  a 
rate  of  interest  lower  than  that  of  any  other  country 
during  the  war.  This  had,  in  some  measure,  a  ten- 
dency to  retard  a  rise  of  prices ;  but 

2.  The  exemption  caused  a  very  different  result, 
in  as  far  as  it  relieved  bankers  from  the  necessity  of 
regulating  their  issues  by  the  state  of  the  exchange. 
It  may  even  be  said  to  have  given  free  scope  to  the 
various  causes  of  enhancement  attendant  on  a  state 
of  war. 

Depreciation  or  Inferiority  of  our  Paper  Coin. 

1.  Our  dependence  on  the  Continent,  and  the  non- 
convertibility  of  our  bank  paper,  were  productive  of 
its  depreciation,  particularly  after  1 809  ;  but, 

2.  The  effect  of  that  depreciation  on  the  price  of 
commodities,  in  other  words,  the  rise  of  prices  conse- 
quent on  the  fall  of  our  bank  paper,  does  not  appear- 
to  have  exceeded  15  per  cent. 

These  conclusions  will,  we  trust,  be  found  to  give 
the  question  a  definite  form ;  yet  moderate  as  our 
statement  may  appear  to  the  reader,  we  hardly  expect 
it  to  receive  a  ready  assent  from  either  party,  so  per- 
plexing is  this  inquiry,  and  so  much  has  it  been  in- 
volved with  other  topics  of  discussion.     We  shall  ac- 

15 


114  The  Question  of 

cordingly  proceed  to  make  a  few  animadversions  on 
the  favourite  tenets  of  each. 

Arguments  of  the  Advocates  of  the  Bank. — These  gen- 
tlemen, with  all  their  ardour  in  the  cause  of  ministers, 
will  hardly  refuse  to  allow  that  the  command  of 
money,  to  which  the  exemption  from  cash  payments 
was  so  instrumental,  increased  our  scale  of  expendi- 
ture during  the  war.  In  admitting  this,  they  can 
make  no  great  objection  to  the  inference  that  the  ex- 
emption act  was  a  powerful,  though  indirect,  cause 
of  the  rise  of  prices  previous  to  1809.  They  will  be 
more  reluctant  to  admit  our  second  position,  that 
which  assumes  depreciation  of  our  bank  paper;  for 
though  they  allow  a  great  fall  to  have  taken  place  in 
the  exchange  after  1809,  they  are  ill  prepared  to  ad- 
mit that  from  the  moment  we  declared  our  paper  not 
convertible  into  the  currency  of  the  rest  of  the  civil- 
ized world,  we  rendered  depreciation  possible,  and 
that  a  postponement  of  the  evil,  or  a  mitigation  of  its 
extent,  would  necessarily  depend  on  the  nature  of 
our  connexion  with  the  Continent,  on  the  degree  to 
which  our  paper  should  be  put  to  the  test. 

But  those  who  still  feel  a  difficulty  in  believing 
depreciation  to  have  existed  at  home,  should  begin 
by  asking  themselves  whether,  without  the  non-con- 
vertibility of  our  paper,  depreciation  would  have  ex- 
isted abroad ;  or,  if  it  had  begun,  whether  it  would 
have  continued.  If  they  refer  to  the  evidence  of  Mr. 
Goldsmid,  and  others,  before  the  Bullion  Committee, 
they  will  find,  that  had  our  currency  been  of  coin,  or 
convertible  into  coin,  7  or  8  per  cent,  would  have  been 
the  greatest  difference  that  could  possibly  have  taken 
place  in  the  exchange  even  at  the  time  of  the  anti- 
commercial  decrees.  Let  them  ask,  in  the  next  place, 
whether  a  reduction  of  the  quantity  of  our  bank  paper 
would  not  at  any  time  have  raised  its  value,  and,  if  car- 
ried a  sufficient  length,  have  brought  it  to  a  par  with 
coin  ? 

Supposing  the  advocates  of  the  Bank  to  assent  to 
this  reasoning,  and  to  admit  the  existence  of  depre- 
dation, our  next  object,  is  to  satisfy  them  that  our  es- 


Depreciation  and  Over-issue.  116 

timate  of.it  not  is  exaggerated.  This  will  best  be  done 
by  a  comparison  of  the  rise  of  prices  in  England,  and 
on  the  Continent.  If  in  this  country  160/.  were  ne- 
cessary towards  the  close  of  the  war  to  make  the 
purchases  which  100/.  made  in  1792,  or  if,  in  other 
words,  our  prices  experienced  a  rise  of  60  per  cent., 
the  rise  on  the  Continent  will  probably  have  been 
found  to  have  been  about  30  per  cent.  This  differ- 
ence was  too  great  to  be  explained  by  any  difference 
in  the  comparative  charges  of  war ;  for  taxation,  the 
demand  of  men  for  the  public  service,  and  the  en- 
hancement of  corn,  were  all  operative  in  a  considera- 
ble degree  on  the  Continent.  Farther,  since  the  re- 
instatement of  our  currency,  the  decline  in  prices  has 
been  about  15  per  cent,  greater  in  England  than  on 
the  Continent,  a  coincidence  which  seems  fully  to 
justify  our  computation,  that  that  proportion  of  the 
rise  in  war  was  produced  by  the  fall  of  our  bank 
paper. 

The  Supporters  of  the  Bullion  Committee. — We  are 
next  to  address  ourselves  to  the  adherents  of  a  differ- 
ent doctrine,  to  men  who  take  a  bolder  tone,  and  do 
not  scruple  to  tax  their  antagonists  with  ignorance  of 
the  principles  of  productive  industry.  Nor  need  we, 
in  truth,  be  surprised  at  the  confidence  of  their  lan- 
guage in  regard  to  the  question  under  discussion. 
The  rise  of  our  prices  during  the  war  was  so  pro- 
gressive, and  so  coincident  in  point  of  time  with  the 
increase  of  bank  paper,  that  the  connexion  of  cause 
and  effect  was  generally  asserted,  long  before  it  re- 
ceived a  kind  of  official  sanction  from  the  Bullion 
Report.  To  ascribe  enhancement  to  over-issue,  was 
easy ;  to  trace  it  to  other  causes  and  to  define  the 
limited  operation  of  the  exemption  act,  would  have 
been  a  tedious  and  intricate  task.  Yet  the  difference 
between  us  and  the  Bullionists  consists  less  in  the 
extent  of  enhancement,  attributed  to  our  bank  paper, 
than  in  the  mode  by  which  that  enhancement  wa? 
produced.  While  they  hardly  notice  the  effect  of  tax- 
ation, demand  of  men  for  government,  or  iho  insuffi- 


1 lb'  The  Question  of 

cient  growth  of  corn,  as  causes  of  rise  of  price,  and 
ascribe  almost  all  to  bank  paper,  we  consider  these  as 
the  direct  causes,  and  our  paper  as  operative  only  in 
a  passive  sense,  by  giving  scope  to  these  causes,  and 
consequently  facilitating  the  continuance  of  the  war. 
We  can  trace  no  direct  power  in  banks  to  over-issue  ; 
and  those  who  insist  on  it,  will  find  themselves  in- 
volved in  all  the  difficulty  attendant  on  an  attack  of 
the  strong  hold  of  their  opponents,  viz.  the  power  pos- 
sessed by  the  public  of  relieving  themselves  of  a  sur- 
charge, by  paying  bank  notes  into  the  Treasury. 

The  Bullionists,  being  in  general  political  econo- 
mists, will  readily  assent  to  the  arguments  of  Dr. 
Smith,  that  banks,  while  subject  to  cash  payments, 
possess  no  power  of  increasing  the  amount  of  cur- 
rency; a  power  which  many  projectors,  about  the 
middle  of  last  century,  fondly  imagined  to  reside  in 
banks,  and  the  non-existence  of  which  is  so  clearly 
explained  by  Dr.  Smith,  in  his  account  of  the  unsuc- 
cessful career  of  the  Ayr  Bank.  When  satisfied  of 
this,  let  them  next  endeavour  to  show  in  what  man- 
ner it  was  possible  that  such  power  could  have 
been  conferred  by  the  exemption  act.  That  act  was 
evidently  incapable  of  giving  solidity  to  bills  or 
other  securities,  which,  without  it,  would  have  been 
bad  or  doubtful;  nor  did  any  of  its  provisions  either 
oblige  or  induce  the  public  to  pay  interest  on  more 
currency  than  they  required.  During  its  operation 
as  before,  our  notes  were  nothing  more  than  an  in- 
strument of  circulation,  and  one  which  continued  to 
cost  the  holders  fully  as  much  as  during  the  war. 
Obtained  by  a  sacrifice  of  interest,  it  was  important 
to  every  individual,  whether  a  speculative  or  a  regu- 
lar dealer,  to  circulate  them  as  quickly  as  possible, 
to  retain  them  no  longer  than  was  necessary  to  ac- 
complish a  specific  purpose.  From  this  reasoning 
we  infer  that  bank  paper,  whether  payable  or  not  in 
cash,  must  await  the  call  of  the  customer,  and  that  its 
circulation  can  be  augmented  only  to  meet  a  rise 
proceeding  from  other  causes.  Farther,  this  ex- 
tended circulation  can  continue  only  so  long  as  the 


Depreciation  and  Over-issue.  117 

causes  of  high  prices  remain  in  force;  for  bank 
paper  has  neither  the  power  of  raising  prices  in  the 
first  instance,  or  of  maintaining  them  when  the  causes 
of  enhancement  cease  to  operate. 

If  this  doctrine  appear  somewhat  bold,  we  appeal 
to  the  evidence  of  facts,  and  invite  our  readers  to 
consider  how  remarkably  our  conclusions  are  sup- 
ported by  the  course  of  circumstances  since  the 
peace.  During  the  years  1815  and  1816  no  compul- 
sion was  exercised  in  regard  to  a  return  to  cash  pay- 
ments, nor  were  the  advantages  arising  to  bankers 
from  the  exemption  act,  restricted  in  a  single  instance; 
yet  country  bankers  were  forced  greatly  to  curtail 
their  circulation,  a  measure  which,  had  they  pos- 
sessed the  power  commonly  attributed  to  them, 
would,  doubtless,  have  been  postponed  till  the  act 
had  been  repealed.  Further,  had  our  banks  pos- 
sessed this  power,  the  latitude  given  to  circulation 
during  the  war,  would,  we  may  be  assured,  have 
been  much  greater.  Mr.  Huskisson,  when  writing 
on  this  subject  in  1810,  and  viewing  the  question  in 
the  light  of  the  Bullion  Committee,  acknowledged  his 
surprise  that  the  issues  of  the  bank  had  not  been  far 
greater.  Is  it  going  too  far  to  ask  whether  this  does 
not  justify  the  suspicion  of  a  latent  error  in  the  reason- 
ing of  Bullionists  ;  of  the  existence  of  circumstances 
of  which  their  arguments  take  no  account  ?  Without 
pressing  this  point  in  the  abstract,  we  shall  adduce 
a  fact  entitled  to  the  most  attentive  consideration  of 
those  who  invest  the  exemption  act  with  so  formida- 
ble an  attribute  as  that  of  enabling  bankers  to  make 
a  direct  increase  of  their  issues.  Our  growth  of 
corn,  inadequate  during  the  whole  war,  became  so, 
in  a  high  degree,  soon  after  the  exemption  act :  our 
farmers  had  then  a  powerful  motive  to  extend  their 
tillage,  and,  in  fact,  did  extend  it  as  far  as  their  means 
admitted.  It  was  a  general  notion  on  the  part  of  the 
public,  and  we  believe  of  ministers,  that  this  exten- 
sion was  limited,  not  by  want  of  funds,  but  by  the 
nature  of  the  soil :  an  opinion,  however,  wholly  dispro- 
ved by  the  experience  of  the  last  seven  years.,  in  which  the 


118  The  Exemption  Act  viewed 

amount  produced  from  our  soil  has  been  so  greatly 
augmented.  To  what  has  this  augmentation  been 
owing,  except  to  the  application  of  additional  capital 
and  labour  ?  Observe  the  importance  of  the  conclu- 
sion to  which  this  leads :  our  soil  having  been,  as  far 
as  regarded  natural  fertility,  equally  capable  of  in- 
creased production,  ten  or  twelve  years  ago,  would 
not  our  farmers,  had  our  banks  possessed  the  power 
ascribed  to  them,  have  obtained  such  an  issue  of  notes 
as  would  have  enabled  them  to  extend  their  tillage, 
and  bring  our  growth  of  corn  on  a  level  with  our 
consumption?  If  want  of  hands  be  alleged  as  the 
obstacle,  we  answer,  that  in  Ireland  and  in  Germany 
there  were  many  thousand  labourers  unemployed, 
and  that  a  command  of  capital,  such  as  is  vulgarly  as- 
cribed to  our  banks,  would  soon  have  transported 
them  to  our  shores. 

Historical  Inquiries. 

1.  The  Exemption  Act,  viewed  in  connexion  with  Hie 
events  of  the  War. — We  shall  now  bestow  a  few  para- 
graphs on  an  interesting,  but  hitherto  unnoticed 
topic,  in  the  history  of  our  paper  currency;  we 
mean  the  question, "  whether  the  exemption  act,  had 
it  not  taken  place  when  it  did,  would  have  been  re- 
sorted to  at  any  subsequent  era  in  the  war  ?"  This 
inquiry,  brief  as  we  shall  make  it,  requires  an  atten- 
tive notice  of  our  situation  relatively  to  the  Continent 
at  particular  periods. 

The  preliminaries  of  peace  between  France  and 
Austria  were  signed  at  Leoben  in  April  1797,  a  few 
weeks  after  the  exemption  act,  and  though  the  defini- 
tive treaty,  (that  of  Campo  Formio)  was  not  conclud- 
ed till  the  autumn,  there  existed  little  doubt  of  its 
taking  place,  and  it  is  a  well-known  fact,  that,  in 
the  course  of  the  summer,  our  pecuniary  resources 
became  more  abundant.  This  was  also  a  time  of  na- 
val success,  and  though  the  dread  of  invasion  con- 
tinued, we  have  the  authority  of  the  Bullion  Commit- 
tee (Report,  page  27,)  that  the  bank  ought  to  have 


m  connexion  ivith  the  Events  of  the  War,         119 

met  an  alarm  of  that  nature  by  a  liberal  issue  of  their 
notes.  Be  this  as  it  may,  it  seems  extremely  unlikely 
that  at  any  time  in  1797,  after  the  preliminaries  of 
Leoben,  ministers  would  have  adopted  a  measure  so 
new  and  questionable  as  the  suspension  of  cash  pay- 
ments. 

The  succeeding  year  was  one  of  peace  on  the  Con- 
tinent, and  of  prosperity  in  this  country.  But  in  what 
manner  did  the  renewal  of  operations  by  land  in 
1799,  affect  the  state  of  our  circulating  medium  ? 
The  effect,  for  some  time  inconsiderable,  became  very 
different  after  the  failure  of  the  harvest ;  the  long  in- 
terval of  two  years  that  elapsed  from  that  failure, 
until  the  certainty  of  a  favourable  crop  in  1801,  would, 
had  cash  payments  been  enforced,  have  recalled  all 
the  difficulties  of  1796 ;  so  that  we  by  no  means  ven- 
ture to  assert  that  ministers  would  have  forborne  a 
recourse  to  the  measure  in  question. 

The  preliminaries  of  peace  with  France  were 
signed  in  the  autumn  of  1801,  and  there  ensued  a  long 
interval  of  ease  in  regard  to  financial  and  commercial 
affairs.  Even  in  1805,  when  we  again  roused  the 
Continent  to  arms,  and  subsidized  not  only  Austria, 
but  Russia,  *jie  pressure  on  our  exchange  was  tempo- 
rary ;  for  this  was  no  season  of  indecisive  warfare,  of 
protracted  operations :  our  allies  had  now  an  anta- 
gonist who  brought  a  campaign  speedily  to  an  issue ; 
and  who,  at  Ulm  and  Austerlitz,  effectually  relieved 
us  from  the  pressure  of  subsidies.  In  1806  and  1807, 
part  of  our  allies  continued  in  arms,  but  they  were 
not  supported  by  ministers  on  a  scale  productive  of 
embarrassment,  and  our  corn  imports  were  fortunately 
not  of  a  magnitude  to  press  on  the  exchange. 

There  thus  elapsed  a  period  of  not  less  than  seven 
years  without  any  great  or  continued  derangement  in 
our  continental  exchanges.  However,  a  very  differ- 
ent prospect  was  opened  by  the  events  of  1809,  by 
our  augmented  expenditure  in  the  Peninsula,  and  the 
necessity  of  large  purchases  of  corn.  Had  our  bank- 
paper  been  at  that  time  demandable  in  cash,  we 
should,  doubtless,  have  experienced  great  difficulties. 


120  The  Exemption  Act  viewed 

nor  would  the  public,  ardent  in  the  cause  of  Spain, 
have  hesitated  to  support  ministers  in  any  measure 
that  promised  an  addition  to  our  pecuniary  means. 
There  is,  on  the  other  hand,  equally  little  doubt,  that 
without  the  previous  existence  of  the  exemption  act, 
and  the  confidence  inspired  by  its  till  then  success- 
ful operation,  we  should  not  have  interfered  with 
the  freedom  of  American  navigation :  we  would  have 
studied  more  carefully  the  effect  of  that  navigation 
on  our  resources,  and  have  cherished  it  as  a  fund  for 
our  continental  expenses.  Our  ship-owners  might 
have  clamoured,  and  individual  members  of  the  cabi- 
net might  have  been  rendered  converts  to  their 
views,  but  the  opinion  of  the  bank  directors  would 
have  been  hostile  to  such  a  measure ;  and  the  dan- 
ger pointed  out  by  the  solitary  voice  of  Mr.  Baring 
(Inquiry  into  our  Orders  in  Council)  would  have  been 
brought  before  government  with  all  the  weight  of 
that  poAverful  body. 

II.  The  next  and  concluding  object  of  our  inquiry 
is,  "to  what  degree  did  the  exemption  from  cash 
payments  increase  to  government  the  means  of  ex- 
ertion on  the  Continent  ?"  By  substituting  at  home 
paper  for  metallic  currency,  it  enabled  us  to  send 
abroad  our  gold  coin,  the  amount  of  which,  very  dif- 
ferently as  it  has  been  computed,  (Bank  Committee 
Report,  May  1819,)  was,  probably,  not  far  short  of 
20,000,000/.  sterling  ; — a  most  substantial  aid,  doubt- 
less, but  one  which  was,  in  a  great  measure,  exhaust- 
ed in  the  first  three  years  of  trial,  1799,  1800,  1801. 
From  that  time  forward,  the  portion  of  gold  coin  in 
the  country  appears  to  have  been  comparatively 
small :  at  all  events,  it  was  found  quite  inadequate  to 
the  demand  in  the  second  period,  1809  and  1810, 
the  exchange  having  fallen  rapidly  as  soon  as  the 
pressure  on  it  became  considerable. 

The  extent  of  direct  aid  arising  from  the  exemp- 
tion act,  seems  thus  to  have  been  limited  to  the 
amount  of  our  gold  coin ;  but  we  should  enter  into  a 
much  wider  field,  were  we  to  calculate  the  augmenta- 
tion of  our  financial  means  by  the  other  results  of  the 


in  connexion  with  the  Events  of  the  War.        121 

act ;  the  increased  facility  of  discount,-  the  compara- 
tively moderate  rate  of  interest,  above  all,  the  prac- 
ticability of  increasing  our  stock  of  currency  in 
proportion  to  the  rise  of  our  prices.  After  every 
deduction  for  exaggeration,  and  after  ascribing  the 
larger  share  of  our  financial  abundance  to  the  bold 
plan  of  raising  the  supplies  within  the  year,  there 
still  remains  a  great  amount  referable  to  the  effects 
of  the  exemption  from  cash-payments.  Of  the  extent 
of  aid  arising  from  a  moderate  rate  of  interest,  some 
idea  may  be  formed  by  those  who  have  visited  the 
Continent,  and  observed  how  slowly  productive 
industry  advances  in  a  country  like  France,  where, 
even  in  peace,  6  or  7  per  cent,  is  the  current  interest 
of  money. 

This  benefit  we  experienced  without  much  alloy, 
until  the  five  last  years  of  the  war,  when  the  de- 
preciation of  our  paper  on  the  Continent  caused  a 
sudden  increase  of  our  foreign  disburse,  and  some 
time  after,  an  increase  less  sudden,  but  of  greater 
amount  and  permanency,  in  our  expenditure  at 
home.  The  losses  hence  arising  may,  we  believe, 
without  pressing  the  point  to  an  extreme,  be  carried 
to  100,000,000/.,  in  addition  to  which  we  have  to 
charge  on  the  exemption  act  a  large  proportion  of 
the  distress  of  our  agriculturists,  conducive  as  that 
act  certainly  was,  to  the  enormous  rise  of  prices 
during  war,  the  fall  of  which  has  been,  and  will  be 
productive  of  great  embarrassment,  until  wages,  sala* 
ries,  and  other  charges,  shall  be  accommodated  to 
the  new  scale.  It  thus  becomes  a  question,  whether 
the  amount  of  benefit  derived  from  the  exemption  in 
the  period  preceding  1 809  has  not  been  balanced, 
perhaps  more  than  balanced,  by  the  loss  and  pressure 
of  the  subsequent  years.  This  point,  however,  we 
have  no  wish  to  urge,  and  still  less  the  speculative 
question  already  alluded  to,  whether,  without  the 
aid  derived  from  this  act,  our  government  would 
have  renewed  the  war  in  1803,  or  have  conducted  it 
on  so  expensive  a  scale.  Our  object  is  statistical, 
not   political;  and  in  calculating  the  advantage  or 

16 


122  The  Exemption  Act  viewed,  &c. 

disadvantage  of  a  great  financial  measure,  we  con- 
fine ourselves  to  reasoning  on  events  as  they  actually 
occurred. 

Mr.  PeePs  Bill. — The  majority  of  the  public,  yield- 
ing to  first  impressions,  and  unable  to  follow  up  an 
intricate  course  of  reasoning,  have  ascribed  to  Mr. 
Peel's  bill  that  re-action  which  arose  from  a  more 
comprehensive  cause.  As  to  the  present  effects  of 
that  bill,  we  can  trace  none  of  consequence,  except 
a  partial  rise  in  the  value  of  gold  throughout  Europe, 
consequent  on  the  large  purchases  of  the  Bank  of 
England ;  while,  as  to  its  permanent  effects,  we  can 
perceive,  so  long  as  peace  lasts,  hardly  any  worth 
notice,  except  an  obligation  on  that  establishment  to 
keep  a  large  reserve  in  cash,  and  consequently  to 
reduce  its  annual  profits  by  400,000/.  or  whatever 
may  be  the  charge  of  providing  and  keeping  that 
deposit.  Country  bankers,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
subjected  to  little  additional  expense,  since  by  a 
clause  in  the  act  of  1819,  recently  prolonged,  they 
continue  exempt  from  the  necessity  of  paying  in 
cash,  if  they  tender  Bank  of  England  notes. 

But  innoxious  as  this  law  in  a  great  measure  was, 
we  consider  its  enactment  matter  of  great  regret, 
partly  as  subjecting  to  undue  censure  the  individuals 
instrumental  in  passing  it,  more  as  tending  to  make 
the  public  mistake  the  real  cause  of  the  distress  that 
has  since  taken  place.  Had  no  such  act  been  passed, 
and  had  the  bank  been  left  to  pay  in  cash  or  not  at 
its  option,  the  public  would,  as  in  1815  and  1816, 
have  fixed  their  attention  on  the  transition  from 
peace  to  war  as  the  real  cause  of  the  fall  of  prices, 
and  have  been  better  prepared  to  comprehend  and 
second  the  financial  measures  which  such  a  transition 
required. 


123 


CHAP.  V. 

Agriculture. 

We  propose  dividing  this  very  important  branch 
of  our  subject  into  three  parts: 

I.  An  historical  sketch  of  our  corn-trade,  particu- 
larly since  1792  :  and  the  causes  of  the  remarkable 
fluctuations  of  price. 

II.  The  present  situation  and  prospects  of  our  agri- 
culturists. 

III.  The  question  of  a  protecting  duty. 

SECTION  I. 

Historical  Sketch  of  our  Corn-Trade. 

The  interference  of  our  legislature  with  the  export 
of  corn,  dates  from  a  very  remote  era ;  but  our  notice 
shall  not  be  carried  beyond  the  reign  of  Elizabeth,  a 
reign  which,  in  its  early  years,  exhibited  corn  at  as 
low  a  price  as  at  any  period  of  our  history,  but  be- 
came in  its  progress  as  remarkable  for  enhancement 
as  the  reign  of  George  III.  England  was  in  those 
days,  a  corn-exporting  country,  if  the  name  of  export 
can  be  said  to  belong  to  a  surplus  produce  hardly 
greater  than  that  of  a  single  county  in  the  present 
age.  In  the  early  part  of  the  reign  of  Elizabeth 
(1562),  export  was  permitted  by  act  of  Parliament, 
whenever  our  prices  fell  to  10s.  the  quarter  for  wheat, 
and  6s.  Sd.  for  barley  and  malt;  prices  remarkably 
low,  when  we  consider  that  our  coin  was,  in  point  of 
metallic  weight  and  fineness,  the  same  as  at  present. 
At  that  rate,  however,  they  did  not  long  continue ;  a 
considerable  rise  took  place  before  1570:  and  in 
1593  the  export  limit  was  extended  by  act  of  parlia- 


124  Historical  Sketch  of  our  Corn-Trade. 

ment  to  20s.  for  the  quarter  of  wheat,  and  12$.  for 
barley  and  malt. 

This  doubling  of  price  in  the  course  of  thirty  years, 
has  not  a  little  embarrassed  political  arithmeticians : 
it  is  commonly  attributed  to  the  influx  of  metallic 
currency  from  the  American  mines  before  an  outlet 
was  found  for  it  in  India  and  China,  but  from  our  ex- 
perience of  the  limited  effect  of  such  a  cause  in  sub- 
sequent times,  particularly  since  the  late  peace,  we 
are  inclined  to  lay  no  little  stress  on  the  general  preva- 
lence of  war  throughout  Europe,  from  the  middle  of  the 
sixteenth  to  that  of  the  seventeenth  century.  Be  this 
as  it  may,  the  enhancement  continued  progressive : 
for  in  1623  the  export  limit  was  raised  to  32s.  the 
quarter  for  wheat,  and  16.s\  for  barley  and  malt.  In 
the  succeding  age,  particularly  under  Cromwell,  our 
markets  were  considerably  higher,  but  the  rise  was 
in  some  degree  nominal,  our  coin,  though  no  longer 
debased  by  government,  being  deteriorated  by  clip- 
ping and  filing,  and  brought,  at  times,  no  less  than  20 
per  cent,  below  its  legal  value, — an  abuse  not  com- 
pletely remedied  till  1717. 

Bounty  on  Export. — In  the  reign  of  Charles  II.  the 
prices  of  corn  declined,  and  though  several  acts 
were  passed  in  (1660,  1663,  1670),  imposing  a  duty 
on  foreign  corn,  their  effect  in  our  market  was  incon- 
siderable, because  our  growth  equalled,  or  more 
than  equalled  our  consumption.  Prices  accordingly 
did  not  rise,  the  agriculturists  complained,  and  the 
epoch  of  the  Revolution  was  marked  by  a  new  refine- 
ment of  legislation  in  their  favour.  The  necessity  of 
providing  supplies  for  the  formidable  contest  with 
Louis  XIV.,  led  government  to  contemplate  a  land- 
tax,  and  to  offer  as  a  douceur  to  the  landed  interest,  a 
premium  on  export,  which,  accompanied  by  a  pro- 
hibition of  the  import  of  foreign  corn,  implied  a  cer- 
tainty of  increase  of  price,  and  consequently  of  rent. 
The  chief  provisions  of  the  act  were  the  payment  of 
a  bounty  of  5s.  for  every  quarter  of  wheat  exported, 
so  long  as  our  price  continued  at  or  below  4&<?..  and 


Historical  Sketch  of  our  Com-  Trade.  1 25 

"2s.  6d.  for  every  quarter  of  barley  or  malt,  so  long  as 
our  home  currency  for  that  grain  did  not  exceed  24$. 

A  deficiency  of  documents  in  regard  to  the  extent 
of  our  tillage,  prevents  our  tracing  the  effects  of  the 
bounty  act :  it  doubtless  stimulated  production,  and, 
under  ordinary  political  circumstances,  might,  after 
creating  a  temporary  superiority  of  demand  to  sup- 
ply, have  in  some  degree  lowered  prices ;  but  the 
market  was,  during  many  years,  kept  up  by  causes 
not  unlike  those  which  followed  in  our  day  the  French 
revolution, — war,  and  a  more  than  usual  prevalence 
of  bad  seasons.  The  proportion  of  the  latter  in  the 
twenty  years  between  1692  and  1712,  was  not  infe- 
rior to  that  of  the  twenty  years  between  1792  and 
1812;  and  as  our  drain  of  men  and  capital  for  the 
war  in  these  days,  made  no  slight  approximation  to 
that  of  our  late  contest,  there  were  wanting  to  com- 
plete the  analogy  of  high  price  only  two  of  the  cha- 
racteristics of  our  age, — a  depreciated  currency,  and 
an  annual  insufficiency  of  growth. 

After  the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  we  enter  on  a  pacific 
era,  on  the  age  of  Fleury  and  Walpole.  The  causes 
of  fluctuation  in  our  corn  market  were  now  much 
simplified,  and  the  half  century  that  succeeded  pre- 
sented the  following  results  : 

Average  Price  of  Wheat  computed  by  the  Winchester  quarter^from 
Purchses  made  at  Windsor  for  Eton  College 

£     *.  d. 

For  ten  years  eading  with  1725              -            -               -             1     15  5 

Do.         -         ending  with  1735               -             -               -             115  2 

Do.         -         ending- with  1 745                -             -               -             1     12  1 

Do.         -         ending- with  1755               -             -               -             1      13  3 

Do.         -        ending  with  1765                -             -               -             1     19  3 

In  what  manner  are  we  to  explain  so  near  an  ap- 
proach to  uniformity  of  price  during  so  long  a  pe- 
riod ?  By  the  maintenance  of  peace  during  thirty- 
years  out  of  fifty,  and  by  an  exemption,  in  general, 
from  bad  seasons.  The  case  Mas  the  same  with  our 
neighbours,  as  appears  from  the  returns  (see  Appen- 
dix) of  the  prices  of  corn  in  France.  In  that  country, 
as  in  England,  the  market  during  the  fifty  years  in 


126  Historical  Sketch  of  our  Corn-Trade. 

question,  presented  an  average  considerably  lower 
than  that  of  either  the  preceding  or  succeeding  half 
century. 

During  the  whole  of  this  period,  we  were  exporters 
of  corn ;  the  quantity  varied,  of  course,  from  year  to 
year,  but  was  almost  always  sufficient  to  establish  the 
fact,  that  the  market  price  in  England  was  little  higher 
than  throughout  the  maritime  part  of  the  west  of  Eu- 
rope ;  we  mean  the  Netherlands,  Denmark,  the  north 
of  France,  and  the  north-west  of  Germany.  The 
cheapness  was  materially  greater  only  in  inland  dis- 
tricts of  the  Continent,  where,  as  at  present  in  Lor- 
raine, the  south  of  Poland,  or  south-west  of  Russia, 
the  want  of  water  conveyance  kept  down  the  market. 

During  this  half  century  of  stationary  price,  and 
of  scanty  agricultural  profits, — this  period,  when  in- 
closure  bills  were  so  rare,  and  lease  after  lease  was 
signed  in  long  succession,  without  any  idea  of  increase 
of  rent,  it  must  not  be  inferred  that  our  tillage  was  on 
the  decrease  :  it  evidently  received  an  extension,  but 
somewhat  more  slowly,  as  appears  by  the  ultimate 
result,  than  the  increase  of  our  population. 

After  1764,  began  a  new  era ;  our  consumption 
equalled,  and  somewhat  surpassed  our  growth,  so 
that  our  import  predominated  over  export.  This 
change,  so  unsuitable  to  a  season  of  peace,  so  con- 
trary to  calculation,  at  a  time  when  additional  labour 
and  capital  became  applicable  to  agriculture,  was 
owing  to  several  reasons, — an  unusual  proportion  of 
bad  seasons ;  the  increase  of  consumers  from  the 
extension  of  our  manufactures,  particularly  cotton; 
and  in  part,  doubtless,  to  the  general  disposition  to 
withhold  surplus  capital  from  the  so  long  unprofita- 
ble investment  of  agriculture. 

Act  of  111 3. — The  rise  in  our  market,  whatever 
may  have  been  its  causes,  was  such  in  the  ten  years 
preceding  1773,  as  to  lead  to  an  act  of  a  new  kind ; 
an  act  implying  that,  in  regard  to  corn,  England  was 
to  be  considered  rather  an  importing  than  an  export- 
ing country.     It  permitted   the   import   of  foreign 


Historical  Sketch  of  our  Corn  Trade.  127 

wheat  whenever  our  own  reached  or  exceeded  48s. 
the  quarter ;  a  limit  just  and  moderate,  which,  while 
it  relieved  the  consumer  from  an  exorbitant  rise  on 
the  occurrence  of  a  bad  harvest,  was  productive  of 
no  injury  to  our  agriculture,  the  prices  of  corn  con- 
tinuing to  afford  a  steady  return  for  the  labour  and 
capital  employed.  Our  market  now  exhibited  all 
the  advantages  of  supply  duly  proportioned  to  de- 
mand :  in  some  years  a  partial  import  was  necessary  ; 
in  others,  the  nature  of  our  crops  enabled  us  to  ex- 
port; but  after  1788,  a  time  of  extension  and  pros- 
perity to  most  of  our  manufactures,  import  decided- 
ly predominated. 

.In  1791,  the  landed  interest,  not  satisfied  with  the 
advantage  secured  to  them  by  the  act  of  1773,  carri- 
ed it  a  step  farther,  and  obtained  a  law  preventing 
import,  except  when  our  wheat  should  reach  or  ex- 
ceed the  price  of  54s.  the  quarter.  Whether  this 
measure  would  have  operated  to  raise  prices,  or  by 
directing  an  extra  share  of  capital  to  tillage,  would 
have,  in  some  degree,  lowered  them,  we  had  no 
opportunity  of  ascertaining,  so  soon  was  it  followed 
by  the  war  of  1793. 

The  late  Wars. — The  wars  of  the  present  age  at- 
tended by  an  unparalleled  drain  of  both  labourers 
and  capital,  could  not  fail  to  raise  the  price  of  corn. 
For  some  time,  however,  the  rise  was  gradual,  the 
average  price  of  our  wheat,  during  the  first  seven 
years  of  the  war,  not  exceeding  63s.;  but  two  bad 
harvests  in  succession,  (1799  and  1800)  altered  en- 
tirely the  state  of  the  market,  and  carried  prices  to 
a  rate  (6/.  and  upwards)  till  then  unprecedented  in 
our  history.  The  seasons  of  1801,  1802,  and  1803, 
were  favourable,  and  produced  a  fall  to  nearly  3/.,  a 
fall  which,  in  concurrence  with  the  demands  of  the 
Treasury  on  the  land-holders  for  our  renewed  con- 
test with  France,  led  to  the  corn  law  of  1804,  by 
which  the  import  of  foreign  wheat  was  in  a  manner 
prohibited,  until  our  own  should  be  at  or  above  63a\. 
and  taxed  till  our  own  jreached  66.9.     These  prices. 


i  28  Historical  Sketch  of  our  Corn  Trade. 

high  as  they  then  seemed,  were  soon  surpassed  by 
the  currency  of  our  market,  in  consequence,  partly 
of  an  unfavourable  season  (1804,)  partly  of  the  con- 
tinued drain  of  hands  and  capital  for  the  war.  These 
causes  operated  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  over  the 
rest  of  Europe,  and  greatly  lessened  the  relief  which 
importation  would  otherwise  have  afforded  us. 

The  non-convertibility  of  our  paper  currency  had 
existed  since  1797,  and  passed,  in  vulgar  estimate, 
for  the  princi  pal  cause  of  this  progressive  rise ; 
but  the  degree  of  enhancement  proceeding  from  it 
was  slight  (not  exceeding  3  or  4  per  cent.)  until  1809. 
in  that  year  it  was  suddenly  accelerated  by  an  un- 
fortunate concurrence  of  circumstances ;  expenditure 
in  Spain,  the  stoppage  of  neutral  traffic,  and,  above 
all,  a  deficient  harvest.  From  this  time  forward,  our 
purchasers  of  foreign  corn  were  made  at  a  sacrifice 
of  1 8,  20,  or  25  per  cent,  a  loss  incurred  on  the  whole 
of  the  very  large  sum  of  7,000,000/.  expended  on  the 
purchase  of  corn  in  1810.  The  currency  of  our 
market  was  now  between  51.  and  6/.,  and  though,  for 
one  year,-  a  rise  was  prevented  by  the  abundant 
harvest  of  1810,  the  case  became  very  different  after 
that  of  1811,  although  only  partially  deficient.  A 
supply  from  abroad  was  now,  in  a  manner,  out  of  the 
question,  partly  from  the  anti-commercial  edicts  of 
the  time,  more  from  our  want  of  specie  and  the  fall 
of  our  bank  paper.  Accordingly,  during  1812  and 
1813,  our  prices  averaged  above  6/.,  a  rate  ill  calcu- 
lated to  prepare  our  farmers  for  the  great  and  gene- 
ral fall  to  be  expected  from  the  approaching  change 
in  the  state  of  Europe. 

The  Peace  of  1814. — Never  were  the  effects  of 
peace  more  promptly  or  generally  felt,  than  in  1814. 
Import  co-operated  with  favourable  seasons ;  the 
price  of  corn  fell  rapidly,  and  it  was  in  vain  that 
parliament  passed,  early  in  1815,  a  new  act,  forbid- 
ding import  till  the  home-price  of  our  wheat  exceed- 
ed 80,9. :  the  market  continued  low,  and  for  a  time 
exposed  both  the  farmers  and  the  public  to  all  the 


Fluctuations  in  the  Price  of  Corn.  129 

evils  of  sudden  transition.  In  1816  a  deficiency  of 
crop,  more  serious  both  in  England  and  the  Conti- 
nent, than  any  in  the  present  age,  reversed  this  state 
of  things,  raised  prices,  and  led,  during  1817  and 
1818,  to  an  import  of  unexampled  magnitude.  But 
when  in  the  early  part  of  1819,  the  effect  of  scarcity 
was  past,  our  market  fell,  and  in  the  autumn  of  1820, 
an  abundant  harvest  brought  it  to  the  state  of  de- 
pression under  which  it  so  long  remained. 

Effect  of  the  Fluctuations  in  the  price  of  Corn,  since 
1792. — We  are  next  to  examine  the  state  of  our 
market  during  the  last  thirty  years,  with  a  view  to  its 
effect  on  the  situation  of  farmers.  The  war  com- 
menced at  a  time  when  corn  was  abundant,  and 
prices  moderate,  wheat  averaging  about  53s.  a  quar- 
ter. The  immediate  effect  of  the  assumption  of  a 
military  attitude,  was  to  withdraw  from  agriculture  a 
portion  of  labour  and  capital,  to  produce  a  rise  in 
the  rate  of  interest,  and  to  necessitate  the  abandon- 
ment of  many  projects  of  improvement,  such  as 
drainages,  canals,  and  other  undertakings,  dependent 
for  success  on  a  low  rate  of  interest.  This  was  pro- 
ductive of  very  general  distress,  but  had  little  effect 
on  the  corn  market,  the  stock  in  hand  being  abundant. 
In  1794  and  1795,  a  partial  deficiency  in  the  crops, 
joined  to  the  continued  operation  of  the  war,  pro- 
duced a  considerable  rise,  and  carried  wheat,  not- 
withstanding a  large  premium  on  import  paid  by 
government,  to  4/.  and  upwards.  This,  however, 
was  of  short  duration :  in  1796,  the  amount  of  im- 
port, followed  by  a  favourable  season,  reduced  our 
market;  in  1797,  wheat  did  not,  on  average,  exceed 
3/.  2s.  and  its  further  fall  in  1798  (to  21.  Us.,)  showed 
how  effectually  a  favourable  season  could,  even  in 
the  midst  of  war,  counteract  the  charges  attendant 
on  the  culture  of  corn.  These  charges  without  being 
at  all  on  a  par  with  the  burdens  of  an  after-period, 
were  such  as  to  make  many  of  our  farmers  hold  the 
language  of  complaint,  and  consider  the  increase 

!7 


i  30  Fluctuations  in  the  Price  of  Com. 

expense  from  the  war  as  materially  exceeding  the 
increase  of  price. 

This  may  be  termed  the  first  era  in  the  war,  which 
had  lasted  six  y ears  without  producing  a  material  rise, 
either  in  rents  or  in  the  average  price  of  corn.  The 
case,  however,  now  underwent  a  complete  change, 
the  occurrence  of  two  bad  seasons  in  succession 
(1799  and  1800)  raising  prices  to  a  rate  (5/.  and  61.) 
wholly  unknown  in  our  history.  What  was  the  effect 
of  these  seasons  on  the  situation  of  our  farmers  ?  At 
first  unfavourable,  because  a  rise  in  price  (Evidence, 
Agricultural  Committee,  p.  36,)  forms  no  equivalent 
to  a  deficiency  of  crop ;  but  prospectively,  it  was  ad- 
vantageous, the  stock  on  hand  being  so  reduced  as 
to  open  a  prospect  of  high  prices  for  some  time  to 
come.  Accordingly,  in  spite  of  the  additional  bur- 
dens of  the  period,  among  others  the  income  tax, 
farmers  and  speculators  in  land  were  induced  to 
contract  for  rents  at  an  advanced  rate.  This  spirit 
showed  itself  strongly  in  1800  and  1801,  but  received 
a  sudden  check  from  the  favourable  harvest  of  the 
latter  year,  and  the  unexpected  conclusion  of  peace 
with  France. 

Our  wheat  now  (1802)  fell  to  nearly  3/. :  the  effect 
of  high  prices  was  pronounced  not  only  temporary 
but  fallacious ;  land  was  almost  every  where  declared 
to  be  over-let,  and  the  consequent  stagnation  was  on 
the  eve  of  leading  to  a  general  reduction  of  rents, 
when  the  scene  was  once  more  changed  by  war. 
This  was  followed  by  the  deficient  harvest  of  1 804 ; 
markets  now  rose,  rents  were  maintained  and  aug- 
mented, the  import  of  corn  was  subjected  to  addi- 
tional restrictions,  and  at  home,  all  the  causes  which 
swell  the  cost  of  production,  rise  of  labour,  taxation, 
interest  of  money,  operated  in  conjunction.  The 
effect  of  all  these,  was  to  carry  wheat  during  1805, 
6,  7,  and  8,  to  an  average  of  somewhat  more  than  4/. 
although  the  seasons  were  not  unfavourable. 

This  may  be  termed  the  middle  epoch  in  the  pe- 
riod of  war :  agriculture  had  become  profitable,  and 
the  style  of  living  of  our  farmers  was  considerably 


Fluctuations  in  the  Price  of  Corn.  13} 

altered,  but  their  charges  being  greatly  augmented, 
their  profits  were  far  from  unreasonable.  Of  this 
the  best  proof  is,  that  all  the  motives  to  extension  of 
culture,  did  not  produce  a  sufficiency  of  growth  for 
consumption.  There  prevailed  among  farmers  a 
general  confidence,  an  extension  of  outlay ;  but  their 
pecuniary  advantage  was  limited  to  increase  of  in- 
come, to  the  more  confortable  support  of  their  fami- 
lies ;  a  substantial  addition  to  property  was,  as  yet, 
experienced  by  very  few. 

We  now  come  to  a  new  era, — the  last  five  years  of 
the  war, — a  time  when  farming  profit,  notwithstanding 
an  increase  of  charges,  materially  exceeded  the  pre- 
ceding ratio.     In    1809,   a  deficient  harvest   raised 
prices,  and  the  imports  from  the  Continent  in  1810, 
though  uncommonly  large,  could  not  bring  them  be- 
low an  average  of  5/.  or  6/.  because  our  currency  was 
now  greatly  depreciated.     No  class  derived  such  be- 
nefit from  the  fall  of  our  bank  paper  as  our  agricul- 
turists, their  rent  and  taxes  being  paid  in  it  without 
any  addition,  while  in  their  sales  they  received  a  full 
allowance  for  its  depreciation,  not  only  in  their  corn 
and  cattle,  but  in  their  butter,  poultry,  and  other  ar- 
ticles.    It  was  at  this  time  that  full  execution  was 
given  to  the  anti-commercial  decrees  of  Bonaparte, 
and  to  our  Orders  in  Council,  measures  which,  without 
absolutely  stopping  neutral  navigation,  added  greatly 
to  its  cost,  and  left  us  more  and  more  to  our  own 
resources.     This  was  the  season  also  of  extended  mi- 
litary operations  in  Spain,  and  of  the  appropriation, 
in  that  country  and  in  Portugal,  of  supplies  of  flour 
from  the  United  States,  which  might  otherwise  have 
found  their  way  to  England.     In  1811  our  crop  was 
not  equal  to  our  consumption,  and  in  consequence  of 
the  want  of  import  from  the  Continent,  our  markets 
experienced    a  great   advance.     Rents    were    now 
raised  rapidly  and  generally :    poor-rate,  tithe,  and 
labour  received  a  great  increase,  and  the  collection 
of  the  property-tax  from  farmers  became  more  rigo- 
rous; drawbacks  which  were  serious,  certainly,  but 
more  than  outweighed  by  the  benefit  of  high  price, 


1 32  Fluctuations  in  the  Price  of  Com. 

In  1812  and  1813  the  harvests  were,  on  the  whole, 
favourable ;  while  the  augmented  depreciation  of  our 
bank  paper  (now  between  20  and  30  per  cent.)  dis- 
couraged import,  and  kept  our  prices  of  wheat  at  the 
exorbitant  price  of  61.  and  upwards. 

At  last  came  peace,  followed  by  the  cessation  of 
so  many  of  the  causes  that  produced  the  enormous 
rise  of  prices  :  our  bank  paper  recovered :  corn  had 
fallen  on  the  continent :  the  expense  of  freight  was 
greatly  reduced,  and  considerable  imports  took  place. 
Our  market  experienced  a  rapid  fall  in  the  summer 
and  autumn  of  1814  ;  a  fall  confirmed  by  other 
causes, — a  reduction  in  the  price  of  labour;  in  the 
interest  of  money;  in  taxation ;— while  the  whole 
was  necessarily  accompanied  by  a  diminution  of  such 
charges,  (seed,  horses,  manure,  tithe,)  as  follow,  or 
rather  are  identified  with  the  price  of  grain.  A  new 
corn-bill  was  loudly  called  for;  that  of  1815  was 
passed,  and  our  ports  shut  to  import :  but  the  amount 
of  the  stock  on  hand,  and  a  crop  fully  adequate  to 
our  consumption,  kept  prices  at  a  low  rate,  wheat 
fetching  only  55s.  or  58s.  a  quarter.  Our  agriculturists 
now  experienced  all  the  evils  of  a  sudden  fall :  rents 
though  lowered,  remained  unpaid ;  farming-stock  was 
sold  at  a  ruinous  depreciation;  tithe  fell  rapidly; 
and  poor-rate,  though  not  increased  in  amount, 
proved,  under  such  altered  circumstances,  a  ruinous 
burden.  In  this  state  of  things,  the  want  of  warmth 
and  continued  wet  of  the  summer  of  1816,  were 
viewed  by  many  of  our  agriculturists  as  benefits,  as 
the  means  of  clearing  the  market  of  the  over-stock  of 
corn,  of  giving  efficiency  to  the  recently  enacted  bill, 
and  of  bringing  back  better  prices.  Such,  in  fact, 
were  its  results :  the  crop,  though  at  one  time  promis- 
ing, never  ripened  in  the  colder  situations;  our 
markets  rose,  and  when,  after  a  time,  they  reached 
the  limit  that  allowed  of  import,  the  supplies  from 
the  Continent  were,  in  consequence  of  an  almost 
equally  bad  season  there,  paid  for  at  such  a  price 
that  our  currency  for  the  year  1817  exceeded  94.9.  a 
quarter. 


Fluctuations  in  the  Price  of  Corn.  13.'* 

We  are  now  arrived  at  an  another  epoch  in  the  fluc- 
tuating history  of  our  agriculture.  Though  the  im- 
port of  foreign  corn  continued  during  1 81 8,  the  average 
price  of  wheat  in  that  year  exceeded  80s.  The  steadi- 
ness of  this  price,  the  revival  of  our  manufacturing  in- 
dustry, the  moderate  interest  of  money,  renewed  the 
hopes  of  our  farmers,  and  created,  if  not  a  rise  in  the 
amount  of  rent,  a  general  briskness  in  making  offers. 
But  our  imports  had  been  over-done,  and  our  crop  in 
1819  being  an  average  one,  the  market  experienced  a 
dulness  and  progressive  decline.  It  was  in  vain  that 
farther  import  was  suspended ;  our  market  continued 
depressed,  and  all  eyes  were  fixed  on  the  harvest  of 
1820,  with  the  singular  view  of  discovering  whether 
its  abundance  would  prove  a  source  of  embarrassment 
to  the  landed  interest.  The  crop,  without  being 
particularly  favoured  by  the  season,  was  found  to 
equal  our  consumption,  which,  joined  to  the  magni- 
tude of  the  stock  on  hand,  produced  a  great  fall  of 
prices ;  and  the  crops  of  1821  and  1822  being  in  like 
manner  adequate,  our  markets  continued  in  a  very 
depressed  state. 

Tabular  Statement  of  the  Nature  of  the  Crops  and  Average 
Prices  since  1790, 

Years. 

1790,  1,  2.  Peace  and  favourable  seasons.      - 

1793.  War,  but  season  favourable.        .... 

1 794,  5.  A  deficiency  of  crop  in  each  year.  $  f7^&T 796  \ 
1796,7,8.  Seasons  more  favourable.  iry^s  9  i 
1790, 1800.  Bad  seasons  -  -  .  }  %£&*{ 
1801. 


srag 

e  price 

of  wheal 

f. 

£. 

*. 

d. 

2 

13 

0 

2 

15 

0 

i 

1 

p 

3 

4 

0 

6 

7 

9 

A  good  crop,  followed  by  peace ;  }  .  f . 

also  by  favourable  seasons  in  >,^r%e  A     t 
1802  and  1803.  i  l»(W,  J,  4.    $ 


3     5     6 


1804.  A  deficient  crop,  followed    how- 1  Average    of} 

ever  by  average  crops  in   1805,  >  the      years  >         4    2     0 
6,  7.  )  1805,6,7,8.  ) 

1808.  A  partial  deficiency        -  1  Average    of  5 

1809.  A  great  deficiency  -        -      >the       years  >         5     9    0 

1810.  A  good  crop  -  -         -      )1809&1810.  J 

1811.  A  deficiency        -  }  Average    of} 

1812,13.     Crops  favourable,  but  currency  >  the  3  years  >         5  18     8 
depreciated.          -         -      S  1811,12, 13.  } 


years  1814,  (         3  115 
15,  16.  \ 


134  Ftuttiifitions  in  the  Price  of  Com. 

yeais-  of  wheat 

£.  s.  (I 

1814.  A  crop  not  exceeding  the  average ' 

but  a  considerable  import,  an:  a 
decrease  both  of  demand  and  of    Average       1 
farming  charges  consequent  on  j>  during    the  f 
the  peace. 

1815.  A  full  average  crop 

1816.  A  great  and  general  deficiency. 

1817.  A  crop  somewhat  below  an  average  )  ^vera£e  of  ) 

1818.  An  average  crop    -        -        -        J^17&JJJS!j        4     9     5 

1819.  A  crop  somewhat  below  the  average  —  —  "        3  13    0 

1820.  A  crop  exceeding  the  average  —  —  3    5     7 

1821.  An  average  crop     ...  —  —  2  14   '2 
\  822.  An  average  crop    ---  —  —  233 

The  deficiency  of  a  particular  year  is  felt  little  on  the  average  price  of 
that  year,  but  greatly  in  that  of  the  succeeding  year,  being  seldom  ascer- 
tained till  late  in  autumn. 

The  prices  in  the  above  table  are  taken  from  the  Windsor  market  to 
1813  inclusive;  afterwards  from  the  average  return  for  England  and 
Wales,  which  is  somewhat  lower  than  the  price  at  Windsor, 

Causes  of  Fluctuation  in  the  Price  of  Corn. 

It  is  common  to  ascribe  a  great  share  of  these  fluc- 
tuations to  the  corn  laws ;  but  those  who  have  written 
and  spoken  on  that  subject,  whether  in  favour  of  or 
against  these  laws,  would  have  performed  a  useful 
service  had  they  been  more  sparing  of  argument  and 
more  attentive  to  the  facts  connected  with  our  corn 
trade.     The  result  would,  we  believe,  have  been  a 
discovery,   that   the  effects   attributed  to  our  corn 
laws,   whether  by  their  supporters   or  opponents, 
have  been  greatly  over-rated,  and  that  parliament, 
in  attempting  to  regulate  the  currency  of  our  markets, 
might,  as  was  remarked  by  the  late  Mr.  Whitbread, 
be  compared  to  the  philosopher  in  Rasselas,  who  re- 
garded the  sun,  wind,  and  rain  as  under  his  control. 
The  bounty  act  of  1 689  had,  doubtless,  for  some  time, 
an  operation  favourable  to  landlords,  enabling  them 
to  let  their  lands  more  readily,  perhaps  on  somewhat 
higher  terms ;  but  after  the  stimulus  of  war  was  re- 
moved, the  bounty  proved  altogether  unequal  to  the 
maintenance  of  prices,  and  certainly  caused  to  our 
country  gentlemen,  as  members  of  the  community  at 
large,  a  loss  greater  than  the  benefit  it  brought  them 


Fluctuations  in  the  Price  of  Corn.  135 

in  the  capacity  of  landlords.  Their  prosperous  day 
did  not  arrive  until  after  1764,  when  their  boasted 
aids,  export  and  bounty,  disappeared  together.  From 
that  time  corn  maintained  a  steady  price,  or  rather 
experienced  a  gradual  rise,  the  causes  of  which,  as 
the  bounty  was  now  inoperative,  will,  we  believe,  be 
readily  admitted  to  have  been, 

First,  and  principally,  an  unusual  proportion  of  un- 
favourable seasons  between  1764  and  1773. 

Secondly,  that  the  increase  of  capital  and  labour 
applied  to  our  agriculture,  was  not  in  proportion  to 
the  increase  of  our  population.  This  arose  from  va- 
rious causes:  the  wars  of  1756  and  1775:  the  ex- 
tension of  certain  manufactures,  particularly  cotton ; 
and  an  impression,  founded  on  the  experience  of  the 
preceding  half  century,  that  agriculture  was  an  un- 
profitable pursuit. 

We  now  come  to  the  act  of  1773,  the  only  act 
which  seems  to  have  had  an  operation  steadily  ad- 
vantageous to  landlords  ;  our  average  price  of  wheat 
from  1773  to  1788  being  about  49s.  a  quarter,  while 
in  France  it  did  not  (see  Appendix)  exceed  38s.  or 
39s.,  and  at  Dantzic  41s.  a  quarter.  Here  was  a  real 
and  steady  superiority  of  price,  the  maintenance  of 
which  was  owing  in  part  to  the  American  war,  but  in 
part  also  to  the  moderate  nature  of  the  act,  the  price 
of  48s.,  pointed  out  by  it  as  a  kind  of  limit,  offering  no 
temptation  to  capitalists  to  transfer  their  funds  from 
trade  or  manufacture  to  land.  Had  the  import  limit 
been  54s.  there  seems  little  doubt,  after  the  proofs 
we  have  had  of  the  practicability  of  extending  our  til- 
lage, that  it  would,  ere  long,  have  been  overdone,  and 
our  growth  rendered  not  only  equal  but  superior  to 
our  consumption.  By  asking  little  the  landholders  ob- 
tained a  certainty,  and  this  example  of  the  success  of 
interference  when  interference  is  very  slight,  has  a 
claim  to  their  serious  attention  at  the  present  moment. 
The  late  Wars. — In  the  period  from  1793  to  1814, 
the  corn  laws  were  in  general  inoperative,  the  cur- 
rency of  our  market  being  usually  above  the  import 
limit,  and  our  ports  consequently  open.  No  differ- 
ence appears  to  have  resulted  from  the  restraint  on 


136  Fluctuations  in  the  Price  of  Corn. 

import  imposed  by  act  of  1 804 ;  an  act  which  had, 
we  believe,  the  effect  of  enabling  landlords  to  make 
a  rise  of  rent  more  general  and  more  approaching  to 
uniformity  over  the  kingdom  in  point  of  time  than 
would  otherwise  have  been  practicable,  but  which 
had  certainly  no  effect  in  raising  markets,  its  tenden- 
cy to  extend  tillage  balancing,  or  more  than  ba- 
lancing, any  tendency  to  keep  up  prices  by  an  occa- 
sional and  short  exclusion  of  foreign  corn. 

What  then  were  the  causes  of  the  unexampled  rise 
of  prices  between  1793  and  1814? 

The  unusual  number  of  bad  or  indifferent  seasons, 
not  less  than  seven  (1794,  1795,  1799,  1800,  1804, 
1809,  1811,)  in  the  course  of  eighteen  years. 

The  great  demand  of  men  for  military  service,  in 
consequence  of  which  the  increase  of  the  producers 
of  corn  failed  to  keep  pace  with  the  increase  of  the 
consumers. 

The  consequent  rise  in  the  price  of  labour,  and  in 
farming  charges  generally. 

The  increase  of  taxation. 

The  prevalence  of  similar  causes  on  the  Continent, 
and  consequent  limitation  of  import. 

The  depreciation  of  our  currency,  particularly 
after  1809. 

Of  all  the  departments  of  our  national  industry, 
none  received  so  continued  a  stimulus  from  the  war 
as  agriculture.  Our  manufactures,  particularly  those 
of  cotton  and  hardware,  experienced  at  times  a  great- 
er impulse ;  but  the  nature  of  manufacture  admitting 
of  more  speedily  increasing  supply  in  proportion  to 
demand,  the  briskness  was  often  temporary,  and  fol- 
lowed by  seasons  of  discouragement.  Our  tillage, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  hardly  at  any  time  brought 
on  a  par  with  our  increasing  population,  so  that  the 
stimulant  of  a  demand,  equal  to  or  greater  than  the 
internal  supply,  prevailed  throughout  almost  the 
whole  period. 

Causes  of  the  Fall  of  Prices  since  the  Peace. — These 
have  been  partly  peculiar   to  this  country,  partly 


Fluctuations  in  the  Price  of  Com.  131 

common  to  it  with  the  Continent  of  Europe.    Of  the 
latter  description  were 

The  application  of  additional  capital,  and,  in  a 
greater  degree,  of  labour,  to  tillage,  since  the  reduc- 
tion of  military  establishments. 

A  succession  of  seasons  more  favourable  than 
during  the  war ;  the  Continent,  like  England,  having 
had,  since  the  peace,  only  one  bad  summer,  1816. 
Though,  from  the  extent  of  the  failure  on  that  occa- 
sion, we  may  consider  it  equivalent  to  two  seasons 
of  ordinary  deficiency,  the  proportion  of  favourable 
seasons  since  the  peace  is  still  considerably  greater 
than  during  the  war. 

Next,  as  to  the  causes  of  decline  peculiar  to  this 
country,  we  have 

The  reinstatement  of  our  paper  currency;  and, 

The  great  reduction  of  freight  and  other  charges 
of  transport ;  a  principal  cause  of  the  magnitude  of 
the  import  in  1817  and  1818. 

Labour  applied  to  Tillage  since  the  Peace. — The  ope- 
ration of  several  of  these  causes  is  sufficiently  obvi- 
ous, but  the  extent  of  one  which  to  us  appears  of  con- 
siderable importance,  may  be  doubted  by  many  per- 
sons, particularly  by  those  who  compute  the  extension 
of  our  growth  by  the  number  of  enclosure  bills,  and 
who  have  remarked  (see  Appendix)  the  great  de- 
crease in  such  acts  since  the  peace.  To  those  per- 
sons we  would  submit  an  observation  which,  however 
plain,  is  of  the  highest  importance,  viz.  that  "  the 
most  productive  husbandry  is  that  which  is  practised 
on  land  already  under  cultivation."  This  truth  es- 
caped the  attention  of  the  Agricultural  Committee  of 
1821,  but  it  is  well  known  to  intelligent  farmers  and 
land-surveyors.  In  support  of  our  opinion,  we  refer 
our  readers  to  the  evidence  of  a  practical  farmer* 
Mr.  Becher,  of  Suffolk,  given  before  the  Corn  Com- 
mittee of  1810.  When  asked  whether  he  considered 
the  import  limit  of  that  time  (63.?.)  as  too  low,  Mr.  B 
answered,  (Evidence,  p.  55.) 

"  I  look  upon  the  price  at  which  wheat  is  now  imported  not  sufficient  to 
enebtrfage  the  culture  of  wheat  to  the  extent,  that  is  necessarv  for  the  king-- 


1 38  Fluctuations  in  the  Price  of  Com. 

dom ;  but  I  believe  there  is  not  the  least  doubt,  if  the  import  price  was  at 
34*.  instead  of  63s.,  or  even  higher,  that  the  effect  would  be,  upon  a  notice 
given  that  that  would  be  the  import  price  after  the  30th  September  in  any 
year,  that  the  consumption  of  the  country  would  be  fully  provided  for  at 
home,  even  in  the  first  year  after  such  notice." 

Could  it  be  provided  for  in  the  first  year  without 
cross-cropping  ? 

"  I  believe  that  the  lands  now  sown  with  wheat  are  not  in  the  high  Btate 
generally  that  they  might  be ;  and  this  I  am  aware  of,  that  every  additional 
hoeing  of  the  wheat  crop  will  give,  upon  an  average,  at  least  two  bushels  an 
acre.  I  have  tried  the  experiment  more  than  once  in  the  same  fields,  by 
not  hoeing,  hoeing  once,  and  hoeing  twice  :  the  difference  has  been — with 
one  hoeing,  two  bushels  an  acre  more  and  upwards,  and  in  that  hoed  twice, 
four  bushels  more." 

This  opinion  may  be  followed  up  by  asking  what 
amount  of  additional  labour  is  at  the  disposal  of  our 
farmers,  since  the  peace?  A  comparison  of  the 
population  returns  of  1811  and  1821,  appears  at  first 
to  operate  against  our  argument,  and  to  imply  that 
the  increase  of  the  growers  of  corn  was,  in  the  course 
of  these  ten  years,  considerably  below  the  increase 
of  the  consumers,  the  former  being  in  the  ratio  of  only 
9,  the  latter  of  19  per  cent,  of  our  population.  But 
this  comparison  is  made  by  a  number  of  families,  and 
the  effectual  plan  is  to  calculate  the  able-bodied  la- 
bourers. Now,  of  these  peace  restored  a  number  to 
agricultural  labour,  and  what  was  of  at  least  equal 
importance,  suspended  the  drain  of  others  as  recruits 
for  the  public  service.  Is  it  practicable  to  reduce 
the  numbers  in  question  to  the  form  of  specific  calcu- 
lation ?  The  proportion  of  the  population  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  employed  in  agriculture  in  the 
latter  years  of  the  war,  could  not  (see  the  Popula- 
tion Return  of  181 1)  be  less  than  7,000,000,  of  whom 
the  able-bodied  exceeded  1,700,000.  Of  these  in 
war  there  were  withdrawn  for  the  army,  navy,  and 
militia,  (exclusive  of  local  militia,)  nearly  one-tenth, 
say         -  -  -  -  -         170,000 

Whereas  in  peace  the  number  of  the 
agricultural  class  so  withdrawn  is  not     -  30,000 

Leaving  a  difference  of  140,000 
or  one-twelfth  of  the  whole.  


Fluctuations  in  the  Price  of  Com.  1 39 

iNow  if  we  calculate  the  produce  of  their  labour  on 
the  most  moderate  scale,  not  at  a  twelfth  but  at  a 
twenty-fourth  of  our  crop,  the  result  is  an  addition  to 
our  supply  of  more  than  a  fortnight's  consumption  of 
our  whole  population,  a  quantity  which,  small  as  it 
may  seem,  was  considerably  larger  than  our  average 
import  during  the  war.  And  as  no  article  is  so  much 
influenced  as  corn,  (Evidence,  Agricultural  Commit- 
tee, pp.  229 — 240.)  by  a  slight  addition  to  or  sub- 
traction from  the  usual  supply,  an  increase,  such  as 
we  have  mentioned,  is  sufficient  to  cause  a  material 
change  in  the  market.  Viewed  in  connexion  with 
the  conversion  of  pasture  lands  in  Ireland  to  tillage, 
it  will,  we  believe,  be  found  to  afford  a  more  adequate 
explanation  of  the  low  price  of  corn,  than  any  other 
cause  except  the  continuance  of  favourable  seasons.* 


SECTION  II. 

Situation  and  Prospects  of  our  Agriculturists. 

We  have  now  explained  the  causes  of  the  greal 
change  that  has  taken  place  since  the  peace,  of  the 
remarkable  increase  in  the  quantity  and  reduction  in 
the  price  of  produce.  Our  next  object  is  to  exhibit 
the  result  of  this  change,  and  to  convey  an  idea  of  the 
actual  situation  of  our  landlords  and  farmers. 

Estimate  of  our  Agricultural  Produce  and  Rental. 

Produce. — Annual  value  of  agricultural  produce, 
(not  only  corn  but  wool,  hemp,  flax,  timber,  &c.) 
raised  in  Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 

In  1812,  our  produce,  exclusive  of  seed,  was  com- 
puted by  Mr.  Colquhoun,  in  his  well-known  work  on 


*  See  the  close  of  the  Appendix  to  this  Chapter :  also  the  close  of  the 
Appendix  to  the  Chapter  on  Population. 


140  Situation  and  Prospects 

the  "  Resources  of  the  British  Empire,"  (pp.  66 — 89.) 
at  £217,000,0  H) 

Deduct  pasture  and  all  produce  used 
for  the  food  of  horses,  horned  cat- 
tle, and  the  lesser  animals,  about      100,000,000 


Value  of  annual  produce  for  the  food 
of  man,  or  for  the  purposes  of 
manufacture  -  -  £117,000,000 


Since  1812,  prices  have  fallen  above  sixty  per 
cent. ;  but  as  Mr.  C.'s  estimate  was  made  greatly  be- 
low the  currency  of  the  time,  the  deduction  applica- 
ble to  his  results  does  not  exceed  26  or  30  per  cent. 
This  deduction  in  prices,  large  as  it  is,  appears  to  be 
balanced,  or  nearly  balanced,  by  the  increase  in  the 
quantity  of  our  produce.  To  ascertain  the  extent  of 
such  increase  is  a  matter  of  great  difficulty,  but  the 
probability  of  its  being  very  large  is  supported  by 
several  powerful  considerations ;  viz. 

The  diffusion  of  improvements  in  husbandry. 

The  addition  to  our  population,  and  the  cessation 
of  a  drain  of  the  able-bodied  men  for  the  public  ser- 
vice. 

The  excess  of  the  population  and  produce  of  Ire- 
land over  Mr.  Colquhoun's  estimate. 

The  conjunct  of  these  causes  may,  we  believe, 
safely  be  computed  to  form  an  addition  of  25  per 
cent,  to  the  quantity  of  our  produce,  and  to  leave  the 
value  of  the  whole  not  far  short  of  Mr.  Colquhoun's 
estimate. 

Rental. — In  1814  the  rental  of  England,  Wales,  and 
Scotland  was  carried,  as  appears  by  the  property- 
tax  returns,  to  nearly         £43,000,000 
Add  for  Ireland,  (conjec- 

turally  estimated)  *  10,000,000 

Together  £53,000,000 

Add  for  all  omissions  and  allow- 
ances on  the  property-tax  returns, 
a  supposed  amount  of  5.000.000 


of  our  Agriculturists.  141 

The  great  increase  that  has  of  late 
taken  place  in  our  produce  having 
been  chiefly  on  lands  already  un- 
der tillage,  we  add  for  new  land 
brought  into  culture  since  the 
peace  only         -  -  -  2,000,000 

Making  in  all  £60,000,000 

Deduct  for  all  abatements  of  rent  since  1814  made, 
making,  or  which  must,  ere  long,  be  made,  one-third, 
or  33  per  cent,  of  the  war-rents,  30,000,000 


Remainder         £40,000,000 


a  sum  which  will  probably  form  the  rental  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland,  when  the  price  of  wheat  shall  be 
steadily  between  50s.  and  60s.  a  quarter,  and  when 
farming  charges  shall  be  brought  down  to  the  peace 
standard.  Large  as  is  this  abatement  of  rent,  it  is 
less  great  than  the  fall  in  the  price  of  produce,  but 
the  improved  husbandry  has  of  late  made  considera- 
ble progress,  and  the  cheapness  of  provisions  has 
caused  a  great  decrease  of  poor-rate. 

In  no  class  of  the  community  has  the  effect  of  tran- 
sition been  either  so  severe  or  so  long  continued  as 
among  the  agriculturists. 

If  to  the  rental  of  landlords  in  the  latter  years  of 
the  war,  we  add  the  income  of  our  farmers,  we  shall 
find,  (see  property-tax  returns  for  1812,  printed  in 
1816,)  including  Ireland,  an  aggregate  of  more  than 
100,000,000/.  This,  it  must  be  allowed,  exceeded 
all  due  bounds,  and  a  reduction  to  75  or  even  to 
70,000,000/.,  for  the  total  of  rental  and  farming  income^ 
would  have  been  nothing  more  than  a  fair  participa- 
tion in  the  general  abatement  attendant  on  peace ;  a 
relinquishment  of  monopoly  for  a  fair  average  profit. 
But  of  late  years  the  income  of  farmers  is,  in  a  man- 
ner, suspended,  and  of  the  rents  they  at  present  pay. 
a  large  proportion  is  drawn  from  their  capital. 


142  Situation  and  Prospects 

Of  the  extent  of  national  injury  arising  from  this 
state  of  things,  some  idea  may  be  formed  from  the 
following  estimate  of  the  proportion  borne  by  agri- 
culture to  the  productive  industry  of  the  country  at 
large. 

Proportions 
in  100 

Proportion  of  the  national  revenue  arising  from  agriculture  at  the 
reduced  prices  of  peace,  about  -  -  -  -       30 

Proportion  of  our  population  dependent  for  employment  on  agri- 
culture (see  the  population  return  of  1821)  in  Great  Britain, 
distinct  from  Ireland  -  -  -  -  -      33 

Proportion  of  national  property  annually  created,  being  the  amount 
of  corn,  grass,  wool,  hemp,  flax,  timber,  &c.  after  a  suitable  de- 
duction from  Mr.  Colquhoun's  estimate  -  -  -      45 

Proportion  of  national  capital  affected  by  the  prosperity  or  decline 
of  agriculture,  being  the  value  of  our  land,  farming  stock, 
and  houses  on  farms  and  estates,  adopting  Mr.  Colquhoun's 
mode  of  estimating,  but  making  a  great  abatement  on  the  prices 
of  1812,  (see  Appendix  to  the  chapter  on  National  Revenue  and 
Capital)  above  -  -  -  -  -  -      60 

After  this  statement  it  is  needless  to  expatiate  on 
the  magnitude  of  the  injury  arising  to  our  manufac- 
turers, our  shop-keepers,  or  the  Treasury,  from  the 
distress  of  agriculture  :  nor  need  we  go  farther  to  ac- 
count for  the  chief  part  of  the  national  embarrassment 
in  1 81 6,  or  of  our  revived  prosperity  in  1 81 8.  It  is  al- 
most equally  idle  to  discuss  the  question,  whether  the 
agriculturists  are  entitled  to  our  sympathy,  or  whether 
their  profits,  towards  the  close  of  the  war,  were  not 
such  as  to  exceed  all  legitimate  proportion.  Their 
case  involves  a  question  of  policy  fully  as  much  as  of 
justice, — the  losses  of  any  great  part  of  the  nation 
forming  the  losses  of  the  whole,  and  any  deficiency  in 
their  contributions  to  the  exchequer  falling  necessa- 
rily on  the  other  classes. 

Present  Situation  of  our  Landlords  and  Farmers. — A 
reduction  in  the  circumstances  of  farmers  was  un- 
avoidable, their  profits  having  consisted  less  in  ac- 
quisition of  capital  than  in  additions  to  income — ad- 
ditions which  were  great  only  in  the  latter  years  of 
the  war,  and  arose  chiefly  from  the  depreciation  of 
our  currency.  With  landlords  the  case  was  some- 
what different:    their  increased  receipts  had  been 


of  our  Agriculturists.  143 

less  connected  with  depreciation,  while  their  pos- 
session of  capital  exempted  them  from  any  immedi- 
ate necessity  of  altering  their  scale  of  expense.  Time 
has  been  afforded  them  to  make  a  deliberate  dis- 
tinction between  nominal  and  real  income ;  between 
that  decrease  which  actually  deducts  from  the  power 
of  expenditure,  and  that  which,  in  consequence  of 
the  rise  in  the  value  of  money,  does  so  only  in  ap- 
pearance. During  the  war  they  had  an  opportunity 
of  observing  how  closely  augmented  expenditure  fol- 
lowed augmented  income ;  it  now  remains  for  them 
to  try  reduction,  and  to  carry  it  to  the  length  pointed 
out  by  the  fall  in  the  price  of  commodities.  That 
fall  does  not,  we  allow,  apply  to  them  so  largely  as  to 
the  lower  and  middling  classes :  it  has  taken  place 
chiefly  in  the  necessaries  of  life,  and,  as  yet  at  least, 
holds  much  less  in  regard  to  the  expense  of  the  high- 
er ranks,  such  as  the  bills  of  tradesmen,  salaries, 
wages  of  servants,  professional  fees,  to  which  we  may 
add  education  at  our  public  schools  or  universities, 
along  with  the  cost  of  articles  of  luxury,  such  as  wines, 
plate,  and  ornamental  furniture.  Yet  even  in  these 
reduction  has  commenced,  and  may  be  carried  much 
farther  when  the  upper  classes  think  proper  to  hold 
a  decided  tone,  and  retrench  abuses  engendered  in 
days  of  abundance. 

On  comparing  the  present  situation  of  our  land- 
lords with  what  it  was  in  the  latter  years  of  the  war, 
we  are  led  to  compute  the  apparent  or  nominal  de- 
crease of  their  income  at  forty  per  cent.,  the  real  de- 
crease at  twenty  per  cent. ;  assuming  that  the  remain- 
ing twenty  per  cent,  are  counterpoised  by  reduction 
in  their  expenditure  either  already  made  or  perfectly 
practicable.  We  go,  perhaps,  too  far  in  supposing 
an  actual  loss  to  the  extent  of  twenty  per  cent. :  if 
we  make  allowance  for  the  repeal  of  the  property- 
tax,  and  reduction  of  the  assessed  taxes,  the  loss 
should,  doubtless,  be  less  ;  but,  without  pressing  that 
point,  we  proceed  to  ask  from  what  source  the  extra 
income  arose  during  the  war  ?  Partly  from  the  gene- 
ral rise  of  profit  at  that  period,  more  from  an  advan- 


144  Situation  and  Prospects 

tage  peculiar  to  agriculturists,  the  monopoly  of  the 
market  in  consequence  of  the  continued  insufficiency 
of  our  growth.  Advantages  such  as  these  are  ne- 
cessarily temporary,  and,  could  the  nature  of  our 
situation  have  been  foreseen,  would  have  been  con- 
sidered by  landlords  as  at  a  close,  as  soon  as  our  po- 
litical circumstances  were  changed,  and  the  country 
became  assured  of  peace. 

But  rents,  even  on  this  reduced  scale,  are  not,  it 
may  be  said,  at  present,  nor  are  our  prices  equal  to 
the  cost  of  production,  leaving  rent  wholly  out  of  the 
question.  We  answer  that  no  calculation  can  be 
founded  on  the  circumstances  of  this  season  of  transi- 
tion and  over-stock ;  but  as  a  great  part  of  the  dis- 
tress arises  from  temporary  causes,  such  as  the  tardy 
reduction  of  farming  charges,  the  better  plan  is  to 
calculate  probabilities,  and  to  reason  on  a  rate  of 
rent,  which  though  not  yet  generally  established,  is 
rendered  likely  by  a  concurrence  of  circumstances. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  this  probable  rate  of 
rent  ?  Several  of  our  principal  landlords,  convinced 
of  the  inefficacy  of  corn  laws  to  keep  up  the  market, 
have  given  examples  of  successive  reduction,  carry- 
ing the  whole,  since  1814,  to  30  or  35  per  cent,  on 
their  war  rents.  Our  hope  is,  that  such  examples 
may  be  imitated  in  all  their  extent.  Supposing,  for 
the  sake  of  illustration,  that  of  this  deduction  10  or  1 5 
per  cent,  had  been  in  general  made  between  the 
year  1814  and  the  date  of  the  examination  of  the  wit- 
nesses, before  the  Agricultural  Committee  of  1821 ; 
there  then  remained  to  make  a  farther  abatement  of 
20  or  25  per  cent,  an  abatement  repeatedly  alluded 
to  in  the  evidence  as  necessary,  acceded  to  by  many 
individuals  since  that  time,  and  which,  as  far  as  we 
are  enabled  to  judge,  is  imperiously  required  by  the 
exigency  of  the  case.  We  shall  suppose,  therefore, 
that  what  is  as  yet  partial,  has  become  general,  and 
that  our  landlords,  throughout  the  kingdom,  aware, 
on  the  one  hand,  of  the  increased  value  of  money,  on 
the  other,  of  the  necessity  of  sacrificing  a  part  to  save 
the  remainder,  have  consented  to  this  reduction ;  also. 


of  our  Agriculturists.  145 

that  the  farmers  succeed  in  the  arduous  task  of  ac- 
complishing a  corresponding  diminution  in  labour 
and  the  other  charges  of  culture.  Were  these  grand 
points  adjusted,  the  prospect  of  our  agriculturists 
would  be  cleared  of  a  part  of  its  gloom ;  their  ho- 
rizon would  brighten,  and  it  would,  we  might  hope, 
be  no  longer  doubtful  whether  ruin  or  recovery  is  to 
be  their  lot. 

Supposing  this  reduction  effected,  what  price,  it 
may  be  inquired,  would  enable  the  farmer  to  dis- 
charge his  engagements,  and  to  earn  a  fair  support  ? 
Sixty  shillings  for  a  quarter  of  wheat  in  the  counties 
adjacent  to  the  metropolis,  and  between  fifty '-five  and 
sixty  shillings  in  those  where  labour  is  cheaper.  This 
estimate  is  supported  directly  by  the  opinion  of  Mr. 
Rodwell,  (Evidence,  Report  of  1821,  p.  86.,)  and  of 
Mr.  Brodie,  (p.  335.)  while  indirectly  it  is  confirmed 
by  all  who,  when  desired  to  say  the  cost  of  raising 
wheat  without  rent,  fixed  it  at  the  charges  of  1 82 ) ,  be- 
tween 55.9.  and  60s.  A  deduction  of  25  per  cent, 
would  bring  the  cost  to  45s.,  and  a  market  price  be- 
tween 55s.  and  60s.  would  obviously  supply  the  fund 
requisite  for  the  payment  of  the  rent,  which  is  in  ge- 
neral a  fourth  or  a  fifth  of  the  produce. 

How  far  is  the  probability  of  55s.  or  60s.,  as  a  me- 
dium price  in  peace,  confirmed  by  other  circumstan- 
ces, in  particular  by  the  average  price  of  other 
countries  ?  Wheat  at  Dantzic  has  averaged,  (Evi- 
dence, Agricultural  Committee,  p.  366.)  during  the 
last  half  century  about  45s.  a  quarter;  while  in  the 
parts  of  the  Continent,  adjacent  to  England,  we  mean 
the  Netherlands,  and  the  north  of  France,  45s.  a 
quarter  are  generally  considered  sufficient  for  the 
indemnity  of  the  farmer.  This  difference  supposes 
an  advance  of  20  per  cent,  to  our  farmers  in  consid- 
eration of  their  higher  rents  and  somewhat  heavier 
burdens  in  other  respects.  After  the  high  prices  of 
the  war,  an  average  of  55s.  or  60s.  appears  low  ;  but 
in  the  payment  of  labour,  in  the  power  of  purchase 
generally,  it  at  present  is,  or  ought  to  be  equal  to  80s 
in  the  latter  part  of  the  war,  and  the  point  is  not  that 

19 


146  Situation  and  Prospects 

which  may  be  expected,  but  that  which  it  is  prac- 
ticable to  attain.  Add  to  this,  that  under  such  a  price 
our  manufacturers  would  probably  acquiesce  with- 
out complaint,  considering  our  national  superiority  in 
fuel,  navigation,  and  command  of  capital,  such  as  to 
admit,  without  much  hazard,  of  a  relative  disadvan- 
tage in  the  cost  of  subsistence. 

How  far  is  the  probability  of  such  an  average  con- 
firmed by  a  retrospect  to  history,  to  periods  in  which 
our  agriculture  was  prosperous?  In  1804,  a  price 
varying  from  63s.  to  66s.  was  accounted  sufficient  by 
Parliament,  under  charges  heavier  than  those  we 
have  now  in  prospect.  During  the  thirty  years  be- 
tween 1763  and  1793,  our  farmers  made  few  com- 
plaints, though  the  average  price  of  wheat  was  49s.  a 
quarter,  or  about  1 5  per  cent,  less  than  we  consider 
necessary  for  the  present  time.  And  if  we  compare 
the  farming  charges  on  the  reduced  scale  we  have 
anticipated,  with  those  previous  to  1793,  we  shall 
find  that  the  excess  of  the  former,  is,  or  ought  to  con- 
tinue great  in  one  point  only, — taxation. 

This  leads  naturally  to  the  inquiry,  "how  far  the 
public  burdens,  at  present  defrayed  by  agriculture, 
exceed  those  of  1792."  In  treating  this  subject  in  a 
preceding  chapter,  we  have  had  occasion  (p.  73.)  to 
estimate  the  increase  of  the  burden  to  the  public  at 
large  at  12  per  cent,  on  their  income  :  in  the  case  of 
the  farmers,  we  shall  make  a  liberal  allowance,  and 
suppose  that  from  the  pressure  of  poor-rate,  the  ad- 
ditional burden  since  1792,  is  nearly  20  per  cent. 
This,  be  it  observed,  is  burden  on  income,  but  the 
produce  of  a  farm  being  computed  by  surveyors  at 
three  or  four  times  the  tenant's  income,  (see  the 
property-tax  return,  1810),  it  follows  that  20  per  cent, 
on  income  will  be  defrayed  by  an  addition  of  5  or  6 
per  cent,  to  the  price  of  produce.  Now  could  the 
farmers  obtain  the  55s.  or  60s.  which  we  have  termed 
a  fair  average,  the  result  would  be  their  having  a 
surplus  above  the  prices  of  1792  sufficient  to  serve  as 
a  counterpoise  to  labour  and  the  other  charges  (dis- 
tinct from  taxation),  which  are  higher  at  present  than 


of  our  Agriculturists.  1 47 

in  1792,  and  which  it  will  be  a  task  of  great  time  and 
difficulty  to  reduce. 

The  reasoning  in  the  preceding  pages,  fair  as  it 
may  seem  to  some,  and  sanctioned  as  it  is  by  the  ex- 
ample of  such  men  as  Earl  Fitzwilliam  and  Mr.  Coke, 
may  appear  in  a  very  different  light  to  others,  who, 
whether  landlords  or  farmers,  are  ill  prepared  to  re- 
linquish the  hope  of  high  price.  Of  these  persons, 
some  may  still  cling  to  the  imagined  effect  of  a  pro- 
tecting duty,  others,  with  more  plausibility,  may 
build  their  expectations  of  an  improved  market  on 
the  progressive  increase  of  population  and  on  the 
contingency  of  a  deficient  harvest.  It  is  of  conse- 
quence, therefore,  to  enter  at  some  length  into  a  con- 
sideration of  these  arguments,  and  to  attempt  to 
bring  into  the  form  of  an  estimate,  results,  which,  at 
present,  are  vague  and  undefined. 

Effect  of  increasing  Population  on  the  Price  of  Corn. — 
The  returns  in  the  present  age  have  shown  an  in- 
crease in  our  population  to  an  extent  which  we  had, 
for  some  time,  difficulty  in  considering  correct,  and 
which  when  put  beyond  doubt,  was  ascribed  by  many 
to  the  temporary  stimulus  arising  from  the  war.  It 
bids  fair,  however,  to  be  progressive,  arising,  as  it 
apparently  does,  from  causes  of  a  permanent  nature ; 
from  an  improvement  in  the  condition  of  the  lower 
orders,  in  diet,  clothing,  and  lodging,  as  well  as  from 
the  preservation  of  the  lives  of  children  by  vaccina- 
tion. But  those  who  found  on  this  an  expectation  of 
relief  to  our  agriculturists,  overlook  one  very  material 
point;  "that  the  productive  powers  of  our  better 
soils,  far  from  having  reached  their  terminus,  may 
be  made  to  yield  a  far  larger  produce  by  additional 
labour,  and  the  adoption  of  the  improved  methods  of 
husbandry." 

In  support  of  this  apparently  bold  assertion,  we 
refer,  as  well  to  the  already  quoted  arguments  of  a 
practical  agriculturist,  (Mr.  Becher,)  as  to  our  expe- 
rience as  a  nation,  during  the  last  nine  years.  No 
period  was  more  calculated  to  suggest  the  inference 


148  Situation  and  Prospects 

of  a  limitation  of  the  productive  powers  of  our  soil 
than  the  twenty  years  preceding  1814,  yet  this  opinion 
(see  the  preceding  section,  page  1 38,)  has  been  com- 
pletely disproved  by  the  result  of  our  agriculture 
since  the  peace.  If  we  take  a  wider  range  than  the 
experience  of  the  present  age,  and  refer  to  the  his- 
tory of  this  and  other  countries,  we  find  France  as 
capable  at  present  of  maintaining  a  population  of 
30,000,000,  as  of  supporting  20,000,000  in  the  begin- 
ning of  the  18th  century,  or  15,000,000  in  the  begin- 
ning of  the  17th.  And  France  may  be  termed  an  ex- 
ample altogether  in  point  of  increase  of  product 
from  increase  of  hands,  manual  labour  forming  the 
basis  of  her  agriculture,  to  the  exclusion,  in  a  great 
degree,  of  machinery. 

England  furnishes  a  case  apparently  stronger  than 
France,  the  increase  of  our  population,  during  the 
last  century,  having  been  considerably  more  rapid, 
and  our  soil  being  still  equal  to  their  subsistence. 
But  we  forbear  dwelling  on  this,  because  it  may  be 
argued  that  the  productive  power  of  our  agriculture 
has,  particularly  in  the  present  age,  been  much  pro- 
moted by  means  distinct  from  increase  of  population. 
we  mean  machinery,  and  other  aids  arising  from  the 
command  of  capital.  We  cannot,  however,  but  ex- 
press a  belief,  that  the  next  generation  of  our  coun- 
trymen will,  in  all  probability,  raise  a  supply  of  sub- 
sistence as  far  beyond  ours,  as  ours  is  beyond  that  of 
the  last  age ;  and  that  our  descendants,  on  comparing 
the  two  periods,  will  feel  no  little  surprise  at  the  nega- 
tive predictions  of  several  of  our  political  economists. 
Without  contesting  in  the  abstract  the  principles  of 
the  latter,  we  must  add  that  nothing  is  more  likely 
to  mislead  than  the  assertions  of  those  who  assign 
limits  to  the  extension  of  the  productive  powers  of 
our  soil,  imperfectly  acquainted  as  they  are  with  its 
capabilities,  and  still  more  unable  to  foresee  the  suc- 
cessive improvements  that  may,  and  in  all  probability 
will,  be  made  in  husbandry.  How  greatly  does  our 
prospect  of  supply  exceed  their  anticipation :  how 
large,  for  instance,  would  be  the  addition  to  the  pro- 


of  our  Agriculturists.  149 

duce  of  the  west  of  England,  and  of  Ireland,  were 
these  countries  merely  to  adopt  the  improved  plan 
now  generally  followed  in  our  eastern  and  northern 
counties.     (See  Appendix,  p.  [37].) 

Consumers  may  increase  without  raising  Prices. — Our 
next  argument,  similar  in  its  object,  is  somewhat  dif- 
ferent in  its  nature.     There  exists  a  perpetual  ten- 
dency to  removal  from  country  to  town,  and,  on  com- 
paring our  population  lists  at  different  periods,  we 
iind  the  inhabitants  of  towns,   in  other  words,  the 
consumers  of  corn,  gradually  augment  their  propor- 
tion relatively  to  the  producers.     Both  classes  in- 
crease their  numbers,  but  in  town  the  ratio  is  larger. 
We  must  be  cautious,  however,  of  drawing  from  this 
fact  any  conclusion  as  to  rise  of  price ;  it  merely 
marks  the  natural  progress  of  society  in  an  enlight- 
ened country ;  a  progress  easily  traced  in  our  his- 
tory for  more  than  two  centuries,  the  agriculturists  of 
England,  who  now  form  only  33  per  cent,  of  our  po- 
pulation, having,  we  believe,  formed  upwards  of  50  or 
60  per  cent,  of  it  in  the  reigns  of  Elizabeth  and  James  , 
[.     Still  the  supply  of  produce  has  continued  equal 
to  our  increased  numbers,  and  the  cause  is  obvious, 
the  use  of  machinery,  and  the  adoption  of  various 
improvements,  enabling  the  same  number  of  hands  to 
raise  a  much  larger  quantity  of  subsistence. 

Is  then  no  rise  of  prices  to  be  expected  from  the 
increase  of  our  population  ?  It  certainly  may  be  x- 
pected  under  circumstances  which  give  a  new  or 
different  employment  to  a  portion  of  our  numbers — 
such  as  appear  to  have  prevailed  on  the  extension  of 
our  cotton  manufactures  after  1780,  and  such  as 
evidently  characterize  the  present  emigration  to 
Upper  Canada,  and  the  Western  States  of  America, 
the  larger  proportion  of  the  emigrants  being  agricul- 
turists. To  this  we  add,  that  the  increase  of  our 
numbers  has  in  it  something  encouraging  and  cheer- 
ing :  it  assures,  in  a  great  measure,  the  continuance  of  til- 
lage on  our  inferior  soils :  and,  taken  in  a  more  general 
view,  it  keeps  alive  the  expectation  of  national  im- 
provement so  fully  described  by  Mr.  S.  Gray,  and 


150  Situation  and  Prospects 

which  shall  be  noticed  at  greater  length  when  we 
come  to  treat  of  the  subject  of  population. 

Effects  of  a  bad  Season  on  the  Price  of  Com. — The 
rise  in  our  corn  market,  produced  by  a  bad  or  even 
an  indifferent  season,  is  in  time  of  war  very  considera- 
ble.    The  difference  between  the  crop  of  one  year 
and  that  of  another  will  be  found,  without  resorting 
to  an  extreme  case,  such  as   1816,  to  be  frequently 
(Evidence,  Agricultural  Committee  of  1 82 1 ,  p.  264.) 
between  1 0  and  20  per  cent.     Add  to  this  that  on 
such  occasions  our  purchases  abroad  are  generally 
enhanced  by  the  causes  which  produce  enhancement 
in  this  country.     The  public,  particularly  the  untra- 
velled  part  of  the  public,  are  hardly  aware  of  the 
similarity  of  temperature  prevailing  throughout  what 
may  be  called  the  corn-country  of  Europe,  we  mean 
Great   Britain,   Ireland,  the  north    of   France,  the 
Netherlands,  Denmark,  the  north-west  of  Germany, 
and,  in  some  measure,  Poland,  and  the  north-east  of 
Germany.     All  this   tract  is   situated   between  the 
45th  and  55th  degrees  of  latitude,  and  subject,  in  a 
considerable  degree,    to  the  prevalence  of  similar 
winds.     Neither  the  superabundance  of  rain  which 
we  experience  in  one  summer,  or  its  deficiency  in 
another,  are  by  any  means  confined  to  Britain  and 
Ireland;    while   in  winter,   both  the    intensity   and 
duration  of  frost  are  always  greater  on  the  Continent. 
Exceptions  certainly  exist  in  particular  tracts,  but  in 
support  of  our  general  argument,  we  have  merely  to 
recall  to  those  of  our  readers  who  are  of  an  age  to 
recollect  the   early  part  of  the  war,  or  who  have 
attended  to  registers  of  temperature,  the  more  re- 
markable seasons  of  the  present  age.     Thus,  in  1794, 
the  spring  was  prematurely  warm  on  the  Continent 
as  in  England  :  there,  as  with  us,  the  summer  of  1798, 
was  dry,  and  that  of  1799  wet:  again,  in  1811   the 
harvest  was  deficient  throughout  the  north-west  of 
Europe  generally,  from  one  and   the  same    cause, 
blight;  while  that  of  1816  was  still  more  generally 
deficient  from  rain  and  want  of  warmth.     In  regard  to 


of  our  Agriculturists.  151 

a  more  remote  period,  we  mean  the  17th  and  18th 
centuries  generally,  if  the  temperature  has  not  been 
so  accurately  noted,  we  find,  from  the  coincidence  in 
prices,  that  it  is  highly  probable  that  there  prevailed 
a  great  similarity  between  our  weather  and  that  of 
the  Continent:  thus  in  France  the  latter  years  of  the 
17th  century,  the  seasons  of  1708  and  1709,  as  well 
as  several  of  the  seasons  between  1764  and  1773, 
were  as  unpropitious  and  attended  with  as  great  an 
advance  of  price  as  in  England. 

Another  observation  as  yet  little  attended  to,  but 
which  has  found  a  place  in  the  Agricultural  Report  of 
1821,  is,  that  an  indifferent  season  is  not  always  fol- 
lowed by  a  favourable  one,  but  that  two,  and  even 
more  than  two  deficiencies  of  crop  occur  sometimes 
in  succession.  Such  was  the  case  in  the  latter  years 
of  Elizabeth,  in  the  reign  of  William  III.,  and  in  our 
own  time,  in  1799  and  1800.  On  each  of  these  oc- 
casions the  consequences  were  very  serious,  leading 
to  a  distressing  rise  of  price,  and  showing  all  the 
importance  of  making  the  plenty  of  one  year  conduce 
to  the  relief  of  another. 

Less  felt  in  peace  than  in  war. — But  while  in  war,  the 
effect  of  a  bad  or  indifferent  season  is  thus  severe, 
its  pressure  is  greatly  alleviated  by  the  cheap  freight 
and  open  communication  of  a  state  of  peace.  On 
referring  to  the  record  of  our  prices  during  a  century 
and  a  half  prior  to  1793,  we  find  that  throughout 
that  long  period  the  effect  of  an  unfavourable  season 
was  to  carry  wheat  from  40s.  to  50s.  or  55s.,  rarely 
to  60s.  Now  55s.  or  60s.  in  these  days  were  neari} 
equal  to  70s.  at  the  present  value  of  money,  and  the 
latter  would  probably  be  the  currency  of  our  market 
in  the  event  of  a  partial  deficiency  like  that  of  1795, 
1804,  1809.  To  carry  our  peace  prices  higher  would 
require  a  failure  as  general  as  that  of  1816,  or  two 
partial  deficiences  in  succession  as  in  1799  and 
1800.  To  those  who  think  otherwise,  we  submit  two 
considerations ;  first,  that  the  increase  of  our  num- 
bers does  not  much  increase  the  difficulty  of  supply- 
ing our  consumption  at  home :    and  next,  that  thV 


152  Situation  and  Prospects 

range  of  foreign  territory  from  which  our  corn  im- 
ports may  now  be  derived  is  much  wider  than  during 
last  century. 

Add  to  this,  that  a  continuance  of  peace  tends  in 
many  ways  to  an  equalization  of  price  between  dif- 
ferent countries.  The  obstacles  to  emigration  are 
then  removed :  the  tempting  profit  attendant  on 
government  contracts  and  other  war  speculations  no 
longer  detain  at  home  either  the  individual  or*his 
capital :  the  charges  of  farming  as  of  productive  in- 
dustry generally,  are  calculated  closely,  and  a  decid- 
ed preference  is  given  to  the  country  where  those 
charges  are  most  moderate.  Another,  and  a  still 
more  substantial  cause  of  equalization  of  price  is  the 
increased  command  of  capital  in  peace,  the  augment- 
ed means  of  buying  up  the  superabundance  of  one 
year  as  a  supply  for  the  demands  of  the  next.  Among 
other  structures  of  recent  date  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
Thames,  are  warehouses  in  which  corn  may  be  pre- 
served during  six  or  seven  years  without  injury  :  the 
expense,  which  in  the  case  of  wheat  was,  till  lately, 
7s.  a  quarter,  would  be  materially  lessened  in  pur- 
chases made  at  the  present  low  prices,  as  a  portion 
of  it  arises  from  interest  on  the  purchase-money. 
(See  Appendix,  p.  [42].) 

Reaction  of  the  Market  Price  of  Corn  on  the  Cost  of 
its  Production. — If  the  influence  of  the  seasons  has  not 
yet  been  duly  appreciated,  much  less  is  that  the  case 
in  regard  to  another  cause  of  rise  and  fall  which  we 
admit  to  be  somewhat  complicated  in  its  nature,  and 
tardy  in  its  operation ;  we  mean  the  reaction  of  the 
market  price  of  corn  on  the  cost  of  its  production. 
Our  objects  will  be  best  understood  by  an  analysis 
of  the  charges  of  cultivation,  as  exhibited  in  the  sub- 
joined table. 


of  our  Agriculturists. 


153 


Expense  of  cultivating  100  acres  qf  arable  land  in  England,  at  three  distinct 
periods,  calculated  in  an  average  qf  the  returns  made  to  circular  letters 
from  the  Board  of  Agriculture  to  farmers  in  different  parts  of  the  king- 
dom. 


V»ent 

1790. 

1803. 

1813. 

£    s.     d. 
88     6     31 
20   14      If 
17    13     10 
15   13     51 
85     5     4f 
46     4   11 
48     3     0 
67     4   10 
22   11    111 

£     8.     d. 
121      2     71 

26     8     0| 
31      7     7f 
22   11    10} 
118     0     4 
49     2     7 
68     6     2 
80     8     01 
30     3     8| 

£     s.      d. 

161    12      7f 
38   17     3£ 
38    19     2f 
31      2    lOf 

161    12   111 
9H   17   10 
37     7     01 

134   19     8i 
5.0     5     6 
1.8      1     4 

Tithe          

Kates    

Wear  and  tear 

Labour. 

Seed ......__. 

Manure    

Team    

Interest     

Taxes 

Total 

411    15   1  If 

547    10  1U 

771    16     41 

Note.     The  article  manure  is  underrated  in  the  last  column  ;  were  it 
fully  stated,  the  aggregate  of  1813  would  have  exceeded  800J. 

This  document  presents  materials  for  reasoning  of 
equal  importance  to  the  agriculturist  and  political 
economist,  exhibiting  all  the  constituent  parts  of  the 
cost  of  corn,  and  enabling  us  to  explain  both  the  high 
prices  of  a  state  of  war,  and  the  fall  attendant  on 
peace. 

War. — The  effects  of  war  are  first  felt  in  the  price 
of  labour,  the  interest  of  money,  and  the  direct  taxes. 
These  all  operate  to  enhance  corn :  the  price  of  seed 
is  necessarily  augmented  by  such  a  rise  :  an  increase 
of  tithe,  as  expressed  in  money,  is  a  consequence 
almost  equally  direct ;  the  expense  of  team  and 
manure,  cannot,  under  such  circumstances,  be  long- 
stationary  ;  and  an  advance  of  poor-rate,  has,  ever 
since  the  days  of  Queen  Elizabeth,  followed,  at  no 
distant  date,  an  augmented  price  of  bread. 

Such  was  the  progress  of  farming  charges  during 
the  late  wars.  The  early  part  of  the  period  was  with 
©ur  farmers  a  season  of  complaint,  and  with  the  ex- 

20 


154  Situation  and  Prospects 

ception  of  tenants  on  lease,  the  partial  rise  in  price, 
accompanied  as  it  was  by  high  charges,  was  ac- 
counted a  disadvantage  to  agriculturists.  After  1 804, 
their  situation  improved,  but  it  was  not  until  1809 
that  the  advantage  of  war  to  the  farmer  became  great 
and  general. 

Peace. — Next,  as  to  the  reverse  of  the  picture, — the 
unweaving  of  that  web  which  owed  its  texture  to  a 
double  war  and  a  depreciated  currency.  Wages, 
interest  of  money,  the  cost  of  horses,  and,  in  some 
degree,  direct  taxes,  have  all  undergone  reduction 
since  the  peace,  in  particular  since  1820:  a  fall  in 
the  price  of  seed  is  a  matter  of  course,  while  a  dimi- 
nution of  tithe  and  a  reduced  charge  in  the  bills  of 
tradesmen,  are  the  eventual  though  less  direct  re- 
sults of  a  decline  in  the  corn  market.  The  remaining 
charges  are  rent  and  poor-rate,  both  very  difficult  of 
reduction,  because  in  the  case  of  landlords  the  dimi- 
nution of  expenditure  is  not  equal  to  the  fall  of  corn, 
while  in  that  of  the  poor  a  decrease  in  employment 
retards  that  reduction  of  parochial  charge,  which 
would  otherwise  follow  the  cheapness  of  the  necessa- 
ries of  life.  These,  however,  are  only  postponements 
of  an  unavoidable  result :  landlords  must  resign  in 
peace  the  monopoly  attendant  on  war,  while  to  our  la- 
bouring classes  the  extension  of  manufactures  conse- 
quent on  the  fall  of  provisions,  affords  relief,  not 
speedy,  perhaps,  but  eventually  certain. 

What  then  ought  to  be  our  inference  from  the  pre- 
ceding reasoning?  That  farming  charges  necessa- 
rily rise  with  the  market  price  of  corn,  and  as  neces- 
sarily become  reduced  by  its  decline.  Now  as  the 
reduction  of  charge  is  as  yet  by  no  means  propor- 
tioned to  the  fall  of  price,  we  are  justified  in  antici- 
pating that  the  former  will  become  general,  and  af- 
ford, in  any  event,  considerable  relief  to  the  farmers. 

Evidence  before  the  Agricultural  Committee. — Our  rea- 
soning may  be  somewhat  elucidated  by  a  reference  to 
the  answers  of  the  witnesses  examined  by  the  Agri- 


of  our  Agriculturists.  155 

cultural  Committee  of  1821,  about  the  cost  of  raising 
a  quarter  of  wheat.  They  declared  55s.  or  60s.  (Evi- 
dence, pp.  37.  55. 72.)  to  be  indispensable  to  meet  the 
charges  exclusive  of  rent ;  but  that  price  will  be  found 
to  supply  a  fund  for  rent  also,  if  we  suppose  a  gene- 
ral diminution  of  twenty-five  per  cent,  on  farming  charges. 
An  abatement  of  this  nature  was,  as  we  have  already 
remarked,  evidently  in  the  view  of  several  of  the 
witnesses.  One  of  them,  a  land  surveyor,  declared, 
(p.  191.)  that  a  price  of  64.9.  with  a,  proportional  re- 
duction of  charges,  would  afford  a  fair  rent :  while  an- 
other, a  farmer  residing  in  Suffolk,  adverted  (p.  86.) 
to  the  remarkable  fact  that  2000/.  forms  as  efficient 
a  capital  at  present  as  3000/.  in  1817,  and  considered 
that  in  the  event  of  an  abatement  of  one-fourth  of 
rent,  poor-rate,  labour,  tithe,  and  taxes,  60.9.  a  quarter 
would  afford  a  fair  profit  in  his  county.  The  answer 
of  a  third  witness  (p.  335.)  is  still  more  remarkable, 
for  it  declares  a  much  lower  price  to  be  sufficient  in 
a  quarter  (East  Lothian)  where  labour  is  somewhat 
cheaper,  and  tithe  happily  unknown. 

How  far  do  these  conclusions  appear  to  be  familiar 
to  the  majority  of  those  who  have  written  or  given 
evidence  on  the  state  of  our  agriculture  ?  Land  sur- 
veyors, accustomed  to  arithmetical  calculation,  are 
aware  of  these  truths,  in  a  general  sense,  but  the  ma- 
jority of  them,  like  the  majority  of  our  farmers,  long  ac- 
customed to  a  state  of  war,  have  still  difficulty  in  con- 
sidering as  permanent  the  low  prices  and  low  charges 
of  peace.  Next  as  to  the  Agricultural  Report  of  1 821 ; 
that  valuable  document  seems  to  have  been  composed 
under  a  conviction  similar  to  that  which  we  enter- 
tain, but  unfortunately  it  nowhere  exhibits  a  clear 
and  pointed  affirmation  of  the  connexion  between  the 
price  of  corn  and  the  cost  of  raising  it. 

Are  low  Prices  likely  to  continue  ? 

We  are  now  to  follow  up  the  arguments  on  the 
very  interesting  question  of  a  rise  or  fall  in  the  mar- 
ket price  of  corn.     Those  in  favour  of  a  rise  are — 


156  Situation  and  Prospects 

1st.  The  expense  of  bringing  into  culture  new  soils 
of  inferior  quality  to  meet  the  wants  of  our  increasing 
numbers.  This,  the  chief  argument  of  theoretical 
writers,  is  already  in  a  great  measure  answered  by 
the  result  of  the  last  nine  years ;  by  the  evidence 
that  the  largest  additional  produce  is  obtained  from 
soils  already  under  tillage;  and  that  the  grand 
means  of  increase  consist  in  the  application  of  addi- 
tional labour  to  such  soils.  Our  enclosure  bills  in 
the  six  years  previous  to  1815  averaged  115  an- 
nually; in  the  six  following  years,  during  which  our 
produce  has  increased  so  largely,  they  averaged 
only  48 ;  a  decisive  proof  that  the  quantity  of  pro- 
duce may  be  kept  up  and  augmented  without 
bringing  much  new  soil  under  culture. 

2d.  The  expense  of  keeping  inferior  soils  in  cul- 
tivation, and  the  necessity  of  abandoning  them  if  low 
prices  continue.  This  argument  carries  much  more 
weight  than  the  preceding,  and  might  produce  a  kind 
of  revolution  in  prices  were  it  not  counteracted  by 
a  cause  of  most  powerful  operation, — the  decrease  in 
farming  charges  consequent  on  a  decrease  in  the 
price  of  corn.  This  fact,  joined  to  the  increase  of 
our  population,  will  probably  prevent  the  abandon- 
ment, to  any  great  extent,  of  inferior  soils.  No  in- 
ference can  be  drawn  from  the  present  situation  of  our 
agriculturists  who  labour  under  all  the  evils  of  transi- 
tion and  disproportion;  subject  at  once  to  heavy 
charges  and  low  prices.  At  a  time  when  we  are  told 
from  so  many  quarters  of  over-cropping,  of  decay  of 
farming  stock,  and  of  multiplied  bankruptcies,  we 
must  necessarily  take  for  granted  that  the  plough  will, 
to  some  extent,  at  least,  be  withdrawn  from  the  less 
productive  lands.  In  the  parts  of  Scotland  where 
tillage  was  carried  farthest,  this  painful  alternative 
seems  hardly  to  be  avoided :  in  England,  at  least  in 
various  parts  of  England,  the  case  is  somewhat  dif- 
ferent :  tillage  was  not  so  often  carried  to  an  extreme, 
and  the  solicitude  of  the  landlords  (Evidence,  p.  43.) 
to  prevent  the  degradation  of  their  estates  by  paying 
for  lime  and  other  requisites  to  the  maintenance  of 


of  our  Agriculturists.  1 57 

good  husbandry,  will  operate  to  lessen  this  and  other 
evils.  Add  to  this  the  remarkable  fact,  that  after  all 
the  extension  given  to  our  tillage  in  the  present  age, 
the  proportion  of  ground  under  the  plough  and  spade 
is  (Napier's  Supplement  to  the  Encyclopaedia,  head 
of  France,  p.  373.)  considerably  smaller  in  England 
than  in  France.  Add  also  another  iact  hardly  less 
important,  that  the  practice  of  drilling  corn,  so  lately 
introduced,  is  particularly  suitable  to  second-rate 
soils. 

But  supposing  that  the  tillage  of  inferior  soils  were 
relinquished  to  a  certain  extent  both  in  England  and 
Scotland,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the 
amount  of  our  produce  would  decrease :  our  labour 
must  be  employed  somehow,  and  would  be  transferred 
to  the  richer  soils.  A  diminution  of  production  is 
altogether  contrary  to  the  disposition  of  our  country- 
men :  an  increase  of  quantity,  even  when  an  article 
sells  for  a  low  price,  is  more  in  correspondence  with 
their  active  and  enterprising  habits.  No  decrease  of 
our  agricultural  produce  took  place  during  the  long 
stagnation  of  last  century ;  during  the  fifty  years  that 
elapsed  between  1713  and  i763.  And  if  we  advert 
to  a  parallel  case  in  the  present  age,  that  of  our  West 
India  sugar  planters,  we  shall  find  that  during  a 
number  of  years,  (1802.  1805,  6,  7,)  their  produce  as 
little  paid  the  expense  of  raising  it,  as  corn  does  at 
present.  A  number  of  estates  were  abandoned ;  in 
others,  the  cultivation  was  reduced ;  but  this  was  so 
effectually  balanced  by  the  increased  productiveness 
of  the  richer  soils,  that  very  little,  if  any,  diminution 
took  place  in  the  total  quantity  raised. 

3d.  A  protecting  Duty  on  Foreign  Com. — The  efficacy 
or  non-efficacy  of  such  a  measure  is,  in  a  great  degree, 
matter  of  opinion.  Without  assuming  a  decisive  tone 
on  either  side,  we  shall  have  occasion  to  show  in  the 
next  section  that  a  high  duty  would  by  no  means 
cause  a  permanent  rise  in  our  corn  market,  and  that 
the  only  safe  course  is  to  regard  the  last  thirty  years 
as  a  period  peculiar  in  its  circumstances,  and   alto- 


1 58  Situation  and  Prospects 

gether  different  from  a  season  of  peace.  We  ought 
in  the  next  place,  to  carry  back  our  view  to  the 
period  preceding  1793,  and  ascertain  whether  the  in- 
crease of  the  charge  of  raising  corn  arising  from  taxes 
or  otherwise,  exceeds  the  saving  attendant  on  the 
improvements  adopted  in  our  husbandry.  In  that 
proportion  only  would  it  be  practicable  to  maintain 
an  increase  of  price :  any  attempt  to  carry  it  higher 
would  be  defeated  by  the  extension  of  our  home 
growth.  Agriculture,  like  trade,  has  its  projectors ; 
men  ready  to  transfer  to  it  capital  from  other  pursuits, 
and  who  would  find,  particularly  in  Ireland,  many 
rich  tracts  open  to  their  speculations,  now  that  there 
remains  so  little  inducement  to  keep  them  in  pasture. 
The  only  method,  therefore,  of  giving  the  established 
farmer  a  fair  chance  is,  to  be  very  sparing  of  bounties, 
protecting  duties,  and  other  stimulants  :  the  effect  of 
which  is  unnatural,  temporary,  and  eventually  per- 
nicious to  those  who  receive  them. 

4th.  Contingency  of  a  bad  Season. — On  this  head  we 
have  already  attempted  a  calculation,  showing  that  in 
former  periods  of  peace  the  extent  of  rise  varied  from 
IQs.  to  20s.  on  the  quarter  of  wheat,  according  to  the 
degree  of  failure  in  the  harvest.  Under  present  cir- 
cumstances, this  limited  advance  is  much  more  likely 
to  characterize  our  markets  than  the  greater  fluctua- 
tion that  took  place  in  the  late  wars. 

That  our  prices  of  wheat  are  not  likely  to  exceed 
55s.  or  60s.,  is  confirmed  by  some  arguments  of  a  more 
consolatory  nature :  viz. 

The  increase  of  our  growth  from  the  diffusion  of  the  im- 
proved Husbandry. — Under  this  head  we  are  disposed 
to  class  the  more  general  introduction  of  drilling; 
the  farther  consolidation  of  small  farms;  and  the 
more  frequent  adoption  of  leases  when  the  changes 
in  our  money  system  shall  have  reached  their  termi- 
nation. For  her  pasturage  England  is  deservedly 
celebrated,  but  her  tillage  is  only  partially  good.  In 
no  branch  of  our  national  industry  has  improving  ex- 
ample been  as  yet  less  generally  followed :  in  none 
has  it  a  wider  field  to  occupy. 


of  our  Agriculturists.  159 

The  reduced  Interest  of  Money. — The  fall  of  interest 
on  public  securities  since  the  peace  is  about  one  per 
cent.,  and  the  prospect  is  in  favour  of  some  farther 
decrease :  or  rather,  that  the  reduction,  at  present 
partial,  will  become  general,  and  be  communicated 
to  private  as  well  as  public  securities.  No  line  of 
business  offers  at  present  a  tempting  return ;  nor  is 
any  likely  to  withdraw  money  investments  from  agri- 
culture. Add  to  this,  that  from  the  reduced  price  of 
all  farming  stock,  the  appropriation  of  1000/.  to  farm- 
ing (Evidence,  Agricultural  Committee,  p.  86.)  is 
likely  soon  to  be  equivalent  to  that  of  2000/.  in  the 
time  of  high  prices. 

Such  are  the  principal  arguments  against  any 
material  rise  in  our  corn  market;  and  if  their  con- 
junct effect  be  merely  to  give  us  the  supply  of  three 
weeks'  consumption  above  the  average  of  our  crops 
in  war,  the  result  will  be  a  prevention  of  high  prices, 
so  nearly  did  our  growth  approach  even  in  former 
years  to  our  consumption. 

Contingency  of  War. — In  the  event  of  war,  all  these 
anticipations  would  be  overturned:  our  capital 
would  no  longer  be  abundant;  our  navigation  no 
longer  cheap ;  while  from  no  branch  of  our  industry 
would  labourers  be  more  generally  withdrawn  for 
government  service  than  from  agriculture.  At  pre- 
sent, however,  we  leave  this  formidable  contingency 
out  of  the  question;  in  France,  the  only  country 
which  immediately  affects  our  foreign  politics,  there 
exist  the  strongest  reasons  for  adhering  to  a  pacific 
course ;  and  if  that  government  be  induced  for  a 
time  to  deviate  from  it,  the  recurrence  of  a  state  of 
war  so  general  as  that  which  followed  the  French 
Revolution,  is  certainty  not  to  be  expected  in  the 
life-time  of  the  present  generation.  Or,  if  we  admit 
it  to  be  impracticable  to  reason  with  confidence  on 
so  wide  a  question,  there  is  at  least  one  point  which 
we  may  safely  take  for  granted,  viz.  that  our  public 
men,  in  the  event  of  a  new  appeal  to  arms,  will 
abstain  from  two  of  the  measures,  which,  more  than 


1 60  Situation  and  Prospects 

any  other,  contributed  to  raise  our  corn  market, — 
interference  with  our  currency,  and  the  stoppage  of 
neutral  navigation. 

"  These  they  will  shun  through  all  the  dire  debate, 
And  dread  those  arms  whose  force  they  felt  so  late." 

Prospect  of  Relief  to  Farmers. — This  question,  though 
apparently  identified  with  that  of  rise  of  price,  will 
be  found  on  examination  to  rest  on  very  different 
grounds,  and  to  present,  happily,  a  less  unfavourable 
prospect.     The  reasons  for  this  opinion  are, — 

1.  The  interest  of  all  farmers  who  are  not  tenants 
on  lease  (Evidence,  Agricultural  Committee,  pp.  49. 
1 20.)  is  to  have  not  a  high,  but  a  steady  price.  Taken 
in  a  permanent  view,  that  price  is  most  desirable 
which  gives  stability  to  our  manufactures,  and  pre- 
vents our  continental  rivals  from  having  too  great  a 
superiority  over  us  in  the  main  point  of  subsistence. 

2.  Our  growth,  if  it  equal,  does  not,  in  ordinary 
seasons,  exceed  our  consumption ;  a  situation  a  good 
deal  different  from  that  of  our  agriculturists  after  the 
peace  of  Utrecht.  This  fact,  if  it  does  not  justify  the 
expectation  of  a  rise  of  price,  affords,  when  consider- 
ed along  with  our  increasing  numbers,  a  kind  of 
guarantee  of  the  past :  a  security  against  the  aban- 
donment, to  any  great  extent,  of  the  inferior  soils. 

3.  The  tendency  of  agricultural  charges  to  de- 
crease with  the  market-price  of  corn,  and  of  the  rate 
of  profit  in  every  line  to  approach  to  a  common  stan- 
dard. 

4.  Tithe. — Since  war  and  high  prices  can  no  longer 
enter  into  the  calculation  of  our  agriculturists,  it  be- 
comes indispensable  for  them,  as  for  the  equally  unfor- 
tunate sugar  planter,  to  seek  relief  in  a  reduction  of 
expense.  In  this  by  far  the  most  effectual  step  would 
be  a  commutation  of  tithe,  an  exchange  of  a  crude, 
unequal,  and  at  present  oppressive,  mode  of  pro- 
viding for  the  clergy,  for  a  contribution  from  the  pub- 
lic generally;  a  change  which  would  be  facilitated 
by  the  growing  nature  of  our  financial  resources,  and 
for  which,  as  shall  be  shown  in  a  subsequent  passage 


of  our  AgricuUimsis.  \  (j  i 

\jp.  178,)  the  landed  interest  would  be  able  to  make 
an  adequate  return  to  the  public. 

5.  Poor-rate. — To  this  subject  we  shall  shortly  ap- 
propriate a  chapter,  and  take  occasion  to  show  how 
little  information  is  as  yet  possessed  either  by  govern- 
ment or  individuals,  in  regard  to  various  essential 
points,  such  as  the  different  modes  of  distributing  re- 
lief, the  number  of  poor  in  work-houses,  the  allowance 
granted  for  children,  and  finally,  the  proportion  of 
disburse  for  law  charges,  removals,  and  other  outlay, 
distinct  from  the  relief  of  the  poor.  With  such  evi- 
dence of  imperfect  information,  (acknowledged  in  the 
Report  on  Poor-rate,  July  15, 1822,)  is  it  too  much  to 
question,  whether  we  act  an  equitable  part  in  con- 
tinuing the  present  mode  of  assessment  ?  Without 
at  all  entertaining  the  proposition  of  rendering  poor- 
rate  national,  we  may  claim  attention  to  the  argu- 
ments for  a  more  limited  change,  for  rendering  it  an 
equal  tax  on  the  parish  or  district,  the  levy  being 
made  not  on  rent  but  on  income  generally,  and  ex- 
tending to  other  classes  besides  the  farmer  and 
householder. 

These  considerations  confirm  the  hope  that  eventu- 
ally, the  situation  of  our  agriculturists  will  alter, 
and  our  tillage  be  carried  on  without  the  impoverish- 
ment of  a  most  useful  and  respectable  body  of  men. 
Still  their  distress  must,  under  any  circumstances, 
continue  some  time  longer,  and  be  shared  by  the 
numerous  persons  resident  in  towns  whose  livelihood 
depends  on  ministering  either  to  the  wants  of  the 
farmer  or  the  luxury  of  the  landlord.  Every  feeling 
mind  must  sympathize  with  those  industrious  classes, 
whether  in  town  or  country,  whose  privations,  very 
different  from  those  of  their  superiors,  too  often  im- 
ply the  renunciation  of  real  comfort.  They  have, 
however,  already  experienced  considerable  relief 
from  reduction  in  their  expenditure  ;  and  a  cheering, 
though  somewhat  indirect  prospect, is  opened  to  them 
from  the  improved  condition  of  other  classes.  All 
must  allow  that  the  sum  withdrawn  from  agricultural 
iiicome  has  been  far  too  great  in  its  amount,  and  too 

2 1 


1 152  Our  Agriculture,  : 

sudden  in  its  deduction ;  but  it  is  a  consolation  that  it 
does  not,  like  shipwrecked  merchandize,  or  the  ex- 
pense of  an  indecisive  campaign,  form  a  total  and 
absolute  loss  to  the  community :  it  is  compensated, 
as  far  as  the  evil  of  sudden  transition  admits  of  com- 
pensation, by  the  cheaper  maintenance  of  our  manu- 
factures, the  prevention  of  their  emigration,  and  the 
ultimate  benefit  arising  to  our  agriculturists  from 
their  consumption  on  a  more  liberal  scale. 


SECTION  III. 

A  Protecting  Duty. 

We  come  now  to  the  portion  of  our  subject  which 
caused  so  much  discussion  in  the  session  of  1822 — 
the  imposition  of  such  a  duty  on  foreign  corn  as  shall 
afford  protection  to  our  agriculturists.  Our  reason- 
ing on  this  head  will  be  found  materially  different 
from  that  of  the  majority  of  parliamentary  speakers, 
the  amount  of  duty  appearing  to  us  a  secondary  ob- 
ject to  the  public  at  large ;  while  to  our  agricultu- 
rists, it  would,  if  raised  to  an  undue  height,  be  re- 
plete with  as  pernicious  consequences  as  the  bounty 
act  of  last  century.  Without  further  preamble,  we 
proceed  to  examine  the  following  points  : — 

The  comparative  burdens  on  agriculture  in  France 
and  England. 

How  far  our  manufactures  receive  protection  from 
our  custom  duties. 

The  danger  of  over-extending  our  tillage. 

The  tendency  of  our  commercial  legislation  to  the 
abolition  of  all  restrictions. 

A  populous  Country  not  necessarily  expensive. 

England  is,  after  the  Netherlands,  the  portion  of 
Europe  in  which  population  is  both  most  dense  as  to 
numbers,  and  most  closely  connected  by  roads  and 
canals.     Compared  to  us,  the  inhabitants  of  France. 


Duty  on  Foreign  Com.  163 

on  an  equal  surface,  are  in  the  proportion  of  only 
two  to  three ;  and  the  degree  of  separation  is  very 
materially  increased  by  another  cause — the  inferiori- 
ty of  the  roads  and  the  want  of  water  communica- 
tion. Germany  is  still  more  inferior  to  England,  both 
in  numbers  and  in  frequency  of  intercourse  ;  and  it  is 
needless  to  show  how  much  more  the  deficiency  pre- 
vails in  the  other  parts  of  Europe,  in  Spain,  Sweden, 
Poland,  Russia.  The  point  at  issue  is,  to  ascertain 
whether  density  of  population  necessarily  tends  to 
raise  prices,  to  render  a  country  dearer  than  its 
scantily  peopled  neighbour  ? 

That  it  has  in  an  eminent  degree  that  tendency 
is  the  general  impression  and  report  of  those  among 
our  travelling  countrymen,  who  found  their  inferences 
on  a  few  points  most  obvious  to  common  observation, 
such  as  the  moderate  price  of  labour  on  the  Conti- 
nent, and  the  no  less  moderate  rate  of  excise  duties  ; 
but  they  overlook  the  various  considerations  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  question,  such  as  the  general  in- 
feriority of  machinery  and  workmanship,  the  loss  of 
time  caused  by  distance  from  towns,  and  by  the  ne- 
cessity of  doing  personally  that  which,  in  a  busy, 
commercial  community,  is  prepared  by  others,  and 
obtained  by  purchase.  In  a  subsequent  publication, 
when  treating  of  "  Economy  and  Retrenchment,"  we 
shall  take  occasion  to  explain  the  distinction  between 
real  and  apparent  saving,  and  describe  the  habitual 
waste  of  time  in  petty  occupations  by  the  inhabitants 
of  provincial  towns  on  the  Continent:  at  present  our 
wish  is  merely  to  lay  down  the  general  rule,  that  a 
population  dense,  improved,  affluent,  does  not  neces- 
sarily render  a  country  more  expensive  than  one  that 
is  poor  and  thinly  inhabited.  The  difference  is  in  the 
mode  of  living,  not  in  the  price  of  the  articles.  An 
increase  of  population,  by  leading  to  an  abridgment 
of  labour,  and  to  the  transaction  of  business  en  masse. 
brings  with  it  a  dispatch  and  an  extent  of  accommo- 
dation ;  the  saving  from  which  is  equal,  we  believe 
more  than  equal,  to  the  enhancement  in  provisions 
attendant  on  augmented  numbers. 

It  is  not  in  towns  of  moderate  size,  however  near 


1 154  Our  Agriculture  ; 

each  other,  but  only  in  the  case  of  an  overgrown 
capital,  such  as  London,  Paris,  or  Constantinople, 
that  the  real  and  unavoidable  difference  of  expense 
becomes  considerable.  Holland  and  England  are,  it 
is  true,  dearer  throughout  all  their  provincial  towns 
than  the  rest  of  Europe ;  but  that  is  owing  partly  to 
style  of  living,  partly  to  high  taxation, — to  the  price 
paid  by  either  country  for  the  rank  which  it  has 
maintained  in  the  scale  of  European  politics.  Were 
we  to  subject  individual  expenditure  to  an  analysis, 
and  to  keep  separate  the  portion  of  it  which  results 
from  these  causes,  we  should  find  that  our  actual 
prices,  the  purchase  money  of  commodities  at  market* 
are  not,  on  the  whole,  much  greater  than  in  other 
countries. 

These  remarks  are  general,  and  apply  to  all  classes 
of  society.  We  now  proceed  to  the  point  more  im- 
mediately in  question,  the  situation  of  our  agricul- 
turists. 

Comparative  burdens  on  French  and  British  Agriculture. 

That  the  pressure  on  our  agriculture  is  greater 
than  on  that  of  our  neighbours  is  sufficiently  known, 
or  rather,  sufficiently  believed  ;  for  very  few  persons 
have  been  at  pains  to  analyze  the  burdens  on  either. 
On  our  side,  they  consist  of  tithe,  poor-rate,  land-tax, 
along  with  a  participation  in  the  assessed  taxes,  the 
excise  duties,  and  the  customs.  To  begin  with  the 
burdens  directly  applicable  to  agriculture — tithe  and 
poor-rate — we  are  inclined,  in  consequence  of  the 
fall  of  corn,  to  anticipate  that  these  charges,  as  far  as 
paid  by  the  landed  interest,  and  as  far  as  poor-rate  is  distinct 
from  wages,  will,  ere  long,  be  reduced  to  a  sum  of 
about  7,000,000/.  for  both.  The  amount  of  the  land- 
tax,  adding  the  redeemed,  is  about  2,000,000/.  making 
together  a  sum  of  somewhat  more  than  9,000,000/. 
To  this  formidable  burden  the  French  may,  with  a 
qualification  to  be  mentioned  presently,  oppose  their 
fonder,  or  assessment  on  real  property ;  which,  after 
the  partial  reduction  of  late  years,  still  forms  a  charge 
of  17  or  18  per  cent.,  not  on  the  rent  merely,  but  on 


Duty  on  Foreign  Com,  165 

the  rent  and  farmer's  profit  together.  Next  come  our 
assessed  taxes,  which,  in  their  present  reduced  state, 
are  probably  balanced  hy  the  portes  et  fenetres  of  our 
southern  neighbours,  when  added  to  the  mobilier,  or 
tax  on  the  reputed  value  of  furniture.  Our  stamps, 
swelled  as  they  have  been  during  the  late  wars,  are 
considered  by  our  landlords  as  a  very  serious  charge, 
whether  on  leases,  sales,  or  loans ;  and  a  member  of 
Parliament,  remarked  for  his  acquaintance  with  such 
subjects,*  went  lately  the  length  of  asserting  that  this 
charge  was  the  most  heavily  felt  of  any  by  our  agri- 
culturists. Heavy,  however,  as  it  is,  even  after  the 
modification  granted  in  1822,  its  pressure  is  equalled, 
in  respect  to  sales  at  least,  by  the  French  enregistre- 
ment,  a  duty  of  no  less  than  5  per  cent,  on  the  pur- 
chase money,  which,  added  to  the  other  departments 
of  the  stamps,  produces  an  amount  of  5,000,000/. ; 
a  surprising  sum  to  collect  from  a  country  never  re- 
markable for  its  wealth. 

So  far  we  may  be  said  to  have  preserved  equality 
in  our  comparisons :  we  now  come  to  points  in  which 
there  necessarily  prevails  a  difference,  though  less 
great  than  is  commonly  imagined.  Thus,  in  regard 
to  the  charges  incurred  in  the  course  of  cultivation, 
viz.  seed,  manure,  wear  and  tear,  working  cattle, — 
the  difference,  very  great  during  the  war,  has  lost,  or 
is  now  losing,  much  of  its  amount.  The  cost,  as  ex- 
pressed in  money,  is  still,  we  admit, smaller  in  France; 
but  in  the  case  of  implements,  and,  in  some  measure, 
in  that  of  working  cattle,  the  difference  means  little 
more  than  inferiority  of  quality;  an  inferiority. not 
unlike  that  which  would  be  exhibited  by  a  parallel 
between  our  agriculture  of  the  present  age  and  that 
of  the  beginning  or  middle  of  the  last  century.  A 
similar  remark  applies  to  the  domestic  expenses  of  a 
farmer.  The  difference  lies  in  the  style  of  living 
more  than  in  the  price  of  the  articles ;  for  in  two  ma- 
terial points,  clothing  and  fuel,  the  cost  is  not  higher 
in  England  than  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Channel, 

*  Mr.  Frankland  Lewi*. 


166  Our  Agriculture  ; 

The  fuel  of  the  rural  districts  of  France  is  generally 
wood  ;  sometimes,  though  rarely,  it  consists,  as  in 
Ireland,  of  turf  or  peat. 

We  come  next  to  a  highly  important  part  of  agri- 
cultural disburse,  the  price  of  labour;  a  point  in 
which  the  balance  is  greatly  in  favour  of  France,  the 
wages  of  an  able-bodied  labourer  not  exceeding 
(Chaptal  sur  Flndustrie  Francaise,  vol.  I.  p.  245.)  six 
shillings  a  week  without  victuals,  a  rate  considerably 
below  any  reduction  that,  we  can  reasonably  expect 
from  the  fall  in  the  price  of  provisions.  Nor  is  this 
advantage  lessened,  as  some  of  our  countrymen  may 
imagine,  by  any  personal  inferiority  on  the  part  of  the 
French  peasantry,  who  repair  to  their  work  at  as 
early  hours,  and  continue  engaged  in  it  with  as  much 
steadiness  and  activity  as  our  own  labourers.  Add 
to  this,  that  the  saving  we  have  mentioned  is  enjoyed 
by  the  French  farmer  equally  in  the  case  of  domestic 
servants,  whose  diet  is  plain  and  whose  habits  are 
sober.  In  what,  then,  shall  we  be  able  to  find  on 
our  side  of  the  Channel  a  counterpoise  to  this  essen- 
tial advantage  ? — First,  our  implements,  particularly 
those  of  iron,  being  much  superior,  enable  men  of  the 
same  bodily  power  to  do  more  work,  or  to  do  it  better. 
Secondly,  the  use  of  machinery,  such  as  threshing- 
mills  or  drilling-implements,  is  almost  totally  un- 
known in  France.  Thirdly,  our  farms  are  of  appro- 
priate size ;  while  those  of  our  neighbours,  limited 
often  to  such  petty  occupancies  as  those  of  our  an- 
cestors of  the  16th  and  17th  centuries,  afford  no  field 
for  the  beneficial  employment  of  either  capital  or 
machinery.  Lastly,  our  farmers,  in  borrowing  money, 
pay  an  interest  less  by  one  or  two  per  cent,  than  is 
required  in  France,  six  or  seven  per  cent,  being  still 
a  very  common  rate  in  that  country. 

A  long  list  of  the  agricultural  disbursements  of  the 
two  countries  is  thus  made  to  balance,  and  the  re- 
mainder of  the  parallel  is  brought  within  a  com- 
paratively narrow  compass.  It  may,  in  fact,  be  con- 
sidered as  reduced  to  two  points :  on  the  one  hand, 
the  contingency  of  benefit   to  the  English  agricul- 


Duty  on  Foreign  Com.  J  67 

tunst  from  a  protecting  duty;  on  the  other,  the 
heavier  excise  and  customs  to  which  he  is  subjected. 
A  protecting  duty  is  not  unknown  in  France ;  and, 
under  the  provisions  of  the  late  acts  of  181 9  and  1821 , 
the  price  of  46s.  or  47s.  for  the  Winchester  quarter 
of  wheat  is  apparently  secured  to  the  farmer ;  but, 
in  a  country  which  generally  grows  its  full  consump- 
tion, regulations  affecting  import  must  be  of  rare  and 
temporary  operation. 

We  pass  over,  therefore,  this  frail  support,  and 
proceed  to  the  permanent  and  substantial  points  of 
difference  in  the  condition  of  the  British  and  French 
farmer.  These  will  be  found  in  the  magnitude  of 
our  taxes  on  consumption.  Our  custom  duties,  being 
chiefly  on  luxuries,  do  not  very  greatly  affect  our 
agriculturists ;  but,  among  our  excise  duties,  the  tax 
on  leather,  which,  after  the  late  reduction,  still  forms 
a  burden  of  nearly  150,000/.  on  our  peasantry, 
is  unknown  in  France;  while  our  duties  on  malt, 
beer,  and  corn-spirits,  amounting,  after  the  abate- 
ment made  in  1822,  to  the  surprising  sum  of  9,000,000/. 
sterling,  are  feebly  met  by  the  French  taxes  on  wine, 
cider,  and  malt.  In  years  of  over-stock  of  corn,  as 
since  1820,  the  whole  of  the  very  large  sum  we  have 
mentioned  may  be  said  to  form  a  charge  on  our  agri- 
culturists, exactly  as  the  tax  on  sugar,  in  a  season  of 
over-growth,  falls  on  the  West  India  planter.  These, 
however,  are  happily  extreme  cases ;  and  we  shall 
at  present  suppose  them  out  of  the  question,  calculat- 
ing that  of  such  duties  no  more  usually  falls  on  our 
agriculture  than  the  portion  paid  for  the  consumption 
of  the  farmers  and  peasantry.  Even  then,  it  will  ex- 
hibit a  sum  of  3  or  4,000,000/.  sterling;  a  sum  which, 
added  to  the  1,000,000/.  by  which  our  tithe  and  poor- 
rate  exceed  the  French  fonder,  may  be  said  to  re- 
present the  greater  share  of  public  burdens  (4  or 
5,000,000)  borne  by  the  British  agriculturist. 

If  we  bring  these  charges  into  the  form  of  a  com- 
parative per  centage,  we  shall  find  that  the  fonder  in 
France  may,  after  making  allowance  for  all  abate- 
ments and  omissions,  be  computed  at  18  per  cent,  of 


1 68  Our  Agriculture ; 

the  rent  and  farming  profit;  while  in  England,  the 
amount  of  land-tax,  tithe,  poor-rate,  and  additional 
excise  duties,  form  a  tax  on  rent  and  farming  income 
to  the  extent  of  25  per  cent.  The  result  is,  a  heavier 
burden  on  the  English  agriculturists,  to  the  extent  of 
7  or  8  per  cent.,  except  in  as  far  as  it  receives  an  oc- 
casional counterpoise  from  the  duty  on  the  import  of 
foreign  corn.# 

What  then,  it  may  be  asked,  has  been,  during  the 
present  age,  the  respective  situations  of  the  agricul- 
turists in  France  and  this  country  ?  The  war  was 
productive  of  a  rise  of  rent  in  both;  but  while  in 
France  that  rise  was  comparatively  slender,  in  this 
country  it  doubled,  and  in  many  cases  more  than 
doubled,  the  payments  of  1792;  so  that  in  1813  the 
landed  rental  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  con- 
siderably exceeded  that  of  their  southern  neighbour. 
The  rental  of  France,  however,  was  much  more  se- 
cure :  the  price  of  corn  in  that  country  is  little  lower 
in  peace  than  in  war ;  and  the  travellers  who  passed 
over  her  departments  did  not,  until  last  year,  hear 
much  of  those  reductions  of  rent  and  wages  which 
among  us  have  been  required  on  so  large  a  scale 
since  the  peace. 

The  price  accounted  sufficient  to  enable  French 
farmers  to  make  a  livelihood  and  pay  taxes  is  about 
45s.  the  Winchester  quarter,  in  peace. 


We  shall  now  suspend  our  continental  parallel,  and 
bestow  a  few  paragraphs  on  one  of  a  different  kind — 
on  the  comparative  situation  of  our  agriculturists  and 
manufacturers. 

Are  our  manufacturers  actually  benefited  by  protecting 
duties  ? — That  such  is  the  case,  and  in  a  very  con- 
siderable degree  too,  is  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of 
our  agriculturists.     It  is  true,  however,  only  in  a  slight 

f  In  Scotland  the  burden  is  much  less,  the  agriculturists  of  that  part  of 
4he  kingdom  being  comparatively  exempt  from  tithe,  poor-rate,  and  land- 
tax. 


Duty  on  Foreign  Com.  Ito9 

degree,  as  will  soon  be  apparent  from  the  following 
facts. — The  total  value  of  British  manufacture  an- 
nually prepared,  whether  for  home  consumption  or 
export,  was  computed  in  1812  by  Mr.  Colquhoun,  at 
1 23,000,000/.  Since  then  their  quantity  has  greatly 
increased;  but  as  their  price  has  experienced  a  ma- 
terial reduction,  we  shall  probably  deviate  little  from 
the  truth,  in  assuming  that  sum  as  a  fair  representation 
of  their  present  aggregate  value.  But  of  this  very  large 
amount,  more  than  80,000,000/.  consist  of  the  three 
great  articles  of  cotton,  woollens,  and  hardware.; 
none  of  which  receive  protection  from  custom  duties, 
our  manufacturers  being  enabled,  by  inherent  advan- 
tages, to  repel  foreign  competition,  and  even  to  meet 
our  rivals  in  their  own  markets.  Thus  our  cottons 
are  cheaper  than  those  of  France,  Germany,  or  the 
Netherlands,  from  various  causes — the  import  of  the 
raw  material  is  somewhat  less  expensive,  our  ma- 
chinery is  superior,  our  supply  of  fuel  more  abundant, 
and  the  capital  employed  subject  to  a  less  heavy 
charge  of  interest.  In  hardware,  we  possess  a  simi- 
lar advantage  in  point  of  fuel  and  capital,  with  farther 
aids  in  the  carriage  of  the  ore  by  water,  and  in  a  sub- 
division of  labour,  to  which  the  Continent  in  no  de- 
gree approaches.  If  in  woollens  our  superiority  be 
less  decisive,  and  if  the  quality  of  French  cloth  be 
more  substantial,  the  fact  is,  that  from  our  power  of 
giving  long  credit  to  Americans  and  others,  we,  as 
yet,  retain  possession  of  most  of  the  foreign  markets. 
We  have  thus  narrowed,  very  considerably,  the 
extent  of  manafacture  supposed  to  be  benefited  by 
protecting  duties.  We  might  go  a  step  farther,  and 
enumerate  various  articles  (such  as  refined  sugar  or 
pottery  ware,)  in  which  protection  is  out  of  the 
question :  while  the  remainder  that  are  more  or  less 
protected  by  our  custom-duties  do  not,  perhaps, 
surpass  the  value  of  the  agricultural  produce  to  which 
favour  is  extended  from  the  same  quarter;  our 
duties  on  foreign  timber,  flax,  hemp,  tallow,  seeds, 
madder,  butter,  cheese,  and  rice,  all  operating,  or 

22 


/70  Our  Agriculture  ; 

being  intended  to  operate,  in  favour  of  our  agricul- 
turists. 

We  add  a  few  words  in  regard  to  our  taxes  on 
consumption  generally.  Of  these,  it  does  not  appear 
that  the  agriculturist  has  greater  reason  to  complain 
than  his  mercantile  or  manufacturing  neighbour. 
Those  most  severely  felt  are  on  leather,  soap,  can- 
dles, and  glass ;  also  those  on  tea  and  sugar,  since 
they  were  raised  in  the  course  of  the  last  war  to  an 
immoderate  rate.  But  these,  as  well  as  the  farther 
imposts  that  form  the  long  list  of  our  excise  duties, 
are  paid  in  common  by  residents  in  towns ;  and  if 
the  pressure  of  the  malt-tax  be  more  heavily  felt  in 
the  country,  a  kind  of  balance  is  afforded  by  the 
untaxed  substitutes  for  groceries,  which  the  country 
supplies  to  its  inhabitants. 

If  against  the  payment  of  land-tax,  we  place  the 
heavier  assessed  taxes  of  towns,  we  find  the  amount 
of  public  burdens  balanced,  with  the  exception  of 
tithe  and  poor  rate.  These  forming  an  extra  burden 
on  agriculture,  and  one  of  great  amount,  parliament 
have  endeavoured  to  countervail  by  our  corn-laws : 
at  one  time  by  a  bounty  on  export,  at  another  by  a 
restriction  on  import. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  was  the  real  motive  on 
the  part  of  government  for  these  multiform  regula- 
tions— this  long  list  of  duties,  drawbacks,  bounties  ? 
Not  to  confer  on  any  of  the  parties,  whether  agricul- 
turist or  manufacturer,  an  absolute  advantage ;  but 
to  reconcile  them  to  the  taxes  imposed  on  the  re- 
spective articles  of  their  produce,  and  to  prevent 
foreigners  from  underselling  them  in  the  home  market. 
Under  this  impression,  and  considering  the  amount 
of  tithe  and  poor-rate  at  present  a  dead  loss  to  the 
landed  interest,  we  can  hardly  coincide  with  the 
argument  in  the  Agricultural  Report  of  1821  (pp.  23, 
24.),  that  our  landholders  have  not  a  right  to  custom- 
house protection.  Our  hesitation  would  arise  from 
a  very  different  cause :  first,  from  a  doubt  of  the  effi- 
cacy of  a  protecting  duty:  and.  next,  from  a  dread 


Duty  on  Foreign  Com.  ill 

that  the  expectation  which  it  would  so  generally 
excite,  might,  as  in  the  case  of  the  bounty,  lead  to 
excess  of  home  growth. 

Danger  of  an  over-extension  of  our  Tillage, 

This  danger,  which  some  years  ago  would  have 
been  treated  as  chimerical,  we  now  find  to  have  as 
strong  a  claim  to  attention  and  to  precautionary 
measures,  as  the  hazard  of  an  over-extension  of 
manufacture.  Of  the  truth  of  this  our  readers  will 
be  satisfied  on  referring  to  our  arguments  in  the  pre- 
ceding section ;  and,  above  all,  to  the  fact,  that  with 
so  small  a  number  of  enclosure  acts  (forty-eight 
annually),  we  have  found  the  means  of  meeting  every 
year,  since  the  peace,  the  demand  of  the  200,000 
consumers  annually  added  to  our  population.  To 
what  can  this  be  mainly  owing,  except  to  the  diffu- 
sion of  improved  methods,  to  the  application  of  ad- 
ditional labour  and  capital  to  soils  already  under 
tillage  ?  And  who,  in  this  age  of  agricultural  dis- 
covery, in  this  season  of  abundant  supply,  both  as  to 
labour  and  capital,  can  with  confidence  predict  either 
the  limit  or  the  result  of  such  application  ? 

In  prosecuting  this  inquiry,  our  readers  may,  we 
believe,  leave  at  once  out  of  consideration  all  argu- 
ments against  the  increase  of  our  growth,  founded  on 
the  expense  of  reclaiming  poor  soils ;  not  that  such 
expense  is  overrated  by  Mr.  Ricardo  and  others, 
but  because  it  is  unnecessary,  a  larger  produce  being 
obtained  by  bestowing  additional  culture  on  the 
better  soils.  If  in  regard  to  England  and  Scotland, 
our  conclusions  are  called  in  question,  and  it  is 
maintained  that  recourse  to  inferior  soils  must  ere 
long  follow  an  increase  of  our  numbers,  our  reasoning 
can  hardly  be  contested  in  respect  to  the  sister  island, 
where  such  extensive  tracts  of  fertile  land  await  the 
application  of  a  better  system.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, what  security  have  our  established  farmers 
against  the  agricultural  speculator,  except  in  a  mea- 
sure at  first  apparently  disadvantageous  to  them,  we 


172  Our  ,Jofi<;)dlHfc ; 

mean  the  removal  of  a  tempting  contingency,  and  an 
assurance,  as  far  as  can  be  conveyed  by  legislative 
regulation,  that  the  prospects  of  agriculture  are  not 
of  a  nature  to  justify  the  transfer  of  capital  from 
other  lines  of  business  ?  The  true  interest  of  both 
farmer  and  landlord  is  to  beware  of  extending  tillage, 
to  adapt  our  growth,  as  nearly  as  they  can,  to  our 
consumption ;  and  to  keep  the  former,  were  it  prac- 
ticable, somewhat  below  the  latter,  submitting,  as 
after  1773,  to  a  small  but  regular  import.  It  is  that 
course  alone  which  can  give  assurance  of  a  steady 
demand,  of  a  generally  brisk  market. 

The  Corn  Committee  of  1813. — This  Committee, 
actuated  by  a  mixture  of  ignorance  and  selfishness, 
hardly  to  be  credited  in  men  of  their  station  in 
society,  ventured  to  recommend  the  prohibition  of 
import,  except  when  our  own  wheat  should  be  at  or 
above  105s.  the  quarter.  Now,  if  with  the  compara- 
tively small  encouragement  held  out  by  80s.  our  til- 
lage has  so  much  increased,  how  much  greater  would 
have  been  the  augmentation  had  the  extravagant 
proposition  of  the  committee  been  adopted  by  par- 
liament? What  an  extent  of  inferior  soil  would 
have  been  brought  under  the  plough  in  the  course  of 
two  years  !  What  an  overstock  on  the  market  before 
discovering  the  inefficiency  of  a  corn-law  to  keep  up 
prices  ! — an  overstock  admitting  not  of  remedy,  like 
excess  of  import,  by  shutting  our  harbours,  but  re- 
maining in  force  for  years,  perhaps  requiring  the 
ruinous  alternative  of  abandoning  land  under  tillage. 

The  iveekly  Averages. — Among  the  various  expedi- 
ents suggested  by  the  distress  of  late  years,  was  that 
of  comprehending  in  the  returns,  which  form  our 
weekly  averages,  such  Irish  wheat  as  is  sold  in  Eng- 
land :  the  result  of  this,  in  consequence  of  the  inferi- 
ority of  Irish  wheat,  is  to  render  a  return  of  60s. 
equivalent  as  a  representative  of  price,  to  62s.  or  63s. 
on  the  former  plan  of  taking  the  averages.  Under 
present  circumstances,  this  has  no  practical  effect ; 
but  were  our  market  to  rise,  we  should  soon  see 
that  all  expedients  of  this  nature  tended  to  stimulate 
production  to  a  hazardous  extent 


Duty  on  Foreign  Com.  173 

Objections  to  a  high  import  duly. — Alter  these  argu- 
ments, we  may  venture  to  hazard  an  opinion,  which 
would  otherwise  have  appeared  not  a  little  paradoxi- 
cal, viz.  that  in  peace  the  injury  resulting  from  a  high 
duty  on  foreign  corn  would  in  all  probability  be 
greater  to  the  producers  than  to  the  consumers  of 
provisions.  Were  a  high  duty  imposed,  the  rise  of 
price  would  be  temporary  :  extremes  soon  produce 
their  own  cure,  and  consumers  might  safely  trust  to 
the  extension  of  home  culture.  The  evil,  however, 
would  not  stop  there :  the  agriculturist  would  be 
sunk  in  distress  by  overproduction,  and  the  mer- 
chants and  manufacturers  would  consequently  be 
subjected  to  an  extra  share  of  the  public  burdens. 
Hence  the  importance  of  maturely  weighing,  not  the 
demands  of  a  particular  class,  but  the  interest  of  the 
public  in  the  most  comprehensive  sense. 

Farther,  the  misfortune  of  the  present  day  is  less 
the  reduction  of  income  than  the  existence  of  inequal- 
ity, the  evil  of  transition  ;  and  the  public  are  entitled 
|  to  expect  such  measures  as  shall  set  at  rest  this  ruin- 
ous fluctuation.  If  our  present  desideratum  be  a  gene- 
ral reduction  of  wages,  salaries,  and  other  money 
payments,  not  yet  brought  to  their  level,  nothing,  it 
is  clear,  can  so  effectually  promote  that  object  as  a 
moderate  rate  of  duty  on  foreign  corn  :  an  assurance, 
as  far  as  assurance  can  be  given,  of  our  market  being- 
kept  at  a  steady  price.  How  satisfactory  to  mer- 
chants, manufacturers,  annuitants,  and,  above  all,  to 
farmers,  to  know  on  what  probable  price  of  corn  they 
are  to  found  their  future  calculations,  to  fix  wages  and 
salaries,  to  regulate  their  domestic  expenditure  ! 

In  what  manner,  it  may  be  asked,  can  a  reference 
to  the  past  be  made  instrumental  in  guiding  us  to  a 
knowledge  of  the  rate  which  forms  a  fit  protecting 
duty  ?  By  fixing  our  attention  on  the  cost  of  raising 
wheat,  not  in  a  period  such  as  that  of  the  last  thirty 
years,  a  period  as  anomalous  in  productive  industry 
as  in  politics ;  but  at  a  time  when  Europe  enjoyed 
that  tranquillity  which  she  has  happily  now  in  pros- 
pect.   Comparing  the  present  and  the  former  charges 


174  Our  Agriculture : 

on  our  tillage,  we  shall  find  that  labour,  team,  ma- 
nure, may  and  ought  soon  to  be  brought  back  to  a 
rate  not  much  exeeding  that  of  1792:  that  tithe  is 
necessarily  proportioned  to  the  market  price  of  corn, 
and  must  follow  its  fall ;  while  poor-rate,  though  more 
difficult  of  reduction,  ought  to  yield  to  the  substantial 
advantage  of  cheap  provisions,  and  the  opportunity 
of  work  afforded  by  our  manufactures. 

All  those  considerations  are  of  a  nature  to  show 
that  the  late  corn  bill,  which  admits  foreign  wheat 
when  our  own  attains  the  average  of  70s.  has  not 
brought  our  import  limit  too  low. 

Tendency  of  our  Legislation  to  ultimate  Freedom  of  Trade- 

We  shall  now  suspend,  for  a  few  moments,  the 
consideration  of  temporizing  measures,  of  the  expe- 
dients devised  to  meet  the  pressure  of  the  day,  and 
carry  our  speculations  to  a  more  distant  object ;  to 
the  probable  situation  of  our  agriculturists  and  ma- 
nufacturers of  the  next  generation.  In  their  time,  our 
financial  circumstances  will  probably  be  more  favour- 
able ;  and  parliament,  relieved  from  immediate  ur- 
gency, may  legislate  with  no  other  view  than  that  of 
the  permanent  advantage  of  the  public. 

It  was  long  an  opinion  among  our  countrymen,  that 
the  landed  and  commercial  bodies  had  opposite  inter- 
ests ;  that  a  tax  imposed  on  the  land  was  of  no  par- 
ticular detriment  to  trade  :  and  that  the  gains  of  our 
merchants  were  of  little  consequence  to  agriculture. 

In  the  present  age  a  more  ample  experience,  a 
community  of  suffering  on  the  part  of  these  great  por- 
tions of  the  community,  have  taught  them  a  more 
liberal  doctrine*  3t  is  no  where  more  emphatically 
urged  than  in  the  passage  (p.  20.)  of  the  Agricultural 
Report  of  1821,  where  the  intimate  connexion,  the 
strict  dependence  of  agriculture  and  trade  on  each 
other,  are  proved  by  the  evidence  of  the  last  hundred 
years  of  our  history.  Assuming,  therefore,  that  such 
will  be  the  ultimate  basis  of  our  legislative  measures, 
we  are  naturallv  led  to  take  a  view  of  our  produe- 


Duty  on  Foreign  Com.  175 

tive  industry  somewhat  more  comprehensive  than  in 
the  preceding  paragraphs,  and  to  inquire  on  what 
particular  advantages  our  national  prosperity  has 
been  and  is  likely  to  be  established, 

Advantages  of  particular  Countries. — Every  country 
possesses  its  physical  characteristics,  its  peculiar  and 
distinctive  aptitudes.  If,  adverting  to  the  early  histo- 
ry of  civilization,  we  cast  our  eyes  over  a  map  of 
Greece,  and  observe  how  much  intercourse  was  there 
facilitated  by  maritime  inlets,  and  by  insular  positions 
in  a  sea  of  easy  navigation,  we  shall  find  it  easy  to 
account  for  the  early  improvement  of  that  country, 
without  ascribing  any  great  share  of  influence  to  for- 
tunate accidents,  to  the  exploits  of  warriors,  or  the 
counsels  of  legislators.  If  we  take  a  wider  range, 
and  inquire  by  what  features  the  physical  structure 
of  Europe  is  discriminated  from  that  of  Asia  or  Africa, 
we  shall  find  its  advantages  consist  partly  in  a  climate 
exempt  from  extremes,  but  more  in  the  ample  means 
of  navigation  afforded  by  the  Mediterranean  and  the 
Baltic.  Lastly,  if,  drawing  nearer  home,  we  en- 
deavour to  ascertain  how  it  happened  that  Flanders 
was  flourishing  amidst  the  barbarism  of  the  thirteenth 
and  fourteenth  centuries,  we  shall  trace  it  principally 
to  two  causes  ;  fertility  of  soil  and  ease  of  water  com- 
munication. The  latter,  joined  to  the  advantage  of 
a  free  government,  explains  the  still  more  remarkable 
growth  of  the  Dutch  provinces  in  the  seventeenth 
century. 

Of  England. — By  what  peculiar  advantages  has 
England  been  distinguished,  and  enabled  to  take  the 
lead  of  France  and  Germany,  countries  equally  fa- 
voured in  soil  and  climate  ?  In  a  religious  and  po- 
litical sense,  our  superiority  has  consisted  in  the  en- 
joyment of  the  reformed  faith  and  a  representative 
government ;  in  a  physical  sense,  in  our  extent  of 
coast,  and  in  the  productiveness  of  our  coal  mines. 
Natural  superiority  of  another  kind  we  can  hardly 
boast :  our  pasture  is,  indeed,  richer  than  that  of  con- 
tinental countries,  and  we  consequently  take  the  lead 
in  horses,  cattle,  and,  in  some  degree,  in  the  woollen 


1 7  6  Our  Agriculture  ; 

manufacture  ;  but  whatever  comes  under  the  descrip- 
tion of  agricultural  advantages,  ought,  we  believe,  to 
be  left  out  of  the  question,  and  to  be  considered  as 
balanced  by  the  less  variable  temperature,  the  great- 
er warmth  of  the  continent.  Our  farming  is,  indeed, 
much  more  advanced ;  but  is  not  that  the  result  of 
indirect  causes,  of  the  reactionof  our  trade  and  ma- 
nufactures, of  the  application  of  capital  to  tillage  and 
pasturage,  and  of  our  tenantry  being  thus  enabled  to 
occupy  farms  of  suitable  size,  instead  of  the  insignifi- 
cant tenures  still  so  common  among  our  neighbours? 

In  what  manner,  it  may  be  asked,  is  this  reason- 
ing applicable  to  the  present  discussion,  the  question 
of  a  protecting  duty  on  corn  ?  Our  answer  is,  that 
we  should  greatly  mistake  our  national  prospects 
were  we  to  suppose  that  we  have  as  yet  received  all 
the  benefit  attainable  from  our  superiority  in  the 
grand  points  of  fuel  and  navigation ; — on  the  contrary, 
it  may  safely  be  asserted,  that  we  are  not  yet  in  the 
midst  of  our  career,  not  half-advanced  in  the  task  of 
turning  these  advantages  to  account.  Continental 
countries  are  making  a  very  slow  progress,  either  in 
navigating  the  ocean,  in  forming  canals,  or  in  work- 
ing coal  mines :  in  each  of  these  our  superiority  still 
offers  an  ample  basis  for  the  superstructure  of  nation- 
al wealth.  It  would  probably  be  such  as  to  enable 
our  manufacturers,  though  taxed  in  regard  to  pro- 
visions, to  maintain  a  competition  with  their  conti- 
nental rivals  ;  but  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  they  never 
will  be  able  to  do  full justice  to  our  national  advantages 
until  placed  on  a  footing  of  equality  in  that  very  es- 
sential point.  A  reference  to  our  custom-house  re- 
turns would  soon  show  how  small  our  export  of  ar- 
ticles, such  as  hardware,  glass,  and  even  woollens,  is, 
in  comparison  with  what  it  might  be,  were  equality  in 
the  price  of  provisions  added  to  our  other  advan- 
tages. 

A  free  Import  of  Corn. — This  opens  to  our  view  all 
the  advantage  that  would  arise  from  a  free  trade  in 
corn,  or  from  the  reduction  of  the  protecting  duty  to 
r*  lower  scale  than  has  as  yet  been  contemplated. 


Duty  on  Foreign  Com.  177 

either  by  ministers  or  by  the  most  temperate  of  their 
opponents.*  In  another  place  (see  Appendix)  we 
have  appropriated  a  few  paragraphs  to  this  topic ; 
and  these,  under  present  circumstances,  are,  perhaps, 
all  that  is  advisable  to  urge  in  regard  to  it.  The 
landed  interest  are  as  jet  but  imperfectly  apprised 
of  the  extent  of  its  ultimate  advantage  to  them ;  nor 
can  we  expect  that  their  attention  will,  for  some 
time,  be  weaned  from  the  high  prices,  the  great 
nominal  rents  of  the  years  of  war.  If  our  ministers 
are  more  deeply  read  in  the  science  of  national 
wealth,  more  fully  convinced  of  the  reaction  of  the 
prosperity  of  trade  and  manufacture  on  agriculture, 
they  have  objections  of  another  kind ;  they  cannot 
but  regard  a  fall  of  prices  as  a  virtual  augmentation 
of  the  public  debt.  They  are  aware,  likewise,  of  the 
evils  of  transition ;  and  must,  to  use  the  language  of 
the  Agricultural  Report,  be  anxious  "  to  spare  vested 
interests,  and  to  deal  tenderly  even  with  obstacles 
to  improvement,  when  long  implanted  in  our  sys- 
tem." 

To  all  these  difficulties  we  have  to  add,  that  the 
exemption  of  our  agriculture  from  its  extra  share  of 
poor-rate,  and  from  tithe  in  England  as  well  as  Ire- 
land, would  be  an  indispensable  preliminary,  to  a 
measure  which  would  bring  our  corn  market  almost 
as  low  as  that  of  the  Continent.  Now  government, 
however  convinced  of  the  impolicy  of  these  burdens 
in  their  present  shape,  could  hardly  fail  to  consider  a 
change  in  long  established  assessments,  above  all,  a 
new  demand  on  our  exchequer,  as  replete  with  em- 
barrassment. Several  of  the  late  measures  of  minis- 
ters, such  as  the  limitation  of  the  sinking  fund,  the  re- 
mission of  the  most  injurious  of  our  taxes,  the  ex- 
tended freedom  of  navigation,  the  transfer  of  the  half 
pay  and  pension  list  into  long  annuities,  evidently 
proceed  on  sound  calculation.  They  seem  to  indi- 
cate an  adequate  estimate  of  our  resources  on  the 
part  of  our  political  guides;  but  the  free  import  of  corn 
would  be  so  great  a  departure  from  our  past  policy, 

*  Ricardo  on  Agriculture,  pp.  82.  83. 

23 


178  Our  Agriculture. 

and  would  involve  so  many  accompanying  changes, 
that  we  can  contemplate  it  only  as  a  remote  result, 
as  less  likely  to  be  the  consequence  of  any  arguments 
that  can  possibly  be  urged,  than  of  a  continuation  of 
low  prices;  which,  by  reducing  the  cost  of  pro- 
duction, and  replacing  our  tenantry  in  nearly  the 
same  situation  as  in  1792,  may  cause  our  corn  laws 
to  expire  by  a  natural  death. 


Such  were  our  views  of  this  interesting1  subject  last  year,  on  sending  to 
press  the  first  edition.  Since  then,  there  have  occurred  several  circum- 
stances favourable  to  an  approximation  to  a  system  of  freedom,  and  to  the 
hope  of  that  advantage  which  always  arises  from  the  removal  of  restraints 
from  productive  industry.  The  lapse  of  time,  the  reduction  of  charges,  and 
the  prospect  of  continued  peace,  have  gradually  accustomed  both  landlord 
and  farmer  to  regard  60*.  for  a  quarter  of  wheat  in  the  light  of  a  remune- 
rating price ;  the  next  step  may  be  to  consider  it  as  a  kind  of  standard  for 
the  duty  on  the  import  of  foreign  corn.  Now,  so  soon  as  the  landed  in- 
terest shall  be  willing  to  permit  import  on  the  average  price  of  our  wheat 
exceeding  60s.,  they  will  be  entitled  to  call  on  the  public  for  decisive  con- 
cessions in  regard  to  tithe  and  poor-rate, — in  other  words,  by  giving  an  as- 
surance of  a  permanently  moderate  price  to  the  consumer,  they  will  have 
a  right  to  demand  that  these  burdens  (tithe  and  poor-rate)  shall  be  shared 
by  the  public  at  large. 

Are  the  recent  measures  of  ministers  of  a  nature  to  promise  a  concurrence 
in  this  plan  of  mutual  concession  ?  To  this  we  are  inclined  to  answer  in  the 
affirmative,  and,  with  confidence,  whether  we  look  to  the  personal  change  in 
the  Chancellorship  of  the  Exchequer ;  to  the  reduction  so  promptly  made  in 
the  assessed  taxes ;  to  the  limits  which,  as  far  as  we  can  judge,  men  in  office 
think  it  fit  to  affix  to  the  sinking  fund ;  and,  above  all,  to  the  introduction 
of  the  too  long  delayed  measure  for  the  commutation  of  tithe  in  Ireland. 

Of  the  power  of  the  monied  interest  to  come  to  the  relief  of  their  coun- 
trymen engaged  in  agriculture,  we  shall  treat  in  our  concluding  chapter. 


mi 


CHAR  VI. 

Poor-Rate. 

The  subject  of  poor-rate  has  already  engaged  so 
much  attention  both  in  parliamentary  investigations 
and  published  works,  that  we  shall  avoid  all  general 
discussion,  and  confine  ourselves  to  what  may  be 
termed  plain,  practical  topics,  such  as  the  compara- 
tive amount  of  money  distributed  at  different  dates  to 
the  poor,  and  the  degree  of  pressure  on  the  con- 
tributors. We  take  up  the  subject  less  as  a  national 
question,  than  as  an  appendage  to  our  observations 
on  agriculture  ;  but  our  summary,  brief  as  it  may  be, 
will,  we  trust,  explain  two  points,  at  present  little 
understood ;  the  great  increase  of  parochial  charge 
during  the  war,  when  labour  in  general  was  so  libe- 
rally paid,  and  the  very  considerable  reduction  that 
is  now  taking  place,  notwithstanding  the  apparently 
less  favourable  state  of  our  productive  industry. 

We  propose  to  treat  successively  of  the — 

Origin  and  progress  of  our  poor  law  system ; 

Its  degree  of  pressure  considered  as  a  tax ; 

Its  effect  on  the  condition  of  the  lower  orders. 

Origin  of  our  Poor  Laws. — The  origin  of  the  English 
poor  laws,  a  system  so  different  from  that  of  neigh- 
bouring countries,  is  to  be  traced  to  two  causes, — the 
call,  at  the  time  of  the  Reformation,  for  a  provision 
for  the  poor,  when  deprived  of  charitable  aid  from 
monasteries ;  and  the  enhancement,  both  progressive 
and  rapid,  which,  as  explained  in  the  preceding  chap- 
ter, took  place  in  provisions  during  the  16th  century. 
If  the  former  offered  a  fair  plea  for  the  new  system, 
the  latter  presented  the  more  substantial  grounds^ 
since  the  rise  of  wages  seldom  keeps  pace  with  a  rise 
in  provisions.  The  conjunct  operation  of  these  causes 


T80  Our  Poor  Law  System  ; 

led  to  various  enactments  in  favour  of  the  poor,  which 
were  definitively  consolidated  in  the  act  of  1601, — 
an  act  prepared  with  all  the  care  and  deliberation 
characteristic  of  the  ministers  of  Elizabeth,  and  which 
would  never  have  received  a  pernicious  extension  had 
its  execution  fallen  into  proper  hands.  Its  provisions 
were  intended  at  first  for  the  relief  of  merely  the  aged 
and  infirm,  and  led  to  little  beyond  the  degree  of  aid 
afforded  at  present  to  the  poor  in  Scotland  or  in 
France ;  but,  from  unfitness  on  the  part  of  annually 
changed  overseers,  and  from  the  remissness  always 
attendant  on  the  disposal  of  public  property,  when 
unchecked,  the  act  received,  in  time,  a  wider  con- 
struction. It  was  interpreted  into  an  obligation  to 
find  work  for  the  unemployed  generally,  as  well  as 
to  make  up  to  those  who  had  children  the  dispro- 
portion which  in  dear  seasons  took  place  between 
the  price  of  bread  and  the  rate  of  wages. 

Our  poor-rate  became  thus  a  fund,  not  merely  for 
charitable  purposes,  but  for  the  equalization  of 
wages ;  a  counterpoise  to  the  fluctuations  arising  from 
inclement  seasons,  or  from  any  cause  productive  of  a 
rapid  fall  in  the  value  of  money.  This  result,  cer- 
tainly well  intended,  and  which  at  first  sight  seems  of 
beneficial  operation,  is  found,  on  trial,  to  be  replete 
with  all  that  irregularity  and  abuse  which  it  is  so  dif- 
ficult to  avoid  in  any  interference  with  the  natural 
course  of  productive  industry.  Of  this,  a  striking 
proof  is  given,  not  only  in  this  country,  but  in  the 
New-England  states,  and  in  the  state  of  New-York ; 
for  even  in  these,  the  countries  of  the  world  in  which 
the  pay  of  the  labourer  is  most  liberal,  the  number  of 
paupers  has  become  large.  They  are,  happily,  the 
only  foreign  countries  in  which  our  example  has  been 
imitated.  On  the  continent  of  Europe,  the  public  in- 
stitutions afford  protection  only  against  infirmity  and 
extreme  penury :  even  Holland,  so  long  noted  for  its 
hospitals  and  charities,  has  not  a  poor-rate  on  the 
comprehensive  plan  of  England. 


its  Origin  and  Progress.  181 

Its  Progressive  Extension. — Our  records  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  relief  to  the  poor  during  the  seventeenth 
century  are  very  imperfect:  its  amount,  however, 
must  have  been  considerable  in  the  first  half  of  the 
century,  in  consequence  of  the  continued  rise  of  corn 
during  the  reign  of  James  L,  and  part  of  that  of 
Charles  I.  But  during  the  thirty  years  that  interven- 
ed from  1 660  to  1 690,  the  price  of  corn  was  on  the  de- 
cline, and  the  country  experienced  in  no  great  degree 
either  the  visitation  of  inclement  seasons  or  the  bur- 
den of  military  expenditure.  In  the  reigns  of  William 
and  Anne  the  case  was  far  different ;  an  enhance- 
ment of  corn  consequent  on  bad  seasons,  on  war,  and 
interrupted  navigation,  concurred  with  the  disorder 
in  our  currency  to  render  a  state  of  suffering  general 
among  the  lower  orders,  and  to  give  a  melancholy 
corroboration  to  their  claims  for  parochial  relief. 
The  number  of  persons  receiving  such  aid  is  said 
(Clarkson  on  Pauperism,)  to  have  amounted,  towards 
the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century,  to  as  large  a 
portion  of  our  population  as  at  present,  viz.  a  tenth 
part  of  the  inhabitants  of  England  and  Wales.  The 
amount  of  money  collected  for  this  purpose  has  not 
been  put  on  record :  it  is  said,  somewhat  loosely,  but 
without  much  appearance  of  exaggeration*,  to  have 
approached  at  the  period  in  question  to  a  million 
sterling ;  a  burden  heavily  felt  in  those  days  of  limit- 
ed rental,  and  productive  consequently  of  great 
complaints. 

The  long  peace  and  reduced  price  of  provisions 
which  followed  the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  were  both  con- 
ducive to  the  decrease  of  poor-rate,  and,  notwith- 
standing an  increase  in  our  population,  we  find  that, 
in  the  middle  of  the  century,  viz.  in  the  three  years 
ending  with  1750,  its  amount  did  not  (Reports  on  the 
Poor  Laws  in  1817  and  1821)  exceed  an  average 
of 700,000/. 

After  1760,  the  charge  for  the  poor  participated  in 
the  general  charge  which  took  place  in  the  state  of 

*  Sir  F.  Eden  on  the  State  of  the  Poor. 


J  82  Our  Poor  Law  System ; 

prices,  and  amounted  in  that  year  to  965,000/. 

while  at  a  subsequent  date,  in  1 770,  it  was  carried 

to • 1,306,000/.; 

so  much  did  the  effect  of  indifferent  seasons  and  the 
enhancement  of  corn  counterbalance  the  otherwise 
favourable  circumstances  of  the  latter  period — the 
enjoyment  of  peace,  the  extension  of  our  manufac- 
tures. Next  came  the  contest  with  our  colonies, 
along  with  the  various  losses  attendant  on  interrupt- 
ed export,  and  the  suspension  of  undertakings  de- 
pendent on  a  low  interest  of  money,  the  result  of 
which,  in  concurrence  with  other  causes,  carried  the 

charge  of  poor  rate  in  1780  to     1,774,000/. 

The  peace  of  1783,  though  favourable  in  the  main, 
was  not  unaccompanied  by  the  evils  of  transition. 
Our  productive  industry  partook  at  first  of  the  dis- 
couragement excited  by  the  loss  of  our  colonies; 
and  though  it  soon  exhibited  symptoms  of  vigour, 
and  even  of  prosperity,  the  price  of  bread  was  kept 
up  by  the  indifferent  harvests  of  1788  and  1789. 
When  to  this  we  add  the  increase  of  our  population, 
and  make  allowance  for  the  progressive  introduction 
of  abuse  into  a  system  subject  to  so  little  check  or 
control,  we  need  not  be  surprised  that  in  1790,  the 
sum  collected  for  the  poor  amounted,  when  joined  to 
the  minor  rates  for  highways,  church,  and  county 
charges,  to     2,567,000/. 

The  late  Wars. — Such  was  the  state  of  our  poor-rate 
at  the  beginning  of  the  French  Revolution,  the  time 
when  we  entered  on  a  course  of  circumstances  pro- 
ductive of  a  continued  fall  in  the  value  of  money.  As 
wages  seldom  rise  in  proportion  to  a  rise  in  provi- 
sions, an  increase  of  poor-rate  is  the  necessary  con- 
sequence. Previously  to  the  war  of  1793,  the  aug- 
mentation of  our  rates  had  been  gradual,  a  century 
elapsing  before  they  doubled,  a  ratio  of  increase  lit- 
tle greater  than  that  of  our  population.  But  after 
1793,  the  concurrent  effect  of  war,  and  indifferent 
seasons,  rendered  the  price  of  bread  so  dispropor- 
tionate to  the  wages  of  country  labour,  that  in  1 800, 


its  Origin  and  Progress,  1H3 

the  poor-rate,  exclusive  of  the  highway,  church,  and 
county  rate,  amounted  to      3,861,000/. 

In  1810,  to 5,407,000/. 

And  in  1812,  to 6,680,00©/. 

The  peace  of  1814  opened,  in  some  respects,  a 
new  era.  It  was  followed,  as  is  well  known,  hy  a 
rapid  fall  in  the  price  of  corn,  which  continued  dur- 
ing two  years ;  and  had,  notwithstanding  the  many 
new  claims  for  parish  relief  arising  from  want  of 
work,  the  effect,  on  the  whole,  of  a  partial  reduction 
of  the  poor-rate.  This  is  apparent  from  the  subjoin- 
ed table. 


1 84  Our  Poor  Law  System  ; 

RETURNS  FOR  ENGLAND  AND  WALES. 


YEAR 

ending  Easter, 
1813. 

Easter  1814. 

25th  March. 
1815. 

£. 

£. 

£. 

Total  money  received 

by  poor-rate,  and  in 

a  smaller  degree  by 

church-rate,     high- 

way-rate      county- 

rate,    he.    in  Eng- 

land and  Wales 

8,651,438 

8,392,728 

7,460,855 

To  these  sums  are  to 

be  added  charitable 

donations,    whether 

arising  from  land  or 

money,  managed  by 

the  clergy,  church- 

wardens,   or    over- 

seers :  Annual  ave- 

rage 
Expenditure. 

238,310 

238,310 

238,310 

For   the   maintenance 

and    relief    of   the 

poor 

6,679,658 

6,297,331 

5,421,168  1 

Law-suits,  removal  of 

! 

paupers  and  expen- 

1 

ses  of  overseers  or 

other  officers  - 

325,107 

332,966 

324,665 

Families     of    militia- 

men and  other  mi- 

litia charges   - 

246,202 

188,576 

105,394 

Church-rate,    county- 

rate,   highway-rate, 

&c. 

1,614,871 

1,692,990 

1,657,871  | 

8,865,838 

8,511,863 

7,508,854  ! 

The  average  of  the  two  years  1815  and  1816  was, 
Church,  county,  and  highway-rate       -         -         £1,212,918 
Maintenance  and  relief  of  the  poor,  including  law- 
suits, removal  of  paupers,  and  expense  of  over- 
seers      -------         5,714,506 


In  all 


£6,937,425 


its  Origin  and  Progress. 


185 


Increase  after  1816. — The  poor-rate  was  thus  in 
progress  of  reduction,  both  as  to  the  amount  levied, 
and  the  number  relieved,  when  a  general  reaction 
took  place,  in  consequence  of  the  high  price  of  pro- 
visions that  followed  the  bad  harvest  of  1816. 


AVERAGE 

OF 

TWO  YEARS. 

Relief  and 
Maintenance  of 
the  Poor  ;  also 
Law  Suits,  re- 
moval of  Pau- 
pers and  Ex- 
pense of  Of- 
ficers. 

Church-rates, 
County-rates, 
Highway-rates, 
and  Militia- 
charges. 

TOTAL. 

1816  and  1817 

1817  and  1818 

1818  and  1819 

1819  and  1820 
Year  ending  ) 
Easter  1821  > 
Do.  1822 

£. 

6,918,217 
7,890,148 
7,531,650 
7,329,594 

6,947,660 

6,335,820 

£. 
1,210,200 
1,430,292 
1,300,534 
1,342,658 

8,128,417 
9,320,440 
8,932,185 
8,719,655 

The  amount  of  our  payments  was  highest  during 
the  interval  (1817,  1818,  1819,)  when  a  high  price 
of  corn  unfortunately  concurred  with  the  derange- 
ment of  productive  industry  arising  from  our  great 
national  transition. 

Since  1819  the  amount  of  this  formidable  charge 
has  experienced  a  progressive,  though  very  gradual 
reduction. 
The  year  ending  Easter  1819,  was  less  than  the  year 

ending  Easter  1818,  by  -         -         5  per  cent. 

Do.  ending  1820,  less  than  1819,  by  3 

Do.  ending  1821,  less  than  1820,  by  5 

Do.  ending  1822,  less  than  1821,  by  9 


Total  reduction  since  1818,    - 

24 


22 


186 


Our  Poor  Law  System ; 


For  the  year  ending  26th  March,  1823, 
the  returns  as  yet  received  exhibit  a 
diminution,  which,  joined  to  a  fur- 
ther reduction  in  the  year  now  in 
progress,  justifies  our  assuming  the 
total  of  our  present  expenditure  for 
the  poor,  at  less  than 


£6,000,000 


NUMBER  OF  PERSONS  RELIEVED. 


Poor  permanently  re- 
lieved     in     work- 
houses - 

Ditto,   ditto,    out    of 
workhouses    (with- 
out reckoning  chil- 
dren 

Parishioners    relieved 
occasionally  - 
Total  of  paupers  > 
relieved  -          y 

YEAR 

ending  Easten 

1813. 

Easter  1814. 

March  <25th, 
1815. 

97,223 

434,441 
440,249 

94,085 

430,140 
429,770 

88,115 

406,887 
400,971 

971,913 

953,995 

895,973 

Workhouses. — The  preceding  return  exhibits  in  a 
separate  line  the  number  of  poor  living  in  work- 
houses. This  plan  is,  in  a  manner,  peculiar  to  Eng- 
land; the  public  establishments  in  other  countries 
being  confined  to  hospitals  or  houses  of  correction. 
The  workhouse  plan,  originally  adopted  above  n 
century  ago,  received  a  great  extension  from  an 
act  passed  in  1782,  commonly  called  Gilbert's  Act, 
from  the  name  of  the  member  of  parliament  by  whom 
it  was  framed.  This  act,  aiming  to  combine  the  ad- 
vantages of  an  assemblage  of  a  number  of  poor  on 
one  spot,  of  a  minute  division  of  labour,  and  a  joint 
management  of  disburse,  empowered  all  magistrates 


its  Origin  and  Progress  I  tf? 

to  consider  any  large  workhouse  as  a  common  recep- 
tacle for  the  poor  throughout  a  diameter  of  twenty 
miles.  Sound  as  these  reasons  apparently  were,  the 
plan  has  as  yet  been  by  no  means  successful :  proper 
care  has  seldom  been  taken  to  separate  the  inmates 
of  the  workhouses  according  to  their  age  or  their 
habits;  nor  has  the  division  of  employment  been 
at  all  carried  to  the  necessary  length.  Their  ear- 
nings have  consequently  been  insignificant,  and  the 
charge  to  the  parish  amounts,  in  general,  to  9/.  10/.. 
or  even  1  2/.  per  head,  while  half  the  sum  would  suf- 
fice, if  paid  to  the  poor  at  their  own  habitations.  It 
is  thus  in  some  measure  fortunate  that  the  limited 
extent  of  our  workhouses  hardly  admits  above 
100,000  individuals. 

Scotland  and  France. — It  is  a  general  notion  in  Eng- 
land, that  Scotland  has  no  poor-laws, — a  notion  ori- 
ginating in  the  very  satisfactory  circumstance  of  the 
lightness  of  her  poor-rate.  But  there  are  and  have 
long  been  in  that  country  statutes  enacting  that  cer- 
tain funds  shall  be  faithfully  applied  to  the  relief  of 
the  poor.  These  funds,  however,  are  levied  by  a 
a  very  easy  process ;  first,  from  collections  made  at 
the  parish  church ;  next,  from  the  interest  of  money 
or  rent  of  land  bequeathed  by  individuals  for  the  use 
of  the  poor ;  and  lastly,  from  a  moderate  assessment, 
paid  in  general,  half  by  the  landlords,  the  other  half 
by  the  rest  of  the  parish.  In  1 817,  a  year  of  scarcity 
and  distress,  the  total  poor-rate  collected  in  Scot- 
land was  119,000/.,  of  which  nearly  70,000/.  pro- 
ceeded from  charitable  collections  and  donations; 
the  remainder  from  assessment.  The  latter,  how- 
ever, did  not  extend  over  the  whole  of  Scotland, 
being  levied  only  in  the  lowr  country,  particularly  in 
the  districts  containing  manufacturers;  while  the 
mountainous  counties  of  the  north  remained,  as  they 
have  always  been,  exempt  from  assessment. 

The  paupers  in  Scotland  are  in  the  proportion  of 
only  one  in  forty,  a  proportion  which  would  doubtless 
have  been  increased,  had  the  price  of  corn,  and  the 


£88  Our  Poor  Law  System  ; 

attendant  operation  of  the  English  poor  laws,  con- 
tinued as  in  1817  and  J  81 8;  for  it  is  a  remarkable 
fact,  that  the  distribution  of  a  parish  allowance  to 
manufacturers  in  England  operates  as  a  serious  com- 
parative disadvantage  to  their  humble  brethren  in 
the  north.  Thus,  when  in  a  depressed  branch  the 
wages  are  equal  to  only  8s.  or  9s.  a  week,  the  alloAV- 
ance  of  poor-rate  to  the  English  manufacturer  may, 
and  generally  does,  carry  his  receipt  to  10s.  or  12s. ; 
a  difference  which  has  had  the  effect  of  inducing  a 
number  of  the  Scottish  workmen  to  forsake  their 
homes. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  have  been  the  causes  of 
so  material  a  difference  in  the  management  of  the 
poor  in  Scotland  and  in  England?  The  two  coun- 
tries embracing  the  Reformation  in  the  same  period, 
and  falling  under  the  sway  of  the  same  sovereign 
soon  after  the  enactment  of  the  poor  law  of  1601, 
the  regulations  were  originally  similar ;  but  in  Scot- 
land their  execution  was  vested,  not  in  temporary 
officers,  such  as  churchwardens  and  overseers,  but  in 
the  landholders,  clergymen,  and  elders  or  deacons, 
whose  functions  were  permanent,  and  whose  personal 
acquaintance  with  the  poor  enabled  them  to  act 
with  discrimination.  The  good  effects  of  this  plan, 
evinced  as  they  have  been  by  the  practice  of  two 
centuries,  induced  the  Committee  on  the  Poor  Laws 
in  1817,  to  recommend,  that  in  England  the  overseer 
should  be  a  permanent  officer  with  a  salary,  and 
should  act,  if  necessary,  for  several  districts ;  a  prac- 
tice that  has  since  been  adopted  with  a  beneficial 
result  in  a  number  of  the  parishes  and  townships  of 
England. 

In  France,  before  the  Revolution,  the  poor  were 
supported,  as  in  Spain,  Italy,  and  other  Catholic 
countries,  chiefly  by  the  abbeys,  priories,  and  other 
beneficial  establishments.  These  sources  of  income 
being  absorbed  in  the  sweeping  changes  of  the  Revo- 
lution, there  took  place  in  the  Assemblee  Legislative,  in 
1791,  a  long  discussion  on  the  fittest  mode  of  provid- 
ing for  the  poor:  the  result  was  a  decided  determina- 


its  Origin  and  Progress.  189 

tion  to  avoid  the  English  plan,  but  to  provide  at  the 
public  charge  a  fund  of  about  2,000,000/.  a  year,  for 
the  relief  of  the  aged  and  infirm  throughout  the  whole 
of  France.  In  the  disorders  of  succeeding  years, 
great  defalcations  took  place  in  regard  to  this  fund ; 
but  in  the  reign  of  Bonaparte  there  were  imposed, 
or  rather  revived,  octrois,  or  dues  on  wines,  cider* 
spirits,  and  other  articles  of  consumption,  paid  on 
the  introduction  of  these  articles  into  towns.  The 
imposition  of  a  tax  was  in  these  days  a  matter  of 
far  greater  difficulty  in  France  than  in  this  country ; 
and  the  revival  of  the  octrois  was  for  a  time  attempted 
only  as  a  fund  for  charitable  purposes  ;  but  when  the 
public  became  accustomed  to  this  mode  of  contribu- 
tion, its  rate  was  augmented,  and  the  proceeds  ren- 
dered available  to  a  variety  of  local  purposes. 

In  addition  to  the  aid  arising  to  the  poor  from 
these  dues,  collections  are  made  in  France  by  sub- 
scription in  the  depth  of  winter,  or  on  the  occurrence 
of  extraordinary  distress ;  and,  finally,  in  a  season  of 
general  hardship,  such  as  the  winter  that  followed 
the  bad  harvest  of  1816,  occasional  issues  are  made 
from  the  public  treasury,  on  the  application  of  mayors 
or  local  magistrates.  In  Paris  there  are  a  number 
of  hospitals :  in  the  large  provincial  towns  there  are 
in  general,  two ;  one  for  the  sick,  the  other  for  the 
aged.  These  institutions,  however,  are  managed 
with  all  the  laxity  and  want  of  method  so  common 
among  our  southern  neighbours ;  mendicity  is  unre- 
stricted, and  prevails  in  many  places  to  a  reprehensi- 
ble degree.  In  fact,  the  dwellings  of  the  lower 
orders  throughout  France  generally,  whether  in  the 
country  or  in  the  suburbs  of  a  town,  exhibit  to  an 
English  eye  a  very  bare  and  denuded  appearance. 
But  to  account  for  this  general  aspect  of  poverty  by 
the  want  of  parochial  aid,  would  be  as  erroneous  as 
to  ascribe  the  comfort  of  the  lower  orders  in  Holland, 
to  the  aid  afforded  by  charitable  contributions.  In 
that  country,  as  in  England,  the  better  lodging  and 
better  furniture  of  the  poor  are  the  result  of  long- 
continued  commercial  activity ;  of  that  ample  supply 


190 


Our  Poor  haw  System  : 


of  work,  of  those  habits  of  care,  cleanliness,  and 
order,  which  in  the  course  of  time,  it  imparts  to  the 
agricultural  portion  of  the  community. 

Poor  Rate  considered  as  a  tax. — -Our  next,  and  equally 
interesting  object  of  inquiry,  regards  the  contributors 
to  the  poor-rate,  and  the  comparative  degree  of 
pressure  imposed  on  them  at  different  periods.  And 
here  our  readers  must  be  prepared  for  our  making  a 
large  deduction  from  the  increase  of  burden  indicat- 
ed by  the  numerical  returns  of  poor-rate  during  the 
late  wars ;  a  deduction  justified  on  two  grounds, — 
the  depreciation  of  the  money  in  which  it  was  paid, 
and  the  increase  in  the  number  of  the  contributors. 
In  what  manner,  it  may  be  asked,  do  the  latter  re- 
ceive an  increase  ?  Of  those  who  pay  poor-rate  it 
may  be  safely  assumed,  that  the  augmentation,  in 
point  of  number,  is  on  a  par  with  the  general  aug- 
mentation of  their  countrymen :  and  we  shall  proba- 
bly not  err  by  assuming,  that  our  national  resources 
increase  in  proportion  to  our  numbers.  This  opinion, 
already  advanced  in  our  pages,  and  about  to  be  more 
fully  developed  in  the  sequel,  we  shall  for  the  present 
consider  as  admitted,  and  extract  from  the  work  of  a 
diligent  and  benevolent  inquirer  into  such  subjects, 
(Barton  on  the  Labouring  Classes,  1817,)  a  table  in 
which  these  different  considerations  are  taken  into 
account. 

Table  of  the  Annual  Expenditure  for  the  Poor,  computed  with 
reference  to  the  Price  of  Corn,  and  the  general  increase  of  our 
Population. 


Periods. 


From  1772  to  1776 
1781  to  1785 
1799  to  1803 
1811  to  1815 


Average 
Price  of 
Wheat. 


5. 

48 
49 


84     8 
93     2 


Average  of 
Annual 
Expenditure 
on  the  Poor. 


1,556,804 
2,004,238 
4,267,965 
5,072,028 


Forming  a  charge  per 

H?ad  on  the  whole 

P  pulation  of  the 

Kingdom. 


44  pints  of  wheat.! 

53  do. 

54  *  do. 
50    do. 


its  Origin  and  Progress, 


.191 


To  judge  from  this  sketch,  the  burden  of  the  poor- 
rate,  estimated  not  by  the  price,  but  by  the  quantity  of 
subsistence,  had  actually  begun  to  decline  before  the 
close  of  the  war:  but  instead  of  pressing  any  inference 
on  this  head,  we  point  the  attention  of  our  readers  to 
the  near  approach  to  uniformity  in  the  real charge  at 
the  time  of  the  greatest  apparent  variation.  This 
inference  is  farther  confirmed  by  the  following  ex- 
tract from  a  pamphlet  on  pauperism,  by  Mr.  W.  Clark- 
son,  published  in  1815. 


Year. 

Population  of  England 
and  Wales,  about 

Total  of  Rates, 

including  Highway, 

Church,  and 

County  rates. 

Numbei  of 
Paopers  relieved. 

1688 
1766 
'1783> 
1785) 
1792 
1803 

5,300,000 
7,728,000 

8,016,000 

8,675,000 
9,168,000 

£665,362 
1,530,804 

2,004,238 

2,645,520 
4,267,965 

563,964 
695,177 

818,851 

955,326 
1,040,716 

In  the  fifty  years  that  elapsed  between  1764  and 
1814,  the  increase  of  our  population  was  as  7  to  1 1, 
and  the  rise  in  the  price  of  provisions  exceeded  the 
proportion  of  7  to  13.  Here,  accordingly,  the  two 
great  causes  of  increase  of  poor-rate  operated  in  con- 
currence; and  in  1814  it  was  incumbent  on  us  to  be 
prepared,  not  only  for  an  augmentation  of  claimants 
in  the  proportion  of  1 1  to  7,  but  for  an  increase  of  ex- 
pense in  their  maintenance,  in  that  of  13  to  7 ;  the 
two  together  forming,  when  compared  to  the  return 
in  1764,  a  sum  (24  to  7)  more  than  tripple  the  respon- 
sibility of  that  year.  Is  it  then  matter  of  surprise, 
that  5,000,000/.  should  go  no  further  in  its  discharge 
in  !  814,  than  1,500,000/.  in  the  beginning  of  the  reign 
of  George  III. 

Wages  paid  by  Poor-Rate, — it  is  a  great,  though  very 
common  error,  to  account  poor-rate  a  bona  fide  tax,  an 
actual  sacrifice  to  its  apparent  extent.  But  the  leading 


192  Poor-Rate  considered  as  w  Tax. 

rule  of  our  system,  particularly  in  the  west  of  England, 
is,  to  afford  relief  to  the  lower  orders  on  a  conjunct 
calculation  of  the  price  of  bread,  and  the  number  of 
children  in  a  family.  An  allowance  made  on  this 
plan  represents  less  the  degree  of  distress  prevalent 
in  the  country,  than  the  difference  between  the  mar- 
ket price  of  provisions,  and  the  existing  rate  of  wa- 
ges ;  a  rate,  perhaps,  transmitted  with  little  variation 
from  years  of  greater  cheapness.  It  is  thus  that  our 
poor-law  system  was  rendered,  during  the  late  wars, 
an  expedient  for  preventing  a  rise  of  wages,  as  far  at 
least  as  regarded  country  labour,  on  the  avowed 
ground,  that  wages  once  raised  cannot  be  reduced 
without  the  greatest  difficulty. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  was  the  effect  of  the  war 
on  the  price  of  labour  generally  ?  To  increase  the 
demand,  and  to  place  a  number  of  the  lower  orders 
in  towns,  whether  manufacturers  or  mechanics,  in  a 
better  situation  than  before,  notwithstanding  the  rise 
in  provisions.  In  no  department  did  it  render  the  de- 
mand greater  than  in  agriculture,  and  in  none  did  the 
wages  of  the  labourer  experience  a  greater  rise  than 
in  Scotland ;  but  in  England,  at  least  in  most  parts 
of  England,  from  the  effects  of  an  artificial  system,  the 
case  was  very  different.  Wages  were  subjected  to 
regulation ;  and  their  rise,  though  considerable,  be- 
ing inadequate  to  the  rise  of  corn,  the  unavoidable 
result  was  a  great  increase  of  poor-rate.  It  is  only 
thus  that  we  find  it  possible  to  explain  the  remark- 
able anomaly,  that  in  a  period  when  farming  was 
flourishing  beyond  example,  the  number  of  agricultu- 
ral paupers  should  increase  in.  a  proportion  fully 
equal  to  that  of  our  trading  and  manufacturing  dis- 
tricts. This  ,was  exemplified  in  Bedfordshire  and 
Herefordshire,  the  two  counties  which  employ  the 
largest  proportion  of  their  inhabitants  in  agriculture, 


Poor-Nate  considered  as  a  Tax.  193 

Extract  from  the  Report  on  the  Poor  Laws,  1817,  p.  8. 


Expended 

on  Paupers  in 

1776. 

Average  expen- 
diture of  1783, 
84,  85, 

In  1803. 

In  1815. 

Herefordshire 
Bedfordshire 

£10,592 
16,663 

£16,728 
20,977 

£48,067 
38,070 

£59,256 
50,371 

There  is  thus  no  doubt,  that  a  part  of  the  poor-rate 
ought  to  be  deducted  from  our  estimate  of  it  as  a  tax, 
and  considered  in  the  light  of  an  equivalent  for 
wages.  If  it  be  asked,  what  proportion  should  thus  be 
deducted,  we  must  answer,  by  admitting  that  the  in- 
quiry is  complicated,  involving  a  reference  to  the  rate 
of  wages  in  Scotland  and  the  counties  in  the  north  of 
England,  where  poor-rate  is  comparatively  light.  The 
proportion,  besides,  must  differ  materially  under  dif- 
ferent circumstances,  in  consequence  of  the  greater 
or  less  demand  for  labour.  In  this  uncertainty,  and 
in  the  absence  of  the  necessary  documents,  we  are 
confined  to  a  conjectural  estimate ;  but  if  a  third  of 
our  poor-rate  is  to  be  thus  accounted  for,  we  exclude 
the  idea  of  a  tax  or  sacrifice  to  the  extent  of  nearly 
2,000,000/.  annually,  during  the  last  ten  years. 


Mode  of  Assessment. — Amidst  the  various  sugges- 
tions entertained  during  the  agricultural  distress  of 
1816,  was  that  of  rendering  the  burden  of  poor-rate 
national,  instead  of  parochial ;  of  paying  it  out  of  a 
general,  instead  of  a  local  fund.  This  proposition  is 
noticed  here,  merely  to  show  its  absolute  inexpedien- 
cy. Under  our  present  system,  it  could  be  accompa- 
nied by  no  adequate  checks, — by  no  satisfactory  rule 
for  restricting  either  the  number  or  the  allowance  of 
the  pensioners.  In  Scotland,  in  France,  in  short,  in  all 
countries  with  which  we  are  acquainted,  the  relief  of 
the  poor  is  defrayed  by  a  local  contribution.  But 
while  we  determine  to  keep  up  the  distinction  of  pa- 
rishes and  townships,  and  to  oblige  each  to  provide 
for  its  poor,  there  appear  to  be  strong  reasons  for  a 
change  that  would  be  perfectly  compatible  with  the 

25 


1 94  Poor-Rate  considered  as  a  1  'ax. 

maintenance  of  local  distinction  :  we  mean  new-mo- 
delling the  assessment  of  property.  At  present  the 
whole  falls  on  land  and  houses ;  but  would  not,  we 
may  ask,  the  income  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  parish 
generally,  returned  on  a  plan  somewhat  similar  to 
that  of  the  property  tax,  form  a  much  more  equita- 
ble basis  of  repartition ;  particularly  since  the  land- 
ed interest  appear  to  have  lost  their  principal  stay — 
the  counterpoise  afforded  by  the  corn  laws. 

The  yearly  rental  of  the  land  and  houses  of  England  and  Wales, 
on  which  poor-rate  was  collected  in  1803,  was  not  (Clarkson 
on  Pauperism)  returned  at  more  than  -  £24,000,000 

The  latter  years  of  the  war  exhibited  both  a  large  increase  of 
rental  and  a  more  correct  return,  the  amount  assessed  being 
(Report  on  the  Poor  Laws,  1817)  not  less  than  -  51,898,000 

But  increase  of  demand  followed,  or  rather  accompanied,  in- 
crease of  means :  the  rate,  3*.  l^d.  in  the  pound  in  1803,  was 
not  below  3s.  Ad.  on  the  far  larger  sum  assessed  in  the  years 
i  812,  1813,  1814.  At  present,  whatever  be  the  official  allot- 
ment, the  burden  bears  an  equal  proportion  to  our  resources, 
because,  since  the  fall  of  corn,  the  rental  of  land  and  houses 
in  England  and  WaJes  can  hardly  exceed  -         -         45,000,000 

In  1803,  the  sum  collected  for  the  use  of  the  poor 
was  below  4,000,000/. ;  and  if,  in  some  years  hence, 
it  be  reduced,  as  we  anticipate,  (see  Appendix  to  the 
chapter  on  Agriculture,  p.  [35])  to  a  sum  (4,500,000/.) 
not  greatly  exceeding  that  amount,  it  would  form  a 
charge  of  from  two  shillings  in  the  pound  on  the  ac- 
tual rent  of  our  land  and  houses,  (45,000,000/.) ; 
but,  if  levied  on  the  income  of  the  parishioners  ge- 
nerally, 4,500,000/.  would  form  a  rate  of  less  than  one 
shilling  in  the  pound. 

Did  Increase  of  Wages  and  Poor-rate  counterbalance  the 
Enhancement  of  Provisions  ? — It  would,  we  believe,  be 
a  mistake,  to  imagine  that  the  increase  of  wages  and 
parochial  aid  during  the  war,  counterbalanced  to  the 
country  labourer  the  enhancement  of  produce,  and 
had  the  effect  of  rendering  his  situation  more  com- 
fortable than  in  the  preceding  period.  A  very 
different  conclusion  is  suggested  by  the  following 
calculation  made  by  Mr.  Barton,  who,  in  his  pamphlet 
on  the  "  State  of  the  Labouring  Clasps,"  published 


Our  Poor-Law  System,  fyc, 


195 


in  1817,  shows,  that  whatever  may  have  been  the 
case  in  towns,  wages  in  the  country,  estimated  by 
their  power  of  procuring  subsistence,  experienced  a 
considerable  diminution  in  the  sixty  years  between 
1760  and  1820. 

Statement  showing  the  Proportion  of  the  If  ages  of  the  Country 
Labourer  to  the  Price  of  Corn. 


Periods. 

Weekly  Pay. 

Wheat 

Wages  in  Pint*! 

per  Quarter. 

of  Wheat,     j 

s.    d. 

S.        d. 

j 

1742  to  1752.   .  . 

6     0 

30     0 

102 

1761  to  1770.  .  . 

7     6 

42     6 

90 

1780  to  1790.   .  . 

8     0 

51     2 

80 

1795  to  1799  .  .  . 

9     0 

70     8 

65 

1     1800  to  1808.   .  . 

11     0 

86     8 

60       ! 

Happily  the  other  articles  of  the  expenditure  of 
the  lower  orders,  in  particular  clothing,  were  en- 
hanced in  a  far  less  degree  than  bread.  Without  that 
advantage,  their  situation,  favourable  as  was  the  pe- 
riod to  our  agriculture,  would  have  been  deteriorated, 
as  will  at  once  appear  by  a  reference  (see  Appendix) 
to  the  table  of  the  constituents  of  family  expense  in 
the  middle  and  lower  classes.  We  there  find,  that 
while  provisions  of  home  growth  form  hardly  30  per 
cent,  of  the  disburse  of  the  middle  classes,  they 
amount  to  50  per  cent,  of  the  more  rigorously  calcu- 
lated out-lay  of  the  lower  orders. 

A  still  more  serious  confirmation  of  the  importance 
of  the  price  of  corn  to  the  poor  will  be  found  in  ano- 
ther short  extract  from  Mr.  Barton's  tables.  Inefficacy 
in  point  of  relief  has  seldom  been  urged  against  our 
poor-law  system,  but  the  following  return  shows  that 
it  is  far  from  being  completely  successful  in  pre- 
venting an  increase  of  suffering,  and  even  increase  of 
mortality,  among  the  poor  and  their  children,  in 
times  of  scarcity.  The  return  comprises  seven  ma- 
nufacturing districts  in  England,  distinct  from  each 
other 


19tf 


Our  Poor 'Law  System 


Years.                    Average  Price  of  Wheat 
per  Quarter. 

Deaths. 

1801. 
1804. 
1807. 
1810. 

s.        d. 

118       3 

60       1 

73       3 

106       2 

55,965 
44,754 
48,108 
54,864 

It  was  thus  equally  desirable,  on  grounds  of  hu- 
manity and  policy,  that  the  price  of  provisions  should 
experience  a  reduction.  It  was  in  1820  that  this  took 
place  on  a  large  scale ;  and  the  fall  of  wages,  though 
considerable,  being  still  far  from  proportioned  to  it, 
the  condition  of  the  lower  orders,  at  least  all  who 
can  find  employment,  has  experienced  a  favourable 
change.  Were  we  in  possession  of  returns  to  a  late 
date,  Mr.  Barton's  parallel  of  weekly  pay  and  price 
of  wheat,  given  in  our  preceding  page,  might  be  con- 
tinued to  the  present  year,  and  would  exhibit  an  ap- 
proximation to  the  wages  of  the  middle  of  the  last 
century;  in  some  measure  in  the  smallness  of  the 
money  amount,  more  in  its  efficiency  in  the  purchase 
of  provisions. 

But  without  such  a  return,  enough  appears  to  esta- 
blish the  important  fact,  that  notwithstanding  the 
relief  afforded  by  an  increase  of  poor-rate,  the  con- 
dition of  the  labouring  classes  experiences  a  very 
unfavourable  change  oh  the  enhancement  of  corn ; 
while,  in  return,  it  is  greatly  to  their  advantage,  that 
the  provisions  should  fall,  and  rates  be  reduced. 
Need  we  then  wonder,  that  in  1810  the  framers  of  the 
Bullion  Report  should  have  considered  the  situation 
of  the  country  labourer  deteriorated  by  a  continu- 
ance of  high  prices,  notwithstanding  the  increase  of 
parochial  aid;  or,  that  after  1820,  ministers  should 
have  accounted  the  public  tranquillity  so  firmly  se- 
cured, as  to  admit  of  a  large  reduction  in  our  army  ? 

Objections  to  our  Poor-Laws. — We  come  next  to  the 
objections  urged  against  our  poor-laws,  viz.  that  they 


its  Effect  on  the  Condition  of  the  Lower  Orders.     1 97 

induce  the  labouring  class  to  contract  premature 
marriages,  depress  their  circumstances  by  an  undue 
increase  of  their  numbers,  and  accustom  them  to  a 
state  of  humiliating  dependence.  Admitting  that 
these  charges  are  considerably  exaggerated,  (since 
the  poor  increase  their  numbers  almost  as  quickly  in 
Scotland,  where  there  is  so  little  parochial  aid,)  a 
sufficient  proof  of  the  radical  defects  or  absurd  mis- 
application of  our  system  is  afforded  by  the  fact,  that 
aid,  originally  restricted  to  the  aged  and  infirm, 
should  be  extended  to  more  than  a  twelfth  part  of 
our  population ;  for  the  persons  receiving  parish  re- 
lief in  England  and  Wales,  amount,  without  reckoning 
children,  to  nearly  a  million.  But,  unluckily,  we  cannot 
speak  with  approbation  of  the  course  as  yet  pursued, 
in  regard  to  the  poor  in  almost  any  other  country. 
That  which  is  followed  in  Scotland  is  charged  with  a 
degree  of  indifference  to  their  sufferings  in  dear  sea- 
sons ;  a  time  when  (Evidence  of  P.  Milne,  Esq.  M.  P., 
before  the  Poor-Law  Committee)  necessity  prompts 
labourers  to  undertake  taskwork  at  reduced  rates, 
and  frequently  to  exceed  their  strength.  A  similar 
feeling  must  have  occurred  to  most  of  our  country- 
men who  have  lived  in  France,  or  other  countries  of 
the  Continent,  and  witnessed  the  habitual  privations 
of  even  the  sober  and  industrious,  among  those  of 
the  lower  orders  who  happen  to  have  families. 
Hence,  a  reluctance  on  the  part  of  many  benevolent 
minds  to  relinquish  our  poor-law  system,  defective  as 
it  is,  or  to  forego  the  hope  of  solving  that  most  in- 
teresting problem,  the  means  of  lessening  to  them  the 
difficulty  of  rearing  a  family. 

Reduction  of  Taxes  on  the  Necessaries  of  Life. — To  at- 
tain this  humane  object,  the  better  plan,  we  believe, 
is  to  abandon  our  attachment  to  system,  and  to  relin- 
quish, as  soon  as  in  our  power,  whatever  is  artificial 
in  our  regulations.  No  contrivance,  however  in- 
genious, no  combination,  however  plausible,  can  be 
so  advantageous  as  the  plain  rule  of  enabling  the 
poor   to  provide  for  themselves.     Much  has  been 


198  Our  Poor-Law  System.; 

lately  done  to  this  effect,  by  the  reduction  of  the  du- 
ties on  salt  and  leather;  let  our  grand  object  be,  the 
removal  of  the  remaining  obstacles,  whether  existing 
in  the  shape  of  taxes  on  the  necessaries  of  life,  or  of 
restrictions  on  employment,  such,  for  example,  as 
arise  from  our  duties  on  coals  carried  coastwise  or  by 
canal. 

A  tax  on  a  necessary  of  life  has,  in  regard  to  the 
poor,  the  same  operation  as  the  enhancement  of  corn : 
wages  do  not  become  proportionally  augmented,  and 
a  new  pressure  falls  on  those  who  are  least  able  to 
bear  it.  The  great  addition  to  the  tax  on  leather  im- 
posed in  1813,  was,  doubtless,  for  a  time,  an  absolute 
sacrifice  on  the  part  of  the  lower  orders.  That  they 
are  indemnified,  or  partly  indemnified,  in  the  rate  of 
wages,  at  times  when  their  services  are  in  demand, 
we  do  not  deny ;  but  the  equivalent  is  uncertain,  the 
sacrifice  immediate  and  unavoidable. 

From  this  painful  consideration,  we  turn  to  the 
consolatory  reflection,  that  "  any  reduction  of  the 
taxes  on  the  necessaries  of  life,  may,  with  confidence, 
be  considered  the  forerunner  of  a  reduction  of  poor- 
rate."  The  more  the  charges  on  the  necessaries  of 
life,  in  this  country,  are  approximated  to  those  of 
the  Continent,  the  more  we  perform  towards  confirm- 
ing the  superiority  of  our  manufacturers ;  resting  the 
support  of  our  lower  orders  on  the  basis  of  the  ividc 
world,  instead  of  England,  and  substituting  for  an  elee- 
mosynary grant,  the  earnings  of  independent  labour. 
Is  it  necessary  that  we  should  specify  the  advantages 
with  which  our  countrymen  enter  on  the  field  of  com- 
petition with  their  continental  neighbours?  They 
have  the  aid  of  productive  mines,  of  extensive  water 
communication,  of  a  minute  subdivision  of  labour,  of 
habits  formed  during  successive  ages  to  industrious 
pursuits.  These  grounds  of  superiority,  imperfect- 
ly perceived  by  Englishmen  who  have  remained 
at  home,  are  amply  appreciated  by  all  who  have 
witnessed  the  slow  progress,  the  deficient  resources, 
the  general  backwardness  of  most  countries  on  tho 
Continent. 


its  Effect  on  the  Condition  of  the  Lower  Orders.  J  99 

But  while  the  benefit  arising  from  this  reduction  is 
admitted,  the  practicability  of  carrying  it  to  any  con- 
siderable extent  may  be  questioned  by  those  who 
look  to  the  magnitude  of  the  wants  of  government. 
These,  persons,  however,  would  soon  modify  their 
objections,  and  extend  their  hopes,  were  they  to 
give  due  attention  to  a  few  fundamental  truths ;  such 
as,  "  that  the  proceeds  of  a  tax  by  no  means  decrease 
in  proportion  to  the  reduction  of  its  rate;"  and,  "  that 
new  and  unforeseen  resources  are  opened  by  the  ex- 
tended activity  consequent  on  such  reduction/' 
Whenever  circumstances  shall  admit  of  giving  a  com- 
plete latitude  to  the  course  we  recommend,  the  public 
may  safely  take  for  granted,  that  England  will  have, 
if  not  fewer  paupers,  at  least  fewer  real  sufferers  from 
poverty  than  any  country  in  Europe. 

Could  this  highly  desirable  result  be  attained,  our 
upper  classes  would  find  their  duties  towards  the 
poor  greatly  simplified.  They  would  be  justified  in 
confining  their  interference  and  aid  to  cases  of 
urgency ;  such  as  an  inclement  season,  a  great  and 
general  transition  like  that  from  war  to  peace,  or  from 
peace  to  war;  or,  finally,  to  a  time  when,  as  is  at 
present  the  case  of  the  lace-manufacturers  on  the 
Continent,  a  multitude  of  persons,  habituated  to  work 
of  a  particular  kind  only,  find  their  earnings  suddenly 
reduced  by  the  introduction  of  machinery.  Assist- 
ance thus  conferred  would  be  substantial  charity : 
except  in  its  consequences  from  the  hazard  and  mis- 
chief attendant  on  our  poor-law  system,  and,  on  that 
account,  doubly  gratifying  to  benevolent  minds — to 
those  who,  eager  to  bestow,  are  withheld  only  by  a 
doubt  of  their  donations  producing  a  beneficial 
result. 


200 


CHAP.  VIF. 

Population, 

Few  subjects  in  the  range  of  political  science 
have  given  rise  to  more  opposite  theories  than  that 
of  Population.  It  is  now  fully  a  century  and  a  half 
since  our  countryman,  Judge  Hale,  taking  doubtless 
for  granted,  like  a  number  of  reasoners  in  a  more 
advanced  age,  that  the  quantity  of  food  in  a  country 
is  limited  by  physical  causes,  declared  gravely  from 
the  bench,  that  "the  more  populous  we  are,  the 
poorer  we  are."  And  the  present  age  has  witnessed 
the  promulgation  of  a  doctrine  of  kindred  import, 
though  somewhat  more  elaborately  expressed,  viz. 
"  that  population  is  imperatively  limited  by  subsist- 
ence." This  opinion,  proceeding  from  a  writer  of 
extensive  research  and  professional  rank,  has  been 
very  generally  received,  not  only  in  England,  but  in 
the  country  of  Dr.  Smith ;  a  quarter  where  political 
economy  forming  more  particularly  a  study,  a  rigid 
scrutiny  of  its  merits  might  naturally  have  been  ex- 
pected. 

Of  the  various  answers  to  Mr.  Malthus,  the  most 
substantial  in  argument,  though  far  from  the  most 
attractive  in  style,  is  the  w  ork  entitled  the  "  Happi- 
ness of  States,"  published  in  1815,  by  Mr.  S.  Gray; 
a  work  of  which  the  leading  principles  were  some 
time  after,  developed  in  a  more  condensed  and 
popular  form.*  Far  from  coinciding  with  the  un- 
comfortable doctrine,  that  increase  of  numbers  leads 
to  increase  of  poverty,  Mr.  G.  maintains,  that  augment- 
ed population  forms  the  basis  of  individual  as  well  as 


*;  In  two  lesser  works,  entitled,  respectively,  "  All  classes  productive  of 
National  Wealth."  8vo.  1817;  "  Gray  v.  Malthus,  the  principles  of  Popu- 
lation and  Production  Investigated."  8vo.  1 8 1 8. 


Increase  of  Population.  20  \ 

of  national  wealth.  He  has  been,  on  the  whole,  for- 
tunate in  the  events  that  have  followed  the  publica- 
tion of  his  opinion,  the  present  abundance  of  subsist- 
ence being  particularly  calculated  to  relieve  the 
alarm  of  those  who  considered  our  numbers  likely  to 
outrun  our  means  of  support.  Still  the  public  mind 
is  far  from  being  completely  satisfied  in  regard  to  the 
benefit  arising  from  augmented  population  :  the  rea- 
soning in  its  favour  is  not  yet  clear  and  convincing; 
while  the  occasional  want  of  work  among  our  lower 
orders  is  attributed  by  many  to  a  population  increas- 
ing too  rapidly  for  employment,  if  not  for  subsistence. 
In  this  view  of  the  subject,  we  are  far  from  joining, 
and  proceed  to  investigate  it  at  some  length,  in  the 
hope  of  finding  not  only  a  confirmation  of  the  con- — 
solatory  and  cheering  doctrine  of  Mr.  Gray,  but  of 
being  enabled  to  found  on  it  a  practical  measure ;  to 
discover  in  the  increase  of  our  numbers,  the  means 
of  lessening  our  financial  pressure. 

Our  principal  topics  of  inquiry  shall  be — 
The  condition  of  society  in  an  early  age; 
The  change  effected  by  increase  of  population ; 
How  far  subsistence  is  limited  by  physical  causes  \ 
The  state  of  Europe  in  regard  to  increase  in  num- 
bers and  wealth, 

SECTION  I 

Increase  of  Population, 

Penury  of  an  early  Age. — The  predilection  with 
which  the  popular  writers  of  almost  every  country 
have  contemplated  a  primitive  age,  and  the  colour- 
ing cast  over  it  by  romantic  imaginations,  have  had 
the  effect  of  misleading  the  majority  of  readers,  and 
rendering  them  strangers  to  the  privations  experienced 
by  their  ancestors.  These,  however,  were  multiform 
and  grievous  ;  such,  in  short,  as  to  form  a  most  striking 
contrast  to  the  comfort  of  an  advanced  state  of  socie- 
ty; and  if  in  England  we  are  happily  unable  to  find 
an  existing  likeness  to  a  rude  age,  the  sister  island 

26 


202  Increase  of  Population. 

will  amply  supply  it.  The  Irish  peasant,  occupying 
a  hovel  without  furniture,  and  carrying  on  his  culti- 
vation with  wretched  implements,  may  convey  to  us 
an  idea  of  the  state  of  England  five  or  six  centuries 
ago,  as  well  as  of  the  present  state  of  a  great  part  of 
the  east  of  Europe,  of  Poland,  Russia,  Hungary,  and 
the  inland  provinces  of  Turkey.  The  improvement 
of  these  countries  at  present,  appears  to  an  English 
traveller  extremely  slow  ;  but,  aided  as  it  it  is  by  the 
introduction  of  settlers  from  Germany  and  other 
parts,  it  is,  of  course,  far  less  tardy  than  the  advance- 
ment of  Europe  in  the  Gothic  ages,  when  all  were 
equally  backward.  In  those  days,  a  few  cottages 
formed  a  hamlet,  and  many  centuries  elapsed  ere  the 
hamlet  became  a  village.  In  point  of  property,  ex- 
tremes predominated :  on  the  one  side  was  the  lord, 
on  the  other  his  vassals ;  while  the  middle  class  were 
few  in  number,  and  uncomfortable  in  circumstances. 

Effect  of  Increasing  Population. — What  a  different 
aspect  of  society  is  exhibited  after  a  progress  in  the 
useful  arts,  accompanied  as  it  is  by  the  rise  of  towns, 
and  general  increase  of  population !  If  we  compare 
such  countries  as  Russia,  Poland,  Hungary,  or  the 
Highlands  of  Scotland,  with  the  more  thickly  peo- 
pled districts  of  the  Continent,  such  as  the  provinces 
of  Holland,  Zealand,  Flanders,  Normandy,  or,  on  our 
own  side  of  the  Channel,  with  such  counties  as  Lan- 
cashire, Warwickshire,  the  West  Riding  of  York  (to 
say  nothing  of  Middlesex,)  we  find  a  surprising  differ- 
ence in  the  number  and  comfort  of  the  middle  class. 
A  return  of  annual  income  from  the  first-mentioned 
countries,  would  exhibit  a  few  princely  fortunes,  with 
a  long  succession  of  names  below  the  limit  of  taxa- 
tion :  in  the  other,  it  would  show  a  number  of  grada- 
tions rising  above  each  other  in  a  manner  almost  im- 
perceptible. How  different  is  the  England  of  the 
present  age,  from  the  England  of  feudal  times,  when 
we  could  not  (see  the  Appendix,  p.  [75].)  boast 
twenty  towns  of  3,000  inhabitants  each,  and  when 
the  commons  or  middle  class  were  too  unimportant 


Increase  of  Population.  20$ 

to  hold  a  share  in  the  representation,  until  brought 
forward  by  the  crown  as  a  counterpoise  to  the  aris- 
tocracy. 

Gradual  Transition  from  Penury  to  Comfort. — In  what 
manner  does  the  transition  from  penury  to  comfort, 
in  general  take  place  ?  If  not  altogether  caused  by 
density  of  population,  it  must  be  allowed  to  have  very 
close  connexion  with  it ;  the  conjunction  of  individu- 
als in  villages  and  towns  being  productive  of  a  de- 
gree of  accommodation,  comfort,  and  finally,  of  re- 
finement, which  would  be  altogether  beyond  their 
reach  in  an  insulated  position.  In  these  assemblages 
the  acquisition  of  one  comfort  creates  a  desire  for 
another,  until  society  eventually  attains  the  high 
state  of  polish  which  we  at  present  witness  in  several 
countries  of  Europe.  All  this,  says  Mr.  Gray,  leads 
the  consumer  to  make  fresh  demands  on  the  produ- 
cer; demands  reciprocated  by  the  latter  on  the  for- 
mer, in  a  different  line  of  business.  Hence,  the  de- 
pendence of  one  class  on  another ;  hence,  the  pros- 
perity caused  to  agriculture  by  the  success  of  trade, 
and  to  trade  by  the  success  of  agriculture.  It  is  of 
no  great  consequence  to  our  argument,  whether  these 
wants  are  of  first  or  of  second  necessity,  that  which 
is  deemed  a  superfluity  in  one  country,  being  often 
accounted  no  more  than  a  comfort,  a  requisite  in  an- 
other. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  criterion  of  the  dif- 
ference in  wealth  and  general  improvement  between 
different  countries  ?  The  relative  density,  not  of 
population  generally,  but  of  town  population.  This  is 
apparent  in  almost  every  link  in  the  chain  of  Euro- 
pean civilization,  Holland  having  in  the  seventeenth 
century  taken  the  lead  of  England,  exactly  as  Eng- 
land at  present  takes  the  lead  of  France ;  France  of 
most  parts  of  Germany,  and  Germany  of  Spain  and 
Poland.  The  distinction  of  town  population  from 
population  generally,  is  important:  for  were  the 
same  advantage  to  belong  to  districts  strictly  rural, 
Ireland  would  claim  an  equal  rank  with  England, 


204  Population : — 

and  Flanders  take  precedence  of  Holland.  It  is  in 
towns  only  that  we  reap  the  advantage  of  collective 
over  scattered  population ; — an  advantage  consisting 
in  extensive  markets ;  a  minute  subdivision  of  em- 
ployment; the  greater  dispatch  and  finish  of  work- 
manship, and  a  supply  of  occupation  to  individuals  of 
every  age  and  every  degree  of  capacity. 

New  Settlers. — It  is  but  too  common  among  un- 
thinking persons  to  consider  new-comers  as  unprofi- 
table intruders,  as  dealers,  not  customers,  as  sellers, 
not  buyers.  This,  however,  is  but  a  superficial  view, 
a  first  impression ;  for  there  is  very  little  reason  to 
doubt  that  in  one  way  or  another  these  persons  will 
disburse  in  proportion  to  their  earnings.  When  it 
happens  that  they  or  any  other  part  of  the  community 
do  not  make  such  disburse,  the  only  source  of  detri- 
ment to  the  public  is  the  practice  (now  very  rare)  of 
hoarding ;  for  money  saved  and  lent  at  interest  ber 
comes  of  service  to  the  community,  increasing  the 
capital  of  the  country,  and  lowering,  or  contributing 
to  lower,  the  premium  paid  for  its  use.  We  may 
safely  take  for  granted,  that  much  public  advantage 
arises  from  the  arrival  of  new  settlers,  whether  manu- 
facturers, such  as  England  and  Prussia  acquired 
from  France  on  the  repeal  of  the  edict  of  Nantes,  or 
agriculturists,  such  as  Canada  and  the  United  States 
are  now  receiving  from  us. 

Population,  however,  is  generally  augmented  less 
by  settlers  from  a  distance,  than  by  a  local  increase  ; 
by  an  excess  of  births  over  deaths  :  a  mode,  which, 
very  different  from  the  easy  acquisition  of  foreigner? 
of  mature  age,  implies  a  long  and  often  a  heav\ 
charge,  until  the  youth  of  either  sex  acquire  the 
strength  or  knowledge  requisite  to  their  support;  re- 
quisite, in  the  language  of  the  economist,  to  consti- 
tute them  "producers  as  well  as  consumers."  Though 
in  such  a  case  the  acquisition  of  new  members  is 
much  more  dearly  purchased,  the  effect  in  a  statisti- 
cal sense  is  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  arrivals  from 
abroad. 


Its  subsistence  limited  by  Physical  Causes.         205 

Is  the  amount  of  Subsistence  limited  by  Physical  Causes  ? 
We  now  approach  the  much-disputed  point  of  the 
physical  limits  to  increase  of  population ;  to  the 
question,  whether  it  is  imperiously  limited  by  sub- 
sistence, or  possesses  the  power  of  augmenting  sub- 
sistence in  proportion  to  its  own  increase.  The 
well-known  argument  of  Mr.  Malthus  is,  that  popula- 
tion, if  unchecked,  would  proceed  in  a  geometrical 
ratio  (1,  2,  4,  8, 16,  32,  &c),  while  the  supply  of  food 
cannot,  he  thinks,  be  brought,  by  the  greatest  efforts 
of  human  skill  and  industry,  to  increase  otherwise 
than  in  the  arithmetical  ratio  of  1,2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  &c. 
This  position  he  illustrates  by  a  reference  to  the  Unit- 
ed States  of  America ;  a  country  where  the  abun- 
dance of  food  is  so  great  as  to  admit  of  the  inhabitants 
doubling  their  number  each  succeeding  generation, 
the  3,000,000  of  1775  having  become  6,000,000  in 
1800,  with  a  probability  of  increasing  to  12,000,000 
in  1825,  and  so  on  progressively. 

That,  as  far  as  regards  physical  considerations, 
there  is  both  an  ability  and  a  tendency  in  mankind 
to  double  their  numbers  in  every  generation,  we 
readily  admit;  also,  that  wherever j-such  reduplica- 
tion does  not  take  place,  the  causes  are  to  be  sought 
in  checks,  such  as  the  poverty  that  deters  from  mar- 
riage, the  occurrence  of  pestilential  disease,  or  some 
other  preventive  of  the  increase  of  numbers.  So  far 
we  agree  with  Mr.  Malthus;  but  in  regard  to  his 
second  proposition,  the  causes  that  limit  the  increase 
of  food,  we  must  observe  that  the  subject  has  as  yet 
been  by  no  means  satisfactorily  illustrated,  the  atten- 
tion of  the  different  writers  on  the  subject,  whether 
himself,  Mr.  Ricardo,  or  others,  having  been  fixed  too 
much  on  the  necessity  of  having  additional  land  to  af- 
ford the  produce  required,  and  too  little  on  the  in- 
crease derived  from  bestowing  additional  labour  on 
the  same  soil.  What  were  the  circumstances  of  the 
period  when  Mr.  Malthus'  book  was  composed  ?  It 
was  a  period  of  war,  of  deficient  crop,  of  continued 
enhancement  of  agricultural  produce;  and  the  author, 
like  the  public  at  large,  was  necessarily  unacquainted 


206  Population : — 

with  our  power  of  augmenting  the  supply,  a  power  so 
remarkably  displayed  since  our  seasons  have  become 
more  favourable,  and  peace  has  restored  to  agricul- 
ture a  sufficiency  of  labourers. 

Average  Increase  of  Population. — In  attempting  a 
computation  of  the  average  increase  of  our  numbers, 
we  begin  by  making  an  exception  of  the  United 
States,  peculiar  as  are  the  advantages  possessed  by 
that  country.  They  consist  in  a  territory  of  vast  ex- 
tent ;  a  river  navigation  of  great  importance ;  a  people 
enjoying  unrestricted  intercourse  with  the  civilized 
world,  and  closely  connected  in  language  and  habits 
with  the  most  commercial  and  colonizing  country  of 
Europe.  Such  an  example  is  necessarily  rare,  and 
ought  to  be  considered  an  extreme  case :  a  more  sa- 
tisfactory result  as  to  the  average  increase  of  popula- 
tion would  be  obtained  from  a  combination  of  cases, 
among  which  assuming  the  United  States  as  the  ex- 
ample of  the  most  rapid  augmentation,  we  may  take, 
as  the  second,  England,  in  which,  under  circum- 
stances more  favourable  than  on  the  Continent  of 
Europe,  but  less  so  than  on  the  other  side  of  the  At- 
lantic, population  has  doubled  within  the  last  cen- 
tury, and  bids  fair  to  double  again  in  sixty  or  seventy 
years.  As  a  farther  example,  we  may  take  France, 
where,  though  the  records  are  far  from  accurate,  the 
doubling  of  the  population  has  as  yet  required  a  term 
of  100  to  120  years.  Other  countries  exhibit  a  greater 
or  less  degree  of  slowness  in  the  ratio  of  increase, 
and  as  these  returns  apply  to  them  when  exempt 
from  the  visitation  of  war,  pestilence,  or  any  vio- 
lent check  to  increase  of  numbers,  Mr.  Gray's  infer- 
ence is,  that  the  average  furnished  by  the  whole  may 
be  assumed  as  indicative  of  the  natural  progress  of  po- 
pulation. 

After  thus  endeavouring  to  establish  the  natural 
ratio  of  increase,  Mr.  Gray  proceeds  to  argue  that 
such  increase  is  no  farther  limited  by  the  difficulty 
of  obtaining  food,  than  by  the  difficulty  of  obtaining 
clothing  or  lodging,  because  the  supply  of  food,  though 


Is  Subsistence  limited  by  Physical  Causes  ?       207 

apparently  restricted  by  a  physical  cause,  is,  on  a 
closer  examination,  found  to  depend  on  the  amount 
of  capital  and  labour  applied  to  raising  it.  In  arguing 
this  very  interesting  question,  Mr.  Gray  and  the  other 
opponents  of  Mr.  Malthus,  would  do  well  to  guard 
against  the  charge  of  over-confidence,  and  to  begin 
by  making  a  distinct  admission  of  the  difficulty  of 
raising  a  family,  a  task  which  to  the  middle  classes  is 
one  of  labour  and  anxiety  :  to  the  lower,  of  toil,  pri- 
vation, and  often  of  distress.  Of  this  heavy  burden, 
what  portion  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  charge  of  food? 
In  the  middle  classes,  food  forms,  (see  Appendix,  p. 
[1 1].)  between  30  and  40  per  cent,  of  the  whole  ex- 
pense of  a  family ;  but  in  the  lower  above  50  per 
cent.,  constituting  thus,  the  grand  article  of  charge  in 
that  class  in  which  the  pressure  of  a  family  is  most 
severely  felt. 

After  this  precautionary  statement,  we  may  safely 
allow  Mr.  Gray  and  his  followers  to  give  a  latitude 
to  their  inferences,  comprehensive  as  they  are,  viz.: — 

That  the  quantity  of  subsistence  in  the  world  may 
be  augmented  in  the  same  manner,  and  by  the  same 
means,  as  the  quantity  of  our  clothing,  or  the  size  of 
our  dwellings ;  and, 

That  an'  addition  to  our  numbers  implies  no  dimi- 
nution of  individual  income  or  property. 

Such  assertions  would  have  appeared  not  a  little 
extraordinary  during  the  greatest  part  of  the  war, 
when  a  continued  insufficiency  in  our  agricultural 
produce  favoured  so  strongly  the  negative  doctrine 
of  Mr.  Malthus:  they  would  have  been  received  also 
with  no  small  surprise  during  1817  and  1818,  when  a 
scarcity  of  provisions,  a  general  irregularity  in  the 
state  of  our  productive  industry,  concurred  to  pro- 
duce apprehension  in  regard  to  our  increasing  numbers. 
But  a  different  lesson  has  since  been  taught  us :  we 
have  now  evidence  that  numbers  increased  greatly  be- 
yond anticipation,  may  draw  their  subsistence  from 
the  same  territorial  surface;  that  the  amount  of  pro- 
duce may  be  greatly  augmented  without  bringing  new 
soil  into  cultivation.      A  similar  result  from  a  simi- 


208  Population : — 

lar  cause  is  at  present  exhibited  on  the  Continent  of 
Europe. 

Comparison  of  the  present  with  former  Periods. — How 
far  does  the  preceding  opinion  appear  to  be  confirm- 
ed by  a  general  retrospect  to  the  past  ?  During  the 
twenty  years  that  elapsed  between  1692  and  1712, 
the  average  price  of  wheat  (about  44s.  per  quarter) 
had  been  such  as  to  afford,  in  these  days  of  low  rent 
and  cheap  labour,  an  ample  inducement  to  the  ex- 
tension of  tillage.  It  was  consequently  considered 
as  having  reached  its  terminus,  and  no  idea  was  enter- 
tained of  the  practicability  of  any  considerable  addi- 
tion to  our  produce.  The  result,  however,  proved 
very  different,  for  though  during  the  half  century  that 
followed  the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  our  population  receiv- 
ed (see  Preliminary  Observations  on  the  Population 
Return  of  1821,  p.  29.)  an  augmentation,  including 
Ireland,  of  fully  3,000,000,  the  increase  of  our  agri- 
cultural produce  Avas  such  as  more  than  counterba- 
lanced that  new  demand.  This  was  apparent  from  the 
average  price  of  wheat,  which  during  that  long  pe- 
riod did  not  exceed  35s.  the  quarter. — Were  it  true 
that  the  acquisition  of  subsistence  becomes  more  dif- 
ficult as  our  numbers  increase,  we  should  naturally 
expect  to  find  the  greatest  abundance  in  a  remote 
age ;  in  times  when  the  number  of  consumers  was 
small,  relatively  to  the  extent  of  territory.  But  if  we 
look  back  to  the  earliest  periods  of  authentic  history, 
to  the  ages  when  Greece  and  Italy  were  most  thinly 
peopled,  we  find  neighbouring  tribes  maintaining  san- 
guinary struggles  with  each  other,  the  motive  of  which, 
as  far  as  regarded  the  lower  orders,  was  the  hope  of  ac- 
quiring additional  territory,  and  increased  means  of 
subsistence.  It  is  thus  that  we  are  to  explain  the  ob- 
stinate warfare  for  small  but  fertile  districts,  such  as 
the  plain  of  Tyria,  the  plain  of  Tanagra,  the  Colles 
Tusculani ; — to  say  nothing  of  contests,  in  a  record 
of  higher  authority,  for  the  valleys  of  Palestine,  or 
the  banks  of  the  Jordan.  Had  subsistence  been 
abundant  in  these  days,  the  inhabitants  of  the  towns 


Is  Subsistence  limited  by  Physical  Causes  f       209 

of  Greece  would  have  shown  less  eagerness  in  emi- 
grating to  new  colonies  ;  while  at  Rome,  the  demand  . 
of  an  Agrarian  law  would  have  been  a  less  powerful 
lever  in  the  hand  of  demagogues.  But  to  confine  our 
examination  to  our  own  country,  and  to  times  compa- 
ratively recent,  how  different  is  the  present  situation 
of  our  lower  orders  from  that  of  their  forefathers  un- 
der Henry  VIII.,  or  under  our  admired  Elizabeth, 
when,  without  any  disposition  to  severity  on  the  part 
of  the  sovereign  or  her  ministers,  the  number  of  ca- 
pita.1  punishments  (Speech  of  Mr.  Fowel  Buxton  on 
our  criminal  code,  May,  1821,)  averaged  no  less  than 
five  hundred  annually !  Various  causes,  in  particu- 
lar the  want  of  education,  must  have  contributed  to 
this  unfortunate  prevalence  of  offences  ;  but  can  any 
be  supposed  to  have  operated  so  largely  on  the  part 
of  the  commonalty,  as  the  difficulty  of  obtaining 
subsistence,  although  in  that  age  our  population  did 
not  exceed  a  third  of  its  present  number? 

But  what,  it  may  be  asked,  was  the  cause  of  this 
difficulty, — of  the  supply  of  subsistence  being  so  scan- 
ty, when  the  number  of  consumers  was  so  small  ?  Of 
this  problem  the  solution  is  to  be  sought  in  the  un- 
productiveness of  even  the  fairest  tracts  so  long  as 
they  remain  in  a  state  of  nature.  Whatever  be  the 
serenity  of  the  climate  or  the  richness  of  the  soil, 
they  continue  unavailing  to  any  useful  purpose,  un- 
til the  application  of  labour.  By  labour  only  can 
over-luxuriance  be  corrected,  the  forest  cleared,  a 
superabundance  of  water  removed  from  one  spot,  a 
deficiency  of  it  supplied  in  another.  It  is  to  the  per-* 
formance  of  tasks  like  these,  the  most  acceptable  of 
any  in  an  early  age,  that  we  trace  the  honours  so  li- 
berally bestowed  in  ancient  mythology, — the  apothe- 
osis of  the  warrior  who  drained  the  Lernsean  marsh, 
and  combated  the  savage  occupants  of  the  woods, 
But  we  are  under  no  necessity  of  dwelling  on  an  age 
of  tradition,  on  a  scene  embellished  by  fiction  :  if  we 
turn  to  plain  reality, — to  the  times  in  which  we  live, 
and  to  a  people  noted  for  their  adherence  to  the  pur- 
suit of  substantial  profit ;  if.  in  short,  we  fix  our  atten- 

27 


\ 


A 


210  Population : — 

tion  on  the  western  states  of  America,  or  on  Upper 
Canada,  we  shall  find  an  example  abundantly  con- 
vincing of  the  unproductiveness  of  the  finest  tracts 
until  improved  by  labour  and  capital. 

It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  illustrations  from  his- 
tory, but  as  our  limits  hardly  admit  of  detail,  we  ex- 
tract from  one  of  the  works  already  mentioned  (Gray 
versus  Malthus,)  a  summary  of  the  leading  ideas  in 
the  opposite  systems  of  population. 

Mr.  Malthus^s  leading1  Ideas.  Mr.  Gray's  leading  Ideas. 

The   increase  of  population  has  a  The  increase  of  population  tends  to 

tendency  to  overstock,  and  to  les-  increase  the  average  amount  of 

sen  the  average  amount  of  em-  employment  to  individuals, 
ployment  to  individuals. 

The  increase  of  population  has  a  na-  The  increase  of  population  has  a  ten- 

tural  tendency  to  promote  povcr-  dency  to  increase  wealth,  not  col- 

ty.  lectively  only,  but  individually. 

From  the  conclusions  of  Mr.  Malthus  we  dissent 
almost  entirely ;  to  those  of  Mr.  Gray*  we  would 
suggest  the  following  modification. 

Increase  of  population,  when  accompanied  by  im- 
provement in  agriculture,  manufacture,  and  the  useful  arts 
generally,  has  a  tendency  to  augment  both  the 

Average  amount  of  employment ;  and 

Our  wealth,  not  collectively  only,  but  individually, 

Mr.  Malthus.  Mr.  Gray. 

The  amount  of  subsistence  regulates  The  amount  of  population  regulates 
the  amount  of  population.  the  amount  of  subsistence,  in  the 

same  way  as  it  regulates  the  sup- 
ply  of  clothing  and  housing,  be- 
cause with  the  exception  of  occa- 
sional famines,  the  quantity  of 
subsistence  raised  depends  on  the 
amount  of  labour  bestowed  on  it. 

Population  has  a  natural  tendency  to  Population  has  a  tendency  to  in- 
increase  faster  than  subsistence.  crease,  but  this  increase  carries 

in  itself  the  power  of  supplying  its 
wants. 

Here,  also,  we  are  desirous  to  introduce  a  refe- 
rence to  the  progress  of  improvement,  since,  although 
the  application  of  labour  on  the  part  of  an  increasing 
and  unimproving  society,  like  the  peasantry  of  Ire- 


Is  Subsistence  limited  by  Physical  Causes  ?        211 

land  and  Brittany,  augment  the  quantity  of  the  mere 
necessaries  of  life,  the  hazard  of  famine  can  be  pre- 
vented only  by  improvement  in  agriculture,  or  in 
those  arts  of  which  the  products  enable  a  people  to 
purchase  subsistence  from  their  neighbours.  The 
early  marriages  of  the  Irish  without  the  certainty  of 
wages,  or  a  stock  of  implements  and  furniture,  are 
productive  of  incalculable  suffering. 

That  the  supply  of  food  may  be  extended,  by 
labour  and  capital,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  supply 
of  manufactures  and  buildings,  we  readily  admit ; 
but,  as  in  the  case  of  four-fifths  of  mankind,  food 
forms  by  far  the  greatest  article  of  charge,  and  is, 
consequently  the  most  difficult  of  acquisition,  we 
are  fully  prepared  to  excuse  those  who,  in  their 
writings,  have  overrated  the  labour  of  procuring  it. 
From  the  unqualified,  and  sometimes  confident  tone 
of  Mr.  Gray,  an  inhabitant  of  Canada  or  the  United 
States  might  fall  into  the  grievous  miscalculation,  that 
to  procure  food  for  a  family  in  Europe,  was  a  task  of 
no  greater  difficulty  than  in  his  own  country,  w  here  a 
grant  of  land  may  be  had  on  such  easy  terms. 

Progressive  Increase  of  Population  in  Europe, 

The  arguments  in  the  preceding  table  are  of  ge- 
neral application,  referring  to  the  state  of  makind  in 
every  age  and  country.  To  give  the  question  a  more 
specific  form,  we  shall  now  introduce  a  fewr  statistical 
results,  and  explain  in  what  manner  are  effected  those 
improvements  in  agriculture  and  the  useful  arts, 
which  we  consider  as  conferring  the  ability  to  support 
an  augmented  population. 

Effects  of  Soil  and  Climate. — Fertility  of  soil  is  too 
directly  conducive  to  increase  of  numbers,  to  require 
illustration  ;  but  in  point  of  climate,  we  cannot  avoid 
remarking  that  the  superiority  of  one  part  of  Europe 
over  another,  is,  as  far  at  least  as  regards  the  produc- 
tive power  of  the  soil,  much  less  than  is  commonly 
imagined.     The  great  art  of  the  husbandman  consists 


212  Pop  ulation  ;-— 

in  adapting  the  object  of  culture  to  the  peculiarity  of* 
the  temperature.  In  various  parts  of  Scotland,  ac- 
counted half  a  century  ago  unfit  for  wheat  culture, 
the  progress  of  improvement  has  led  to  raising  that 
grain,  not  only  in  abundance,  but  of  a  quality  fit  for 
the  London  market ;  while  in  the  boasted  climate  of 
the  south  of  France,-  the  season  is  often  too  dry  for 
wheat,  and  the  frequent  failure  of  that  crop  seems  to 
point  out  maize  as  a  more  appropriate  object  of  til- 
lage. In  regard  to  potatoes,  the  culture  of  which  is 
so  directly  connected  with  density  of  population,  the 
warmest  and  finest  climate  of  the  Continent  has  no 
superiority  over  our  own.  It  is  thus  only,  when  in 
extremes,  as  in  the  bleak  tracts  of  Russia,  Sweden, 
and  Norway,  that  climate  has  operated  materially  to 
restrict  produce  and  population :  the  physical  supe- 
riority of  the  south  of  Europe,  whatever  may  be  its 
eventual  effect,  has  not,  as  yet,  been  such  as  to  out- 
weigh the  political  advantages  of  the  north. 

Effect  of  Communication  by  Sea,  Rivers,  Canals,  Roads. 
—The  effect  of  prompt  communication  in  promoting 
commercial  intercourse  is  sufficiently  apparent,  but 
its  tendency  to  increase  the  population  of  towns  may 
require  some  explanation.  What,  in  the  first  place, 
are  the  advantages  enjoyed  by  the  inhabitants  of 
towns  over  those  of  the  country ;  by  a  collected  over 
a  scattered  population  ?  They  consist  in  a  more 
ample  field  for  sale  or  purchase ;  a  better  division  of 
employment ;  greater  dispatch  and  finish  of  work- 
manship ; — a  more  varied  supply  of  occupation,  so  as 
to  suit  individuals  of  almost  any  degree  of  strength  or 
capacity.  Now  these  advantages,  arising,  in  a  large 
town,  from  concentration  of  numbers,  may,  in  a  great 
degree,  be  enjoyed  by  places  comparatively  small 
and  distant  from  each  other,  when  connected  by 
rivers,  canals,  or  a  line  of  sea-coast.  Such  was  the 
origin  of  the  prosperity  of  Greece ;  such,  at  present, 
is  the  cause  that  the  maritime  part  of  her  population 
make  in  their  contest  with  the  Turks  a  figure  not  un- 
worthy of  their  ancestors.     It  is  thus  that  the  several 


Causes  of  its  Increase  in  Europe.  213 

towns  of  Holland,  Zealand,  and  Flanders,  have  for 
centuries  maintained  an  active  intercourse  with  each 
other ;  that  Paris  is  so  closely  connected  with  Rouen 
and  Havre  de  Grace  ;  that  Switzerland  maintains  by 
the  Rhine  an  intercourse  with  Holland ;  and  that  in 
England,  particularly  since  the  multiplication  of  ca- 
nals within  the  last  seventy  years,  the  conveyance  of 
coal,  iron,  salt,  and  other  bulky  commodities  is  so 
much  facilitated.  On  the  other  hand,  the  want  of 
such  intercourse  is,  as  we  shall  see  presently,  the 
principal  cause  of  the  backwardness  of  Spain,  Po- 
land, the  south  of  Germany,  and  in  no  inconsidera- 
ble degree,  of  France. 

Effect  of  the  Protestant  Religion. — The  adoption  of 
the  reformed  faith  has  been  found  conducive  to  the 
increase,  not  only  of  individual  comfort,  but  of  the 
population  of  towns  in  the  countries  into  which  it  has 
been  introduced.  Among  its  other  effects,  are  a 
more  general  diffusion  of  education,  and  an  exemption, 
in  the  case  of  the  labouring  classes,  from  the  loss  of 
time  attendant  on  the  endless  holydays  of  the  catho- 
lic church.  In  agriculture,  the  operation  of  these 
advantages  is  less  apparent,  most  countries  sufficing 
wholly,  or  nearly,  to  their  own  consumption,  while 
the  insulated  position  of  the  husbandman  prevents, 
in  a  great  measure,  the  benefit  arising  from  competi- 
tion and  frequent  personal  communication.  But  in 
manufactures,  particularly  in  those  prepared  for 
foreign  sale,  the  case  is  very  different ;  the  ease  of 
transporting  them  to  a  distant  market,  and  of  com- 
paring their  respective  quality  and  price,  opens  a 
wide  field  of  competition,  and  awards  the  preference 
to  superior  skill  and  ingenuity.  Accordingly,  though 
the  catholics  of  Europe  are,  collectively,  much  more 
numerous  than  the  protestants,  the  far  larger  share 
of  exported  merchandise  proceeds  from  protestanl 
countries,  the  labour  of  the  Flemings,  the  French, 
and  the  northern  Italians,  forming  a  feeble  counter- 
poise to  those  of  the  Silesians,  the  Saxons,  the  Prus- 
sians, and  above  all,  of  our  countrymen.     In  Ireland. 


2 1 4  Population  ;—* 

linen  weaving,  the  only  great  branch  of  manufacture, 
is  almost  wholly  in  the  hands  of  protestants. 

We  proceed  to  apply  this  reasoning  to  the  progress 
of  population  in  Europe,  availing  ourselves  of  the  of- 
ficial returns  which  have  been  made  in  most  coun- 
tries in  the  course  of  the  present  age,  and  which  sup- 
ply the  following  abstract : — 

Inhabitants 
per  square  Mile. 

East  Flanders                     -  554 
West  Flanders                    -  420 
Holland  (Province  of)         -             -             -             .'.'••  362 
Ireland                    _-.-_.  237 
England,  distinct  from  Wales         -  232 
Austrian  Italy,  viz.  the  Milanese  and  the  Venetian  States  219 
The  Netherlands,  viz.  the  Dutch  and  Belgic  Provinces,  col- 
lectively            ------  214 

Italy          -------  179 

France                   -             -             -             -             -             -  150 

The  Austrian  Dominions                 -             -             -             -  112 

The  Prussian  dominions                  -             -             -             -  100 

Denmark                __._-_  73 

Poland                    ------  60 

Spain         -------  58 

Turkey  in  Europe  (conjectural)                   -  50 

Sweden  (distinct  from  Norway  and  Lapland)  25 

Russia  in  Europe               -----  23 

Here  are,  indeed,  some  very  remarkable  differ- 
ences in  population,  and  to  trace  this  diversity  to  its 
source,  is  an  object  of  no  slight  interest. 

Flanders  possesses,  in  a  high  degree,  the  main 
causes  of  dense  population,  fertility  of  soil,  and  ease 
of  communication,  having  on  the  north  the  sea  and 
the  Scheldt,  while  the  flatness  of  its  surface  admits 
of  easy  intersection  by  canals.  Accordingly,  so  ear- 
ly as  the  12th  century,  when  productive  industry  was 
in  its  infancy  in  every  part  of  Europe,  except  Pisa, 
Venice,  Genoa,  and  a  few  other  towns  of  Italy,  Bru- 
ges was  a  place  of  commercial  eminence,  a  kind  of 
centre  for  the  intercourse  of  the  northwest  of  Europe. 
In  this  it  was  succeeded  by  Antwerp  and  Amster- 
dam ;  but  though  Flanders  has  long  ceased  to  have 
much  foreign  trade,  its  population  and  manufactur- 
ing industry  have  not  declined.  The  great  articles 
of  its  produce  are,  corn,  hemp,  and  flax ;  of  its  ma- 
nufactures, linen,  lace,  leather,  and,  in  later  times. 


Causes  of  its  Increase  in  Europe.  £15 

cotton.  Of  cities,  it  contains  only  two,  Ghent  and 
Bruges,  and  their  conjunct  population  does  not  ex- 
ceed 90,000.  But  it  abounds  in  towns  and  villages 
which  are  populous,  though  not  noticed  in  history, 
and  hardly  in  geography. 

Of  the  Dutch  provinces,  the  most  remarkable  for 
population,  as  for  other  characterestics,  are  Holland 
and  Zealand.  On  the  ground  of  fertility,  they  have  little 
claim  to  density  of  numbers,  the  soil  being,  in  general, 
ill  adapted  to  tillage ;  but  in  ease  of  water  commu- 
nication, they  surpass  every  other  part  of  Europe. 
The  mouths  of  the  Rhine,  Maese,  and  Scheldt,  afford 
capacious  inlets  for  foreign  commerce,  while  the  le- 
vel surface  of  the  territory  admits  of  easy  intersec- 
tion by  canals.  These  provinces  possessed,  conse- 
quently, considerable  population  and  trade  before 
the  16th  century,  when  their  prosperity  was  confirm- 
ed by  the  adoption  of  the  protestant  religion,  and  by 
the  establishment,  after  a  long  struggle,  of  an  inde- 
pendent government. 

How  far  does  fertility  of  soil  account  for  the  in- 
crease of  population  in  England  ?  Inferior  to  seve- 
ral tracts  on  the  Continent,  such  as  Flanders  or  the 
Milanese,  but  more  fertile  than  the  mountains  of 
Spain  or  the  sandy  levels  of  the  north  of  Germany, 
the  soil  of  England  may  be  said  to  hold  a  medium, 
and  to  have  a  claim  to  rank  with  the  average  of  the 
French  and  Austrian  territory.  This  degree  of  fer- 
tility would  have  determined  a  population  in  the  pre- 
sent age  of  perhaps  150  to  the  square  mile :  the  ad- 
ditional number  is,  as  far  as  regard  §  physical  causes,  to 
be  attributed  to  our  insular  position,  and  the  produc- 
tiveness of  our  mines,  particularly  of  coal;  advanta- 
ges which  lead  so  directly  to  the  increase  of  our  ma- 
nufacturers, seamen,  and  traders.  In  ease  of  inland 
navigation,  England  is  second  only  to  the  Dutch  pro- 
vinces. 

Inland  Countries :  Austria  and  Prussia. — From  these 
examples  of  maritime  prosperity,  we  pass  to  inland 
countries,  and  begin  by  the  dominions  of  Austria. 


216  Populat 


ion 


which,  with  a  slight  exception,  are  at  a  distance  from 
the  sea,  traversed  by  a  few  navigable  rivers,  and  by 
hardly  any  canals.  Though  equal  to  France  or  Eng- 
land in  fertility,  the  communication  between  the  dif- 
ferent provinces  is  difficult,  the  progress  of  improve- 
ment extremely  slow,  manufactures  backward,  and 
the  town  population  very  limited.  Prussia,  in  like 
manner,  has  few  harbours  or  navigable  rivers,  indif- 
ferent roads,  and  canals  that  are  only  in  their  infan- 
cy*: Jie  majority  of  her  subjects  enjoy  the  advantage 
of  the  protestant  religion,  and  of  an  education  less 
imperfect  than  that  of  their  southern  neighbours ;  but 
her  population  is  thin,  in  consequence  of  a  great  part, 
of  her  territory  being  sandy  or  marshy. 

A  still  stronger  example  of  the  disadvantage  of  an 
inland  position  is  afforded  by  Poland.  That  coun- 
try, without  possessing  all  the  fertility  vulgarly  as- 
cribed to  those  which  export  corn,  is  not  naturally 
below  the  average  productiveness  of  Europe.  Its 
climate,  if  in  winter  it  partake  of  the  rigour  of  Russia, 
is  in  summer  favourable  to  corn  culture,  and  the 
great  impediment  to  the  increase  of  its  produce  is 
not  a  mountainous  surface,  but  a  cause  more  within 
the  remedying  power  of  industry — extensive  marshes* 
Still,  its  town  population  is  scanty  and  wretched,  the 
causes  of  which,  in  a  political  sense,  are,  long  con- 
tinued misgovernment,  a  bigotted  creed,  the  almost 
total  neglect  of  education ;  in  a  physical,  the  difficulty 
of  transporting  commodities,  the  extent  of  sea-coast 
being  small,  the  roads  proverbially  wretched,  and 
the  access  to  the  interior  by  the  Vistula,  circuitous, 
and  too  confined  for  so  large  a  tract  of  country. 

France. — Between  these  extremes,  our  ancient 
rival  forms  a  medium,  possessing  a  considerable  ex- 
tent of  coast,  but  labouring  also  under  the  disadvan- 
tage of  an  inland  territory,  square  in  its  form,  slightly 
penetrated  by  navigable  rivers,  having,  as  yet,  verj 
few  canals,  and  roads  good  only  in  particular  direc- 
tions. Compared  to  the  Austrian  or  Prussian  states. 
France  is  an  improved  country,  but  the  case  is  far 
otherwise  when  put  in  competition  with  the  Nether- 


Causes  of  its  Increase  in  Europe.  217 

lands  or  England.  Superior  to  our  island  in  climate, 
and  equal  to  it  in  soil,  she  is  greatly  inferior  in  density 
of  population,  and  still  more  in  the  average  income 
of  individuals.  Of  her  population,  two-thirds  (above 
twenty  millions)  live  in  the  country,  and  her  peasant- 
ry partake,  in  many  provinces,  of  the  poverty  of  those 
of  Ireland.  In  the  size  of  her  towns,  this  great  king- 
dom, so  long  the  dread  of  our  forefathers  and  of  Eu- 
rope, has  in  the  last  and  present  age,  been  altogether 
surpassed  by  England  and  Scotland ;  for  though  our 
island  boast  only  half  her  population,  her  distri- 
bution of  it  is  made,  in  a  manner,  far  more  condu- 
cive to  efficiency  in  a  commercial  and  financial  sense. 
This  is,  at  once,  apparent  from  a  comparison  of  the 
twelve  principal  towns  in  each. 

Population  Return  of  1821. 

ENGLAND    AND   SCOTLAND.  FRANCE. 

London,  Westminster, 
Southwark,  and  the 
adjoining  parishes    -       1,225,694     Paris  -  720,000 

Glasgow,  with  suburbs  147,043     Lyons  -  115,000 

Edinburgh,  with  Leith 

and  their  suburbs  138,235     Marseilles  -  102,000 

Manchester,  with  Sal- 
ford     -      -      -      -  133,788     Bordeaux    -      -      -      -      92,000 

Liverpool       -      -      -  118,972     Rouen  -      -  86,000 

Birmingham,  with*  Aston        106,722     Nantes         -       -  77,000 

Bristol  and  suburbs     -  87,779      Lille     -----       60,000 

Leeds  and  suburbs      -  83,796      Strasburg    -  50,000 

Plymouth,  with  Dock 

and  suburbs      -      -  61,212     Toulouse     -  50,000 

Norwich        -      -      -  50,288     Orleans       -      -       -      -      42,000 

Newcastle  on  Tyne, 
with  Gateshead       -  46,948      Metz 42,000 

Portsmouth  with  Port- 
sea      -      -      -      -  45,648     Nimes 40,000 

Ireland. — In  our  enumeration  of  towns  we  have 
omitted  those  of  Ireland,  because  the  situation  of 
that  country  is  peculiar.  Possessing,  in  point  of  navi- 
gation, maritime  and  inland,  advantages  equal  to 
those  of  England,  her  towns  are  comparatively  small, 
her  manufactures  considerable  in  one  province  only. 
To  what,  then,  is  owing  the  remarkable  density  of 
her  population  ?  To  two  causes,  fertility  of  soil,  and 
^  28 


218  Population : — Connexion  between  ik 

the  habit,  on  the  part  of  .the  peasantry,  of  subsisting 
on  a  food,  the  produce  of  which,  on  a  given  spot,  is 
much  larger  than  that  of  the  wheat,  the  rye,  or  the 
oats,  which,  in  other  parts  of  Europe,  form  the  basis 
of  national  subsistence. 

Italy, — Few  countries  surpass  Italy  in  natural  ad  van- 
tages ;  in  soil,  in  climate,  extent  of  sea  coast,  and,  in 
her  northern  part,  in  the  means  of  inland  navigation. 
But  a  bigotted  creed  has  confirmed  the  indolence 
inspired  by  the  climate,  and  her  unfortunate  division 
into  petty  states,  has  prevented  measures  for  the  ad- 
vancement of  her  productive  industry.  Though 
more  populous  than  France,  her  inhabitants  have  a 
smaller  average  income :  the  want  of  a  concentrated 
government  may  be  considered  the  cause  of  lighter 
financial  burdens,  but  the  advantage  is  balanced  or 
more  than  balanced  by  the  loss  of  that  rank  among 
the  states  of  Europe,  to  which  this  country  is  entitled 
by  her  population  and  geographical  position. 

Spain  has  a  climate  on  the  whole,  favourable,  but 
in  respect  to  territorial  surface,  it  is,  after  Switzer- 
land, the  most  mountainous  country  in  Europe. 
Having  been  all  along  deprived  of  the  blessings  of 
good  government  and  enlightened  religion,  the  physi- 
cal obstacles  to  communication  between  one  district 
and  another,  have  been  very  little  lessened  by  exer- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants ;  the  roads  are  few 
and  indifferent,  while  of  canals  there  are  hardly  any. 
Her  great  extent  of  sea  coast,  ought,  it  may  be 
thought,  to  have  remedied  these  disadvantages,  but 
the  small  number  of  navigable  rivers  has  confined 
this  benefit  to  the  outskirts  of  her  territory,  leaving 
the  interior  untraversed  and  almost  unopened.  Thus, 
with  the  exception  of  Catalonia,  Biscay,  and  part  of 
Andalusia,  Spain  exhibits  all  the  backwardness  of  a 
country  deprived  of  water  communication.  Portugal 
is  more  favourably  circumstanced ;  she  has  two  great 
inlets  from  the  ocean,  the  Tagus  and  Douro;  her 
towns  are  less  thinly  scattered,  and  without  sur- 
passing Spain  in  climate  or  soil,  she  is  enabled  to 
pay  a  larger  revenue  in  proportion  to  her  population. 


increase  and  the  Increase  of  Wealth.  219 

Russia  and  the  north  of  Sweden,  form  an  example 
of  extreme  thinness  of  population,  consequent,  partly 
on  rigour  of  climate,  partly  also  on  difficulty  of  in- 
tercourse. 

Connexion  between  Increase  of  Numbers  and  Increase  of 
Wealth. — Having  thus  explained  the  increase  of  popu- 
lation in  Europe,  we  are,  in  the  next  place,  to  ex- 
amine the  circumstances  connected  with  the  increase 
of  wealth. 

Our  experience  since  the  peace,  unfortunate  as  it 
has  been  to  particular  classes  of  the  community,  has 
put  beyond  doubt  one  material  point,  we  mean  our 
power  of  subsisting  an  increased  population.  The 
case  of  England  is  that  of  Europe  at  large,  and  even 
anti-populationists  can  hardly  apprehend  that  such 
abundance  is  temporary,  or  that  the  civilized  world 
is  at  all  in  hazard  from  insufficiency  of  subsistence. 
Equally  little  can  they  deny  that  increase  of  national 
wealth,  has,  for  a  long  time,  accompanied  increase 
of  numbers.  Such  has  evidently  been  the  case  in 
France,  in  Germany,  in  the  countries  along  the  Baltic, 
and,  above  all,  among  ourselves. 

But  while  the  facts  are  undoubted,  the  inference 
that  the  increase  of  wealth  is  closely  connected  with 
increase  of  numbers,  will  not  be  so  readily  granted. 
From  the  adherents  of  Mr.  Malthus,  it  is  not  to  be 
looked  for,  nor  do  we  expect  it  for  some  time  from 
the  majority  of  our  public  men. 

Their  objections  to  it  however  will,  we  believe,  be 
lessened  by  a  qualification  similar  to  what  we  have 
already  suggested,  viz.  that  our  arguments  for  "  an 
increase  of  wealth  from  increase  of  numbers  are  urged 
only  in  regard  to  a  society  advancing  in  a  knowledge 
of  agriculture,  manufacture,  and  the  useful  arts  ge- 
nerally." 

After  inserting  this  important  condition,  we  may 
with  confidence  propose  some  interesting  questions, 
such  as  "whether,  when  the  same  portion  of  public 
burdens  is  distributed  over  a  greater  number  of  per- 
*ons.  the  pressure  on  the  individual  is  not  necessa- 


220  Population : — Connexion  between  its 

rily  lightened?"  Our  revenue  arises  chiefly  from 
consumption :  each  individual  bears  his  part,  and  the 
50,000,000/.  at  present  paid  by  somewhat  less  than 
15,000,000  of  inhabitants  in  Great  Britain,  will  obvi- 
ously give  a  smaller  average  per  head  when  they  shall 
come  to  be  shared  among  a  population  of  16,000,000. 
Our  next  question  is,  "  whether  the  effect  of  aug- 
mented numbers,  in  adding  to  the  revenue,  has  not 
been  remarkably  exemplified  in  the  present  age: 
whether  it  had  not  an  important  share  in  swelling  the 
product  of  our  taxes  during  the  war,  and  in  prevent- 
ing their  diminution  since  the  peace  ?"  If  these  pre- 
liminary points  are  admitted,  we  may  proceed  to  put 
the  more  general  question,  whether  "  when  a  greater 
population  is  maintained  in  equal  comfort  on  the 
same  territory,  the  wealth  and  power  of  the  commu- 
nity are  not  increased  ?"  This  approaches  so  nearly 
to  a  self-evident  proposition,  that  we  shall  not  hesi- 
tate to  take  for  granted,  that  as  to  national  income  and 
power,  no  doubt  can  be  entertained  of  an  increase 
attendant  on  the  increase  of  our  numbers.  It  re- 
mains that  we  investigate  its  effects  in  another  sense. 

Increase  of  Income  to  the  Individual. — Has  an  aug- 
mented population  a  tendency  to  expand  or  contract 
the  separate  earnings  of  its  members  ?  The  present 
may  be  termed  the  age  of  statistical  returns,  the  first 
period  in  history  in  which  the  governments  of  the 
civilized  part  of  the  world  have  called  periodically 
for  returns  of  population.  It  has  also  been  an  era  of 
great  fluctuation  in  the  property  of  individuals :  yet 
amidst  all  the  complaints  of  losses  arising  at  one 
time  from  the  expenditure  of  war,  at  another  from 
want  of  employment  or  superabundance  of  produce, 
we  have  nowhere  seen  it  argued  that  the  circum- 
stances of  our  population  have  undergone  deteriora- 
tion from  the  increase  of  their  numbers.  Of  this  one 
main  cause  is,  that  the  necessity  of  providing  for  a 
family  is  the  strongest  of  all  stimulants  to  the  renun- 
ciation of  indolent  habits,  to  the  productive  employ- 
ment of  time  and  capital     What  a  contrast  in  the  re- 


Increase  and  the  Increase  of  Wealth.  221 

suit  of  the  labour  of  the  parent,  who  necessarily  ad- 
heres to  a  uniform  pursuit,  and  of  him  who,  exempt  from 
the  calls  of  a  family,  is  at  liberty  to  pass  his  time  in 
speculation,  indecision,  and  change !  In  nothing  is  the 
advantage  of  a  mercantile  community,  like  England, 
Holland,  or  the  United  States  of  America,  more  con- 
spicuous over  most  countries  of  the  Continent  of 
Europe ;  where  fanciful  changes  and  visionary  pur- 
suits are  so  common,  and  where  the  upper  classes, 
as  they  are  styled  the  noblesse,  so  frequently  pass 
their  lives  without  a  definite  object,  and  seek  to  es- 
cape trouble  by  avoiding  the  responsibility  of  a 
family. 

Let  us  not,  however,  be  understood  as  asserting 
that  the  increase  of  our  population  cannot  be  too 
rapid,  or  as  making  light  of  the  pressure  on  the 
parents  of  a  numerous  family ;  a  pressure  which  in 
general  implies  the  necessity  of  renouncing  the  grati- 
fications of  leisure,  and  of  almost  "sacrificing  enjoy- 
ment for  the  means  of  living."  That  this  is  applica- 
ble to  the  middle  as  well  as  to  the  lower  classes,  we 
are  fully  convinced ;  and  if  we  do  not  dwell  on  it 
more  largely,  it  is  because  we  have  already  adverted 
to  it,  and  our  present  inquiry  regards  the  effect  of 
increasing  numbers  in  a  sense  strictly  statistical. 

Mr.  Gray,  not  content  with  stipulating  for  an 
equality  of  circumstances  to  the  rising  generation, 
goes  a  step  farther,  it  being  one  of  the  fundamental 
articles  of  his  creed,  that  an  increase  in  the  numbers 
of  a  nation  or  society,  tends,  not  only  to  keep  up,  but 
to  improve  the  income  of  its  members :  that  the  30/. 
forming  the  average  income  of  individual  workmen 
in  one  age,  may,  and,  in  fact,  is  likely  to  become  31/. 
in  the  next;  or  to  express  it  in  a  comprehensive 
form,  that  "  the  more  varied  the  classes  of  a  commu- 
nity, the  more  they  conduce  to  the  welfare  of  each 
other."  To  this  interesting  and  important  conclusion 
we  are  ready  to  assent,  provided  the  increase  of 
income  be  considered  as  dependent  less  on  increase 
of  numbers,  than  on  the  circumstances  under  which 
(see  p.  210.)  such  increase  takes  place. 


->.>.-> 


Population 


How  far  exemplified  in  the  State  of  Europe, — We  pro- 
ceed to  put  this  doctrine  to  the  test,  by  a  reference 
to  the  returns  of  taxation  and  other  public  burdens, 
in  different  countries  of  Europe.  These,  we  are 
aware,  do  not  furnish  an  unexceptionable  criterion  of 
national  wealth,  as  the  proportion  of  public  burdens 
may  differ  from  circumstances  unconnected  with  the 
state  of  productive  industry,  such  as  the  greater  or  less 
participation  of  a  particular  country  in  war,  since  the 
adoption  of  the  funding  system.  They  form,  however, 
the  least  defective  basis,  the  nearest  approximation 
to  the  truth  in  the  present  imperfect  state  of  public 
surveys :  for  few  countries  have  been  the  object  of 
an  assessment  so  directly  calculated  to  convey  an 
estimate  of  national  wealth,  as  the  property-tax  of 
England  or  the  fonder  of  France. 


Proportion  of  Public  Burdens 

Population  per  square  Mile. 

paid  by  each  Individual. 

£.    s.    d. 

England  distinct  from  Scotland  and  Wales 

232 

-      3     2     0 

England,  Scotland,  and  Wales,  collectively 

165 

-      2  15     0 

The  Netherlands* 

- 

214 

-       1   10     0 

France            - 

- 

150 

1     4     0 

The  Austrian  Empire 

- 

112 

0  12    4 

The  Prussian  Dominions 

- 

100 

0  13    4 

Denmark        - 

- 

73 

0  16     3 

Spain               - 

• 

58 

0  116 

Sweden           - 

- 

25 

0  10     0 

Russia  in  Europe 

- 

23 

0     9     9 

The  maritime  provinces  of  Holland  and  Zealand, 
are  perhaps  as  heavily  taxed  as  England,  the  charge 
of  defence  against  the  sea,  added  to  the  interest  of  a 
heavy  debt,  contracted  during  two  centuries,  render- 
ing the  total  assessment  probably  equal  to  our  3/.  2s. 
per  head.  France  exhibits  a  medium  in  her  taxes  as 
in  her  population :  while  in  our  case,  the  increase  of 
taxation  since  1792  has  been  more  than  double  the 
increase  of  our  population,  in  France  the  proportion 
of  the  former  has  outstripped  that  of  the  latter  only 
by  a  fourth,  or  25  per  cent.  Still  the  average  pay- 
ment per  head  is  much  greater  in  France  than  in  the 

*  The  repartition  of  taxes  is  here  very  unequal,  the  Dutch  provinces, 
particularly  those  of  Holland  and  Zealand,  paying  much  more  than  1/.  10*. 
a  head,  the  Belgic  considerably  less. 


its  stationary  Condition.  223 

Austrian  empire,  a  country  fully  equal  to  France  in 
fertility,  but  more  thinly  peopled,  because  it  is  devoid 
of  the  means  of  communication  afforded  to  France 
by  a  considerable  extent  of  coast. 

The  population  of  Denmark,  though  more  thinly 
spread  than  that  of  Austria  or  Prussia,  pays  a  larger 
average  contribution,  the  chief  cause  of  which  must 
be  the  extent  of  water-communication. 

Rural  population;  its  stationary  condition. — Of  the 
poverty  of  rural  population,  examples  are  but  too 
abundant  in  every  part  of  Europe,  with  the  exception 
of  England  and  Holland :  we  confine  our  notice,  how- 
ever, to  those  quarters  that  are  populous,  and  which 
ought  to  be  comparatively  exempt  from  poverty,  did 
the  same  rule  hold,  as  in  the  case  of  town  population. 
That  such  is  far  from  being  the  case  is  apparent  from 
the  following  return  : 

Population  per  square  mile, 

Ireland         - 

The  Milanese  and  Venetian  territory 

The  Neapolitan  Dominions   - 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  are  the  causes  of  the  sta- 
tionary condition,  we  may  almost  say  the  hereditary 
poverty  of  cottagers  ?  Their  insulated  position  ;  their 
want  of  ready  co-operation  with  their  neighbours, 
for  purposes  of  labour ;  and  the  imperfect  subdivision 
of  employment  even  in  their  own  families.  For  most 
kinds  of  manufacturing  and  mechanical  labour,  such 
a  situation  is  decidedly  unfavourable,  since  it  offers 
neither  stimulating  example,  nor  the  means  of  direct- 
ing the  exertion  of  others.  In  a  state  of  society  like 
that  of  the  Irish  peasantry,  the  acquisition  of  food  is 
almost  the  only  consideration ;  the  son  subsists  him 
self  and  his  family  on  the  potatoes  raised  on  a  patch 
of  land,  separated  from  the  occupancy  of  his  father, 
and  regards  lodging,  clothing,  and  still  more,  furniture* 
as  secondary  objects.  In  such  a  situation,  what  con- 
nexion can  there  be  between  increase  of  numbers, 
and  increase  of  individual  income  ?  Mr.  Gray  could 
here  trace  hardly  a  single  feature  of  the  animating 


Payment  per  head 
only 

£.   s.    d. 

237 

- 

0  11     0 

219 

- 

0  10     0 

154 

- 

0     8     0 

224  Population ; — 

picture  he  has  drawn  of  a  country  with  augmenting 
numbers :  yet  it  seems  to  form  rather  a  qualification 
than  a  contradiction  of  his  doctrine ;  and  to  prove 
nothing  at  variance  with  his  creed  in  regard  to  a 
population  differently  circumstanced;  we  mean  so 
placed  as  to  be  near  to,  and  in  a  state  of  co-operation 
with  each  other. 

Town  Population. — What  a  contrast  to  this  station- 
ary condition  is  exhibited  by  theprogress  of  towns, 
whether  we  go  back  to  the  days  of  antiquity,  or  fix 
our  attention  on  modern  history :  whether  we  con- 
template Tyre,  Carthage,  Athens,  Syracuse,  in  the 
former;  or  Pisa,  Genoa,  Venice,  Bruges,  Antwerp, 
Amsterdam,  in  the  latter;  or,  finally,  look  to  the 
growth  of  the  towns  of  our  own  country  in  the  present 
age.  Widely  different  as  is  this  progress,  according 
to  difference  of  situation,  we  can  hardly  trace  in  any 
country  an  example  of  numbers  collected  in  one  spot, 
without  an  acompanying  increase  of  wealth.  Even 
such  a  place  as  Debreczin,  in  Hungary,  an  assem- 
blage of  40,000  souls  in  a  succession  of  cottages, 
affords  relief  from  the  poverty  that  reigns  throughout 
the  greatest  part  of  that  backward  and  thinly-peo- 
pled region. 

In  what  consist  the  advantages  of  a  concentrated 
population?  In  the  subdivision  of  labour;  in  the 
power  of  making  the  exertions  of  many  concur  to 
one  object ;  in  the  means  of  giving  employment,  of 
some  kind  or  other,  to  persons  the  most  different  in 
education  and  attainments.  In  proportion  as  employ- 
ment becomes  subdivided,  the  efficiency  of  the  indi- 
vidual is  increased,  and  the  same  labour  enables  him 
to  furnish  commodities,  superior,  either  in  quantity 
or  quality,  generally  in  both.  Besides,  an  assemblage 
of  numbers  is  highly  favourable  to  those  discoveries 
and  inventions,  the  effect  of  which,  whether  in  agri- 
culture, manufacture,  or  mechanics,  is  to  increase  so 
remarkably  the  productive  powers  of  a  country,  to 
render  the  articles  produced  so  much  cheaper  and 
better.     It  admits,  we  believe,  of  no  doubt  that  the 


its  stationary  Condition.  225 

rate  of  wages  in  a  capital,  such  as  London  or  Paris, 
or  in  a  large  town,  such  as  Manchester,  Birmingham, 
or  Rouen,  exceeds  those  of  a  small  town  in  a  degree 
greater  than  the  difference  in  the  expense  of  living. 

The  resources  of  collected  population  have  been 
exemplified  in  the  Dutch  provinces  of  Holland  and 
Zealand,  during  two  centuries,  by  the  payment  of  an 
amount  of  taxation  almost  unparalleled  in  the  annals 
of  finance.  At  a  time  when  in  England,  the  majority 
of  the  inhabitants  lived  as  at  present  in  France, 
in  the  open  country,  Holland  had  accumulated  the 
larger  part  of  her  population  in  towns ;  and  though 
their  numbers  have  now  experienced  a  decrease, 
Amsterdam  and  the  eight  cities  situated  within  a  cir- 
cuit smaller  than  one  of  our  middle  sized  counties, 
still  contain  a  population  of  more  than  400,000,  a 
density  exceeded  only  by  London  and  Paris,  and 
which,  rapidly  as  the  numbers  of  our  manufacturers 
increase,  will  hardly  be  surpassed  in  the  present  age 
by  the  population  of  either  our  cotton,  our  woollen, 
or  our  hardware  districts. 

These   districts,  however,  and  the  parts   of  our 
island  rendered  populous  by  navigation,  already  con- 
firm the  result  exhibited  by  Holland,  the  average 
income  of  individuals  being  considerably  greater  in 
these  than  in  the  less  populous  parts  of  our  island. 
This  was  apparent  from  the  returns  made  under  the 
Property-tax  Act.     In  like  manner   in   France,  the 
returns  made  to  government  under  the  fonder,  or  tax 
on  the  income  of  landlords,  farmers,  and  house  pro- 
prietors, show  that  the  revenue  not  only  of  the  public, 
but  of  the  individual,  is  smaller  where  the  numbers  are 
thinly  scattered,  smaller  in  the  mountainous  depart- 
ments of  the  south,  than  in  the  more  fertile  and  popu- 
lous districts  of  the  north.     In  the  main  articles  of 
food  and  fuel,  the  peasantry  are  often  better  provided 
than  the  lower  orders  in  towns,  but  in  other  respects, 
there  are  on  the  Continent   the  same  reasons  as  in 
England  for  allotting  the   superiority  in  property  to 
the   latter.     It   is  in  a  large    association    only  that 
activity  and  talent  find  an  adequate  field;  that  the 

29 


226  Population : — 

command  of  capital,  the  co-operation  of  assistants, 
can  be  turned  to  account :  there  is,  hence,  no  com- 
parison between  town  and  country  in  the  proportion 
of  those  who  from  poverty  attain  the  comfort  of  a 
middle  station :  to  say  nothing  of  those  who  reach  a 
high  rank  in  the  scale  of  property. 

Farther,  as  every  country  raises  food  for  the  far 
greater  part  of  its  consumption,  density  of  town- 
population  implies,  in  general,  an  advanced  state  of 
agriculture :  it  is  along  with  such  density  that  we 
find  extensive  farms,  a  general  application  of  ma- 
chinery, and  a  variety  of  improvements  which  enable 
cultivators  to  send  to  market  a  much  larger  propor- 
tion of  produce  than  can  be  spared  in  a  country  like 
the  centre  and  south  of  France,  where  all  work  being 
done  by  manual  labour,  the  larger  share  of  the  pro- 
duce is  necessarily  consumed  by  those  who  raise  it. 
In  all  respects,  therefore,  a  numerous  town-population 
seems  to  us  a  proof  of  wealth;  an  evidence  of  the 
tendency  of  individual  as  well  as  national  income,  to 
increase  as  society  advances  in  improvement.  (See 
Appendix,  p.  [75].) 

Subsistence  more  easy  of  Acquisition  as  Society  advances. 
— The  late  wars,  remarkable  as  they  were  for  the 
frequent  recurrence  of  bad  seasons,  exhibited  no 
examples  of  local  suffering  equal  to  those  which 
marked  the  latter  years  of  the  16th  and  17th  centu- 
ries ;  the  scarcities  in  the  reigns  of  Elizabeth  and 
William.  The  cause  is  to  be  sought  in  the  general 
ease  of  communication  arising  from  the  improvement 
of  our  roads,  canals,  and  maritime  navigation ;  also 
in  the  more  ample  means  of  purchase  afforded  to  the 
lower  orders  by  the  diffusion  of  employment,  chiefly 
mechanical  and  manufacturing,  throughout  almost 
every  corner  of  the  island.  One  part  of  the  kingdom 
is  thus  enabled  to  come  to  the  relief  of  the  other,  and 
prices  are  kept  nearly  on  an  equality  throughout. 
To  this  source  of  relief  at  home,  is  added,  particu- 
larly since  the  peace,  a  supply  from  abroad,  arising 
from  the  extension  of  tillage  over  countries  in  a  man- 


Acquisition  of  Subsistence.  227 

ner  unknown  to  our  ancestors.  In  our  chapter  on 
Agriculture,  (p.  150.)  we  took  occasion  to  remark 
that  that  which  formerly  constituted  the  corn  coun- 
try of  Europe,  meaning  the  country  producing  corn 
in  sufficiency  for  export,  is  comprised  between 
the  45th  and  55th  degree  of  latitude,  and  has  a  simi- 
larity of  climate  greater  than  is  supposed  by  those 
of  our  countrymen  who  have  not  travelled  or  studied 
the  temperature  of  the  Continent.  This  remark  ap- 
plies to  the  Netherlands,  the  north  of  France,  the 
north  of  Germany,  Denmark,  and  even  to  part  of 
Poland,  all  too  similar  to  our  country  in  latitude  and 
vicinity  to  the  sea,  to  escape  a  participation  in  those 
causes  of  deficiency,  whether  arising  from  want  or 
excess  of  rain,  which,  from  time  to  time,  affect  our 
harvests.  But  the  extension  of  tillage  along  the  shores 
of  the  Euxine,  and  the  increased  cultivation  of  the 
United  States,  afford  new  sources  of  supply ;  these 
countries  are  distant,  indeed,  and  the  amount  of  im- 
port from  them,  must,  from  the  cost  of  conveyance, 
necessarily  be  limited ;  but  as  it  will  proceed  from 
climates  not  likely  to  be  affected  by  the  causes  which 
lead  to  deficient  crops  in  the  north-west  of  Europe, 
it  will  of  course  be  available  in  the  day  of  need. 

These  different  inferences,  whether  deduced  from 
historical  or  geographical  authority,  may  be  admitted 
by  the  adherents  of  Mr.  Malthus,  and  when  viewed 
in  connexion  with  our  present  abundance  of  subsist- 
ence, may  be  allowed  of  a  nature  to  relieve  a  few 
generations  from  the  apprehension  of  scarcity ;  but 
the  anti-populationists  will  still  contend  that  their 
principle  is  correct,  and  that  a  time  must  come  when 
the  world  will  be  exposed  to  the  misery  of  over  po- 
pulation. The  argument  is  thus  brought  to  a  kind  of 
ne  plus  ultra,  but  even  on  this  final  and  decisive  ground 
we  are  not  afraid  to  meet  our  antagonists.  Without 
denying  that  there  is  in  the  womb  of  time,  a  period 
when  population  will  attain  its  complement,  we  con- 
tend that  such  a  period  is  far  more  distant,  and  the 
intermediate  increase  of  our  numbers  likely  to  be  far 
greater  than  enters   into  the  conception   of  either 


228  Population : — 

our  opponents,  or  the  public  at  large.  Nor  does  it 
follow  that  when  such  a  period  shall  arrive,  it  must 
be  necessarily  a  period  of  misery : — but  to  waive  all 
speculation  on  this  mysterious  point,  and  to  confine 
ourselves  to  that  which  is  of  nearer  interest,  we  shall 
briefly  give  our  reasons  for  the  opinion  that  our  pos- 
terity, lor  many  generations  at  least,  are  likely  to  in- 
crease their  numbers  with  less  difficulty  than  has 
been  experienced  by  us  or  our  ancestors. 

1.  Our  fundamental  doctrine,  that  increase  of  pro- 
duce depends  less  on  the  extent  of  newly-culti- 
vated soil,  than  on  the  number  of  hands  employed  on 
the  old,  will  be  found  proof  against  the  severest 
analysis.  It  is  supported  equally  by  the  experience 
of  the  present  age,  and  the  general  evidence  of  his- 
tory :  it  supposes  besides,  a  proportion  between  de- 
mand and  supply, — that  ability  on  the  part  of  labour 
to  obtain  its  reward,  which  corresponds  so  clearly 
with  the  benevolent  ordinations  of  Providence. 

2.  From  the  great  diversity  of  soil  and  climate  in 
the  cultivated  portion  of  the  globe,  scarcity  is  never 
general :  "  when  famine  was  in  other  lands,  in  the  land 
of  Egypt  there  was  bread."  If  this  applied  to  an  age 
when  civilization  extended  over  hardly  ten  degrees  of 
latitude,  how  much  more  does  it  hold  at  present,  and 
how  greatly  do  the  advantages  arising  from  improve- 
ments perpetually  in  progress,  increase  the  power  of 
mankind  to  turn  to  account  the  bounty  of  nature  ? 
Extended  communication  by  water  enables  even  dis- 
tant countries  to  supply  the  deficiency  of  each  other; 
while  in  the  same  territory  improved  methods  of  pre- 
serving corn,  additional  granaries,  augmented  capital, 
all  concur  to  enable  the  inhabitants  to  keep  over  the 
surplus  of  one  year,  as  a  provision  for  the  possible 
failure  of  the  next. 

3.  The  labour  employed  in  raising  subsistence,  be- 
comes progressively  more  effectual,  the  source  of  a 
larger  produce,  as  society  advances.  This  is  evinced 
in  two  ways ;  one,  the  use  of  improved  implements, 
is  obvious  to  the  common  observer :  the  other  the 
supply  of  the  requisite  produce  by  a  smaller*  num- 


Acquisition  of  Subsistence.    x  229 

ber  of  agriculturists  compared  to  other  classes,  is 
less  obvious  and  requires  the  evidence  of  statistical 
documents.  A  census  of  our  ancestors,  taken  a  cen- 
tury and  a  half  ago,  would  have  given,  under  the  head 
of  agriculturists,  above  50  persons  in  100,  instead  of  the 
33  of  the  present  day.  The  majority  of  our  present 
population  are  thus  enabled  to  reside  in  towns  and 
villages,  and  are  rendered  disposable  for  other  pur- 
poses: the  humbler  orders  employ  themselves  in 
supplying  clothing  or  lodging ;  a  higher  class  minis- 
ter to  the  amusements,  the  education,  or  the  luxury 
of  the  rich ;  while  the  highest  of  all  are  exempt  from 
the  necessity  of  following  any  occupation  whatever. 
Confining  our  view  to  the  topic  at  present  under  dis- 
cussion, in  what  light  may  we  consider  the  persons 
who  minister  to  our  luxuries  ?  They  may  be  said  to 
form  a  reserve  of  capital  and  labour  applicable  to 
the  increase  of  subsistence,  in  a  case  of  imperious 
necessity. 

A  population  return  in  France,  or  almost  any  part 
of  the  Continent,  exhibits,  it  is  true,  a  larger  number 
of  residents  in  country  than  in  town,  but  many  of  the 
former  are  producers  of  other  articles  than  food :  the 
flax,  the  hemp,  the  madder  of  their  fields,  the  wool  of 
their  flocks,  the  timber  of  their  forests,  the  hides  of 
their  cattle,  are  all  constituents  of  supply  or  ingre- 
dients of  consumption,  quite  distinct  from  the  raising 
of  provisions. 

4.  As  society  advances,  and  a  part  of  the  lower 
orders  participate  in  the  comfort  of  the  middle 
classes,  food  forms  progressively  a  less  considerable 
proportion  of  their  expenditure.  In  a  population 
like  that  of  Ireland,  the  chief  part  of  France,  and  the 
poorer  counties  of  England,  food  constitutes  above  60 
percent,  of  the  total  family  charge;  but  in  our  more 
populous  rural  districts,  in  our  larger  villages,  and  in 
our  towns  generally,  the  proportion  (see  the  Appen- 
dix, p.  [1 1],)  is  little  above  50  per  cent.  What  does 
this  imply,  but  the  enjoyment  of  greater  comfort  on 
the  part  of  our  lower  orders,  the  possession  of  a  fund 
with  which  to  purchase  clothes  and  furniture  in  years 


230  Population  : — 

of  plenty,  and  to  pay,  in  years  of  scarcity  the  extra 
price  required  for  provisions  ?  Hence,  the  less  severe 
pressure  of  high  prices  of  food  on  a  population,  such 
as  that  of  Holland  or  England,  than  one  devoid,  in  a 
manner,  of  exchangeable  commodities,  such  as  the 
peasantry  of  Poland,  Russia,  or  the  inland  districts  of 
the  Highlands  of  Scotland. 

Ought   Government   to   take  Measures  for  promoting 
Population? — "The  maxim   of  the  politician,"   says 
Mr.  Gray,  "  ought  to  be  to  take  care  of  population,  as 
population  will  take  care  of  subsistence  and  of  every 
other  species  of  supply."     Though  convinced  that 
there  is  much  more  truth  in  this  than  in  most  po- 
litical apophthegms,  we  do  not  go  quite  so  far  as  Mr. 
G.,  and  have  no  wish  to  keep  in  the  back  ground  the 
case  of  a  population  like  that  of  Ireland,  Brittany,  and 
Poland,  in  which  increase  of  numbers  is  attended  by  a 
very  slight  increase  of  comfort  to  the  individual,  or  of 
strength  to  the  public.     Nor  do  we  assert  that  even 
in  a  country  the  most  fortunately  constituted,  increase 
of  population  can  bring  with  it  a  speedy  cure  to  a  dis- 
ordered state  of  productive  industry,  such  as  has  ex- 
isted among  us  since  the  peace.     In  the  case,  for  ex- 
ample, of  agriculturists,  distressed  by  a  superabun- 
dance of  home  growth,  little  relief  is  to  be  anticipated 
from  increase  of  consumers,  because  the  producers 
can  hardly  fail  to  augment  their  numbers  in  an  equal 
proportion,  leaving  relief  to  arise  from  the  extension 
of  home  manufacture,   the  removal  of  hands  from 
country  to  town,  or  other  causes  uncertain  in  the  time 
of  their  occurrence,  and  distinct,  in  a  great  measure, 
from  the  general  increase  of  our  numbers. 

Next,  as  to  men  in  office,  on  whom  Mr.  G.  seems 
to  think  it  incumbent  to  take  measures,  more  or  less 
direct,  to  promote  population,  we  confine  our  exhor- 
tation to  a  passive  course,  satisfied  if  they  do  nothing 
to  obstruct  the  natural  increase  of  numbers.  Let 
them  carefully  guard  their  minds  against  the  notion 
which  so  naturally  follows  the  creed  of  limited  sub- 
sistence :  viz.  that  the  discouragement  of  marriage, 


Europe  taken  collectively. 


231 


or  the  loss  of  lives  in  the  field,  and  in  unhealthy  colo- 
nies, are  not,  in  a  statistical  sense,  a  great  misfortune, 
because  they  operate,  forsooth,  as  checks  to  supera- 
bundant numbers.  In  regard  to  population,  as  to  na- 
tional wealth,  the  plain  rule  is  to  avoid  interference, 
to  take  no  step  for  the  purpose  of  giving  a  new  direc- 
tion to  the  course  of  events,  but  to  remove  obstacles 
wherever  such  have  been  interposed  by  the  mistaken, 
though  well  intended  intervention  of  preceding  legis- 
lators. As  to  town  population,  with  all  our  convic- 
tion of  its  advantage,  both  to  the  individual  and  the 
community,  we  should  infinitely  regret  the  adoption 
of  any  measure  to  increase  its  relative  amount.  Let 
the  tide  flow  in  its  natural  course :  the  duties  of  go- 
vernment evidently  extend  no  farther  than  keeping 
open  the  channel. 

We  shall  now  turn  aside  from  general  reasoning, 
and  direct  the  attention  of  the  reader  to  data  of  a  more 
specific  character,  to  an  estimate  of  the  population 
and  resources  of  the  different  states  of  Europe : 

STATISTICAL  TABLE  OF  EUROPE,  IN  1823. 


Persons 

Taxes 

Proportion  j 

Total 
Population. 

to  a 

and  public 

of  such      j 

square 
mile. 

burdens 
generally. 

burdens 
per  head. 

£.  s.    d. 

Norway,  including-  Finmark 

950,000 

6 

s 

Sweden,  Norway,  and  Swe- 

j 

dish  Lapland  . 

3,600,000 

10 

j 

Sweden,  distinct  from  Nor- 

way and  Swedish  Lapland 

2,600,000 

25 

1,300,000 

0     10     0  ! 

Russia  in  Europe 

37,000,000 

23 

18,000,000 

0       9     9  1 

Scotland;    viz.   the    High- 

lands distinct  from  the  low 

country  . 

30 

Turkey  in  Europe,  not  as- 

certained,   but   probably 

not  above 

8,000,000 

50 

5,000,000 

0     12     6 

Poland,  before  the  partition 

15,000,000 

53 

Poland,   the  present  king- 

1 

dom  of,  distinct  from  the 

provinces      incorporated 

1 

with  the  Austrian,  Rus- 

sian,   and    Prussian    do- 

minions 

2,850,000 

60 

1,200,000 

0       8     0 

Sardinia,  island  of 

520,000 

1     57 

Spain         .... 

11.000,000 

1     60 

6.000,000 

0     11     ft 

232 


Population :- 


Person 

s       Taxes 

Proportion 

Total 

to  a 

and  public 

of  such 

Population. 

square 

burdens 

burdens 

mile. 

generally. 

per  head. 

Denmark,  exclusive  of  Fa- 

£.   4.   d. 

roe  and  Iceland 

1,600,000 

73 

1,300,000 

0     16     3 

Hanover 

1,300,000 

90 

900,000 

0     14    0 

Portugal    .... 

3,700,000 

90 

3,000,000 

0     16     3 

Switzerland,  the  twenty-two 

cantons 

1,750,000 

91 

430,000 

0       5     0 

(The  pecuniary  burden  is 

very    small,    but    the 

Swiss  are  liable  to  mili- 

tary service.) 

Wales        . 

740,000 

96 

The  Austrian  empire,  inclu- 

ding Lombardy,  and  Aus- 

trian Poland  . 

29,000,000 

112 

18,000,000 

0     12     4 

The  Prussian  dominions 

10,500,000 

100 

7,000,000 

0     13     4 

Bavaria     .... 

3,600,000 

120 

2,500,000 

0     14     0 

Sicily,  island  of . 

1,655,000 

132 

Dominions  of  the  king  of 

Sardinia,  viz.  Piedmont, 

part  of  the  Milanese,  the 

Genoese  territory,  Savoy, 

and  the  island  of  Sardinia 

4,000,000 

148 

2,200,000 

0     11     0 

States  of  the  Church  . 

2,450,000 

150 

900,000 

0       7     6 

The  Neapolitan  dominions, 

including  Sicily 

6,700,000 

154 

2,700,000 

0       8     0 

France,  including  Corsica, 

30,700,000 

150 

37,000,000 

1       4     0 

Scotland;  the  low  country 

distinct  from  the    High- 

lands 

150 

2       0     0 

Great  Britain  exclusive  of 

Ireland  (the  taxes  com- 

puted   according  to  the 

value  of   money  on  the 

Continent) 

14,500,000 

165 

40,000,000 

2     15     0 

Wirtemberg 

1,400,000 

170 

1,000,000 

0     14     4 

Saxony      .... 

1,200,000 

170 

900,000 

0     15     0 

Italy,  exclusive  of  Sicily     . 

17,000,000 

179 

Great  Britain  and  Ireland 

collectively    . 

21,500,000 

182 

44,000,000 

2       0     0 

The  Netherlands*      . 

5,300,000 

214 

8,000,000 

1     10     0 

Austrian,  Italy,  or  the  Lom- 

bardo- Venetian  kingdom 

4,000,000 

219 

2,000,000 

0     10     0 

Ionian  islands,  republic 

230,000 

230 

100,000 

0       8     9 

Fingland,distinct  fromWales 

11,600,000 

232" 

36,000,000 

3       2     0 

Ireland      .... 

7,000,000 

237 

4,000,000 

0     11     0 

Holland,  province  of . 

760,000 

362 

West  Flanders  . 

630,000 

420 

East  Flanders    . 

610,000 

554 

Europe  collectively,  about . 

200,000,000 

58     J 

180,000,000 

0     18  0 

*  The  repartition  of  taxation  is  here  very  unequal,  the  Dutch  provinces, 
particularly  those  of  Holland  and  Zealand,  paying  much  more  than  11.  1 0*. 
a  bead ;  the  Belgic  much  less. 


Europe  taken  collectively.  233 

These  returns,  both  as  to  population  and  public 
burdens,  are,  in  general,  taken  from  official  docu- 
ments :  they  require,  however,  a  few  explanations^ 
thus : 

Extent  in  square  Miles. — The  amount  assigned  to 
England,  Scotland,  and  Wales,  is  taken  from  official 
returns,  but  in  regard  to  Ireland,  and  most  parts  of 
the  Continent,  the  statements  are,  in  some  measure, 
conjectural,  and  to  be  considered  only  as  approxi- 
mations. 

Our  Public  Burdens.— The  sum  of  44,000,000/.  as 
the  aggregate  of  our  public  burdens,  may  appear 
greatly  below  the  mark,  but  is  formed  by  two  import 
tant  deductions  from  our  present  payments ;  first,  by 
taking  credit  for  a  farther  reduction  of  our  taxes, 
and,  in  the  next  place,  by  making  an  abatement  (of 
20  per  cent.)  from  the  numerical  amount  of  our  bur- 
dens, to  bring  their  value  on  a  par  with  those  of  the 
Continent,  with  which  they  are  here  compared. 

Taxation  of  Rural  Districts. — It  may  be  objected  to 
the  preceding  table,  that  an  estimate  founded  on 
taxation,  does  not  do  justice  the  property  of  a  rural 
population,  who,  in  many  parts  of  the  Continent, 
seem  almost  to  escape  the  grasp  of  the  exchequer. 
This  exemption,  however,  is  limited  chiefly  to  excise 
dues,  and  is,  in  a  great  measure,  balanced  by  a  heavy 
land-tax,  which,  under  different  names  in  different 
countries,  forms  the  basis  of  continental  taxation, 
and  is  included  in  the  column  of  public  burdens. 

Population  per  Square  Mile. — Mr.  S.  Gray  assumes, 
(Happiness  of  States,  p.  421.)  that  an  individual  for 
every  two  acres,  or  320  persons  for  a  square  mile, 
would  be  a  fair  complement  of  population  for  the 
soil  and  climate  of  Europe.  From  this  rate,  how- 
ever, we  are  still  at  a  great  distance,  having  at- 
tained it  only  in  Flanders  and  Holland :  in  England 
and  Ireland  we  are  likely,  if  we  proceed  as  in  the 

30 


234  Population : — 

present  age,  to  reach  it  in  somewhat  less  than  twenty 
years. 

In  Iceland  the  proportion  is  little  more  than  one 
person  to  a  square  mile,  but  the  lowest  extreme  of 
European  population  is  exhibited  in  Lapland,  where 
there  is  not  more  than  one  inhabitant  to  two  or  three 
square  miles. 

Europe  taken  collectively. — Our  estimate  is  greater  in 
regard  to  population,  and  smaller  in  respect  to  public 
burdens  than  that  which  is  at  present  current  on  the 
authority  of  German  statisticians ;  but  the  latter  made 
their  computation  in  or  before  the  year  1817,  since 
which,  population  has  increased,  and  taxation  has  ex- 
perienced a  partial  reduction. 

If  those  of  our  readers  who  are  familiar  with  his- 
tory,  wHl  compare  the  present  state  of  Europe  in  po- 
pulation and  revenue,  with  what  it  was  two  or  three 
centuries  ago,  they  will  perceive  a  degree  of  exten- 
sion that  is  hardly  credible.  How  feeble  do  we  find 
the  establishments  of  France,  even  when  administer- 
ed by  Sully ;  of  England,  when  guided  by  Burleigh ; 
of  Austria,  when  stimulated  by  the  vigour  of  Charles 
V.,  if  we  compare  them  to  those  of  the  same  powers 
at  the  present  day !  The  army  of  Henry  IV.  of 
France,  was,  when  at  the  highest,  only  40,000  men  : 
the  revenue  of  queen  Elizabeth  was  600,000/.*  Even 
the  Spain  of  Philip  II.,  aided  by  the  mines  of  Ameri- 
ca, is  found,  when  her  revenue  and  her  army  are 
brought  to  the  test  of  accurate  computation,  to  have 
been  on  a  par  with  only  the  second-rate  powers  of 
our  age. 

What  a  striking  example  is  here  afforded  of  the 
tendency  to  rapid  improvement  in  those  communities 
which  have  overcome  the  difficulties  of  primitive 
ignorance,  and  in  which  safety  is  afforded  to  persons 
and  property  !  More  than  that  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Continent  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  received  at  the 

*  Napier's  Supplement  to  the  Encyclop.  Brit,  under  the  heads  of  England 
and  Franre. 


Europe  taken  collectively.  235 

hands  of  their  respective  governors,  since  if  some  so- 
vereigns have  been  distinguished  by  active  measures 
for  promoting  improvement,  the  beneficial  result  of 
their  labours  has  been  balanced  or  more  than  ba- 
lanced by  ambition  and  unnecessary  warfare  on  the 
part  of  their  brethren.  How  much  more  effectually 
would  the  latter  have  consulted,  not  merely  the  hap- 
piness of  their  subjects,  but  the  increase  of  their  po- 
litical power,  had  they  never  unsheathed  the  sword, 
but  been  content  to  allow  individual  industry  to  work 
its  way,  augmenting  the  number  and  wealth  of  the 
community  by  a  silent  but  sure  increase ! 

It  would  be  idle  to  lament  what  cannot  be  recalled ; 
but  in  regard  to  the  future,  we  may  be  allowed  to  in- 
dulge a  hope  that  the  sovereigns  of  the  Continent  will 
pursue  a  more  enlightened  course !  How  wide  a  field 
of  improvement  is  open  to  them,  if  they  will  merely 
labour  to  transfer  to  their  respective  territories  the 
degree  of  agricultural  knowledge  introduced  into  this 
country !  No  Englishman  who  has  not  travelled  can 
form  an  idea  of  the  general  backwardness  of  the  Con- 
tinent, of  the  poverty  of  the  farmers,  the  awkwardness 
of  their  implements,  the  deficiency  of  their  buildings. 
If  we  cross  the  narrow  seas  and  fix  our  attention  on 
the  districts  of  the  Continent  said  to  be  farthest  ad- 
vanced, such  as  Flanders,  Normandy,  or  the  Pays  de 
Eeauce,  we  shall  find  their  machinery  so  rude,  and 
their  work  performed  in  so  great  a  degree  by  manual 
labour,  that  the  productive  powers  of  their  soil  might 
be  doubled  by  the  mere  application  of  the  discove- 
ries and  inventions  that  have  taken  place  in  our  east- 
ern and  northern  counties.  If  we  carry  our  observa- 
tion farther,  and  calculate  how  much  remains  to  be 
done  in  the  neglected  plains  of  Hungary  and  Poland, 
in  the  half-irrigated  provinces  of  Spain,  Italy,  and 
even  the  south  of  France,  the  inference  is,  that  Eu- 
rope, that  boasted  seat  of  cultivation,  is  not  peopled  tp 
the  extent  of  a  fifth  of  the  numbers  it  may  be  render* 
ed  capable  of  supporting. 


2  3 » •»  Population,  8fc. 

The  prospect  of  England. — Let  us  not,  however, 
imagine,  that  the  advancement  of  the  Continent  would 
have  the  effect  of  lessening  the  relative  superiority  of 
this  country ;  on  the  contrary,  those  advantages  which 
have  enabled  us  to  take  the  lead — extent  of  water 
communication,  richness  of  mines,  command  of  capi- 
ta!, superiority  of  civil  institutions,  formed  habits  of 
business, — are  all  calculated  to  confirm  our  pre-emi- 
nence, and  even  to  lead  us  forward  in  a  quicker  ratio 
than  our  neighbours.  To  comprehend  this  fully,  the 
reader  ought  first  to  acquire  the  conviction,  that  na- 
tional improvement  is  likely  to  be  progressive,  and 
has  at  present  no  more  reached  a  limit,  than  it  had 
thirty,  fifty,  or  one  hundred  years  ago.  To  acquiesce 
in  the  notion,  that  the  present  mode  of  tilling  the 
ground,  of  navigating  the  ocean,  or  performing  me- 
chanical labour,  is  the  best  that  can  be  devised,  is  the 
part  of  the  indolent  and  unthinking ;  such  is  the  creed 
of  the  spiritless  Asiatic,  of  the  unenlightened  peasant, 
and  the  almost  equally  unenlightened  manufacturer 
in  many  parts  of  the  Continent  of  Europe.  In  this 
country,  happily  the  discoveries  that  so  rapidly  suc- 
ceed each  other,  afford  a  proof  that  we  have  not  jet 
advanced  half  way  in  the  extension  of  our  national 
resources.  Of  this,  a  more  ample  development  shall 
be  given  in  our  concluding  chapter,  when  we  shall 
show  how  surprisingly  we  have  gained  on  our  politi- 
cal rivals,  in  the  course  of  the  last  century,  and  how 
little  we  have  at  present  to  dread  at  their  hands — 
considerations  calculated  to  confirm  the  public,  in  an 
approval  of  the  pacific  system  which  we  have  now  so 
fortunately  adopted,  and  to  satisfy  the  apprehensive 
among  our  countrymen,  that  with  a  steady  adherence 
to  such  a  course,  the  day  of  trial  in  the  finances  of 
England  will  ere  long  be  surmounted. 


37 


CHAP.  VIII. 

National  Revenue  and  Capital, 

Having  appropriated  several  chapters  to  an  exami- 
nation of  the  condition  of  the  country,  under  the  se- 
parate heads  of  Agriculture,  Population,  and  Poor- 
rate,  we  are  now  to  make  an  attempt  of  a  more  com- 
prehensive nature,  and  to  bestow  a  chapter  on  our 
National  Revenue  and  Capital  generally.  This  will 
lead  us  to  discuss 

The  amount  of  our  taxable  income. 

The  connexion  between  its  increase  and  the  in- 
crease of  our  population ;  and  lastly, 

The  fluctuations  it  has  experienced  in  the  thirty 
years  that  have  elapsed  since  the  French  Revolution. 

Estimate,  by  the  late  Mr.  Colquhoun,  of  Property  created  in  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  in  the  year  1812. 

Agriculture  in  all  its  branches   (including"  pasture,)    .  £217,000,000 

Mines  and  minerals,  including  coals   ....  9,000,000 

Manufactures  in  every  branch            ...             .             .  114,000,000 

Inland  trade  and  banking       .             .                           .             .  35,000,000 

Foreign  commerce  and  shipping         ....  46,000,000 

Coasting  trade            ...                           .  2,000,000 

Fisheries,  exclusive  of  the  colonial  fisheries  of  Newfoundland,  2,000,000 

Foreign  income  remitted        .....  5,000,000 


Total  .  .  .  430,000,000 


Such  was  the  amount  of  the  property  created  in 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland  in  1812 ;  since  which  there 
have  occurred  two  very  material  changes, — a  great 
increase  in  the  quantity,  and  a  still  greater  decrease 
in  the  prices.  The  latter,  in  the  case  of  agriculture 
amounts  to  60  per  cent. ;  in  that  of  manufactures  to 
40  or  50  per  cent ;  but  as  Mr.  Colquhoun's  estimate 
was  made  greatly  below  the  currency  of  the  time, 
20,  or  at  the  utmost,  25  per  cent,  will  form  a  suffi- 


238  National  Revenue, 

cient  deduction  from  its  amount.  To  this  we  find  an 
ample  counterpoise  in  the  increase  of  quantity  arising 
from 

The  additional  produce  on  the  part  of  the  hands 
restored  to  labour  by  the  peace ; 

The  increase  of  our  population  since  1812  ;  and 

The  progress  of  improvement  in  agriculture  and 
manufactures,  by  which  the  same  number  of  hands 
are  enabled  to  produce  a  considerably  larger  quan- 
tity. 

The  result,  therefore,  is,  that  even  at  reduced 
prices,  the  value  of  the  produce  of  the  present  year, 
equals  or  exceeds  that  of  1812;  but  as  Mr.  Col- 
quhoun's  calculation  included,  under  the  head  of  agri- 
culture, a  very  large  sum  for  produce,  such  as  oats, 
hay,  grass,  &c.  appropriated  to  the  food  of  horses  and 
cattle,  and  as  our  object  is  to  confine  our  table  to  ar- 
ticles for  the  consumption  of  man,  or  for  the  purposes 
of  manufacture,  we  assume  the  total  at  350,000,000/. 
That  sum,  then,  we  consider  as  representing  the 
amount  of  the  property  annually  created  in  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland ;  in  other  words,  the  amount  of 
our  annual  production. 

Of  this  large  sum,  what  proportion,  in  this  land  of 
taxes,  can  be  considered  as  exempt  from  the  visit  of 
the  assessor  ?  About  25  per  cent.,  as  appears  from 
the  calculations  in  the  Appendix,  leaving  for  our  tax- 
able income,  somewhat  more  than  260,000,000.  Thus, 

Estimate  of  our  Taxable  Income  in  1823. 

(Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland.) 
Rent  of  land  returned  in  1814,  at  43,000,000/. 

and  probably  amounting,  after  allowing'  for 

all  deductions,  omissions,  and  evasions  in  the 

returns,  to .  .  •  .  .     £48,000,000 

Add  for  land  brought  into  culture  since  the 

peace         .....         2,000,000 

Together       .  .       50,000,000 

Deduct  for  all  abatements  of  rent  since  the 
peace,  made,  making,  or  which  must  ere 
long  be  made,  one  third,  or  33  per  cent.  17,000,000 


Probable  rental  in  peace  [Carried  forward]   33,000,000 


National  Revenue. 


239 


Brought  forward         33,000,000 
Peduct  further  for  temporary  deficiencies  on 
the  part  of  farmers  at  this  time  of  peculiar 
pressure     .....  3,000,000 


£30,000,000 

4,000,000 

17,000,000 

12,000,000 


Tithe;  amount  in  1812  (see  Returns  of  Property  Tax, 
4,700,000/. ;  at  present  computed,  after  making-  an  addi- 
tion for  the  increase  of  produce,  and  an  abatement  for  the 
great  fall  of  prices  ..... 

Rental  of  houses,  returned  at  nearly  16,000,000/.  in  1814, 
since  which,  the  houses  have  augmented  in  number  by  15 
per  cent.,  and  as  rents  have  fallen  only  partially,  we  com- 
pute the  amount  at  .... 

Farming  income,  which,  during  the  latter  years  of  the  war, 
was  so  large  as  to  equal  the  rental  of  our  land,  but  which 
is  at  present  so  greatly  reduced,  we  estimate,  with  a  view 
to  the  future,  at  the  medium  rate  of  6  per  cent,  on 
200,000,000/.,  the  supposed  amounted  of  capital  invested 
in  agriculture        ...... 

Income  from  trade  and  professions,  comprising  not  only  ma- 
nufacturing and  mercantile  profits,  but  income  from  mines, 
docks,  canals,  tolls,  iron-works ;  likewise  salaries,  as  far 
as  derived  from  the  concerns  of  individuals ;  to  the  exclu-  , 
sion,  however,  of  all  incomes  below  50/.  a  year.  This  por- 
tion of  our  national  revenue,  returned  during  the  war  at 
30,000,000/.,  and  which,  if  augmented  in  proportion  to  the 
increase  of  our  numbers,  should  at  present  be  35,000,000/., 
we  compute,  in  consequence  of  the  change  in  the  value  of 
money,  and  the  decrease  of  business,  at  a  great  reduction,say      22,000,000 

Wages  and  all  incomes  below  50/.  a  year,  computed  on  a  po- 
pulation, which,  (exclusive  of  Ireland)  is  now  nearly 
15,000,000,  but  from  which  somewhat  more  than  a  third  is 
deducted  for  persons  either  above  or  below  the  station  of 
those  receiving  wages.  This  large  deduction  comprises 
not  merely  paupers,  but  cottagers  and  all  others  whose 
mode  of  life  is  such  as  to  lead,  in  a  very  slight  degree,  to 
the  consumption  of  taxed  articles.  The  result,  estimated 
on  a  population  of  9,000,000  working  at  the  reduced  wages 
of  peace,  but  adding  the  earnings  of  women  and  children  to 
those  of  the  men,  is  ....  .       90,000,000 

Interest  of  our  debt,  funded  and  unfunded,  since  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  5  per  cents.      .....       30,000,000 

Conjectural  amount  of  interest  from  other  money  securities  ; 
viz.  mortgages,  private  securities  generally;  also  public 
securities,  such  as  bank  stock,  East  India  stock,  foreign 
stock,  in  short,  all  securities  distinct  from  those  of  our  go- 
vernment. ......       20,000,000 

Income  of  the  army,  navy,  civil  list,  and  public  offices,  after 
allowing  for  the  late  retrenchments,  and  leaving  out  the 
proportion  expended  in  Ireland     ....       15,000,000 

Total  of  Great  Britain          .....  240,000,000 
Ireland :    taxable    income    computed   during    the  war    at 

35,000,000/.;  at  present  at            ....  25,000,000 

(See  Appendix  p.  [79].) 

Total  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland   ....  265,000,000 
Of  which,  lost  to  taxation,  being  expended  abroad  by  travel- 
lers and  emigrants                         ....  4,000,000 
Remainder            .  261,000,000 


240  National  Revenue, 

Ireland. — The  total  produce  of  land  and  labour  in 
Ireland  cannot,  from  the  magnitude  of  the  population, 
be  below  70,000,000/.  a  year,  but  the  cottagers  are  so 
numerous  and  their  mode  of  living  so  inferior  to  that 
of  the  inhabitants  of  towns,  that  the  portion  of  nation- 
al income  expended  on  taxed  articles  can  hardly, 
(particularly  since  the  fall  of  rents,  and  the  general 
decline  of  incomes,)  exceed  the  25,000,000/.  which 
we  have  introduced  into  the  table. 

Increase  of  National  Income  since  1792. — The  last  thir- 
ty years  have  been  a  period  equally  remarkable  for 
financial  as  for  political  revolutions.  Do  we,  it  may 
be  asked,  possess  the  means  of  forming,  with  any  de- 
gree of  accuracy,  an  estimate  of  the  increase  of  na- 
tional income  since  1792  ?  Such  an  estimate,  whether 
in  peace  or  war,  is  a  matter  of  great  difficulty :  the 
improvements  in  our  land,  our  houses,  our  furniture ; 
the  additions  to  our, towns,  our  harbours,  our  manu- 
facturing establishments,  in  the  present  age,  are  ob- 
vious, and  have  been  great  beyond  example ;  but  as 
no  record  can  express  the  amount  of  expenditure  in- 
curred, or  the  success,  necessarily  very  various,  of 
such  investments  of  capital,  it  remains  with  the  in- 
quirer to  seek  a  standard  of  computation.  For  this 
we  are  in  some  measure  prepared  by  the  researches 
in  the  preceding  chapters ;  and  by  following  up  that 
course  of  reasoning  we  shall  probably  be  enabled  to 
reduce  to  a  systematic  form  that  which  seems  at  pre- 
sent involved  in  contradiction.  The  cause  of  the 
changes  since  1792,  we  are  disposed  to  seek  in — 

Fluctuations  in  the  activity  of  our  productive  in- 
dustry ; 

Fluctuations  in  the  value  of  money ; 

The  increase  of  population. 

Of  these  different  causes  the  first  and  second  have 
already  been  illustrated  (Chap.  II.  and  III.)  at  consi- 
derable length  ;  and  whatever  maybe  wanting  in  re- 
gard to  them  shall  be  supplied  in  a  subsequent  part 
of  our  volume.     At  present,  therefore,  we  confine  our 


National  Revenue.  241 

attention  to  the  effect  of  the  third  cause, — increase  of 
numbers ; — adopting  the  principles  laid  down  in  our 
chapter  on  Population,  and  applying,  or  endeavouring 
to  apply  them,  to  the  circumstances  of  the  present 
age. 

Connexion  between  the  increase  of  Numbers  and  increase 
of  National  Income. — We  have  already  remarked  that 
no  adherent  of  Mr.  Maithus,  whatever  might  be  his 
objection  to  increase  of  numbers,  has  alleged  that  our 
lower  orders  have  made  a  descent  in  the  scale  of 
comfort ;  nor  does  the  surprising  increase  of  our  po- 
pulation in  the  present  age  appear  (Chapter  on  Poor 
Rate,  p.  191.)  to  have  carried  the  proportion  of  our 
paupers  to  our  total  numbers,  much  beyond  what  it 
was  a  century  ago.  We  are  far  from  maintaining  that 
marriages  in  humble  life  are  contracted  with  the  re- 
quisite prudence,  or  that  the  parents  of  a  numerous 
family  can  avoid  a  long  and  serious  struggle :  our  ar- 
gument merely  is,  that  the  situation  of  the  lower  class- 
es generally,  is  not  altered  for  the  worse.  It  is  the 
characteristic  of  a  civilized  and  industrious  society, 
like  the  inhabitants  of  Holland,  England,  or  Scotland, 
to  make  successive  discoveries  in  the  means  both  of 
augmenting  produce  and  diminishing  expense ;  im- 
provements by  which,  whether  effected  in  agricul- 
ture, manufacture,  navigation,  or  trade,  a  country  is 
enabled  to  support  many  more  inhabitants  in  equal 
comfort.  Increase  of  numbers  therefore  is,  even  in 
the  case  of  the  lower  orders,  conducive  to  increase 
of  taxable  income ;  for  we  have  already  had  occa- 
sion to  show  what  large  sums  are  annually  brought 
into  the  exchequer  by  the  duties  on  beer,  spirits,  to- 
bacco, groceries;  all  of  which  enter  into  the  con- 
sumption of  the  classes  in  question,  particularly  when 
resident  in  towns. 

The  lowest  class  of  Poor. — How,  it  may  be  asked, 
stands  the  question  of  increase  of  income,  in  regard 
to  a  population  of  such  primitive  habits  as  the  cot- 
tagers of  Ireland,  or  the  mountaineers  of  Scotland,  ac- 
customed to  confine  their  demands  to  mere  subsis- 

31 


242  National  Revenue, 

tence  ?  In  such  a  case,  an  increase  of  numbers  im- 
plies a  correspondent  increase,  not  of  taxable  income, 
but  of  the  produce  which,  like  potatoes  or  bread, 
constitutes  the  mere  necessaries  of  life ;  and  the  re- 
sult is  an  addition  to  our  population  of  individuals, 
who,  though  able  to  earn  their  subsistence,  can  be  said 
to  add  to  our  political  strength  in  hardly  any  other 
sense  than  as  recruits  for  the  public  service,  or  as 
mere  manual  labourers,  being  unable  to  make  the  sa- 
crifice requisite  for  learning  the  business  of  an  artisan. 
The  connexion  between  increase  of  numbers,  and 
increase  of  wealth,  will  appear  more  clearly,  if  we 
have  recourse  to  arithmetical  statement,  and  if  we 
subject  to  an  analysis  the  250,000,000/.  constituting 
the  taxable  income  of  the  nation.  This  will  exhibit 
the  following  proportions. 

Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 
(Taxable  Income,  exclusive  of  the  pay  of  the  Army  and  Navy.) 

Arising-  from  wages  and  salaries,  and  of  course,  directly  af- 
fected by  increase  of  population  -  £100,000,000 

From  capital  and  labour  combined,  a  portion  of  national  in- 
come, which  also  is  much  increased  by  increase  of  popu- 
lation - 50,000,000 

From  rent  of  land,  houses,  or  interest  of  money,  which  are 
influenced,  though  indirectly,  and  in  an  inferior  degree, 
by  the  increase  of  numbers  -  100,000,000 


Total      -         -         250,000,000 

That  the  increase  of  taxable  income,  as  far  as  such 
arises  from  wages  and  salaries,  is  in  correspondence 
with  the  increase  of  our  numbers,  requires  no  demon- 
stration :  the  same  holds  in  regard  to  professional 
men,  to  merchants,  to  master  manufacturers ;  in  short, 
in  respect  to  every  line  in  which  income  depends  on 
personal  exertion.  Thus,  land  in  the  hands  of  the  far- 
mer, like  money  in  those  of  the  merchant,  is  produc- 
tive in  proportion  to  the  labour  which  it  is  made  to  put 
in  motion.  So  far  the  connexion  is  clear  and  undoubt- 
ed ;  the  case,  it  may  be  said,  is  somewhat  different  in 
regard  to  a  fixed  income,  whether  derived  from  real  or 
personal  property ;  but  even  in  that,  the  effect  of  in- 
creasing numbers   is   great,  producing,  as   is   well 


National  Revenue.  243 

known,  an  increasing  demand  for  both  land  and  mo- 
ney capital.  In  proof  of  this,  we  have  merely  to  take, 
as  an  example,  the  almost  daily  case  of  a  family  be- 
coming numerous  ;  the  consequent  repartition  of  the 
paternal  property,  and  the  increase  of  productive 
power  given  to  the  portion  that  is  put  in  a  state  of 
activity. 

Fluctuations  of  Income  since  1792. — These  arguments 
will  readily  be  accounted  applicable  in  a  general 
sense,  and  for  ordinary  times  ;  but  what  shall  furnish 
a  rule  for  computing  national  income  in  so  fluctuating 
a  period  as  that  through  which  we  have  passed  since 
1792?  The  question  is  certainly  very  complicated, 
and  seems  at  first  to  admit  of  no  clear  solution;  for  while 
a  calculator,  in  forming  an  estimate  twelve  or  fifteen 
years  ago,  could  hardly  have  failed  to  pronounce  the 
war  highly  favourable  to  the  increase  of  our  wealth 
(our  debt  forming  apparently  no  counterpoise  to  the 
increase  of  our  resources),  a  statement  prepared  since 
our  years  of  distress  would  convey  a  very  different 
result.  In  France,  the  revolution  has  been  styled, 
the  "  queen  of  all  earthly  reverses ;"  but  we  might 
almost  hazard  an  opinion  that  the  effect  of  that  con- 
vulsion, viewed  in  regard  to  change  of  property  and 
in  all  the  extent  of  its  duration  (now  above  thirty 
years),  has  been  as  great  in  this  country  as  in  that 
which  gave  it  birth.  Among  our  neighbours,  the 
change  was  more  sudden,  directed  more  against  a 
particular  class,  and  bringing  with  it,  too  often,  the 
melancholy  consequence  of  loss  of  life ;  but  with  us 
it  has  been  more  comprehensive,  for  the  alteration 
in  the  value  of  money  has  come  home  to  every  class 
and  condition.  If  in  France,  government  annuitants 
suffered  during  the  war  a  much  greater  reduction 
than  here,  there  is  no  comparison  between  the  two 
countries  in  the  extent  of  fluctuation  in  the  circum- 
stances of  a  far  more  numerous  class — the  farmers. 
Their  prosperity  during  the  war  and  their  decline 
since  the  peace,  have  both  been  much  more  in  ex- 
tremes among  us,  than  on  the  Continent. 


244  "National  Revenue, 

An  Estimate  of  them  attempted. — Amidst  all  these 
changes  in  individual  property,  is  it  practicable  to 
discover  any  rules  of  general  application,  any  data 
on  which  to  found  a  comparison  of  the  circumstances 
of  the  public  of  the  present  day  with  those  of  the 
public  of  1806  or  1792  ?  This  task  may,  perhaps,  be 
found  less  difficult  than  it  appears.  In  a  community 
so  great  and  so  varied  as  the  population  of  these  king- 
doms, the  ease  of  one  part  is  often  contemporary  with 
the  embarrassment  of  another;  and  there  prevails, 
in  the  general  result,  a  tendency  to  a  balance,  an  ap- 
proach to  uniformity  which  would  hardly  be  credited 
by  those  who,  in  drawing  their  inferences,  allow  them- 
selves to  be  forcibly  struck  by  the  fluctuation  of  par- 
ticular classes.  It  was  thus  that  our  revenue  stood  its 
ground  during  all  the  trials  of  the  Avar  and  the  no  less 
trying  interval  that  has  followed:  it  is  thus,  also, 
that  the  amount  of  our  exports  and  imports  has  con- 
tinued to  bear  a  proportion  to  two  regulating  circum- 
stances (the  value  of  money  and  the  increase  of  our 
population),  amid  all  the  anomalies,  introduced  by 
restrictions,  prohibitions,  licences :  it  is  thus  that  at 
present,  the  distress  of  the  producer  of  corn,  is  ac- 
companied by  a  temporary  advantage  to  the  con- 
sumer. The  political  arithmetician  is,  therefore,  in 
some  measure,  justified  in  forming  a  conclusion, 
which,  without  this  collateral  support,  might  appear 
vague  and  untenable ;  viz.  "  That  though  the  cir- 
cumstances of  individuals,  separately,  are  so  much 
altered  since  1792,  those  of  any  given  number, 
whether  100,  1000,  or  10,000,  are  more  nearly  on  a 
par  than  is  generally  supposed." 

This  reasoning  is  calculated  to  lead  to  the  infer- 
ence, that  our  national  income,  (at  least  that  of 
Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland),  has  increased 
since  1792  in  the  ratio  of  the  increase  of  our  popula- 
tion. We  have,  however,  no  wish  to  press  this  point, 
it  being  of  little  consequence  to  our  argument,  whe- 
ther the  proportion  of  the  one,  has  been  greater  or 
Jess  than  that  of  the  other.  It  is  enough  that  we  ob- 
tain assent  to  one  leading  consideration,  viz.  that  the 


National  Revenue.  245 

surprising  addition  to  our  numbers  since  1792  (50 
per  cent.)  is,  as  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  unaccom- 
panied by  any  general  deterioration  of  private  cir- 
cumstances. The  changes  in  such  circumstances 
have  been  almost  infinite,  but  there  seems  no  reason 
to  imagine  that  the  number  of  families  or  individu- 
als, who  have  experienced  a  decline,  exceeds  that  of 
those  who  have  improved  their  circumstances. 

But  are  we,  it  may  be  said,  authorized  to  assume  an 
equality  in  the  individual  income  of  this  country  be- 
tween 1792,  a  season  of  tranquillity,  and  the  pre- 
sent, which  is  one  of  general  embarrassment ?  To 
this  argument,  unluckily  of  great  weight,  we  oppose 
one  of  equal,  or  almost  equal  power;  viz.  the  great 
comparative  increase  of  our  town  population,  the 
extent  of  which,  as  income  increases  so  much  more  in  town 
than  in  the  country  (Chapter  on  Population,  p.  225.) 
would  have  justified  us,  had  our  present  circum- 
stances been  as  tranquil  and  secure  as  in  1792,  in  as- 
suming an  increase  of  national  property  considerably 
beyond  that  of  the  50  per  cent,  indicated  by  our 
numbers. 

Without,  therefore,  affecting  precision  in  a  calcula- 
tion where  it  is  evidently  unattainable,  we  shall  adopt 
the  increase  of  our  numbers,  as  an  approximation  to  a 
basis  for  calculating  the  increase  of  our  national  reve- 
nue. Proceeding  on  this  ground,  we  shall  exhibit  in 
the  tabular  form,  the  augmentation  that  has  taken 
place  since  1792,  premising  that  our  chief  materials 
are  the  population  and  property-tax  returns,  and  that 
for  the  period  of  war,  we  make  a  considerable  addi- 
tion on  the  score  of  extra  wages  and  profits. 


246  Natiotial  Revenue  ; 

Conjectural  Amount  of  our  National  Revenue  or  Taxable  Income  at  different 
Periods, from  1792  to  1822. 

Great  Britain  distinct  from  Money  of         Totals,  also  m 

Ireland.  1792.  Money  of  1792. 

In  1792,  our  taxable  income  appears  to  have 

been  as  stated  in  p.  54.  about  £125,000,000 

In  1806:  increase  calculated  in  the  ratio  of 
the  increase  of  our  populution,  1 8  per  cent. 
in  14  years  -  22,500,000 


Together      -  -  -  -     147,500,000 

Probable  addition  from  the  higher  wages  and 
higher  profits  of  a  state  of  war      -  -       22,500,000 


Total  of  taxable  income  in  1806       -  -  170,000,000 

In  1813  or  1814:  Increase  of  national  in- 
come since  1806,  calculated  in  the  ratio  of 
the  increase  of  population,  1 1  per  cent. ; 
thus : — 

National  income  in  1806,  as  above  -        147,500,000 


Add  11  percent.     -  16,500,000 

Together  -  164,000,000 


Probable  addition  from  the  higher  wages  and 
higher  profits  of  a  state  of  war       -  -      24,000,000 

Total  of  taxable  income  in  1813  or  1814      -  188,000,000 

Great-Britain  and  Ireland. 

1823.     Increase  of  taxable  income  in  the 

ratio  of  the  population,  15  per  cent,  since 

1814;  thus:— 
Amount  in  1814       -  164,000,000 

Add  15  per  cent.      -  24,000,000 

Add  farther  the  taxable  income  of  Ireland, 

25,000,000/.  equal  in  money  of  1792  to    -      21,000,000 


Total  of  our  taxable  income  in  1823,    (in 
money  of  1792)    -  209,000,000 

These  results,  which,  we  repeat,  are  only  approxi- 
mations, convey  a  clear  idea  of  the  effect  of  increasing 
population  on  national  income.  The  next  point  is, 
the  difference  of  numerical  amount  produced  by  the 
rise  or  fall  in  the  value' of  money. 


its  Increase  since  1792. 


247 


Great  Britain  distinct  Money  of    Money  of  subse- 

Jreland.  1792.  quent  years. 

1792  :  Taxable  income  as  per  preceding  ta- 
ble £125,000,000 

1805 :  Do.  per  do.  -  -  -  -     170,000,000 

After  the  general  rise  of  prices  that  took  place 
between  1792  and  1806,  170,000,000Z.  in 
money  of  1792,  was  in  the  transactions  of 
1806,  equivalent  to  -  -     %  220,000,000 

And  an  actual  return  of  our  national  revenue 
or  taxable  income  in  the  currency  of  1806, 
would  probably  have  given  a  sum  of 
220,000,000/. 

1813  or  1814 :  Taxable  income  as  in  last  page     188,000,000 

The  rise  of  prices,  in  all  60  per  cent,  since 
1792,  rendered  this  sum  equal  in  all  money 
transactions  in  1813  and  1814,  to  nearly  300,000,000 


Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 

1823.  Taxable  income,  as  in  last  page 
The  calculation  in  regard  to  the  value  of  mo- 
ney is  now  reversed,  prices  having  fallen, 
or,  in  other  words,  money  having  risen  in 
value  between  1814  and  1823,  nearly  30 
per  cent.  Still  it  is  about  30  per  cent, 
lower  than  in  1792,  so  that  the  last  men- 
tioned sum  209,000,000/.  (money  of  1792), 
is  equal  in  the  currency  of  1 822,  to  about 
A  sum  not  materially  different  from  the 
amount  of  the  table  of  taxable  income 
contained  in  p.  239. 


209,000,006 


270,000,000 


Our  next  object  is  to  introduce  our  burdens  into 
this  comparative  table,  and  to  calculate  their  propor- 
tion at  different  periods  to  our  revenue. 

Statement  of  our  Public  Burdens  and  National  Revenue,  cal- 
culated for  distinct  periods.  The  Public  Burdens  include 
Taxes,  (before  deducting  the  expense  of  collection),  Poor- 
rate,  and  Tithe. 


Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland. 


Years. 


Public  Burdens. 


Our  National  Re- 
venue or  Taxable 
Income. 


Proportion  of  Bur- 
den to  Revenue. 


1792. 
1806. 
1814. 

1823. 


£125,000,000  nearly  18  to  100 
220,000,000  27  to  100 

300,000,000  27  to  100 

Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  {see  Appendix,  p.  [85].) 

I       64,000,000)     260,000,000|  25  to  100 


£22,000,000 
60,000,000 
80,000,000 


248 


National  Revenue  ; 


That  we  may  divest  this  statement  of  the  intrica- 
cies attendant  on  the  difference  in  the  value  of  money 
at  different  periods,  we  subjoin  a  table,  in  which  the 
-urns  on  both  6ides  are  reduced  to  a  common  stand- 
ard, viz.  the  money  of  1792. 


Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland. 


Years. 


Public  Bur- 
dens, in  Money 
of  1792. 


Out  .National  Re- 
venue or  Taxable 
Income  in  Money 
of  1792. 


Proportion  of  Burdens 
to  Revenue. 


1792  £22,000,000  £125,000,000  nearly  18  to  100 

1806  46,000,000i     170,000,000  27  to  100 

1814  50,000,000]     188,000,000  27  to  100 

Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  [see  Appendix,  p.  [85.]) 
1823       |       50,000,000|     200,000,000)  25  to  100 


The  reduction  to  a  common  standard  is  useful  in 
several  respects,  particularly  in  correcting  the  exag- 
gerated estimate,  which,  during  the  war,  we  were 
accustomed  to  make  of  both  our  burdens  and  our  re- 
sources. 

France;  her  Actional  Income. — We  conclude  our 
chapter  by  a  brief  parallel  between  this  country  and 
her  most  powerful  neighbour.  The  national  income, 
by  which  we  mean  the  aggregate  of  individual  income, 
is,  in  one  sense,  somewhat  greater  in  France  than  in 
this  country ;  but  in  regard  to  the  portion  of  it  that 
is  taxable,  the  advantage  will  be  found  on  our  side, 
in  consequence,  chiefly,  of  our  greater  town  popula- 
tion; thus. 


Parallel  with  France. 


249 


Comparative  Sketch  of  National  Income,  expended  on 
taxed  Articles. 


• 

France,  after 
adding  to  the 

Great  Britain 

actual  receipts 

and 

20  per  cent,  for  the 

Ireland. 

greater  value  of 
money. 

£. 

£. 

Rent  of  land  and  farmer's  profit  at 

peace  prices    - 

50,000,000 

60,000,000 

Tithe     - 

5,000,000 

Rent  of  houses   - 

13,000,000 

18,000,000 

Income  arising-  from  commerce, 

manufactures,  and  professions, 

as  far  as  such  are  of  50/.  and  up- 

wards ;  also  income  from  mines, 

docks,  canals,  tolls,  &c. 

24,000,000 

18,000,000 

Small  incomes,  (below  50/.)  and 

wages  of  all  accustomed  to  con- 

sume  taxed  articles,  as  beer, 

tea,   sugar,  tobacco,   in  Eng- 

land ;  or  wine,  cider,  tobacco, 

sugar,  coffee,  in  France 
Together 

100,000,000 

110,000,000 

197,090,000 

206,000,000 

Such  is  the  amount  of  income 

arising  from  the  land  and  labour 

of  either  country.     To  this  we 

now  make  an  addition  of  great  im- 

portance as  a  source  of  taxation, 

whatever  may  be  thought  of  it  as 

a  constituent  of  national  wealth. 

Income  from  money  in  the  public 

funds,  or  lent  on  private  securi- 

rities  - 

50,000,000 

25,000,000 

Received  from  government,  dis- 

tinct from  the  interest  of  the 

public  debt;    viz.    the  pay  of 

the  army,  the  navy,  the  public 

offices,  the  civil  list,   the  mis- 

cellaneous services,  after  allow- 

ing for  the  late  reductions 
Total  taxable  income* 

18,000,000 

19,000,000 

265,000,000 

250,000,000 

*  Any  discrepancies  between  this  column  and  that  in  page  248,  arise  from 
the  latter  exhibiting  the  returns  of  Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland. 


Wages. — To  put  the  two  countries  so  nearly  on  a 
par  in  regard  to  wages,  may  seem  hardly  fair  towards 
France,  superior  as  that  country  is  in  population* 

32 


250      National  Revenue ; — Parallel  with  France. 

and  reduced  as  wages  in  some  measure  have  been,  and 
are  likely  to  be  among  us.  But  in  a  calculation  of 
national  revenue,  the  magnitude  of  the  population  of 
France  ought,  in  a  great  measure,  to  be  kept  in  the 
back  ground,  many  millions  being  cottagers,  who,  as 
in  Ireland,  do  little  more  than  maintain  themselves  on 
their  petty  occupancies,  consuming  few  articles  pro- 
ductive to  the  exchequer,  and  adding  little  to  the  na- 
tional strength,  otherwise  than  by  recruits  for  the 
military  service.  Wages  are  highest  among  a  town 
population,  in  which  England  takes  greatly  the  lead. 
Add  to  this,  that  in  all  Catholic  countries  there  is 
a  considerable  loss  of  wages  from  holidays. 

Rent  of  Houses. — In  this  respect,  France  was  for- 
merly entitled  to  rank  before  us ;  but  houses  in  a 
rural  district  yield  very  little  rent :  and  while  French 
towns  are  comparatively  stationary,  ours  have  been 
and  continue  in  a  state  of  rapid  increase. 

Comparative  Prospects  of  England  and  France — This 
interesting  question  shall  be  discussed  at  considera- 
ble length  in  our  chapter  on  Finance. 


■i:>\ 


CHAP.  IX. 

Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  Property,  individual 
and  national. 

The  researches  we  have  already  had  occasion  to 
make  in  regard  to  our  agriculture  and  national  reve- 
nue, prepare  us,  in  a  considerable  degree,  for  the 
farther  and  more  comprehensive  inquiry  to  which 
this  chapter  is  appropriated.  In  the  investigations 
connected  with  it,  we  shall  studiously  avoid  discussing 
the  policy  or  impolicy  of  our  great  contest ;  the  prac- 
ticability of  avoiding  it  in  the  outset,  or  of  terminating 
it  in  an  earlier  stage.  We  shall  avoid,  in  like  man- 
ner, any  parallel  between  the  magnitude  of  our  sacri- 
fices on  the  one  hand,  and  the  benefit  resulting  on  the 
other  from  restoring  the  equilibrium  of  the  Continent. 
Nothing,  indeed,  would  be  more  hopeless  than  an 
attempt  to  produce  any  thing  like  uniformity  of 
opinion  on  such  a  subject.  The  oppositionist,  in  his 
review  of  the  events  of  the  last  thirty  years,  takes 
little  account  of  the  danger  that  arose  after  1795,  from 
the  aggrandizing  spirit  of  the  French  government ; 
nor,  while  urging,  and  urging  justly,  the  insignificance 
to  us  of  most  causes  of  continental  quarrel,  does  he 
make  due  allowance  for  the  importance  of  the  Neth- 
erlands, and  the  alarming  addition  which  their  pos- 
session made  to  the  power  of  France.  The  ministe- 
rialist, on  the  other  hand,  is  equally  confident  and 
indiscriminating,  making  no  admission  of  the  occa- 
sions on  which  (as  in  1793  and  1807)  our  govern- 
ment acted  an  aggressive  part,  and  justifying  the  at- 
tack on  Copenhagen  as  he  would  the  defence  of 
Spain.  From  the  delusion  that  the  war  was  a  source 
of  permanent  wealth,  we  now  begin  to  be  awakened ; 
but,  in  other  respects,  we  are  yet  far  distant  from  the 
time  when  the  public  shall  be  enabled  to  view  the 


252  Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  Property, 

transactions  of  this  eventful  age  with  the  calmness  of 
historical  inquiry.  It  will  be  for  a  succeeding  gene- 
ration to  appreciate,  on  the  one  hand,  the  ferment 
produced  by  the  French  Revolution ;  on  the  other, 
the  course  by  which  our  political  guides,  had  they 
been  aware  of  the  little  dependence  to  be  placed  on 
foreign  allies,  and  of  the  aid  to  be  derived  for  the 
maintenance  of  order  from  the  upper  and  middle 
classes  at  home,  might  have  endeavoured  to  cond  uct 
our  affairs  during  the  period  of  alarm.  The  hazard- 
ous alternative  of  an  appeal  to  arms  would  probably 
have  been  avoided,  had  our  councils  been  guided  by 
a  Burleigh  or  a  Walpole  ;  or  had  he  who  was  placed 
at  our  helm  in  those  critical  times,  been  of  an  age  to 
derive  from  personal  reflection  and  experience  that 
knowledge  in  which  he  was  necessarily  deficient, 
and  the  want  of  which  was  so  feebly  supplied  by  the 
coadjutors  with  whom  our  system  of  parliamentary 
influence  obliges  a  minister  to  become  connected. 

Political  Economists. — The  discrepancy  that  pre- 
vails among  politicians  is  equally  remarkable  among 
political  economists.  To  the  follower  of  Smith 
and  Say,  all  war  seems  impolitic  and  unnecessary; 
in  his  eyes,  the  whole  of  military  array,  the  training, 
equipping,  and  maintaining  of  fleets  and  armies,  is  an 
absolute  sacrifice,  the  loss  of  the  labour  of  the  most 
valuable  part  of  our  population.  It  is  with  great 
difficulty  that  he  can  be  brought  to  allow  that  war 
brings  with  it  even  a  temporary  aliment  to  its  con- 
suming powers.  Mr.  Say,  the  political  economist  of 
France,  after  visiting  this  country,  in  the  first  year  of 
peace,  published  the  following  remarks  : 

"  Ministers  and  public  men  in  England  are  as  yet 
(he  wrote  with  reference  to  our  ministry  of  1807),  far 
from  having  a  just  sense  of  the  folly  and  ruinous  ten- 
dency of  war :  their  progress  has  not  kept  pace  with 
the  progress  of  the  nation.  The  misfortunes  of  Eng- 
land take  their  rise  in  the  higher  regions,  like  the 
hail  and  the  tempest,  her  blessings  spring  from  be- 
neath, like  the  fruits  of  an  inexhaustible  soil.     The 


Individual  arid  National  253 

taxes  have  not  only  doubled,  but  tripled  since  1792 ; 
and  still  the  war  expenditure  greatly  exceeded  their 
amount.  The  consequence  is,  an  enormous  enhance- 
ment of  prices ;  mercantile  men  are  obliged  to  do 
business  on  very  slender  profits,  and  what  is  still 
worse,  many  of  the  manufactured  articles  are  sadly 
fallen  from  their  former  reputation.  My  French 
readers,"  he  adds,  "  will  be  surprised  to  find  in  my 
pages  an  opinion  so  much  at  variance  with  the  cur- 
rent notion  that  England  is  the  land  for  the  easy  and 
rapid  attainment  of  fortune ;  but  the  reality  is  widely 
different  from  the  appearance." 

A  very  different  picture  of  the  effect  of  war  is 
given  by  Mr.  S.  Gray,  to  whom  we  have  so  fre- 
quently referred  in  our  chapter  on  population,  and 
who  came  several  years  ago  before  the  public,  as  the 
author  of  a  system  bearing  the  emphatic  name  of 
"productive."  The  pages  in  which  that  doctrine  is 
recommended  to  the  world,  contain  a  number  of  ar- 
guments on  the  connexion  between  government  ex- 
penditure, and  the  increase  of  individual  income, 
taxes  being  considered  by  Mr.  Gray  in  the  light  of 
useful  stimulants  to  our  national  industry.  He  has 
the  merit  of  detecting  several  imperfections  in  Dr. 
Smith's  definition  of  productive  and  unproductive 
labour;  but  in  reasoning  on  our  war  expenditure,  he 
evidently  fails  to  distinguish  between  a  temporary 
and  a  lasting  excitement,  and  assumes,  from  the  cir- 
culation of  money  raised  by  loans  and  taxes,  as  much 
advantage  as  if  war  prices  were  necessarily  perma- 
nent, and  as  if,  on  concluding  peace,  we  could  con- 
sider ourselves  exempt  from  the  frightful  reaction  ex- 
perienced during  the  last  nine  years. 

To  these  opposite  authorities,  each  tending  in  some 
degree  to  an  extreme,  we  add  the  observations  of  a 
third  writer. 

"  Notwithstanding  the  immense  expenditure  of  the  English  government 
during  the  late  wars,  there  can  be  little  doubt  but  that  the  increased  pro- 
duction on  the  part  of  the  people  has  more  than  compensated  for  it.  The 
national  capital  has  not  merely  been  unimpaired,  it  has  been  greatly  in- 
creased ;  and  the  annual  revenue  of  the  people,  even  after  the  payment  of 
their  taxes,'  is  probably  greater  at  the  present  time  than  at  any  former  pe~ 


254  Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  Property, 

riod  of  our  history.  For  the  proof  of  this,  we  might  refer  to  the  increase 
of  population, — to  the  extension  of  agriculture, — to  the  increase  of  shipping 
and  manufactures, — to  the  building-  of  docks, — to  the  opening  of  numerous 
canals, — as  well  as  to  many  other  expensive  undertakings ; — all  denoting 
an  increase  both  of  capital  and  of  annual  production."  (Ricardo  on  Politi- 
cal Economy,  second  Edition,  p.  170.) 

This  passage  presents,  perhaps,  too  favourable  a 
view  of  our  situation ;  and  ought,  before  we  can  re- 
ceive it  as  a  true  picture,  to  be  accompanied  by  two 
admissions.  First,  that  though  our  national  income 
has  increased,  our  burdens  have  augmented  in  a  still 
greater  ratio  ;  and,  secondly,  that  in  any  estimate  of 
our  wealth  expressed  in  money  in  the  present  day,  a 
considerable  deduction  is  to  be  made  from  an  esti- 
mate in  1792,  on  account  of  the  inferior  value  of  mo- 
ney. It  is  fair,  however,  to  add,  that  this  passage  was 
written  at  a  time  (1816)  when  the  fall  of  prices  was 
only  beginning,  and  when  we  are  unable  to  calculate 
the  extent  of  fluctuation  and  loss  arising  from  the 
war.  Since  then,  seven  eventful  years  have  elapsed, 
and  have  disclosed  a  succession  of  circumstances 
beyond  the  reach  of  foresight,  but  replete  with  in- 
struction when  examined  in  the  order  of  their  occur- 
rence. With  this  advantage,  we  now  follow  up  the 
inquiry,  and  instead  of  reasoning  in  general  terms, 
like  the  writers  we  have  quoted,  we  shall  endeavour 
to  build  on  a  secure  foundation,  and  proceed  as  in 
our  preceding  chapters,  by  a  series  of  calculations 
and  specific  results.  Our  arrangement  shall  be  as 
follows: 

Losses  incurred  during  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

Losses  attendant  on  the  transition  from  war  to 
peace. 

Comparative  amount  of  our  national  income  in 
war  and  peace. 

Have  our  public  men  understood  our  financial 
situation  ? 

Losses  to  our  Productive  Industry  on  a  Transition  from 
Peace  to  War. — These  losses,  unknown  in  a  great 
measure  to  the  younger  part  of  the  present  genera- 
tion, will  long  live  in  the  recollection  of  those  who 


Individual  and  National.  25a 

are  of  an  age  to  remember  the  bankruptcies  of  1793. 
These  pervaded  equally  our  commercial,  manufac- 
turing, and  agricultural  interests,  and  affected  almost 
all  whose  undertakings  were  not  supported  by  sub- 
stantial capital.  To  what  was  a  pressure  so  general 
to  be  ascribed  ?  To  the  sudden  and  extensive 
change  that  took  place ;  to  a  demand  on  the  part 
of  government  for  men  and  money ;  and  to  the  conse- 
quent necessity  of  abandoning  various  undertakings, 
the  profit  of  which,  almost  always  less  than  is  vul- 
garly imagined,  could  be  made  to  answer  only  by  the 
aid  of  a  low  rate  of  interest  and  moderate  price  of 
labour.  In  those  days,  as  at  present,  our  country- 
men were  speculative,  eager  to  embark  on  new  en- 
terprises, and  apt  to  trust  to  prospective  advantages 
for  those  means  of  providing  for  payments  which 
their  limited  capital  did  not  afford.  This  sanguine 
disposition  may  be  termed  the  great  feature  that 
distinguishes  our  countrymen  and  the  North  Ameri- 
cans from  the  traders  and  agriculturists  of  the  conti- 
nent of  Europe,  among  whom  the  same  occupation 
is  so  often  followed  from  father  to  son,  with  little 
idea  of  change  or  attempt  at  extension.  But  our 
spirit  of  enterprise,  however  favourable  to  discovery 
and  improvement,  is  necessarily  attended  by  a  revo- 
lution in  the  circumstances  of  individuals  on  the  oc- 
currence of  any  political  change.  The  blow  first 
strikes  establishments  of  the  most  adventurous  cha- 
racter, and  goes  on  to  involve  others  injured  by  the 
failure  of  the  first,  and  possessing,  like  them,  few  re- 
sources against  an  unforeseen  demand.  Embarrass- 
ments of  this  description  were  felt  chiefly  in  the  first 
and  second  years  of  the  war,  during  the  interval  that 
unavoidably  elapsed  before  the  capital  and  labour 
disturbed  in  their  employment  by  the  war,  could  re- 
ceive a  new  direction,  and  be  invested  anew  in  a 
productive  form. 

From  this  almost  forgotten  theme,  we  proceed  to  a 
part  of  the  subject  much  more  familiar  to  the  majori- 
ty of  our  readers ;  to  an 


256  Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  Property. 


Estimate  of  the  Burden  arising  from  Government  Expenditure 
during  the  War. 

Interest  of  the  debt  contracted  during  the  war,  after  allowing 

for  the  reduction  of  the  5  per  cents.         -  £22,000,000 

The  annual  amount  of  half-pay  and  pensions  in  the  army,  na- 
vy, and  civil  service,  arising-  from  the  war,  is  at  present 
(1823),  about  4,500,0002. :  but  consisting  almost  all  of  life 
annuities,  may  be  computed  equal  to  a  permanent  burden 
of        -  2,000,000 

Exclusive  of  this,  the  expense  of  our  army  and  navy  is  very 
greatly  augmented  since  1792,  partly  from  the  extension  of 
our  foreign  possessions,  partly  from  causes  unconnected 
with  the  war,  such  as  the  increase  of  our  population,  and 
the  necessity  of  enforcing  the  collection  of  the  revenue  in 
Ireland.  As  yet  the  charge  of  our  army  and  navy  (distinct 
from  half-pay  and  pensions)  exceeds  that  of  1792  by 
6,000,000/.,  but  from  the  prospect  of  continued  peace,  and 
the  general  fall  of  prices,  we  may  anticipate  a  farther  even- 
tual reduction  of  1 ,000,000/.  Of  the  remaining  5,000,000/. 
we  put  to  the  account  of  the  war,  somewhat  more  than 
half,  viz. 3,000,000 

Add,  for  increase  of  the  civil  list,  salaries,  pensions  in  conse- 
quence of  the  war  and  of  the  rise  caused  by  it  in  prices        -        2,000,000 

Other  war  charges  not  enumerated 1 ,000,000 

Total  £30,000,000 


Such  is  the  amount  of  burden  arising  from  our  war 
expenditure ;  happily,  however,  there  are  alleviating 
considerations. 

Deductions  from  our  apparent  Burdens, 

Taxation  of  other  Countries. — It  is  in  some  respects  a 
matter  of  little  difficulty  to  understand  the  financial 
relief  which  we  have  in  prospect ;  such,  for  example, 
as  the  decrease  in  our  half-pay  and  pensions,  either  by 
the  occurrence  of  deaths,  or  a  transfer  for  long  an- 
nuities ;  but  the  case  may  not  be  quite  so  clear  in  re- 
gard to  a  deduction  of  another  kind,  we  mean  that 
which  arises  from  a  "  community  of  the  pressure  of 
taxation  on  the  civilized  world  at  large."  Yet,  how- 
ever real  our  losses  from  the  war,  however  inferior 
our  national  wealth  to  what  it  would  have  been,  had 
peace  been  uninterrupted,  we  cannot  be  said  to  have 
incurred  absolute  injury,  or  to  labour  under  any  per- 


Individual  and  National.  257 

manent  disadvantage,  in  as  far  as  similar  burdens  have 
been  imposed  on  those  who  are  our  competitors  in 
the  career  of  productive  industry.  This,  we  say, 
though  perfectly  aware  of  the  folly  of  the  doctrine 
that  one  nation  gains  by  impoverishing  another.  Our 
argument,  when  attentively  examined,  will  be  found 
to  rest  on  a  very  different  basis  :  war,  at  all  times  a 
losing  game,  would  be  doubly  so,  were  our  opponents 
to  escape  a  participation  in  the  pecuniary  pressure ; 
our  productive  labourers  would  soon  emigrate,  and 
pursue  their  industry  in  untaxed  countries.  To  bring 
our  argument  to  a  point:  if  in  England  the  late  wars 
have  increased  the  proportion  of  burden  to  income 
by  twelve  per  cent,  and  if  in  France,  Germany,  or 
the  Netherlands,  the  comparative  increase  be  h\e  or 
six  per  cent.,  our  loss,  serious  as  it  is,  can  hardly  be 
considered  as  exceeding  the  difference;  we  mean 
that  in  whatever  regards  the  hazard  of  rivalship,  or 
the  injury  from  foreign  competition,  our  disadvantage 
is  limited  to  the  extra  six  or  seven  per  cent. 

Our  War  Taxes. — Our  next  modification  of  our  loss- 
es is  also  of  a  very  extensive  character,  though  it  does 
not  happen  to  form  a  deduction  from  the  preceding 
table.  It  comprises  no  less  than  the  larger  portion  of 
the  sum  raised  by  war  taxes,  which,  though  (see  Chapter 
II.  p.  44.)  of  very  great  amount,  we  are  disposed  to 
consider  as  defrayed  out  of  the  extra  profits  of  a  state 
of  war;  so  largely  were  the  gains  of  the  public,  whe- 
ther in  the  shape  of  interest,  salary,  wages,  or  profit  of 
stock,  increased  by  the  circulation  of  the  money  raised 
by  our  loans.  In  making  this  great  allowance,  we 
are  perfectly  aware  that  in  many  cases,  particularly 
after  our  unfortunate  Orders  in  Council,  our  mer- 
chants and  manufacturers  paid  their  taxes,  as  our 
farmers  at  present  pay  their  rent,  not  from  income 
but  from  capital.  We  are  aware,  also,  that  the  re- 
sources which  supplied  our  war  taxes  were,  in  a  great 
measure,  temporary,  and  of  a  nature  to  disappear 
with  the  stimulus  that  excited  them  :  but  our  estimate 
is  confined  to  the  years  of  war;  and  we  are  probablv 

33 


258  Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  Properly, 

justified,  on  considering  all  circumstances,  in  making 
the  preceding  deduction,  important  as  it  is. 

Public  Works,  such  as  Canals,  Roads,  and  Bridges.- 
These,  however  commendable  in  the  intention,  are 
expedient  as  undertakings  only  when  the  returns  are 
such  as  to  afford  a  fair  interest  for  the  capital  invest- 
ed. From  the  high  price  of  labour  and  materials  in 
the  latter  part  of  the  war,  most  speculations  of  the 
kind,  such  for  example  as  the  new  bridges  of  the  me- 
tropolis, were  attended  with  a  far  greater  charge  than 
if  they  had  been  postponed  and  executed  in  peace. 
The  same  holds  in  regard  to  our  agriculture,  in  which 
a  large  share  of  the  outlay  was  incurred  on  the  as- 
sumption of  high  prices.  Even  in  the  case  of  our 
manufacturing  machinery,  a  put  erected  when  labour 
was  high,  is  no  longer  necessary  or  profitable,  now 
that  labour  is  reduced.  Still,  a  great  part  of  such 
loss  is  merely  in  appearance,  and  resolves  itself  into 
the  different  value  of  money  :  the  canal  share,  which, 
in  1813,  cost  100/.,  may  be  said  to  indemnify  its  owner, 
if  it  at  present  fetches  75/.,  because  that  sum  is  at 
present  equal  in  the  power  of  purchase  to  the  100/. 
of  1813.  Such  investments  of  property  involve  an 
absolute  loss  only,  in  as  far  as  they  fall  below  that 
proportion,  a  case  at  present  unfortunately  too  fre- 
quent. 

Tithe. — This  portion  of  our  burdens  is  different,  in 
several  respects,  from  general  taxation.  Its  amount, 
as  expressed  in  money,  increased  surprisingly  during 
the  war,  in  consequence  of  two  causes, — the  enhance- 
ment of  produce,  and  the  extended  cultivation  atten- 
dant on  the  increase  of  our  numbers.  How  far  did 
the  payment  of  this  increased  amount  prove  of  detri- 
ment to  our  resources  ?  It  was  defrayed  by  that  por- 
tion of  the  community,  who,  so  long  as  the  war  lasted, 
were  most  able  to  defray  their  burdens.  On  the  pub- 
lic at  large,  its  pressure  was  not  apparent ;  in  an  indi- 
rect sense,  however,  that  pressure  was  great,  for  tithe 
operated  as  an  obstacle  to  cultivation,  and  greatly  restrict- 
ed the  amount  of  our  produce,  at  a  time  when  it 
would  have  been  most  desirable  to  increase  it. 


Individual  and  National.  259 

Poor  Sate. — In  this  respect,  the  estimate  of  burden 
during  the  late  wars  is  subject  to  considerable  quali- 
fication. The  increase  of  the  rate  having  been  as 
great  in  agricultural  as  in  manufacturing  districts,  al- 
though in  the  former,  work  was,  all  along,  abundant, 
the  inference  is,  that  the  rise  was,  in  a  great  measure, 
nominal,  and  would  otherwise  have  been  paid  in  the 
shape  of  wages.  Add  to  this  the  decrease  of  rates  in 
the  last  and  present  year,  with  the  probability  of  a 
progressive  diminution,  add  we  shall  find  that  the 
portion  of  burden  attributable  to  the  war  is  by  no 
means  so  great  as  might  be  inferred  from  the  numeri- 
cal statements  of  the  poor-rate. 

The  National  Debt. — After  all  these  allowances,  it 
may  be  incumbent  on  us  to  answer  the  question, 
whether  we  "  consider  our  national  debt  as  forming  an 
actual  loss,  an  absolute  addition  to  our  public  bur- 
dens ?"  This  question,  idle  in  the  view  of  the  atten- 
tive inquirer,  is  by  no  means  superfluous  in  regard 
to  the  cursory  observer,  to  those  who  imagine  our 
debt  a  property  which,  without  the  war,  would  have 
had  no  existence,  a  responsibility  of  little  importance 
because  due  among  ourselves.  All  such  notions  we 
entreat  our  readers  to  dismiss  from  their  minds,  and 
to  consider  our  debt  as  not  less  real  for  being  due  to 
our  countrymen.  It  is  the  record  of  money  expend- 
ed, gone  for  ever ;  and  involving,  as  far  as  our  bur- 
dens exceed  those  of  other  countries,  a  series  of  dis- 
advantages. Had  we  had  no  war,  the  capital  and 
labour  that  has  led  to  the  formation  of  our  debt  would 
not  have  been  unemployed ;  it  would  have  been  put  in 
activity  by  other  causes,  and  received  its  increase  in 
a  different  form.  The  product,  we  allow,  would,  pro- 
bably, have  been  smaller,  because  the  ratio  of  in- 
crease, whether  from  interest,  profit  or  stock,  or  per- 
sonal exertion,  would,  in  a  state  of  continued  peace, 
have  been  much  less  considerable. 

Effect  of  the  War  on  the  Habits  of  Individuals. — The 
increase  of  wealth  arising  from  the  war  was  much 
more  an  increase  of  income  than  of  property.  In  the 
latter  sense  the  war  was  beneficial  to  those  only  who 


260  Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  Property, 

had  formed  their  habits  in  a  season  of  tranquil  occu- 
pation, of  moderate  profit,  and  who,  from  their  expe- 
rience and  time  of  life,  were  capable  of  reaping  the 
new  harvest  without  abusing  it.  The  case  was  very 
different  with  those  who,  entering  on  business  during 
the  war,  took  for  granted  that  circumstances  would 
continue  as  they  found  them,  and  made  no  provision 
for  a  reverse.  The  characteristics  of  this  youthful 
generation  may  be  said  to  have  been  a  general  con- 
fidence, a  habit  of  early  expense,  a  repugnance  to  the 
cautious  perseverance  of  former  days.  The  extent 
of  evil  arising  from  such  a  source  can  be  computed 
by  those  only  whose  observation  has  embraced  a 
wide  range,  who  have  marked  throughout  the  pre- 
sent age  the  frequent  substitution  of  adventure  for 
industry,  and  the  reiterated  loss  of  capital  when  in- 
trusted to  the  young  and  inexperienced. 

Losses  on  the  Transition  from  War  to  Peace, 

No  period  of  our  history  affords  an  example  of  a 
change  so  sudden  and  so  extensive  as  that  which  took 
place  in  the  state  of  our  productive  industry  after  the 
peace  of  1814.  For  the  relinquishment  of  foreign 
colonies,  and  for  an  active  rivalship  in  manufacture, 
on  the  part  of  the  continent  of  Europe,  the  public 
were  prepared ;  but  they  had,  in  a  manner,  lost  sight 
of  the  great  difference  between  government  expen- 
diture in  peace  and  war ;  and  the  few  who  took  this 
difference  into  account,  imagined  that  the  diminution 
of  demand  at  home  would  be  balanced  by  our  exports 
to  newly  opened  markets  in  America  and  Asia.  These 
persons  were  by  no  means  aware  either  of  the  mag- 
nitude of  our  circulation  at  home  arising  from  war  ex- 
penditure, or  of  the  substantial  difference  between  an 
assured  payment  in  England,  and  the  hazard  atten- 
dant on  transactions  with  distant  countries.  Many 
anticipated  a  partial  reduction  of  wages,  but  not  a 
general  want  of  work ;  a  diminution  of  mercantile 
and  manufacturing  profit  to  a  certain  extent,  but  in 
no  degree  proportioned  to  that  which  took  place. 


Individual  and  National.  261 

Yet  the  years  of  peace  have  been  marked  by  no  ca- 
lamity of  a  general  nature ;  by  no  such  bankruptcy 
as  the  South  Sea  or  Mississippi  scheme ;  by  no  terri- 
torial cessions,  like  the  relinquishment,  at  the  peace 
of  1783,  of  our  North  American  provinces ;  by  no  in- 
surrection in  our  colonies ;  no  successful  rivalship  on 
the  part  of  competitors  either  in  manufacture  or  navi- 
gation. 

Magnitude  of  the  Change. — What,  then,  were  the 
causes  of  our  great  and  unexpected  embarrassments? 
Not  a  reduction  of  our  means  considered  physically 
or  intrinsically,  but  a  general  change  in  the  mode  of 
rendering  them  productive  ;  a  sudden  removal  of  the 
stimulus  arising  from  the  war.  In  no  former  contest 
had  our  military  establishments  been  carried  to  such 
a  height :  the  number  of  our  militiamen,  soldiers,  and 
sailors,  discharged,  amounted  to  between  two  and 
three  hundred  thousand,  while  the  individuals  em- 
ployed in  the  manufacture  of  cloths,  arms,  stores,  in 
the  supply  of  provisions,  the  navigation  of  transports, 
amounted,  perhaps,  to  two  hundred  thousand  more. 
The  magnitude  of  the  transition  will  be  best  shown 
by  a  brief  comparison  of  the  sums  expended  by  go- 
vernment in  the  five  last  years  of  the  war,  and  the 
live  first  years  of  peace : 


YEARS  OF  WAR. 

1311. 
1812. 
1813. 

£92,200,000                  1814. 
103,400,000                  1815. 
121,000,000                          Average 

YEARS   OF    PEACE. 

£  117,000,000 
110,000,000 
108,720,000 

1316. 
1817. 

1813. 

72,000,000                  1819. 
66,300,000                  1820. 
67,000,000                          Average 

59,000,000 
61,000,000 
64,660,000 

Peace  thus  caused  an  immediate  reduction  of  more 
than  forty  millions  in  the  amount  of  the  money  dis- 
tributed by  government  to  pay  employment,  or,  in 
other  words,  to  stimulate  productive  industry,  Add 
to  this,  that  during  the  war  most  of  our  establish- 
ments had  been  formed  on  a  large  scale,  a  scale 
that  supposed  a  power  of  demand,  a  capacity  of  pay- 


262  Effects  of  the  late  War  on  Property, 

ment  much  greater  than  was  found  to  exist  after  the 
Jpeace.  This  was  the  case  in  regard  not  only  to  great 
offices,  but  private  establishments  of  the  most  dis- 
similar character ;  manufactures,  mercantile  houses, 
seminaries  of  education,  and  a  variety  of  underta- 
kings, almost  all  of  which,  whether  in  the  metropolis 
or  provincial  towns,  were  adapted  to  a  community 
increasing  not  only  in  its  numbers,  but  in  its  power  of 
expenditure. 

The  means  by  which  we  were  enabled  to  pay  such 
heavy  contributions  during  the  war  have  been  already 
explained.  Exempt  from  continental  competition, 
the  public,  or  at  least  four-fifths  of  the  public,  had  at 
that  time  the  power  of  indemnifying  themselves  for 
their  taxes  by  an  increased  rate  of  charge.  This  was 
the  case  of  the  land-holder,  the  farmer,  the  owner  of 
houses,  the  receiver  of  tithe:  it  was  the  case,  like- 
wise, of  persons  exercising  professions,  of  those  re- 
ceiving salaries,  and  of  the  very  numerous  class, 
whose  dependence  is  on  wages.  At  the  peace,  all  or 
almost  all  was  reversed :  agriculturists,  merchants, 
manufacturers,  fell  from  their  Vantage  ground,  and 
prosperity  was,  during  several  years,  confined  to  an- 
nuitants, to  whom,  since  1820  or  182!,  we  are  enabled 
to  add  the  majority  of  the  labouring  classes.  It  must 
not  be  inferred  from  this  that  our  consumption,  whe- 
ther of  agricultural  or  manufactured  produce,  expe- 
rienced an  absolute  diminution  ;  for  our  numbers,  as 
was  shown  at  the  time  by  the  extent  of  new  buildings, 
and  subsequently  by  the  population  returns,  were  an- 
nually on  the  increase ;  but  partly  from  the  economy 
introduced  by  altered  circumstances,  more  from  an 
augmentation  of  supply,  the  increase  of  buyers  did  not 
equal  the  increase  of  sellers,  and  a  general  fall  of 
prices  became  unavoidable.  Finally,  our  distress 
was  aggravated  in  no  slight  degree  by  the  absence  of 
many  of  our  countrymen  of  the  upper  and  middling 
classes,  who,  whether  as  travellers  or  as  residents  on 
the  Continent,  incurred  an  expenditure  of  several 
millions  annually  abroad,  at  the  time  it  was  most 
wanted  at  home. 


Individual  and  National.  263 

Distress  of  Foreign  Countries. — Similar  causes  of  em- 
barrassment were  unfortunately  in  operation  on  the 
Continent  of  Europe.  In  former  wars  the  evils  of 
transition  had  been  felt  in  few  countries,  and  to  a 
comparatively  small  extent;  but  in  1813  and  1814, 
almost  all  Europe  had  been  in  military  array,  and 
every  country  felt  the  sudden  change  from  disembo- 
dying of  armies,  cessation  of  government  purchases, 
and  an  overstock  of  productive  labourers.  Add  to 
this,  that  our  greatest  customers,  the  United  States  of 
America,  had  suffered  so  severely,  first  from  the  stop- 
page of  their  navigation,  and  afterwards  from  the  re- 
turn of  peace,  as  to  be  far  less  able  to  pay  for  our 
goods  than  during  the  continuance  of  the  war.  The 
consequence  was  that  our  foreign  trade,  though  not 
diminished,  and  even  partially  increased  in  amount, 
failed,  from  irregularity  in  the  payments,  to  prove  an 
efficient  source  of  relief. 

Temporary  Revival  of  Activity  in  1818. — The  extent  of 
our  suffering  might  have  been  in  some  degree  lessen- 
ed, had  our  real  situation  been  earlier  known,  or  had 
it  not  undergone  considerable  fluctuation  in  the  years 
that  have  elapsed  since  the  peace.  The  year  1814 
produced  two  great  results ;  a  fall  of  corn,  and  a  re- 
instatement of  the  value  of  bank  paper.  Both  conti- 
nued during  1815  and  1816,  but  the  bad  harvest  of 
the  latter  year  renewed  the  operation  of  our  corn 
laws,  and  being  followed  by  a  revival  of  trade  and 
manufacture,  accustomed  us  anew  to  high  prices,  gave 
a  temporary  increase  to  the  revenue,  and  suspended 
the  measures  that  might  otherwise  have  been  taken 
for  a  general  adaptation  of  our  burdens  to  our  means; 
we  mean  a  reduction  of  salaries  and  those  other  in- 
comes in  regard  to  which,  from  the  sums  being  pre- 
viously fixed,  the  course  of  circumstances  has  not  had 
free  operation.  Our  second  period  of  distress  (be- 
ginning in  1819)  thus  came  on  us  as  unexpectedly  a^ 
the  first,  and  we  are  now,  in  the  ninth  year  of  peace, 
discussing  those  points  which  it  had  been  of  infinite 
importance  to  us  to  have  understood  from  the  moment 


264  Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  Property, 

that  the  overthrow  of  Buonaparte  opened  the  pros- 
pect of  a  general  change. 

Our  probable  Situation  had  the  War  been  avoided. — We 
shall  close  these  remarks  by  a  brief  calculation  of 
what  would  probably  have  been  our  financial  situa- 
tion, supposing  political  science  to  have  been  as  well 
understood  at  the  time  of  the  French  revolution  as  at 
present,  and  our  statesmen  equally  convinced  of  the 
close  connexion  between  the  preservation  of  peace, 
and  the  increase  of  national  prosperity.  Had  such 
been  the  case,  we  may  fairly  assume  that  our  cabinet 
would  either  not  have  interfered  in  the  war  at  all,  or 
would  have  made  peace  in  1793,  as  soon  as  the 
French  were  driven  within  their  frontiers.  For  tran- 
quillity at  home  they  would  probably  have  trusted  to 
measures  of  police,  to  the  aid  of  an  armed  force,  and 
to  the  support  of  the  middle  and  upper  classes  of  so- 
ciety. The  troubled  aspect  of  the  times,  and  the  ne- 
cessity of  arming  the  executive  branch  with  power 
both  to  repress  sedition,  and  to  effect  such  measures 
as  the  union  with  Ireland,  and  the  equal  collection  of 
taxes  throughout  the  kingdom,  would  doubtless  have 
obliged  us  to  increase  our  army  and  carry  our  ex- 
expenditure  considerably  beyond  that  of  1792.  The 
result  might  have  been  that  our  taxes  and  poor-rate 
which  in  1792.  amounted  (including  Ireland)  to  about 
20,000,000/.,  might  by  this  time  have  been  carried  by 
a  gradual  increase  to  28  or  30,000,000/.  In  other  re- 
spects also,  our  situation  would  have  been  exempt 
from  the  extraordinary  fluctuations  we  have  witness- 
ed. Thus  the  price  of  wheat  would,  even  after  the 
double  failure  of  crop  in  1799  and  1800,  hardly  have 
exceeded  80s.  moderate  as  would  have  been  the 
charges  on  import. 

In  a  state  of  peace  the  attention  of  our  ministers 
might  have  been  bestowed  on  measures  of  internal  im- 
provement, such  as  commutation  of  tithe,  equaliza- 
tion of  poor-rate,  or  the  removal  of  commercial  re- 
strictions, all  necessarily  postponed  during  a  contest, 
which  not  only  absorbed  their  time,  but  obliged  them. 


Individual  and  National  265 

from  their  dependence  on  the  support  of  particular 
interests,  to  submit  to  a  tacit  continuance  of  abuses. 
If  we  are  told  that  the  average  rate  of  profits  and  wa- 
ges being  smaller  in  peace  than  in  war,  our  national 
income  would  not  in  the  former  alternative  have  been 
so  large,  our  answer  is,  that  while  we  admit  the  quick- 
er increase  of  individual  income  during  war,  we  have 
to  bring  against  it  a  formidable  deduction  in  the  losses 
attendant  on  the  transition  to  peace.  Or  if,  to  avoid 
argument,  we  limit  our  estimate  of  loss  arising  from 
the  war  to  a  sum  of  which  the  interest  is  15  or 
18,000,000/.  a  year,  we  allow  even  then  that  we  have 
incurred  a  burden  equal  to  the  revenue  of  the  Austrian 
or  Russian  empire. 

The  late  Wars  examined  by  moral  Considerations. — We 
proceed  to  bestow  a  few  sentences  on  the  events  of 
the  late  war,  considered  on  higher  grounds  than  those 
of  mere  calculation.  The  apparent  triumph  of  injus- 
tice, in  national  as  well  as  individual  transactions,has, 
as  is  well  known,  often  embarrassed  candid  inquirers, 
and  reduced  them  almost  to  question  the  interference 
of  Providence  in  the  course  of  human  affairs.  Among 
our  neighbours  on  the  southern  shore  of  the  Channel, 
scepticism  received  an  unfortunate  extension  at  the 
time  of  the  revolution :  an  extension  to  be  attributed 
partly  to  the  youth  and  unthinking  character  of  many 
of  the  reformers,  partly  to  the  odium  to  which  the  Ca- 
tholic clergy  exposed  themselves  by  their  opposition 
to  the  new  cause.  During  many  years  the  success  of  a 
restless  despot  seemed  to  confirm  the  doubts  of  the 
intervention  of  a  higher  power,  since  it  was  not  till 
the  Continent  had  been  overrun,  that  political  justice 
resumed  its  course. 

But  if  such  impressions  may  be  expected  in  a  coun- 
try where  religion  wears  a  form  ill  calculated  to  ob- 
tain the  conviction  of  a  reflecting  mind,  ought  we  to 
have  expected  in  England  a  favourable  reception  to 
such  a  doctrine  as  that  of  our  national  wealth  being 
augmented  by  war  ?  Happily  no  such  conclusions 
nre  suggested  bv  the  writings  of  those  who  have  most 

34 


266  Effect  of  Ifie  late  Wars  on  Property, 

successfully  investigated  the  sources  ofnational  pros- 
perity ;  by  the  labours  of  Turgot,  Smith,  or  Say.  If 
to  describe  the  structure  of  the  human  frame ;  to  ex- 
plain the  connexion  and  the  subserviency  of  its  vari- 
ous parts,  has  been  declared  equivalent  to  a  hymn  in 
praise  of  its  divine  Author,  not  less  is  that  testimony 
due  to  the  study  of  the  causes  of  the  success  of  pro- 
ductive industry.  Researches  into  that  subject, when 
prosecuted  in  the  spirit  of  impartiality,  tend  more  and 
more  to  establish  the  connexion  between  equity  and 
prosperity,  between  fairness  in  principle  and  success 
in  practice. 

This  connexion,  we  can  safely  assure  our  readers, 
is  no  philanthropic  dream,  but  is  practically  recognis- 
ed by  the  directors  of  our  mercantile  policy.  The 
system  of  prohibition  and  high  duties,  so  long  in  fa- 
vour with  our  ancestors,  is  now  renounced,  and  our 
Board  of  Trade  has,  during  the  last  eight  years,  acted 
on  the  conviction  that  the  increase  of  our  wealth  is,  in 
a  great  measure,  dependent  on  the  increase  of  that 
of  our  neighbours.  Further,  if  we  pass  in  review 
our  mercantile  history  during  the  war,  and  discrimi- 
nate the  gain  and  loss  of  particular  classes,  we  shall 
find  that  the  change  of  circumstances  since  the  peace 
has,  in  general,  been  such  as  to  constitute  a  fair  retri- 
bution to  those  who  had  either  benefited  or  suffered 
by  fluctuation.  Annuitants  have  been  relieved  from 
their  long  depression,  and  now  find  their  income  re- 
stored, or  nearly  restored,  to  its  former  value.  Of  our 
countrymen  at  present  in  a  state  of  suffering,  we  may 
be  permitted  to  remark  that  they  belong  in  general  to 
the  classes  whose  gains  were  greatest  during  the  war  ; 
a  remark  made  without  the  slightest  intention  of 
weakening  their  claim  to  relief,  since  not  humanity 
only,  but  the  public  interest  (see  the  chapter  on  Agri- 
culture, p.  142.)  calls  on  us  to  prevent  their  farther 
depression.  And  we  have  adverted  to  their  case 
merely  to  show  the  transient  and  unsubstantial  nature 
of  gains  derived  from  a  state  of  war ; — the  frightful 
recoil  to  be  apprehended  by  those  who  imagine  that 
in  them  they  have  found  a  source  of  permanent  ad- 
vantage. 


Individual  and  National  267 

The  result,  therefore,  is,  that  the  late  war,  so  long 
accounted  a  source  of  national  wealth,  involved  a  sa- 
crifice of  property  not  inferior  to  the  sacrifice  of  lives. 
To  this  double  drain  in  our  resources,  what  has  been 
the  grand  counterpoise  ?  Our  progress  in  the  arts  of 
peace :  the  power  of  extracting  a  larger  supply  of 
subsistence  from  our  soil ;  a  larger  revenue  from  our 
labour  and  capital.  By  what  criterion  are  we  enabled 
to  compute  the  amount  of  the  addition  thus  obtained  ? 
We  know  of  none  more  satisfactory  than  a  return  of 
the  numbers  added  to  our  population  and  supported 
by  our  resources ;  a  subject  replete  with  satisfactory 
conclusions,  and  which  we  have  already  discussed  at 
considerable  length.  At  present,  without  recurring 
to  our  arguments  on  that  head,  we  shall  merely  ad- 
vert to  a  very  common,  but  a  very  erroneous  notion, 
that  "the  rapid  increase  of  our  numbers  in  the  pre- 
sent age  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  war."  Whatever 
may  have  been  the  case  in  regard  to  the  middle  class- 
es, the  wages  of  many  of  the  lower  orders,  particular- 
ly those  of  the  country  labourer,  bore,  even  when  add- 
ed to  the  poor-rate  (see  the  chapter  on  Poor-rate,  p. 
276.),  a  smaller  proportion  to  the  expense  of  rearing 
a  family  than  in  peace.  Now,  as  the  lower  orders 
form  by  far  the  most  numerous  portion  of  the  nation, 
and  the  circumstances  affecting  them  are  decisive  of  the 
general  increase  of  our  numbers,  we  can  by  no  means  join 
in  ascribing  the  surprising  augmentation  in  the  pre- 
sent age  to  the  excitement  arising  from  the  war,  al- 
though that  opinion  may  have  (Lord  Liverpool's 
speech,  March  1822)  the  sanction  of  ministerial  au- 
thority. It  has  continued  with  equal  rapidity  since 
the  peace,  and  our  rulers  may,  we  believe,  trace  it 
with  confidence  to  causes  of  a  cheering  and  perma- 
nent character ;  to  the  effect  of  vaccination,  to  the 
improvement  in  the  lodging,  cleanliness,  and  sobriety 
of  the  lower  classes. 

In  thus  dwelling  on  the  evils  of  war,  our  object  is 
not  to  join  with  the  decided  Oppositionists,  in  la- 
menting what  cannot  be  recalled,  or  in  affixing  a  ge- 
neral censure  on  a  course  of  policy,  which  though  re- 


268  Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  Property, 

prehensible  in  some  respects,  admitted  in  many  others 
of  vindication  from  the  conduct  of  our  enemies  ;  or  of 
defence,  from  the  limited  foresight  of  human  nature. 
Our  purpose  is  strictly  ^statistical,  and  our  wish  is 
merely  to  impress-^n^  me  public  a  consideration  of 
great  importance  to  their  future  welfare,  viz.  that  the 
injury  to  national  prosperity  resulting  from  war,  how- 
ever it  may  be  palliated  or  postponed,  is  eventually 
of  most  serious  magnitude  even  when,  in  a  military 
sense,  the  issue  of  the  contest  has  proved  triumphant. 

We  now  proceed  to  a  more  enlivening  theme, — 
to  a  survey  of  the  present  state  of  our  productive  in- 
dustry, and  of  the  prospect  opened  to  us  by  a  conti- 
nuance of  peace.  To  our  reasoning  on  this  head  we 
shall  endeavour  to  give  a  definite  form  by  bringing  it 
before  the  eye  of  the  reader  in  the  shape  of  arithmeti- 
cal calculation.  We  begin  our  table  with  the  year 
1813,  as  the  last  in  which  our  prices  bore  the  stamp 
of  a  state  of  war.  In  comparing  this  with  the  present 
year,  we  keep  in  view  two  important  facts. 

1.  The  increase  of  our  population,  which,  since 
1813,  is  about  15  per  cent. 

2.  The  fall  in  the  price  of  commodities,  in  other 
words  the  reduction  of  expense,  which  to  most  classes 
we  compute  at  25  and  to  some  at  35  per  cent. 

An  attention  to  these  facts  is  indispensable  to  a 
correct  estimate  of  our  situation :  we  should  other- 
wise fall  into  the  common  error  of  considering  our- 
selves rich  or  poor,  merely  as  prices  happened  to  be 
high  or  low.  The  complexity  of  the  following  table 
will,  we  trust,  disappear  after  an  attentive  examina- 
tion. 


Individual  and  National. 


269 


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270  Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  Property, 

The  reader,  who  shall  bestow  a  little  time  on  stu- 
dying this  table,  will  not,  we  trust,  be  long  in  finding 
his  labour  repaid,  and  in  making  the  satisfactory  dis- 
covery that  the  decrease  of  our  financial  means  since 
the  peace  is  by  no  means  so  great  as  is  commonly  sup- 
posed. 

Remarks  on  Col.  II. — Interest  of  Money. — The  surplus 
in  the  receipts  of  our  monied  men  above  their  expen- 
diture supplies,  is,  as  is  well  known,  an  annual  fund 
for  investment,  and  as  there  has  been  of  late  no  op- 
portunity of  making  loans  to  our  exchequer,  this  sur- 
plus has  sought  a  vent  in  advances  to  private  indivi- 
duals, or  to  the  French,  American,  and  other  foreign 
governments.  We  have  accordingly  made  in  our  ta- 
ble a  large  addition  to  the  estimated  amount  of  inte- 
rest arising  since  the  peace  from  such  investments. 

Agriculturists. — Though  the  increase  of  number  in 
this  class  since  1813  has  been  considerable,  and  has 
evidently  been  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  in- 
crease of  produce,  we  have  declined,  for  obvious  rea- 
sons, to  suppose  it  productive  of  increase  of  income. 

Tithe. — Here  the  same  objection  does  not  altogether 
hold,  tithe  not  having  experienced  either  so  great  a 
rise  in  war  or  so  great  a  decline  since  the  peace. 

Wages. — Under  the  head  of  wages,  we  have  suppos- 
ed between  200  and  300,000  men  withdrawn  at  the 
peace  from  the  militia,  army,  and  navy,  and  have  add- 
ed the  amount  of  their  probable  earnings,(6,000,000/.) 
to  the  head  of  wages. 

A  corresponding  deduction  is  made  under  the  head 
of  income  to  individuals  in  the  public  service.  The 
i^reat  diminution  in  this  branch  puts  in  a  striking  light 
the  stagnation  attendant  on  the  transition  from  war  to 
peace. 

Ireland. — The  untaxed  income  of  Ireland  rests  (see 
A  ppen&ix  p.  [78].)  on  a  very  different  calculation  from 


Individual  and  National.  27 1 

her  taxed  income,  and  must,  from  the  increase  in  the 
number  of  her  peasantry,  have  received  a  very  large 
augmentation  since  1813. 

Remarks  on  Col.  IV. — Reduction  of  Expense.— We 
may,  perhaps,  be  charged  with  making  a  somewhat 
too  large  allowance  in  this  respect,  the  saving  com- 
pared to  1813  being,  in  various  situations,  not  yet 
carried  to  the  extent  of  25  per  cent.  Our  answer  is, 
that  peace  being  evidently  the  policy  of  our  govern- 
ment, there  is  a  probability  of  reduction  continuing, 
and  of  that  which  has  not  taken  place  in  the  present 
year,  being  accomplished  in  the  next. 

Farmers. — Amidst  all  the  distress  of  this  respecta- 
ble part  of  the  nation,  it  is  some  satisfaction  to  per- 
ceive the  large  reduction  in  their  disburse  for  labour 
and  other  farming  charges. 

The  Lower  Orders. — These  form  so  great  a  portion 
of  the  community,  that  we  can  hardly  advert  too  often 
or  too  attentively  to  their  situation.  The  transition 
from  war  to  peace,  bore,  doubtless,  very  heavy  on 
particular  classes,  principally  manufacturers,  whose 
wages  were  very  low  at  a  time  when  provisions  were 
by  no  means  cheap.  Since  1820,  however,  circum- 
stances have  altered  greatly  in  their  favour,  the  fall 
of  provisions  having  rendered  22s.  a  week  equivalent, 
in  the  power  of  purchase,  to  30s.  during  the  war.  K 
this  fall  was  too  great  and  too  rapid,  it  is  at  least  a 
satisfaction  that  the  advantage  of  it  should  have  ac- 
crued to  the  most  necessitous  part  of  the  community. 
Viewing  this  very  numerous  body  collectively,  we  find 
their  situation,  whether  in  town  or  country,  more  com- 
fortable at  present  that  at  almost  any  period  within 
our  recollection. 

Rernarhs  on  the  Table  generally. — In  comparing  the 
amount  of  national  revenue  at  different  periods,  it  is 
fit  to  keep  in  view  the  increasing  number  of  consu- 
mers, in  other  words,  of  individuals  to  be  supported 


272  Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  Property, 

from  that  revenue.  This  increase,  including  Ireland, 
amounts  to  nearly  3,000,000  for  the  ten  years  that 
have  elapsed  since  1813.  For  this  surprising  addi- 
tion to  our  numbers,  allowance  is  made  in  Col.  II., 
but  as  it  may  be  thought  from  the  estimate  in  Col. 
III.,  that  our  means  are  not  adequate  to  the  support 
of  this  new  charge,  we  must  remind  the  reader,  that 
increased  population  happily  brings  with  it  the 
means  of  supporting  itself,  and  that  on  comparing 
Cols.  II.  and  V.  he  will  discover  that,  even  after 
making  a  deduction  from  the  favourable  part  of  our 
statement,  our  present  means  of  affording  wages, 
salaries,  and  income  of  different  kinds,  are  not  infe- 
rior to  our  means  during  the  war,  by  more  than  10 
per  cent.  Now  a  reduction  of  the  income  of  the 
community  to  the  extent  of  10  per  cent,  would  not, 
had  it  been  equal  and  general,  have  proved  disas- 
trous :  it  would  have  necessitated  a  diminution  of  ex- 
pense, and  have  given  a  general  check  to  sanguine 
expectation,  but  could  never  have  been  the  cause  of 
severe  distress.  But  the  transition  unfortunately  took 
place  in  a  very  unequal  manner,  for  while  in  the  case 
of  the  landholders,  the  decrease  of  income  appears 
to  be  20  per  cent.,  and  in  that  of  farmers  not  less 
than  60  per  cent,  annuitants  on  the  public  funds  have 
benefited  or  will  soon  benefit  to  an  extent  of  20  or 
25  per  cent. 

In  what  order  or  succession  did  these  reductions  of 
income  take  place  ?  First,  in  the  army,  the  navy, 
and  the  classes,  such  as  contractors  and  manufactu- 
rers, who  derived  their  support  from  government: 
the  agriculturists^followed  almost  immediately,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  unchecked  import  of  foreign  corn 
during  1814.  Trade  and  manufactures,  though  un- 
diminished as  far  as  regarded  export,  experienced, 
during  several  years,  a  great  decrease  at  home,  from 
the  cessation  of  government  purchases,  and  an  over- 
stock of  hands  from  the  discharge  and  non-enlistment 
of  men  for  the  army  and  militia.  Among  the  liberal 
professions,  the  medical  suffered  a  direct  surcharge 
from  an  obvious  cause :  the  same  held  in  regard  to 


Individual  and  National.  273 

the  civil  service  of  government,  and  if  in  the  law  and 
the  church,  the  overstock  has  been  less  rapid,  it  has 
not  been  the  less  certain,  so  much  does  stagnation  of 
demand  in  any  of  the  great  departments  affect  the 
community  at  large. 

Our  public  Burdens  ;  their  comparative  Pressure  in  War 
and  Peace. — Since  the  peace,  the  numerical  amount 
of  our  burdens  has  been  considerably  diminished, 
the  repeal  of  the  property-tax,  along  with  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  duties  on  malt,  salt,  and  leather,  having 
formed  (previously  to  the  reduction  of  the  assessed 
taxes)  a  diminution  of  nearly  20,000,000/.  This 
sum,  however,  large  as  it  is,  has  been  balanced, 
or  nearly  balanced,  by  the  rise  in  the  value  of  mo- 
ney; the  65,000,000/.  which  we  have  paid  annually 
since  the  peace,  having  formed  an  amount  of  equal 
value  with  the  80  or  85,000,000/.  paid  at  the  close  of 
the  war.  There  was  thus  no  real  reduction  of  our 
burdens  until  the  present  year,  and,  unfortunately, 
from  the  evils  of  transition,  from  the  sudden  diminu- 
tion in  the  income  of  particular  classes,  our  taxes 
have  been  found  a  burden  of  greater  pressure  since 
the  peace,  than  during  the  war. 

Effect  on  our  Public  Debt  of  the  Rise  in  the  Value  of 
Money. — We  come  now  to  the  circumstance  in  the 
series  of  our  transitions,  which,  more  than  any  other, 
has  contributed  to  increase  the  burden  of  our  taxes. 
To  comprehend  this  fully,  the  reader  should  bear  in 
mind,  that  government  stands  permanently  in  the  ca- 
pacity of  a  debtor ;  that  its  responsibility  is  repre-- 
sented  not  in  land,  houses,  or  what  is  technically 
termed  real  property,  but  in  money ;  and  that  what- 
ever raises  the  value  of  money,  increases  the  pressure 
of  its  debt.  During  the  long  depreciation  of  money 
attendant  on  the  war,  the  payment  of  9  or  10,000,000/. 
of  interest,  at  the  Treasury,  required  no  greater  drain 
on  the  national  resources,  than  the  payment  of  7  or 
8,000,000/.  previous  to  1793.  This  fact,  long  known 
to  our  finance  ministers,  formed  during  a  time  the 

35 


274  Effect  of  the  late  Wars  on  Property. 

basis  of  very  confident  calculations :  so  long  as  high 
prices  were  kept  up,  so  long  did  our  leading  men  at 
the  Treasury  and  in  Parliament  imagine,  that  the 
pressure  of  the  debt  contracted  during  the  war, 
would  be  alleviated  by  the  continued  depreciation  of 
money.  At  the  peace,  indeed,  a  degree  of  reaction 
or  rise  in  the  value  of  money  was  anticipated ;  but  in 
the  opinion  of  the  public,  as  of  government,  that  re- 
action was  likely  to  be  slight.  Had  such  proved  the 
case ;  had  the  price  of  corn  been  kept  up  both  here 
and  on  the  Continent,  the  evils  of  transition  would 
have  been  comparatively  slight,  and  our  national 
burdens  would  have  been  less  severely  felt.  Their 
pressure  would  have  gradually  decreased  as  our 
numbers  augmented,  and  we  might  have  considered 
the  expense  of  the  contest  as  in  a  great  measure  liqui- 
dated from  two  sources, — the  extra  profits  of  labour 
and  capital  which  had  supplied  our  war  taxes,  and 
the  depreciation  of  that  money  debt,  which  repre- 
resented  the  undischarged  burden.  But  all  such 
calculations  were  disappointed ;  reaction  took  place 
on  a  large  scale ;  and  without  experiencing  any  di- 
rect increase  of  charge,  the  public  were  subjected 
to  serious  embarrassment  from  the  general  diminu- 
tion of  the  sums  paid  for  rent,  salaries,  wages,  in 
short,  for  almost  every  thing  except  the  income  of 
annuitants. 

Has  this  increase  of  burden  been  accompanied  by 
any  circumstances  of  alleviation  ?  In  private  life  we 
have  for  some  time  experienced  relief  from  the  re- 
duction of  our  expenditure ;  but  what  is  the  situa- 
tion of  government  ?  It  feels  the  pressure  on  more 
than  two-thirds  of  its  disburse ;  the  benefit  on  less 
than  one-third.  The  former  consist  of  interest  of 
debt,  military  and  naval  pay,  pensions,  half-pay, 
salaries,  and  retirement  allowances,  all  of  a  fixed 
amount  in  money,  and  all  virtually  increased  as  the 
price  of  commodities  has  fallen.  On  the  other  hand, 
a  reduction  of  goverument  change  from  the  fall  of 
prices,  was,  till  very  lately,  experienced  only  in  the 


Conduct  of  our  Public  Men  since  1793.         275 

victualling  of  our  navy,  the  purchase  of  stores,  and 
in  a  portion  of  the  miscellaneous  services. 

These  discoveries  may  be  said  to  constitute  the 
denouement  of  the  mysterious  financial  drama  that  has 
been  acting  during  the  last  thirty  years.  Our  power 
of  pecuniary  contribution,  so  often  and  so  loudly  as- 
cribed to  generosity  in  the  sacrifice  of  our  wealth, 
may  now  be,  in  a  great  measure,  traced  to  causes  of 
a  humbler  character ;  to  an  increase  of  our  produc- 
tive industry,  founded  on  loans,  and  to  a  great,  but 
temporary  rise  of  prices.  Both  of  these  remarkable 
features  in  our  situation  were  expected  to  be  perma- 
nent ;  but  the  rise  of  prices  has  disappeared,  and  to 
the  extension  of  our  productive  industry,  circumstan- 
ces were  long  unfavourable.  Add  to  this,  that  though 
from  the  time  of  the  overthrow  of  Bonaparte,  the 
prospect  of  continued  peace  produced  a  radical 
change  in  our  situation,  our  ministers  were  tardy  in 
bringing  forward  any  measure  of  finance  founded  on 
that  change,  or  on  the  confidence  with  which  we 
may  anticipate  an  increase  of  our  wealth  and  num- 
bers. In  fact,  until  the  present  year,  we  made  little 
progress  towards  relief,  unless  we  account  as  such  a 
more  correct  knowledge  of  our  situation :  a  discovery 
of  certain  errors :  a  perception  of  the  transient  na- 
ture of  the  aids  on  which  we  relied  during  the  first 
years  of  peace. 


Have  oar  public  men,  since  1793,  understood  our  finan- 
cial situation? — After  ascertaining  the  existence  of 
such  general  misapprehension,  it  is  impossible  to 
avoid  asking  whether  several  important  circumstan- 
ces in  our  situation  and  prospects  have  not  been  un- 
known to  our  political  guides.  Were  they  aware 
during  the  war,  that  the  extension  of  our  productive 
industry  was,  in  a  great  degree,  artificial,  and  must 
decline  with  that  government  expenditure  which 
called  it  forth  ?  Looking  to  the  amount  of  the  in- 
terest of  our  public  debt,  of  our  pensions  and  other 


276  The  late  Wars ; 

fixed   payments,   did  they  or  did  they  not  foresee 
that,  on  the  cessation  of  this  artificial  stimulus,  the 
natural  course  of  circumstances  would  cause  a  rise 
in  the  value  of  money,  and  a  consequent  increase  of 
pressure  ?     To  what  degree  do  these  considerations 
affect  the  reputation  of  Mr.  Pitt,  the  leader  in  that 
course  of  policy,  which,  in   a  military  sense,  pro- 
duced so  brilliant  a  result,  in  a  financial,  so  much 
embarrassment  ?     That  Mr.  Pitt  was  at  first  averse 
from  the  war  with  France,  is  apparent,  from  several 
circumstances,  whether  we  refer  to  the  declaration 
of  respectable  writers,*  or  to  the  undeniable  fact, 
that  a  state  of  war  was  altogether  contrary  to  his 
plans,  for  the  reduction  of  our  public  burdens.   That, 
after  the  campaign  of  1794  had  disclosed  the  weak- 
ness of  our  allies,  and  the  strength  of  France,  he  la- 
mented our  involving  ourselves  in  the  contest,  there 
seems  little  reason  to  doubt :   but  when  the  country 
was  fairly  engaged  in  it,  and  our  resources  were  called 
into  full  activity,  it  accorded  with  his  confident  and 
persevering  character,  to  maintain  the  struggle,  in 
the  hope  of  recovering  the  Netherlands  so  unfortu- 
nately lost.     Hence,  a  continuance  of  the  contest, 
notwithstanding  the  defection  of  our  allies  and  the 
financial  difficulties  of  1797 ;  hence  those  war  taxes, 
which  no  other  minister  would  have   ventured  to 
propose,  and   certainly  no  other  would   have   suc- 
ceeded in  raising ;  hence,  also,  our  second  attack  on 
France  by  the  coalition  of  1799. 

But  the  perseverance  of  Mr.  Pitt  was  not  blind  per- 
sistency :  on  a  renewed  experience  of  the  weakness 
of  our  allies,  on  a  proof  of  the  sufferings  of  the 
country  from  heavy  taxation  and  deficient  harvests- 
he  felt  the  expediency  of  peace,  retired  from  office 
to  facilitate  its  conclusion,  and  gave  it,  when  not  re- 
sponsible for  its  conditions,  a  sanction  unequivocal 
and  sincere.  His  ardour  in  1803  for  the  recom- 
mencement of  war,  admits  of  a  less  satisfactory  solu- 

!"  *  Nichols'  Recollections  of- George  III.  and  J.  Allan's  Biographical 
Sketch  of  Fox,  in  Napier's  Supplement^  to  the  Encyclopaedia  BHtannjca. 
page  361. 


Conduct  of  our  Public  Men  since  1793.  277 

tion ;  it  discovered  much  more  the  zeal  of  a  comba- 
tant, than  the  discretion  of  the  senator ;  a  disposition 
to  sink  the  admonitory  recollections  of  our  late  strug- 
gle in  ardour  for  new  contest.  He  warned  us  once 
in  Parliament  of  the  magnitude  of  the  expense,  and  of 
the  necessity  of  preparing  ourselves  for  sacrifices 
greater  than  before ;  but  his  caution  was  general  and 
cursory,  unaccompanied  by  any  private  admonition 
to  the  inexperienced  ministry  of  the  day,  or  any  ad- 
vice to  delay  hostilities,  until  circumstances  should 
give  us  an  assurance  of  co-operation  on  the  part  of  the 
great  powers  of  the  Continent.  His  last  great  measure, 
the  attack  on  France  by  the  coalition  of  1805,  was, 
doubtless,  on  the  whole,  injudicious,  preponderant  as 
France  then  was  in  military  strength,  the  whole  under 
the  guidance  of  a  single  head.  Still  it  may  be  added 
that  it  is  by  no  means  uncommon  with  men  of  ability 
to  fall  into  the  miscalculation  made  by  Mr.  Pitt  on 
that  occasion :  and  to  anticipate,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  judicious  conduct  on  the  part  of  their  coadju» 
tors.  Every  impartial  man  must  allow,  that  it  wrould 
have  been  carrying  mistrust  to  an  extreme,  to  have 
apprehended  the  commission  of  faults  so  gross  as 
those  which  led  to  the  disasters  of  Ulm  and  Auster- 
litz.  And  those  who  are  surprised  that  a  man  of 
talent  should  misplace  his  confidence,  or  should  cal- 
culate on  others  acting  with  the  discrimination  natu- 
ral to  himself,  will  be  at  no  loss  to  find  similar  exam- 
ples in  the  conduct  of  the  most  eminent  men  of  the 
age :  in  that  of  Lord  Wellington,  when  he  expected 
discretion  from  Blucher ;  and  in  that  of  Bonaparte, 
when  he  allowed  the  command  of  Spain  to  remain  in 
the  hands  of  Jourdan;  or  when,  at  a  subsequent 
date,  he  committed  that  of  his  main  body  at  Water- 
loo, to  Ney. 

Since  the  distress  that  has  followed  the  peace  of 
1814,  it  has  been  publicly  said,  that  the  embarrass- 
ment likely  to  ensue  to  our  productive  industry  on 
the  cessation  of  the  war  expenditure  of  government, 
had  not  escaped  the  foresight  of  Mr.  Pitt.  Such  as- 
sertions are  often  made  loosely  and  inaccurately  ;  but 


278  The  late  Wars; 

the  one  in  question  seems  to  rest  on  probable  grounds. 
Mr.  Pitt  was  no  stranger  to  the  limited  produce  of 
our  revenue  in  peace ;  he  had  felt  the  financial  diffi- 
culties of  the  first  years  of  the  contest,  and  the  sur- 
prising relief  afforded  to  the  Treasury  by  the  imposi- 
tion of  war  taxes.  He  could  thus  hardly  fail  to  be 
aware  that  the  spring  given  to  our  national  industry 
was,  in  a  great  measure,  artificial ;  still  less  could  he 
be  unconscious  of  the  ultimately  injurious  operation 
of  loans  and  taxes  when  carried  to  an  extreme.  Nor 
is  it  incompatible  with  such  impressions,  that  he 
should  for  a  time  have  overlooked  the  inferences 
which  they  seem  so  naturally  to  suggest,  and  have 
been  hurried  along  by  ardour  in  the  contest,  by  an 
earnestness  to  obtain  a  present  advantage  at  the  ha- 
zard of  a  future  burden.  It  is  not  when  engaged  in  the 
bustle  of  business,  that  the  mind  is  capable  of  repos- 
ing on  itself,  of  meditating,  patiently  and  impartially, 
the  result  of  favourite  measures.  How  few  plans  of 
remote  operation,  of  a  nature  that  requires  continued 
thought  in  the  combination  or  length  of  time  in  the 
execution,  originate  with  men  in  office  !  Add  to  this 
that  the  great  evils  of  our  financial  system,  the  depre- 
ciation of  our  bank  paper,  the  extreme  pressure  of 
taxation  took  place  not  only  after  Mr.  Pitt's  death, 
but,  in  some  measure,  in  consequence  of  a  deviation 
from  his  principles.  Never  would  he  have  given  his 
sanction  to  such  a  measure  as  our  Orders  in  Council ; 
or  if,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  we  suppose  him  to  have 
been  led,  by  urgency  or  by  plausible  argument,  to 
their  adoption,  will  any  one  maintain  that  he  would 
have  been  likely  to  persist  in  so  absurd  a  course  dur- 
ing four  years,  until  it,  in  a  manner,  drove  the  Ameri- 
cans to  the  alternative  of  war — a  war  carried  on  be- 
tween us  and  our  best  customers — a  war  in  which  it 
was  apparent  that  injury  to  our  opponents  must  be  al- 
most as  pernicious  to  our  national  industry,  as  injury 
to  ourselves  ? 

The  responsibility  of  a  great  part  of  our  existing 
burden,  is  thus  transferred  from  Mr.  Pitt  to  his  succes- 
sors, of  whose  measures,  in  regard  to  neutrals,  from 


Conduct  of  our  public  Men  since  1793.  279 

September  1807,  to  May  1812,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  give  a  satisfactory  explanation.  They  implied  a 
total  unconsciousness  of  the  precarious  state  of  our 
paper  currency,  and,  in  regard  to  trade,  either  a  dis- 
avowal of  principles  generally  admitted,  or  a  readi- 
ness to  infringe  those  principles  for  temporary  pur- 
poses— purposes  that  could  have  no  decisive  effect 
on  the  result  of  the  grand  struggle  with  France.  In 
1812  began  a  different  era:  our  Orders  in  Council 
were  withdrawn ;  peace  was  repeatedly  offered  to 
the  United  States  of  America ;  and,  at  a  subsequent 
date,  no  harsh  treaty  of  commerce  was  imposed  on 
France  in  the  day  of  her  adversity.  Add  to  this,  that 
since  the  peace,  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  give  a 
fallacious  prop,  by  bounties  or  prohibitions,  to  any  of 
our  suffering  interests.  Admirable  rules  of  conduct 
these,  and  yet  in  regard  to  our  finances,  we  must  re- 
peat, that  ministers  have  not  been  prompt  in  render- 
ing the  national  resources  instrumental  to  the  national 
relief.  The  fault  appears  to  have  lain,  not  as  is  usual 
with  governments,  in  interfering  with  the  course  of 
productive  industry,  but  either  in  deficient  foresight 
in  regard  to  the  changes  occurring  in  our  situation, 
or  in  deficient  vigour  in  acting  on  such  changes.  Take 
for  example  the  rise  in  the  value  of  money,  a  natural 
consequence  of  a  return  to  a  pacific  system,  and  one 
which,  with  some  temporary  exceptions,  has  been  re- 
gularly gaining  ground  since  1814.  Would  Mr.  Pitt, 
had  his  life  been  prolonged,  have  delayed  until  the 
ninth  year  of  peace  a  reduction  of  public  salaries,  an 
adaptation  of  government  payments  to  the  augmented 
value  of  the  money  in  which  these  payments  were 
made  ?  Is  it  not  more  likely  that  he  would  have  long 
since  anticipated  the  result  of  the  general  change,  and 
have  given,  in  his  own  case,  a  decided  example  of 
what  he  would  have  exacted  from  others  ?  Farther, 
is  it  probable  that  in  peace  he  would  have  adhered 
blindly  to  the  financial  routine  pursued  during  the 
war,  without  attempting  some  measure,  founded  on 
the  circumstances  that  have  predominated  in  our  si- 
tuation since  1814 — the  reduced  interest  of  money, 


280  The  late  Wars; 

and  the  prospect  of  long  continued  peace,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  conviction  annually  gaining  ground 
that  a  state  of  war  is  as  contrary  to  policy  as  to  hu- 
manity, and,  from  our  growing  power,  far  less  neces- 
sary for  defence  than  when  France  was  so  preponde- 
rant ? 

If  ministers  are  open  to  the  charge  of  deficient  vi- 
gour in  finance,  in  what  manner  can  the  impartial 
reasoner  characterize  the  conduct  of  their  parliamen- 
tary opponents  ?     On  their  part  there  existed  no  mo- 
tive for  reserve,  in  regard  to  public  distress ;  no  dread 
of  disseminating  alarm,  by  the  proposition  of  change ; 
yet  the  investigations  of  most  of  the  Opposition  mem- 
bers have  been  confined  to  insulated  points,  their  ob- 
jections to  specific  grants.     Where,  in  the  long  list  of 
those  who  opposed  the  war,  did  we  find  a  speaker 
capable  of  giving  the  House  or  the  country  a  distinct 
conception  of  the  operation  of  our  augmented  expen- 
diture; of  the  temporary  nature  of  the  activity  caused 
by  it  during  war ;  of  the  unfortunate  re-action  to  be 
apprehended  at  a  peaee  ?     Where,  on  the  part  of 
those  who  have  combated  the  measures  of  ministers 
since  the  peace,  do  we  find  a  comprehensive  view  of 
our  national  means,  the  suggestion  of  any  measure  of 
a  new  or  of  a  general  character,  adapted  to  our  pre- 
sent circumstances  ?     To  what  shall  we  ascribe  this 
deficiency  of  resource,  this  scanty  measure  of  statisti- 
cal knowledge  on  both  sides  of  the  House  ?     To  a 
cause  to  which  we  have  owed  no  small  share  of  our 
political  disappointments  in  the  present  age — an  edu- 
cation on  the  part  of  our  representatives  very  little 
suited  to  their  functions  as  men  of  business.     This  to- 
pic has  a  claim  to  our  attentive  examination,  for  by 
nothing  has  the  situation  of  the  public  during  the  pre- 
sent age,  been  more  materially  affected. 

Education  of  our  Public  Men. — The  course  of  study 
followed  in  this  country,  in  the  case  of  young  men 
destined  for  public  life,  is  remarkable  as  indicative 
of  the  tenacity  with  which  established  usages  main- 
tain their  ground.     Previous  to  the  17th  century,  the 


Education  of  our  Public  Men.  281 

acquisition  of  Latin  was  indispensable  to  a  polite 
education,  no  modern  language  being  in  these  days 
a  depository  of  elegant  learning,  or  a  received  medium 
for  the  correspondence  of  either  men  of  letters  or  di- 
plomatists. It  is  thus  that  we  are  to  account  for  the 
interchange  of  voluminous  epistles  in  Latin,  between 
the  scholars  of  Italy,  Germany,  France,  and  England, 
as  well  as  for  the  study  of  the  classical  languages  by 
females  of  rank,  as  was  exemplified  in  the  case  of 
Queen  Elizabeth,  of  Lady  Jane  Grey,  and  of  the 
daughters  of  Sir  Thomas  More.  The  colleges  added 
in  these  days  to  our  universities,  were  naturally  con- 
fined to  the  branches  of  literature  familiar  to  the 
founders ;  and  in  no  part  of  Europe  has  this  limitation 
been  more  strictly  maintained,  or  the  changes  sug- 
gested by  modern  discoveries  been  less  adopted, 
than  at  Oxford  and  Cambridge.  If  academical  chairs 
have  been  provided  for  chemistry,  for  moral  or  for 
natural  philosophy,  an  adherence  to  the  established 
usage  of  these  seminaries  has  prevented  their  being 
generally  attended,  and  continues  to  confine  the  la- 
bours of  our  youth  to  mathematical  and  classical 
pursuits,  to  which  alone,  are  awarded  honours  at  the 
public  examinations. 

The  study  of  mathematics  has  obviously  little  con- 
nexion with  the  business  of  life,  or  with  the  intended 
profession  of  nine-tenths  of  those  who  pursue  it.  The 
evidence  by  which  the  inferences  of  the  student  are 
there  guided,  is  of  a  nature  altogether  different  from 
that  which  he  will  be  called  on  to  weigh  in  his  inter- 
course with  the  world,  in  the  transaction  of  business, 
in  the  discrimination  of  character.  On  this  we  shall 
not  enlarge,  as  it  will,  of  course,  be  readily  admitted, 
and  the  defence  of  the  study  made  to  rest  on  its  "  ten- 
dency to  improve  the  reasoning  powers  of  youth :" 
but  would  it  not,  we  may  ask,  be  practicable  to  at- 
tain equal  improvement  in  that  respect  by  directing 
their  labours  to  subjects  connected  with  their  future 
occupation  ?  Taking  for  example  young  men  intend- 
ed for  public  life,  would  it  not  be  preferable  to  seek 
an  exercise  far  their  intellect  in  the  historv  of  our 

3fi 


282  The  late  Warn; 

country  as  related  by  Hume,  or  in  the  conclusions  of 
political  economy  as  exhibited  in  the  writings  of 
Smith  or  Say  ?  By  history  they  would  be  introduced 
to  a  knowledge  of  characters,  such  as  they  are  likely 
to  meet  on  the  stage  of  life ;  while  political  economy 
would  lead  them  to  the  examination  of  subjects 
which  they  will  be  called  on  to  discuss,  and  which 
they  will  find  as  yet  very  imperfectly  understood.  In 
regard  to  impressions  of  a  higher  kind,  the  tendency 
of  these  studies  to  convey  liberal  views,  to  prove  the 
connexion  between  the  justice  of  a  government  and 
the  welfare  of  its  subjects,  between  the  course  of 
public  events  and  the  ordination  of  Providence,  we 
have,  we  trust,  said  enough  in  a  preceding  paragraph 
of  this  chapter. 

Classical  erudition,  says  an  elegant  writer,*  is  by 
the  custom  of  England  more  peculiarly  called 
learning ;  and  we  admit  that  in  education,  its  claim  to 
attention  is  powerful,  even  when  we  keep  out  of  view 
its  fascinating  appeals  to  the  imagination,  and  are 
content  to  contemplate  it  with  a  mere  reference  to 
utility.  The  record  of  instructive  facts,  the  delinea- 
tion of  character,  the  illustration  of  the  rules  of  com- 
position, the  exemplification  of  the  finest  precepts, 
all  belong  to  writers  of  Greece  and  Rome,  and  warn 
us  to  beware  of  neglecting  to  cultivate  that  grateful 
soil.  Of  this  we  are  so  fully  satisfied,  that  our  doubts 
are  confined  to  the  time  requisite  to  acquire  a  know- 
ledge of  the  critical  niceties  of  the  languages,  and  to 
the  question  whether  we  ought  not,  in  most  cases,  to 
be  satisfied  with  that  progress  which  enables  us  to 
comprehend,  with  tolerable  accuracy,  the  sense  of  a 
writer.  And  here,  fortunately,  the  line  of  distinction 
seems  to  admit  of  being  traced  with  considerable 
confidence.  By  the  youth  intended  for  an  active 
pursuit,  for  the  bar,  the  pulpit,  or  the  senate,  philo- 
logical researches  need  hardly  be  carried  further  than 
is  necessary  to  enable  him  to  understand  the  meaning 

*  Sir  James  Mackintosh  on  the  character  of  Fox,  in  the  collection  by 
Dr.  Parr,  under  the  name  of  Philopatris  Varvirpnsi*. 


Education  of  our  Public  Men.  283 

uf  an  author,  while  a  more  minute  and  scrupulous 
investigation  is  incumbent  on  him  who  directs  his 
labours  to  the  instruction  of  others^  or  cultivates 
literature  in  retirement  with  all  the  advantage  of 
the  command  of  time.  But  why,  it  may  be  said, 
cannot  the  two  be  combined  by  persons  intended  for 
active  professions  ?  To  do  so,  would,  we  apprehend, 
be  to  underrate  the  sacrifice  of  time  indispensable  to 
the  attainment  of  thorough  knowledge,  and  to  lose 
sight  of  the  scrupulous  care  with  which  the  eight  or 
ten  years,  in  general  allowed  for  education,  must  be 
appropriated,  if  we  mean  to  avoid  the  frequent  error 
of  misapplying  our  labour,  of  undertaking  studies 
which  we  may  be  unable  to  follow  up. 

Conduct  of  public  Affairs  since  1793. — Let  us  proceed 
to  make  a  brief  application  of  these  remarks  to  the 
statesmen  of  the  present  age ;  to  the  men  who  guided 
our  councils  in  the  stormy  period  of  the  French  revo- 
lution. How  different,  in  all  probability,  would  have 
been  the  course  of  their  policy  had  their  early  im- 
pressions partaken  more  of  the  light  to  be  derived 
from  the  study  of  recent  periods  of  history,  from  an 
attentive  observation  of  foreign  countries.  Had  they 
possessed  a  more  accurate  knowledge  of  the  national 
character  of  the  French,  of  the  degree  in  which  the 
invidious  distinction  between  the  titled  and  untitled 
classes  was  kept  up,  of  the  circumstances  which  ren- 
dered a  revolution  as  much  the  wish  of  the  majority 
of  the  nation  as  it  was  in  this  country  in  1688,  our 
ministers  would  have  known  with  how  much  qualifi- 
cation the  declamations  of  Burke,  and  the  assertions 
of  the  emigrants  were  to  be  received.  In  regard  to 
this  country,  they  would  probably  have  discovered 
that  the  support  of  the  middle  and  upper  classes  af- 
forded a  sufficient  safeguard  against  the  danger  of 
innovation  without  resorting  to  the  alternative  of  war. 
Or,  supposing  that  after  the  loss  of  the  Netherlands 
in  1792,  and  the  alarm  given  to  our  sovereign  and 
our  nobility  by  the  violence  of  the  Jacobins,  it  be- 
came impossible  to  avoid  an  appeal  to  arms,  bow  difc* 


284  The  late  Wars; 

ierent,  with  the  knowledge  we  have  supposed  in  our 
political  guides,  would  have  been  the  conduct  of  the 
war  ?  Had  they  been  aware  of  the  backward  state 
of  the  countries,  in  particular  Austria,  on  which  we 
relied  for  military  co-operation,  of  that  blind  adhe- 
rence to  old  usage,  that  deference  to  family  rank  and 
court  influence,  which  clogged  the  wheels  of  go- 
vernment and  restrained  the  energy  of  the  people,  is 
it  likely  that  our  ministers  would  have  counselled  an 
offensive  course  against  a  nation  emancipated  from 
these  fetters,  and  which  conferred  its  appointments, 
whether  civil  or  military,  by  very  different  rules  ? 
If  from  foreign  affairs  we  turn  to  our  interior  situa- 
tion, is  it  likely,  we  may  ask,  that,  with  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  principles  of  productive  industry, 
our  ministers  would  have  been  so  deluded  by  ap- 
pearances as  to  mistake  a  rise  in  the  price  of  commo- 
dities for  an  increase  of  national  wealth,  or  to  ima- 
gine that  war  could,  under  any  circumstances,  be 
conducive  *  to  commercial  prosperity  ?  Had  they 
studied  the  lesson  to  be  learned  in  the  history  of  Hol- 
land, and,  in  some  degree,  in  our  own,  (since  inter- 
vals of  stagnation  have  followed  almost  every  war 
since  the  revolution,)  our  public  men  would  have 
anticipated  a  reaction  at  a  peace,  and  have  carefully 
circumscribed  their  expenditure  during  the  war.  If 
we  examine  the  discussions  that  have  from  time  to 
time  taken  place  on  one  very  material  question, — the 
state  of  our  currency, — we  shall  find  the  speeches  of 
our  leading  men  indicate  little  more  than  an  elemen- 
tary knowledge  of  the  subject.  These  discussions 
began  in  1810,  when  if  we  could  not  resume  cash  pay- 
ments, we  might  have  desisted  from  our  measures 
against  neutral  navigation ;  but  the  degree  to  which 
the  restraint  imposed  on  that  navigation  affected  the 
credit  of  our  bank  paper  was  unknown  to  parliament, 
and  inadequately  felt  by  the  Cabinet.  Nothing  con- 
sequently was  done ;  and,  when  at  a  subsequent  date, 
and  under  very  different  circumstances,  we  mean  in 
3819.  parliament  did  interfere  with  the  currency,  th* 


Education  of  our  public  Men .  285 

measure  was  ill-timed,  and  tended,  if  not  to  aggravate 
the  evil,  to  mislead  the  public  in  regard  to  its  cause. 

After  all  these  examples  of  error,  does  it  seem  ne- 
cessary to  add  that  the  labours  of  our  public  men 
ought  to  be  modelled  on  a  new  plan  ?  To  give  a 
cursory  attention  to  a  multiplicity  of  topics,  leads  to 
a  knowledge  very  little  beyond  that  of  first  impres- 
sions :  to  obtain  a  satisfactory  conviction,  to  place  our 
opinions  on  a  firm  basis,  it  is  indispensable  to  make  a 
selection,  to  restrict  the  objects  of  inquiry,  and  to 
give  a  long  continuance  to  our  research  and  reflec- 
tion on  the  prescribed  themes.  Looking  round  in 
private  life,  and  extending  our  view  to  men  of  emi- 
nence generally,  commercial  as  well  as  professional, 
what  else  than  this  limitation  of  object  and  perseve- 
rance in  pursuit,  do  we  find  to  form  the  basis  of  such 
characters,  and  to  distinguish  them  from  the  credu- 
lous multitude,  from  those  who  listen  with  ready  ac- 
quiescence to  every  plausible  assertion  ?  If  the  ha- 
bits of  our  representatives  are  different,  if  they  un- 
fortunately betray  the  absence  of  such  discrimination 
and  perseverance,  ought  it  to  be  matter  of  surprise, 
that  delusion  should  have  prevailed  among  them  dur- 
ing so  many  years :  that  a  temporary  rise  of  prices 
and  increase  of  activity,  should  have  been  mistaken 
for  a  permanent  augmentation  of  national  wealth ;  and 
that  the  unwelcome  discoveries  of  late  years,  the 
finale  of  which  is  no  less  than  a  suspension  of  their 
incomes,  should  have  come  on  them  by  surprise  ? 


286 


CHAP.  X. 

Value  of  Money. 

SECTION  I. 

Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money  or  in  the  Price  of  Com- 
modities. 

The  fluctuation  in  prices  consequent  on  the  great 
political  transitions  of  the  age,  has  been  already  dis- 
cussed in  our  second  chapter :  at  present  our  object 
is  to  pursue  the  same  inquiry  on  a  more  comprehen- 
sive plan,  and  to  carry  back  our  views  to  changes  that 
have  taken  place  in  former  ages.  Changes  of  this 
nature  rank  among  the  most  interesting  subjects  of  in- 
quiry in  political  economy.  To  the  reader  of  histo- 
ry, a  knowledge  of  them  is  indispensable  to  the  for- 
mation of  a  correct  estimate  of  the  price  of  labour,  of 
the  public  revenue,  and  of  the  comparative  wealth  of 
a  nation  at  different  periods ;  while,  in  a  practical 
view,  an  acquaintance  with  this  subject  is  of  very 
serious  interest,  as  connected  with  the  future  value  of 
bequests,  leases,  and  time-contracts  generally.  The 
discussion  naturally  divides  itself  into  the  following 
heads: — 

The  tendency  of  prices  to  fluctuate. 

The  impracticability  of  foreseeing  or  preventing 
such  fluctuation. 

A  plan  for  lessening  its  injurious  operation. 

Publications  on  the  Fluctuation  of  Prices. — The  docu- 
ments for  forming  an  estimate  of  these  changes,  have 
as  yet  been  given  to  us  scantily  and  imperfectly,  the 
subject  never  having  engaged  the  attention  of  go- 
vernment, and  but  lately  that  of  any  of  our  public  bo- 
dies.    In  France,  a  country  little  remarked  forstatis- 


Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money,  2  87 

tical  research,  the  attempts  hitherto  made  to  compare 
the  rate  of  prices  at  different  periods  have  been  con- 
fined to  a  few  literary  men :  in  England,  one  of  the 
earliest  was  that  of  Bishop  Fleetwood,  who  collected 
prices  of  wheat  during  a  number  of  years  from  the  13th 
to  the  17th  century,  and  reduced  them  to  money  of 
our  present  standard.  His  labours,  published  in 
1707,  formed  the  chief  materials  for  the  reasonings  of 
Dr.  Smith,  whose  life  was  not  prolonged  until  the  pub- 
lication (in  1797)  of  a  very  valuable  addition  to  such 
collections  by  Sir  Frederick  Eden,  in  his  work  on  the 
"  State  of  the  Poor,"  the  copious  materials  of  which 
have  been  termed  afons  perennis  for  succeeding  inqui- 
rers. 

In  1798  there  appeared  in  the  Transactions  of  the 
Royal  Society,  a  tabular  statement  by  Sir  George 
Shuckburgh,  which,  from  the  clearness  of  its  form 
(See  Appendix,)  and  the  confidence  of  its  deductions, 
obtained  much  more  credit  than  it  deserved,  being- 
far  from  correct,  even  in  the  fundamental  points.  In 
1811,  the  late  Arthur  Young,  alarmed  at  the  impres- 
sion made  on  the  public  by  the  Report  of  the  Bullion 
Committee,  and  dreading  a  contraction  of  paper  cur- 
rency attended  by  a  fall  in  the  price  of  agricultural 
produce,  entered  into  researches  of  great  extent,  both 
as  to  the  past  and  current  prices  of  commodities,  and 
published  the  whole  in  a  pamphlet,  entitled  "  An  In- 
quiry into  the  Progressive  Value  of  Money  in  Eng- 
land." This  tract,  however  inaccurate  in  a  theoreti- 
cal sense,  has  a  claim  to  attention,  as  well  for  the  va- 
lue of  its  materials,  as  for  a  correction  of  the  mistakes 
of  Sir  George  Shuckburgh.  Since  1811,  serious  be- 
yond example  as  has  been  the  fluctuation  of  our 
prices,  there  has  appeared  no  treatise  of  consequence 
on  the  subject  until  Mr.  Tooke's  valuable  publication 
on  "High  and  Low  Prices  since  1792." 

Historical  Sketch  of  the  Fluctuation  of  Prices. — It  is  a 
prevalent  notion  that  the  money  prices  of  commodi- 
ties have  been  progressively  rising  since  the  Norman 
conquest,  or  even  since  the  earlier  period,  when  the 


288  Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money. 

luxury  of  Rome,  and  the  revenue  paid  to  it  by  tribu- 
tary provinces,  disappeared  before  its  rude  invaders 
from  the  north  and  east.  To  this  opinion,  however, 
there  are  several  strong  objections.  The  supply  of 
gold  and  silver  from  the  mines,  was,  during  the  mid- 
dle ages,  scanty  and  precarious ;  while  the  numbers 
of  society  requiring  the  use  of  the  precious  me- 
tals, in  other  words,  the  population  of  the  west  and 
central  part  of  Europe,  were,  in  some  degree,  in  a 
state  of  increase.  Dr.  Smith,  reasoning  on  the  price 
of  commodities  generally,  from  the  price  of  corn,  and 
founding  his  view  of  the  latter  on  the  collections  of 
Bishop  Fleetwood,  assumes,  that  from  the  year  1200 
to  1550,  there  was  no  considerable  rise  of  prices ; 
and  that  such  rise  did  not  begin  till  the  reign  of  Eli- 
zabeth, the  time  when  the  American  mines  became 
productive  on  a  large  scale.  The  import  from  that 
quarter,  small  as  it  would  appear  in  the  present  age, 
was  sensibly  felt  at  a  time  when  silver  was  very  little 
used  in  manufacture,  and  not  largely  in  plate :  its 
amount  was,  under  such  circumstances,  almost  whol- 
ly added  to  the  circulating  medium  of  Europe.  This 
addition  was  considered  by  Dr.  Smith  the  main  cause 
of  the  rise  of  prices  which  continued  until  towards 
the  year  1 650,  when,  from  circumstances  on  which 
we  shall  enlarge  presently,  prices  ceased  to  rise,  and 
became  either  stationary  or  declining.  This  state  of 
things  lasted  until  1764,  when,  as  is  well  known,  a 
new  era  commenced  and  continued  until  1814. 

Effect  of  a  State  of  War. — Dr.  Smith's  view  of  the 
progressive  value  of  money  is  admitted  by  Mr.  Young, 
but  neither  of  these  writers  has  thought  of  tracing  a 
correspondence  between  the  fluctuations  in  the  pre- 
cious metals  in  the  16th  and  17th  centuries,  and  the 
political  transactions  of  Europe.  A  state  of  war  tends, 
as  we  have  shown  in  a  preceding  chapter,  greatly  to 
advance  prices,  and  the  rise  in  the  reign  of  Elizabeth 
may,  in  no  inconsiderable  degree,  be  ascribed  to  the 
increase  of  military  establishments  in  that  age,  to  our 
defensive  attitude  against  Philip  II.,  to  the  obstinate 


Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.  2&H 

contest  carried  on  between  him  and  his  insurgent  sub- 
jects in  the  Netherlands,  to  the  civil  wars  of  France, 
and  to  the  troubled  state  of  Germany.  On  the  other 
hand,  after  the  treaty  of  Westphalia,  the  chief  part  of 
Europe  enjoyed  tranquillity,  and  the  effect  on  trade 
and  agriculture,  of  reduced  armies  and  diminished 
taxes,  is  described  by  Sir  W.  Temple,  in  a  manner 
that  strikingly  resembles  the  state  of  this  country 
and  the  Continent  since  the  late  peace. 

This  political  change  accounts  for  the  decline  of 
prices  that  prevailed  after  1 650,  but  the  application 
of  our  theory  is,  it  must  be  allowed,  less  clear  after 
1672,  when  war  was  renewed  on  a  great  scale,  and 
continued,  with  comparatively  little  intermission, 
during  forty  years.  Add  to  this,  that  there  took  place, 
during  all  that  time,  an  import  of  specie  from  Ame- 
rica, to  an  extent  somewhat  increased ;  viz.  to  the 
amount  of  three,  four,  or  five  millions,  annually.  In 
what  manner,  under  the  operation  of  this  double 
cause  of  enhancement,  are  we  to  account  for  prices 
experiencing  no  great  or  permanent  rise  ?  Perhaps 
by  the  following  considerations : — 

1.  An  increased  use  of  the  precious  metals,  in 
plate,  manufactures,  and  ornaments,  in  consequence 
of  the  general  increase  of  wealth. 

2.  An  augmented  export  of  them  to  the  eastern 
world,  chiefly  through  the  means  of  the  Dutch  East 
India  Company. 

3.  The  fact,  that  previous  to  1 672,  the  supply  of 
agricultural  produce  in  England,  as  in  the  northwest 
of  Europe  generally,  had  become  somewhat  more 
than  equal  to  the  consumption ;  an  excess  of  which 
the  effects  are  generally  felt  for  a  long  series  of  years. 

The  peace  of  Utrecht  was  the  commencement  of  a 
period  of  general  tranquillity ;  government  expendi- 
ture was  reduced,  labourers  were  restored  to  agricul- 
ture, and  the  decline  of  prices  became  general  and 
progressive.  In  vain  did  ou ^landholders  look  to  the 
bounty  on  the  export  of  corn,  for  a  counteraction  of 
the  fall  in  the  market:  they  exported  largely,  and  re- 

37 


2&)  Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money. 

ceived  premiums  on  a  liberal  scale,  but  their  abun- 
dant growth  kept  down  the  home  market,  and  the 
excess  of  supply  oyer  consumption  continued  during 
half  a  century,  terminating  only  in  1 764.  Nor  is  it  at 
all  probable  that  it  would  have  ceased  at  that  time, 
peace  having  been  but  lately  concluded,  had  we  not 
had  a  succession  of  indifferent  seasons :  these  raised 
priced,  and  the  contest  that  ensued  with  our  colonies, 
prevented  their  fall. 

After  1783,  the  restoration  of  peace  tended,  natu- 
rally, to  reduce  prices,  but  its  effect  was  retarded  by 
several  causes,  in  particular,  the  demand  of  hands  for 
our  manfactures,  and  the  occasional  occurrence  of 
indifferent  seasons.  After  1792,  the  progress  of  en- 
hancement was  accelerated  in  an  unexampled  degree 
by  the  general  state  of  war  consequent  on  the  French 
revolution.  A  rise  of  prices  progressive  during  twenty 
years,  and  amounting  at  last  to  more  than  60  per 
cent,  above  those  of  1792,  overturned  time  contracts 
throughout  the  kingdom,  depressing  annuitants  while 
it  raised  tenants  on  lease,  with  various  other  classes, 
above  their  former  station, — an  elevation,  unfortunate- 
ly, of  short  duration,  since  they  have  been  made  to 
descend  from  it  with  still  more  rapidity  in  the  years 
that  have  followed  the  peace. 

Can  such  fluctuations  be  foreseen  or  prevented  f — After 
this  summary  in  regard  to  the  past,  the  next  and  still 
more  important  point  is  to  ascertain  how  far  such 
fluctuations  are  likely  to  continue.  But  here  the  most 
indefatigable  inquirer  will  find  the  result  uncertain, 
and  be  obliged  to  admit,  that  in  so  complicated  a 
question,  all  that  we  can  do  with  confidence,  is  to 
state  the  arguments  on  either  side.  Those  in  favour 
of  the  rise  of  prices,  are, 

The  contingency  of  war. 

The  probable  increase  of  the  produce  of  the  mines, 
from  the  application  of  steam-engines  and  other  im- 
proved machinery. 

The  farther  substitution  of  bank  paper  for  metallic 
currency:  a  substitution,  which,  in  its  general  (though 


Fluctuation  m  the  Fake  of  Money.  291 

not  in  its  local)  effect,  operates  like  the  increased 
productiveness  of  a  mine.* 

On  the  other  hand,  the  arguments  for  the  fall  of 
prices  are  equally  substantial ;  viz. 

The  tendency  of  all  improvements  in  productive 
industry,  whether  in  agriculture,  manufacture,  me- 
chanics, or  navigation,  to  produce  cheapness. 

The  increasing  demand  for  the  precious  metals, 
from  the  increasing  population  of  the  civilized  world. 

As  to  England  in  particular,  the  tendency  of  a 
country  where  prices  are  higher  than  in  the  neigh- 
bouring states,  to  approximate  (see  p.  294),  by  com- 
mercial intercourse,  to  the  standard  of  other  countries. 

Supply  of  Specie  from  the  .Mines — The  amount  of 
specie  extracted  annually  from  American  mines,  was 
computed  in  1760,  at  6,000,000/.  sterling:  in  the 
course  of  the  succeeding  twenty  years,  it  had  increa- 
sed to  fully  7,000,000/.,  and  some  time  after  (Appen- 
dix to  the  Bullion  Report  of  1810)  to  8,000,000/.  In 
this,  as  in  other  respects,  Mexico  is  by  far  the  fore- 
most of  the  Spanish  colonies,  the  yearly  produce  of 
her  mines  being  nearly  five  millions  sterling,  while 
that  of  the  rest  of  Spanish  America  may  be  estimated 
at  three  millions  more.  Adding  to  these,  somewhat 
less  than  a  million  sterling  for  Portuguese  America, 
and  somewhat  more  than  another  million  for,  the 
mines  of  our  own  hemisphere,  we  make  a  total  of 
nearly  ten  millions  annually  added  to  the  stock  of 
the  precious  metals  throughout  the  world.  From 
this,  however,  is  to  be  made,  both  at  present  and  for 
some  time  back,  a  deduction  on  account  of  the  politi- 
cal troubles  of  Spanish  America :  still  the  importa- 
tion is  on  a  large  scale,  and  would  speedily  produce 
depreciation,  were  not  the  demands  of  the  civilized 
world  on  the  increase. 

Consumption  of  Specie. — The  demands  for  the  pro- 
duce of  the  mines  arise  from  various  causes,  of  which 

*  Our  mention  of  bank  paper  must  always  be  understood  as  of  bank  notes 
payable  in  cash  ;  a  resort  to  nonconvertible  paper  will,  we  take  for  grant- 
ed, be  henceforth  excluded  from  our  financial  creed. 


292  Fluctuation  m  the  Value  of  Money. 

the  greatest,  by  far,  is  the  aunual  consumption  of  it 
for  plate,  watches,  gilding,   and  ornamental  manu- 
facture, generally.     The  amount  of  this  admits  of  no 
satisfactory  calculation,  but  is  probably  (Appendix, 
p.  [89])  not  far  short  of  two-thirds  of  the  total  pro- 
duce  of  the  mines.     Next  comes  the   demand  for 
coin:   the  currency  of  almost  all  the  Continent  of 
Europe  is  metallic,  and  an  annual  supply  is  requisite, 
partly  to  make  good  accidental  loss  or  the  effect  of 
wear,   partly  to   meet   the   increase  of  population. 
This,  though  not  large,  may,  when  joined  to  the  an- 
nual export  of  specie  to  India  and  China,  (to  say 
little  of  losses  arising  from  shipwreck  or  hoarding,) 
account  for  the  absorption  of  the  remaining  third  of 
the  produce  of  the  mines.     What  then  appears  to  be 
the  general  result  ?     That  in  ordinary  times  these  va- 
rious sources  of  demand  are  equal,  or  nearly  equal. 
to  the  amount  supplied  from  the  mines ;  but  that  for 
some  years  back  (since  1818,)  they  appear  to  have 
been  more  than  equal,  in  consequence  of  the  extra 
demand  for  gold  on  the  part  of  the  banks  of  this  coun- 
try, Russia,  and  Austria,  for  the  purpose  of  substitu- 
ting a  metallic  for  a  paper  currency. 

Dr.  Smith,  in  adverting  to  the  future  supply  of  spe- 
cie from  the  mines,  considered  it  an  equal  chance 
that  old  mines  may  become  exhausted,  as  that  new 
mines  may  be  discovered,  or  the  produce  of  the  old 
increased.  Without  contesting  the  accuracy  of  this 
opinion  in  his  age,  it  will  hardly  be  doubted,  that 
since  the  discovery  of  the  power  of  steam,  the  ap- 
plication of  improved  machinery  to  the  existing 
mines,  would  be  productive  of  a  very  considerable 
extension  of  produce ;  but  whether,  or  in  what  time, 
it  will  be  carried  so  far  as  to  lower  materially  the 
value  of  specie,  it  appears  in  vain  to  conjecture. 

Circulation  of  Bank  Paper. — Our  countrymen,  accus- 
tomed during  more  than  half  a  century  to  the  use  of 
bank  notes,  have  observed,  with  some  surprise,  that 
a  currency  so  cheap,  and  apparently  so  easy  of  intro- 
duction, should,  as  yeU  be  hardly  known  on  the*  Con- 


f 


Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.  293 

tinent.     The  bank  of  France,  though  of  undoubted 
stability, has  found  it  practicable  to  establish  branches 
in  very  few  of  the  provincial  towns :  several,  con- 
taining a  population  of  40,000  and  upwards,  are  still 
without  such  branches :  and  there  is  not  a  private 
bank   of  circulation  in  the   whole   country.      The 
causes  are,  the  distrust  excited  by  the  recollection 
of  the  assignats,  the  want  of  confidence  in  govern- 
ment, the  absence  of  commercial  enterprise,  as  well 
as  of  the  habits  of  care  and  arrangement,  which  are 
indispensable  to  success  in  a  line  of  itself  less  profi- 
table than  is  commonly  imagined.     Holland,  with  all 
her  commercial  improvements,  has  never  adopted 
the  bank-note  system,  while  in  Austria,  Russia,  and 
Sweden,  the  paper  circulated  is  a  forced  government 
currency,  not  convertible  into  cash. 

The  obstacles  to  the  circulation  of  bank  paper  on 
the  Continent,  might  perhaps  have  yielded  to  the  ef- 
fects of  peace  and  augmented  trade,  but  they  have 
been  strengthened  of  late  years,  by  the  increased  fa- 
cility of  forgery.  It  would  thus  be  vain  to  calculate 
on  the  extended  use  of  bank  paper,  or  on  any  effect 
likely  to  arise  from  it  in  regard  to  the  value  of  the 
precious  metals. 

Supply  of  Agricultural  Produce. — Though  corn  is  so 
liable  to  fluctuation,  as  well  from  difference  of  sea- 
sons, as  from  the  occurrence  of  peace  or  war,  it  is  re- 
markable that  a  character  of  rise  or  fall  when  once 
stamped  on  a  period,  is  found  to  prevail  during  a  con- 
siderable time.  Thus,  the  rise  of  price  begun  in  the 
early  part  of  the  reign  of  Elizabeth,  continued,  with 
only  occasional  intermissions,  to  1650,  not  far  short 
of  a  hundred  years.  At  that  time  began  an  era  of 
stationary,  and,  in  some  degree,  of  decreasing  prices, 
which,  with  temporary  suspensions  during  the  indif- 
ferent seasons  and  expensive  wars  of  the  reigns  of 
William  and  Anne,  continued  until  1764.  From  that 
year  until  1814,  we  had  no  less  than  fifty  years  of 
Ijrisk  demand  and  high  prices ;  while  at  present,  as 
far  as  can  be  judged  from  appearances,  either  in 


294  fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money, 

England  or  on  the  Continent,  we  are  entering  on  a 
period  similar  to  that  which  followed  1650  or  1713, — 
a  period  when  our  growth  being  somewhat  more  than 
adequate  to  the  demand,  the  market  long  continued 
heavy,  and  prices,  in  a  great  measure,  stationary. 

In  what  circumstances  are  we  to  look  for  the  cause 
of  a  stagnation  continuing  during  so  long  a  period  as 
half  a  century  ?  In  the  investment  of  capital  and  la- 
bour in  agriculture,  to  an  extent  productive  of  a  sur- 
plus growth ;  and  in  the  fact,  that,  as  in  the  natural 
course  of  things,  the  producers  increase  in  the  same 
proportion  as  the  consumers,  the  disproportion  con- 
tinues, year  after  year,  until  the  occurrence  of  some 
great  national  change,  such  as  a  war,  or  the  direction 
of  an  extra  portion  of  labour  to  manufactures. 

To  return  to  the  more  immediate  object  of  our  in- 
quiry— the  effect  of  the  cost  of  corn  on  prices  gene- 
rally. This  effect  is  of  the  greatest  importance,  both 
as  corn  is  the  chief  object  of  family  consumption, 
and  as  it  regulates,  in  a  great  measure,  that  other 
main  constituent  of  prices,  the  rate  of  labour.  Since 
1814,  and  more  particularly  since  1819,  the  operation 
of  the  corn  market  has  tended  to  reduce  prices,  by 
gradually  extending  to  other  articles  the  reduction 
that  has  taken  place  in  agricultural  produce.  Nor 
does  this  tendency  seem  likely  to  alter :  part  of  our 
taxes  on  agriculture  are  reduced ;  the  effect  of  the 
remainder  is,  as  we  have  shewn  in  a  preceding  chap- 
ter, considerably  over-rated ;  and  the  charges  of  til- 
lage bid  fair  to  return  to  a  standard  little  higher  than 
that  of  1792.  Such  is  also  the  prospect  in  France 
and  the  Continent  at  large ;  a  state  of  peace  reducing 
the  cost  of  labour,  and  preventing,  in  consequence, 
any  permanent  rise  of  prices  in  the  corn  market. 

Effect  of  Continental  Prices  on  those  of  England. — In 
the  case  of  two  countries  enjoying  peace  and  the 
benefit  of  commercial  intercourse,  there  is  a  per- 
petual tendency  to  equality  of  price.  The  reasons 
are  obvious  ;  there  exists  a  direct  motive  for  emigrat- 
ing from  the  dearer  country,  and  for  making  in  the 


Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.  295 

cheaper,  articles  for  importation,  whether  open  or 
clandestine,  into  the  dearer.  In  the  latter,  the  rate 
of  interest  is  generally  lower,  and  affords  a  tempta- 
tion to  send  out  of  it  funded  and  other  monied  pro- 
perty. The  operation  of  these  causes,  steady,  though 
almost  unseen,  has  been  a  main  reason  of  the  fail  in 
our  prices  since  1814. 

War  ;  Mode  of  its  Operation. — Of  the  effect  of  war 
there  can  be  no  doubt ;  it  enhances  commodities  in 
various  ways : — First,  by  the  addition  of  a  tax  to  the 
price  of  an  article;  next  by  a  general  rise  in  labour 
from  the  demand  for  men  for  government  service, 
whether  in  the  field  or  in  the  preparation  of  clothing, 
arms,  and  other  warlike  stores  ;  and,  lastly,  by  the  in- 
terruption of  international  intercourse,  and  the  in- 
creased charge  of  transport.  If  in  the  16th  and  17th 
centuries  these  causes  had  a  serious  operation  on 
prices,  their  effect  was  greatly  increased  by  the 
adoption  of  the  funding  system,  since  which,  the  scale 
of  military  expenditure  has  been  enlarged  in  every 
country  of  Europe. 

What,  in  this  respect,  was  the  situation  of  France 
during  the  reign  of  Bonaparte  ?  His  unsettled  go- 
vernment and  personal  want  of  credit,  discouraged 
loans,  and  diminished  one  great  source  of  expendi- 
ture ;  nor  was  his  power  displayed  with  much  effect 
in  the  imposition  of  additional  taxes.  But  the  de- 
mand of  men  for  his  service,  was  on  a  large  scale, 
and,  without  the  operation  of  either  paper-currency 
or  war  taxes,  prices  in  France  rose  between  1792  and 
1814,  about  30  per  cent.  From  this  important  fact  we 
may  form  some  idea  of  the  effect  of  a  new  war  on  the 
price  of  commodities  in  England,  without  supposing 
a  repetition  of  extreme  measures,  such  as  an  ex- 
emption from  cash  payments,  or  the  stoppage  of 
neutral  navigation.  Even  in  a  mitigated  form,  the 
effect  of  war  on  prices  would  be  so  decisive  as  to 
counteract,  in  the  course  of  a  few  years,  the  opera- 
tion of  almost  all  the  causes  of  reduction.  On  this, 
however,  we  forbear  to  dwell,  because  the  advan- 


;29b  Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money. 

tages  of  peace  are  now  better  understood,  and  a  re- 
currence to  a  state  of  hostility,  to  that  state  which 
subverts  the  calculations  of  the  governor,  as  it  de- 
stroys the  happiness  of  the  governed,  will  be  less  and 
less  frequent,  as  sovereigns  become  aware  that  the 
lield  of  combat  presents  only  barren  glories. 

The  arguments  for  the  rise,  as  for  the  fall  of  prices, 
are  thus  of  great  weight,  and  no  question,  it  is  evident, 
can  be  more  complicated,  or  present  a  longer  cata- 
logue of  opposing  causes.  On  the  one  hand,  what  a 
prospect  of  fall  is  held  out  by  the  application  of  im- 
proved machinery  to  the  American  mines,  and  the 
introduction  of  bank  paper  on  the  Continent  of 
Europe !  On  the  other,  what  a  counterpoise  from 
the  prospect  of  increased  population  or  the  recur- 
rence of  a  state  of  war !  To  attempt  to  strike  a 
balance  between  these  contending  causes,  to  advance 
an  opinion  in  regard  to  future  probability,  would  be 
vain  :  all  we  can  pronounce,  is,  that  fluctuation  in  the 
value  of  money  cannot  be  prevented;  that  it  can  hardly 
fail  to  recur  on  any  great  political  transition;  and 
that  a  measure  which  should  put  an  end  to  uncertain- 
ty in  time  contracts,  would  relieve  us  from  a  great 
national  evil. 

Injurious  Effect  of  Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money. — 
Money,  as  Dr.  Smith  remarks,  (Book  I.  Chap.  V.)  is, 
in  buying  and  selling,  an  unexceptionable  measure  of 
value ;  and  in  a  contract  from  year  to  year,  it  is,  in 
general,  a  safe  measure ;  but  in  a  contract  of  long 
duration  it  is  far  otherwise.  How  great  was  the  de- 
preciation of  money  during  the  late  wars ;  and  not- 
withstanding the  various  disadvantages  attendant  on 
landed  property,  how  general  was  the  preference 
given  to  it  in  the  case  of  a  provision  for  a  young 
family,  for  grand-children,  or  for  any  remote  object. 
Is  it  not  in  the  unfortunate  tendency  of  money  pro- 
perty to  fluctuate,  rather  than  in  any  distrust  of  the 
stability  of  the  public  funds,  that  we  are  to  look  for 
the  c anso  of  stock  selling  for  6,  7.  or  H  years'  p' 


Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.  297 

chase  less  than  land  ?  Then,  as  to  land  itself,  and 
the  mode  of  letting  it,  can  we  trace  among  the  various 
objections  to  long  leases  any  so  powerful  as  the  un- 
certainty of  the  value  of  money?  Lastly,  amidst  all 
the  difficulties  in  the  question  of  a  commutation  for 
tithe,  what  operates  so  greatly  as  this  uncertainty  to 
prevent  the  church  from  acceding  to  a  fixed  income, 
from  reducing  to  a  determinate  form  those  collections 
which,  in  their  present  unsettled  state,  leave  open  so 
wide  a  field  for  contention  ? 

Situation  of  Annuitants. — We  have  already  explained 
in  our  second  chapter,  that  as  to  land  and  houses  the 
fluctuations  in  price  during  the  war.  were,  in  a  great 
measure,  nominal ;  that  it  was.  in  general,  money  that 
changed,  and  commodities  that  maintained  their 
value.  This  maintenance  of  value  was  exemplified 
in  many  other  respects  :  in  income  derived  from  per- 
sonal exertion,  whether  in  the  shape  of  wages,  salaries, 
or  professional  fees  :  in  each,  the  money  received  was 
increased  in  proportion,  or  nearly  in  proportion,  to 
the  decrease  of  its  value,  the  whole  exhibiting  a  ten- 
dency in  the  transactions  of  life,  to  find  their  level, 
and  to  counterbalance  all  artificial  changes,  whether 
arising  from  additional  taxes,  the  non-convertihility 
of  paper-currency,  or  the  restriction  of  national  inter- 
course. But  "from  the  benefit  of  this  tendency  to 
equality,  of  this  antidote  to  enhancement,  the  fixed 
annuitants  are  excluded ;"  thev  are  unable  to  guard 
against  a  progressive  decline  of  income  during  a  war ; 
and  the  recovery  of  income  which  may  indirectly 
take  place  at  a  peace,  will  hardly  prove  an  indemnity 
to  them  if  it  arise,  as  at  present,  from  circumstances 
which  bear  hard  on  the  solvency  of  other  classes. 
Are  we  not,  therefore,  justified  in  inferring,  that  the 
case  of  the  annuitant,  as  it  stands  at  present,  is  un- 
natural, and  at  variance  with  the  rules  of  equity  ;  and 
may  we  not  conclude  that,  by  conferring  on  money 
income  the  stability  attendant  on  income  derived 
from  labourer  real  property,  we  shall  correct  an  es- 
sential defect  in  our  institutions  ? 

38 


298  Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money. 

Money-property  in  the  Kingdom — Magnitude  of  its 
Amount. — We  proceed  to  calculate  the  amount  of  mo- 
ney-property in  the  kingdom, — the  property  that 
would  be  beneficially  affected,  or  relieved  from  uncer- 
tainty of  value,  by  the  adoption  of  such  a  measure.  In 
former  ages,  when  the  funding  system  was  unknown, 
and  loans  of  money  from  one  individual  to  another 
were  of  very  limited  extent,  land,  houses,  furniture, 
implements,  and  clothing,  comprised  almost  every  de- 
scription of  property :  they  constituted  "  the  move- 
ables and  immoveables"  of  our  ancient  statutes.  But 
within  the  last  century,  there  has  arisen  in  the  public 
funds,  in  canals,  vdocks,  and  other  undertakings,  held 
in  shares,  as  well  as  in  private  loans,  (on  mortgages 
and  otherwise,)  a  property  represented  solely  in  money, 
of  which  the  aggregate  approaches  to  two-fifths  of  the 
total  wealth  of  the  kingdom. 

Thus,  were  we  to  compute  the  land,  the  houses,  the 
farming,  the  manufacturing,  the  mercantile  stock  of 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland  at  2,000,000,000/.  (see  Ap- 
pendix, p.  [82],  we  should  not  be  disposed  to  rate  our 
public  funds,  the  amount  of  loans  existing  between  in- 
dividuals, the  value  of  shares  in  public  works,  in  short, 
all  property  of  which  the  value  is  directly  affected  by 
the  rise  or  fall  of  money,  at  less  than  1,200,000,000/. 
Though  of  this  sum  the  greater  part  can  hardly  be 
called  an  addition  to  the  national  property,  the  whole 
is  evidently  individual  property;  and  its  amount  is 
demonstrative  of  the  magnitude  of  that  income,  which 
is  most  exposed  to  suffer  by  fluctuation  of  prices. 


SECTION  II. 

Plan  for  lessening  the  Injury  arising  from  the  Fluctuation 
of  Prices. 

If  we  proceed  to  analyze  the  use  of  money,  whe- 
ther for  national  or  individual  purposes,  we  shall  find 
it  resolve  itself  into  "  the  power  of  purchase,"  or,  in 
other  words,  into  the  power  of  procuring  articles  for 
consumption.     It  is  consequently  of  much  more  im- 


Money  Contracts. 


299 


portance  in  all  contracts  of  duration  to  look  to  the 
value  than  to  the  numerical  amount  of  a  given  sum. 
The  expediency  of  this  has  long  been  felt,  and  the 
price  of  corn  has  been  recommended  as  a  standard  of 
regulation  in  regard  to  leases  and  other  time  con- 
tracts. Such  it,  in  some  measure,  may  be  in  a  coun- 
try like  France,  where  the  majority  of  the  lower  or- 
ders are  strangers  to  the  use  of  foreign  articles,  such 
as  groceries,  and  expend  literally  three-fourths  of 
their  wages  on  bread.  The  price  of  corn  is  farther 
of  importance  in  that  country  in  an  indirect  sense, 
from  its  influence  on  the  price  of  labour,  as  manual 
labour  is  there  made  to  perform  much  more  in  agri- 
culture, and  even  in  manufactures,  than  with  us :  the 
whole  exemplifying  the  doctrine  of  Dr.  Smith,  who  as- 
sumed labour  as  the  measure  of  value,  and  corn  as 
the  measure  of  labour. 

The  case  of  France  is  that  of  the  Continent  at 
large,  and  was  that  of  our  ancestors  a  century  ago; 
our  situation,  however,  is  now  materially  altered,  our 
consumption  of  corn  having  undergone  a  comparative 
reduction,  while  manual  labour  enters  in  a  propor- 
tion far  smaller  than  formerly  into  the  cost  of  our  ma- 
nufactures. 

That  corn  occupies  a  very  different  proportion  in 
the  expenditure  of  different  classes,  will  be  apparent 
from  a  short  comparative  table. 


Heads  of  Expenditure. 
(See  Appendix,  p.  [11]. 

Family  of  a  Cotta- 
ger ;  Expense    about 
37/.  a  Year.    Propor- 
tions in  100. 

Family  of  the  mid- 
dle class,   residing  in 
a    provincial     town, 
Expense  370/.  a  year. 
Proportions  in  100. 

Provisions    - 

Clothing  and  Washing    - 

[louse-rent  - 

Fuel  and  Light      - 

Other  charges,  namely,  Wa- 
ges, Assessed  Taxes,  Edu- 
cation,       Medical      Atten- 
dance, &c.         - 

1 

60 
20 

10 

Sh 
100 

33 

18 

10 

6 

33 
100 

300  Plan  for  giving  a  permanent  Value  to 

This  sketch,  brief  as  it  is,  puts  in  a  very  clear  light 
the  difference  between  the  wants  of  the  lower  and 
those  of  the  middle  and  upper  classes.  To  the  lat- 
ter, corn  is  evidently  ineligible  as  a  standard  of  value. 
In  a  direct  sense,  it  forms  hardly  a  third  of  their  ex- 
penditure, and  though,  on  making  allowance  for  its 
indirect  operation,  in  particular  for  its  effect  on  wa- 
ges, we  become  more  aware  of  its  importance,  it  will 
hardly  he  denied,  that  in  an  age  of  such  varied  and 
refined  expenditure,  a  standard  of  a  more  comprehen- 
sive character,  ought  if  possible  to  be  adopted.  Now, 
the  progress  of  statistics,  and  the  multiplication  of  of- 
ficial returns  within  the  last  half-century,  have  sup- 
plied data  which,  in  the  time  of  Dr.  Smith,  were  not 
accounted  reducible  to  a  definite  form.  Of  this,  some 
idea  may  be  formed  from  a  table  in  the  Appendix 
(p.  [95])  comprising  a  list  of  articles  of  general  con- 
sumption, corn,  butcher-meat,  manufactures,  tropical 
products,  &c.  and  containing  the  probable  amount  of 
money  expended  on  each  by  the  public.  This  table 
is  followed  by  explanatory  remarks,  of  which  the  ob- 
ject is  to  show  that  contracts  for  a  series  of  years 
ought  to  be  made  with  a  reference  to  the  power  of 
money  in  purchasing  the  necessaries  and  comforts 
of  life:  that  after  fixing  a  given  sum,  say  100/.  as  the 
amount  of  an  annual  salary,  the  payment  in  subse- 
quent years  should  not  necessarily  be  100/.,  but  either 
95/.,  100/.,  or  105/.,  according  to  the  varied  power  of 
money  in  making  purchases. 

Being  aware  of  the  uncertainty  of  calculations, 
when  unsupported  by  official  returns ;  as  well  as  that 
to  give  to  a  table  the  authority  requisite  to  constitute 
it  a  regulator  of  the  value  of  money,  must  be  a  work 
of  much  time  and  labour,  we  decline  inserting  our  list 
in  the  text,  and  confine  ourselves  to  an  inquiry  in  re- 
gard to  the  means  of  obtaining  the 

Documents  for  the  Formation  of  a  Table  of  Reference. 
— As  yet  our  official  returns  are  scanty,  or  rather 
the  use  made  of  them  has  been  on  a  confined  scale : 
enough,  however,  has  been  done  to  show  the  practi- 
cability of  obtaining  the  information  we  desire.   Thus, 


Money  Contrasts,  301 

in  regard  to  corn,  the  registers,  both  as  to  price  and 
quantity,  are  now  on  a  more  satisfactory  footing  than 
in  former  years :  of  sugar,  a  similar  record  has  long 
been  kept,  and  there  are  also  registers,  which  might 
easily  be  rendered  more  complete,  of  our  woollen  and 
linen  manufactures.  Of  the  consumption  of  all  ex- 
cised articles,  estimates  approaching  to  correctness 
may  be  formed  from  documents  in  possession  of  that 
Board ;  while  in  regard  to  foreign  commodities,  the 
custom-house  would  supply  similar  results.  Then, 
as  to  average  prices,  there  are  the  Books  of  the  Vic- 
tualling Office,  of  the  Commissariat  department,  and 
of  public  hospitals,  such  as  Greenwich.  The  Board 
of  Agriculture  has  at  various  times  obtained  informa- 
tion, not  strictly  official,  but  substantially  correct, 
by  sending  circular  letters  to  their  correspondents 
throughout  the  kingdom ;  a  plan  acted  on  to  a  great 
extent  by  the  late  Arthur  Young,  in  1811. 

Returns  of  this  nature,  when  obtained,  might  easily 
be  reduced  into  the  tabular  form  on  the  plan  of  the 
late  Mr.  Colquhoun,  but  with  more  selection  and 
discrimination.  Since  the  date  of  his  calculations 
(1812,)  great  changes  have  occurred  in  respect  both 
to  price  and  quantity,  and  to  complete  the  collections 
with  the  accuracy  requisite  to  form  a  document  of 
authority  would  require  an  extent  of  labour  beyond 
the  means  of  an  individual.  A  task  of  such  length, 
and  of  such  general  utility,  should  be  defrayed  from  a 
common  fund,  and  government,  if  unwilling  to  give  so 
direct  a  sanction  to  a  new  project,  as  would  be  im- 
plied by  the  appointment  of  persons  for  collecting 
and  comparing  materials,  would,  doubtless,  on  the 
demand  of  any  respectable  association,  communicate 
from  the  public  offices,  all  returns  applicable  to  the 
subject. 

For  the  details  of  the  table,  and  the  calculations 
connected  with  it,  we  refer  to  the  Appendix :  at  pre- 
sent, we  shall,  for  the  sake  of  illustration,  suppose  it 
in  operation,  and  bestow  a  few  paragraphs  on  the  ef- 
fects that  the  adoption  of  such  a  measure  would  have 
on  the  great  interests  of  the  country. 


302  Plan  for  giving  a  permanent  Value  to 

In  what  it  may  be  asked,  would  the  benefits  of  it 
consist?     In  ascertaining  on  grounds  that  would  ad- 
mit of  no  doubt  or  dispute,  the  power  in  purchase  of 
any  given  sum  in  one  year,  compared  to  its  power  of 
purchase  in  another.     And  what  would  be  the  prac- 
tical application  of  this  knowledge  ?     The  correction 
of  a  long  list  of  anomalies  in  regard  to  rents,  salaries, 
wages,  &c.  arising  out  of  unforeseen  fluctuations  in 
our   currency.     In   the   present   undefined   form   of 
leases,  annuities,  and  other  time  contracts,  the  100/. 
of  this  year  may,  three  years  hence,  be  equivalent  in 
power  of  purchase,  either  to  110/.  or  to  90/.  the  for- 
mer  being  probable,  if  peace   continue,  while  the 
latter  is  a  moderate   estimate   of  the  change  that 
would  follow  the  first  year  of  a  war.     So  much  are 
the  chances  on  the  side  of  fluctuation,  in  the  value  of 
money,  that  it  may  almost  be  said,  that,  "in  aeon- 
tract  of  duration,  an  adherence  to  a  fixed  sum  of  money 
implies  an  acquiescence  under  a  change  of  value." 
But  a' table  exhibiting  from  year  to  year  the  power 
of  money  in  purchase,  would  give  to  annuitants  and 
other  contracting  parties,  the  means  of  maintaining 
an  agreement,  not  in  its  letter  only,  but  in  its  spirit ; 
of  conferring  on  a  specified  sum  a  uniformity  and 
permanency  of  value,  by  changing  the  numerical  amount 
in  proportion  to  the  change  in  its  power  of  purchase. 

It  does  not  follow  from  this,  that  a  change  of  nu- 
merical amount  ought  to  be  annual :  it  would,  in  ge- 
neral, be  sufficient  that  it  took  place  at  periods  of 
three,  four,  or  five  years,  taking  ae  the  criterion  the 
average  value  of  money  in  purchases  throughout  the 
whole  period. 

Effect  on  the  labouring  Classes  of  the  adoption  of  such  a 
Standard. — The  use  of  money  to  the  country  labourer 
is  very  simple,  extending  to  little  beyond  the  pur- 
chase of  the  articles  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
sketch  of  his  annual  expenditure.  In  the  case  of  the 
inhabitants  of  towns,  the  proportion  required  for 
house-rent,  fuel,  and  clothing  is  somewhat  larger, 
while  that  for  provisions  is  somewhat  smaller  than  in 
the  family  of  the  cottager.     To  both,  the  chief  object 


Money  Contracts.  303 

of  expense  is  corn,  the  average  price  of  which  is  al- 
ready ascertained  periodically;  but  to  render  the 
table  complete,  our  wish  would  be  that  the  average 
of  the  other  articles  consumed  by  the  labouring 
classes,  such  as  beer,  coarse  clothing,  fuel,  were  in 
like  manner  put  on  record.  If  to  such  returns  were 
added  a  few  plain  tables  of  the  average  consumption 
of  the  lower  class  in  various  situations,  one  for  an  un- 
married labourer,  others  for  a  labourer  married,  and 
having  two,  three,  or  four  children,  it  would  be  an 
easy  process  to  calculate  how  far  a  given  sum  of 
wages  (for  example  45/.  annually)  was  more  or  less 
adequate  than  in  former  years  to  the  supply  of  such 
wants.  We  should  then  possess  completely  the 
means  of  judging  of  the  comparative  comfort  of  the 
working  classes  ;  of  making,  in  a  manner  satisfactory 
and  conclusive,  the  calculations  hitherto  prepared 
with  much  labour,  and  an  unavoidable  share  of  error, 
by  Sir  F.  Eden,  Mr.  Barton,  and  others. 

How  important  would  such  a  standard  of  reference 
have  been  throughout  the  last  thirty  years,  a  period 
of  such  frequent  contention  between  the  employer  and 
the  employed  !  During  the  war,  workmen  in  towns 
were  repeatedly  obliged  to  combine  for  the  purpose 
of  raising  their  wages  to  the  level  of  provisions,  and 
in  rural  districts,  where  combination  was  impracti- 
cable, the  poor-rate  was  called  in  to  supply  the  defi- 
ciency. At  present  the  case  is  reversed ;  the  employ- 
er, particularly  when  resident  in  a  town,  has  found, 
and  will  long  find  it  a  matter  of  great  difficulty  to  re- 
duce wages  to  the  standard  justified  by  the  fall  of 
provisions. 

What  a  scene  of  inequality  is  exhibited  at  present 
by  the  current  payments  of  the  metropolis !  Wages, 
salaries,  professional  fees,  are  almost  all  on  as  high  a 
scale  as  during  the  war,  notwithstanding  the  diminu- 
tion of  the  two  great  causes  of  rise, — the  expense  of 
living  and  the  extra  demand  for  labour.  The  per- 
sons, whether  of  high  or  low  station,  who  are  in  re- 
ceipt of  the  established  allowances,  if  called  on  for 
an  abatement,  would  naturally  plead  the  uncertainty 


304  Plan  for  giving  a  permanent  Value  to 

of  provisions  continuing  at  a  reduced  rate  i  and 
nothing,  it  is  evident,  will  induce  them  willingly  to 
assent  to  a  reduction,  except  a  guarantee  against  a 
recurrence  of  the  grand  evil — a  rise  of  prices  with- 
out a  correspondent  rise  in  wages.  Such  a  guarantee 
we  should  hope  to  afford,  not  by  an  interference  be- 
tween the  payer  and  receiver,  but  by  an  alternative 
offered  to  their  voluntary  adoption ;  by  putting  it  in 
their  power,  when  making  a  time  contract,  to  affix  a 
permanent  value  to  a  money  stipulation ;  or  to  have 
access,  when  no  such  precaution  was  taken,  to  an 
equitable  standard  of  reference. 

What  would  be  the  probable  effect  of  having  this 
authenticated  record  of  the  price  of  commodities, 
this  monitor  to  declare  the  rise  or  fall  in  the  value  of 
money  ?  It  could  hardly  fail  to  operate  greatly  in 
abridging  altercations.  At  a  time  when  a  reduction 
of  wages  became  expedient,  it  would  relieve  the  in- 
ferior from  the  humiliation  attendant  on  such  a  step ; 
and,  in  the  case  of  a  rise  of  prices,  it  would  guide  the 
employer  to  a  fair  advance  of  wages,  the  distributor 
of  charitable  aid  to  a  fair  apportionment  of  relief. 

Effect  of  such  a  Measure  on  Agriculture. — In  no  de- 
partment of  our  productive  industry  has  our  progress 
as  a  nation  been  less  conspicuous  than  in  tillage  ;  our 
superiority  over  our  continental  neighbours  being  in 
a  great  degree  limited  to  our  live  stock  and  our  ma- 
chinery. On  computing  the  annual  amount  of  pro- 
perty created  in  the  kingdom,  we  find,  after  making 
a  great  deduction  from  the  prices  (moderate  as  they 
were,  considering  the  state  of  markets  at  the  time) 
assumed  by  Mr.  Colquhoun,  that  the  annual  pro- 
duce of  the  agriculture  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland 
still  amounts  to  120,000,000/.  What  a  field  is  there 
here  for  the  application  of  skill  and  judgment,  and 
how  great  the  call  for  both  in  the  present  situation  of 
our  agriculturists ! 

Leases. — It  is  not  little  remarkable,  that  several  of 
the  counties,  such  as  Norfolk  and  Northumberland,  in 
which  our  husbandry  is  most  improved,  are  by  no 


Money  Contracts.  305 

means  our  most  fertile  districts  naturally.  To  what, 
then,  are  they  indebted  for  their  superiority  ?  To  a 
cause  which  Mr.  Coke  has  repeatedly  pressed  on  his 
brother  land-holders,  both  in  and  out  of  parliament. — 
that  there  is  no  good  agriculture  without  leases*  In  what 
other  way  can  we  explain  the  high  rents  paid  in  a 
country  in  general  so  little  favoured  in  soil  and  cli- 
mate as  Scotland  ?  The  objections  of  our  landlords 
to  long  leases,  are  various,  arising  partly  from  the 
habits  of  their  predecessors;  partly  from  a  reluc- 
tance to  part  with  the  command  of  their  property  for 
a  number  of  years  ;  but,  more  than  all,  from  the  un- 
certainty of  the  value  of  money.  During  the  war 
this  uncertainty  was  of  very  serious  import :  at  pre- 
sent it  is  removed,  as  far  as  regards  landlords,  by  the 
return  to  cash  payments,  and  the  difficulty  now  is  to 
induce  a  solvent  tenant  to  take  a  lease.  To  both 
parties,  therefore,  the  fluctuation  of  our  currency, 
even  when  metallic,  is  replete  with  anxiety. 

Corn-rents. -^-Of  late,  the  great  fall  of  price  has  in- 
duced several  of  our  principal  land-holders  to  regu- 
late their  rents  by  the  price  of  corn ;  a  plan  open  to 
many  objections,  when  varied  from  year  to  year,  be- 
cause, a  season  of  high  price  may  be,  and  generally 
is,  a  season  of  deficient  produce.  When  calculated 
on  the  price  of  a  series  of  years,  this  course  is  less 
exceptionable :  in  any  form,  however,  it  seems  less 
eligible  than  the  plan  which  (Appendix,  p.  [98])  we 
are  desirous  to  propose,  of  combining  the  price  of 
corn  with  that  of  other  articles  of  consumption. 

Tithe. — Referring  to  the  remarks  under  this  head 
in  the  Appendix,  we  shall  at  present  merely  observe, 
how  great  would  be  the  benefit  accruing  from  a  re- 
gulating standard,  applied  to  clerical  income,  and 
calculated,  as  far  as  regards  permanency  of  value,  to 
justify  the  church  in  commuting  tithe  for  a  money 
stipend.  A  change  of  that  nature  would,  on  the  one 
hand,  put  an  end  to  altercations  unfortunately  too 
frequent ;  while,  on  the  other,  it  would  prevent  tithe 
from  operating  as  an  impediment  to  agricultural  im- 
provement.   The  great,  and,  at  present,  well-fou,nded 

39 


306  Plan  for  giving  a  permanent  Value  to 

objection  of  the  clergy  to  a  permanent  commutation 
of  tithe,  is  a  dread,  not  of  the  faith  of  parliament,  but 
of  the  uncertain  value  of  money  :  remove  that  appre- 
hension, and  you  give  them  substantial  motives  to 
prefer  a  fixed  sum,  whether  they  look  to  the  interest 
of  themselves  or  their  successors.  In  the  Protestant 
church  of  Holland,  they  have  an  example  of  stipends 
paid  during  more  than  two  centuries,  by  local  magis- 
trates or  by  government,  without  any  derogation  from 
the  respectability  of  those  who  received  them  :  and 
if  in  France  the  amount  of  clerical  income  be  too 
small  to  be  dwelt  on  when  we  are  treating  of  a  Pro- 
testant establishment,  the  regularity  of  its  payment 
during  twenty  years,  under  circumstances  of  great 
financial  embarrassment,  is  calculated  to  lessen  one 
material  ground  of  apprehension. 

The  commutation  to  which  we  allude  does  not,  of 
course,  imply  any  reduction  of  the  existing  income  of 
the  clerical  body,  nor  a  relinquishment  of  any  secu- 
rity arising  from  the  tenure  by  which  they  are  at 
present  invested  with  tithe.  A  change  from  an  un- 
fixed to  a  fixed  money  income,  may  evidently  take 
place  without  interfering  either  with  such  security, 
or  with  the  patronage  of  the  church  as  at  present 
established.  It  might  be  proposed  as  a  temporary 
arrangement,  to  last  only  during  the  interval  required 
to  carry  into  effect  a  plan  that  has  been  more  than 
once  proposed,  and  which  has  lately  received  a  kind 
of  legislative  recommendation — the  purchase  of  land 
for  the  purpose  of  affording  the  church  a  revenue 
from  rent  instead  of  tithe.  But  on  this  we  will  not 
enlarge,  our  subject  naturally  confining  us  to  the 
operation  of  the  measure  with  a  view  to  the  relief  of 
the  agriculturists ;  a  view  in  which  it  would  soon  dis- 
close satisfactory  results. 

Under  our  present  system,  the  church  is  entitled 
to  an  increase  of  revenue  in  proportion  to  the  increase  of 
produce  ;  such,  we  may  sately  take  for  granted,  would 
form  no  part  of  its  demand  Under  a  different  arrange- 
ment. All  that  its  representatives  would  be  likely 
to  desire,  would  be  an  assurance  that  the  contract 


Money  Contracts.  307 

should  be  maintained  bona  fide,  that  the  sum  once 
fixed  should  be  made  good,  whatever  be  the  fluctua- 
tions of  our  currency.  And  what  would  be  the  result 
to  the  agriculturists  of  tithe  being  thus  limited  ?  That 
all,  whether  landlords  or  farmers,  might  extend  their 
tillage  as  they  chose,  without  being  annually  taxed 
in  a  portion  of  the  produce.  Our  numbers  are  on 
the  increase;  our  production  increases  with  them, 
and  it  is,  above  all,  in  a  case  of  such  increase,  that 
the  pressure  of  tithe  is  felt.  An  exemption  from  such 
pressure  is  most  strongly  called  for  by  our  situation, 
present  and  prospective;  and  may  we  not  add,  that 
when  viewed  in  connexion  with  the  various  circum- 
stances stated  in  our  chapter  on  Agriculture,  it  would 
render  probable  a  result,  on  which,  at  present,  it 
seems  somewhat  bold  to  speculate?  we  mean  Mr. 
Tooke's  idea  of  the  practicability  of  our  competing 
with  foreigners  in  the  export  of  corn,  as  was  done  by 
our  countrymen  previous  to  1764. 

Application  of  the  proposed  Plan  to  the  Public  Funds. 
— To  offer  any  suggestion  connected  with  the  public 
funds  is,  we  are  aware,  to  tread  on  delicate  ground, 
men  in  office  being  very  properly  backward  to  inter- 
fere, in  even  a  slight  degree,#with*the  existing  con- 
tract with  the  fund-holder.  We  shall,  however,  sa- 
tisfy the  most  cautious,  by  premising  that  the  accept- 
ance of  the  plan  should  be  optional  on  the  part  of  each 
stock-holder,  although  we  can  have  little  doubt  of  the 
beneficial  tendency  of  a  measure,  the  effect  of  which 
would  be  to  ensure  to  the  stock-holder  and  his  pos- 
terity, the  same  income,  whether  the  country  was  at 
peace  or  war;  whether  its  currency  were  sound  or 
depreciated;  whether  the  mines  of  gold  and  silver 
throughout  the  world,  became  more  or  less  produc- 
tive. The  100/.  of  1792,  which  in  1&06  was  equiva- 
lent to  80/.,  and  seven  years  'after,  to  less  than  70/., 
would  thus  remain  100/.  throughout.  The  apprehen- 
sions which  at  present  not  unfrequently  lead  to  sales 
of  stock  against  the  wish  of  the  holders,  would  cease 
or  be  materially  diminished,  and  funded,  like  landed 


308  Plan  for  giving  a  permanent  Value  to 

property,  would  be  seldom  disposed  of  except  on 
particular  occasions,  such  as  when  a  division  of  pro- 
perty became  expedient  on  the  demise  of  a  testator, 
on  legatees  attaining  majority,  or  on  their  entering  on 
mercantile  business.  In  fact,  after  the  adoption  of 
such  a  measure,  the  chief  features  of  distinction  be- 
tween land  and  stock,  would  be,  that  while  the  one 
possessed  the  attraction  of  local  influence,  the  other 
would  have  the  more  direct  advantage  of  dispatch 
and  certainty  in  regard  to  receipt  of  income. 

The  present  is,  we  believe,  the  first  proposition  of 
a  measure  for  giving  a  permanent  value  to  our  funded 
property.  Our  public  men,  or  rather  the  few  among 
them  who  are  accustomed  to  take  comprehensive 
views  of  finance,  have  hitherto  contemplated  a  very 
different  course.  Money,  they  saw,  was  declining  in 
value  during  half  a  century,  and  funded  property  de- 
clined with  it ;  a  fall  carefully  kept  by  them  in  the 
back  ground,  and  consequently  in  a  great  measure 
unknown  to  the  public.  Our  successive  chancellors 
of  the  exchequer  anticipated  (see  p.  273.)  a  continu- 
ance of  this  decline,  and  silently  calculated  on  its 
producing  a  diminution  in  the  pressure  of  the  debt. 
But  the  reaction  of  the  last  eight  years  has  greatly 
shaken  this  calculation :  money  has  recovered,  and 
along  with  that  recovery,  the  pressure  of  our  debt  has 
greatly  increased.  It  is  time,  therefore,  to  seek  re- 
lief in  a  measure  of  a  different  character. 

Its  Effect  on  the  Price  of  Stocks. — Nothing  can  be 
more  different  than  a  rise  of  stock  caused  by  the 
adoption  of  a  plan  such  as  we  propose,  and  a  rise 
that  might  be  consequent  on  the  operation  of  a  large 
sinking  fund.  The  latter  would  be  liable,  as  we  shall 
show  in  our  chapter  on  Finance,  (p.  323.)  to  various 
objections  :  in  particular,  it  would  afford  a  strong  in- 
ducement to  sell  out  and  to  vest  capital  in  other  se- 
curities, probably  in  foreign  stock.  But  a  rise  pro- 
ceeding from  a  course  such  as  we  are  anxious  to  re- 
commend, would  prove  an  inducement  to  keep  ca- 


Money  Contracts.  309 

pital  in  our  funds,  the  value  conferred  by  the  measure 
being,  in  its  nature,  permanent  and  likely  to  increase. 

Consequent  Advantage  to  the  Public. — This  brings  us 
to  a  question,  which,  under  present  circumstances, 
may  very  naturally  be  asked  by  our  readers, — why 
confer  additional  value  on  the  funds,  at  a  time  when 
they  have  risen  so  considerably  in  the  scale  of  com- 
parison with  land,  houses,  and  merchandise ?  Our 
answer  is,  that  we  contemplate  no  undue  favour  to  the 
stock-holder ;  we  merely  point  out  a  measure,  which,  by 
benefiting  him  in  the  first  instance,  may  give  govern- 
ment a  fair  plea  to  demand  from  him  a  return  calcu- 
lated to  afford  relief  to  other  classes  of  the  commu- 
nity. To  require  such  from  the  fund-holder  without 
a  consideration,  would,  of  course,  imply  a  sacrifice 
on  his  part,  but  the  results  which  we  anticipate  from 
the  proposed  measure,  will,  if  they  be  well  founded, 
confer  on  him  in  one  way  as  much  as  he  may  be 
called  on  to  relinquish  in  the  other.  Thus,  if  it  con- 
tinue a  favourite  object  with  ministers  to  reduce  the 
interest  on  the  old  four  per  cents.,  nothing  is  so 
likely  to  promote  that  measure,  as  conferring  an  ad- 
ditional value  on  funded  property.  And  if  it  be  said 
that  such  would  be  a  return  partial  and  inadequate 
to  the  advantage  conferred,  the  discussion  may  be 
cut  short  by  the  general  argument,  that  if  the  legisla- 
ture improve  materially  the  circumstances  of  the 
fund-holder,  or  of  any  great  class  in  the  community, 
there  can  be  no  great  difficulty  in  rendering  that 
prosperity  conducive  to  the  relief  of  the  public  at 
large. 

All  this  may  be  admitted,  but  the  plan,  it  will  be 
said,  can  be  adopted  by  the  governments  of  other 
countries,  and  our  stocks  soon  deprived  of  any  rela- 
tive superiority  which  it  might  confer.  Our  answer 
is,  that  the  success  of  such  a  plan,  and  the  extent  of 
rise  attendant  on  its  adoption,  will  depend  chiefly  on 
the  degree  of  confidence  that  each  nation  has  in  its 
government :  a  point  in  which  we  possess  a  great  and 
undoubted  superiority  over  the  rest  of  Europe. 


310  Plan  for  giving  a  permanent  Value  to 

General  Remarks. — We  conclude  this  chapter  by  a 
lew  remarks  on  the  general  characteristics  of  the 
proposed  plan.  Does  it,  it  may  be  asked,  contain 
any  thing  compulsory  or  unfair,  and  in  particular, 
does  it  imply  the  imposition  of  any  burden  on  pos- 
terity ?  Our  posterity  will,  in  all  probability,  be  in 
a  far  easier  condition  than  ourselves,  and  would  in- 
cur no  loss  from  our  conferring  the  character  of  per- 
manent value  on  our  dividends  :  on  the  contrary, 
they  will  be  benefited  by  whatever  shall  be  found 
conducive  to  the  relief  of  the  present  generation. 
Our  proposition  may  be  considered  an  attempt  to 
fill  up  a  blank  in  the  mode  of  regulating  our  pro- 
ductive industry,  and  to  do  it  in  a  way  not  fanciful 
or  artificial,  but  on  the  principles  of  unreserved 
freedom  so  strongly  recommended  by  Dr.  Smith 
and  other  eminent  authorities.  But  the  use  to  be 
made  of  it  would  be  perfectly  optional.  It  would 
be  in  itself  merely  a  table  of  reference,  and  all  con- 
tracts, whether  relative  to  loans,  leases,  or  bequests, 
might,  at  the  will  of  the  parties,  be  made  payable, 
either  according  to  the  proposed  standard,  or,  as  at 
present,  in  money  of  undefined  value. 

Our  preceding  pages  explain  the  operation  of  the 
proposed  plan  in  respect  to  individuals.  In  regard 
to  its  result  in  a  national  sense,  we  may  be  allowed 
to  anticipate  that  the  removal  of  uncertainty  from 
time-contracts  would  contribute  very  effectually  to 
the  extension  of  our  national  industry.  That  industry 
and  its  results  have  been  carried  farther  by  us  than 
by  almost  any  of  our  neighbours,  but  they  are  still  far 
from  having  reached  a  limit.  Circumstances  have  of 
late  become  more  favourable  and  the  pressure  of 
taxation  less  heavy ;  but  great  exertions  will  still  be 
requisite  to  carry  our  national  income  to  an  amount 
corresponding  with  our  burdens ;  that  is,  to  increase 
it  so  that  the  proportion  of  our  taxation  to  our  re- 
sources shall  not  be  greater  than  in  other  countries. 

How  far,  it  may  be  asked,  has  the  proposition 
brought  forward  in  this  chapter  the  sanction  of  pre- 
cedent ?     That  sanction,  though  it  cannot  be  cited 


Money  Contracts.  311 

as  of  frequent  occurrence,  is  not  altogether  wanting. 
The  course  now  suggested,  is  analogous  to  the  plan 
of  corn  rents  lately  adopted  by  several  of  our  great 
proprietors,  and  which,  for  many  years  has  been  ex- 
emplified in  the  proceedings  of  the  Court  of  Teinds, 
or  tithe,  in  Scotland.  The  decisions  of  that  court 
purport  that  clerical  income  shall  be  regulated  by 
the  price  of  corn  in  the  public  markets  during  a  series 
of  years.  But  were  precedent  wholly  wanting,  the 
rule,  "that  prospective  engagements  should  be  framed 
so  as  to  maintain  their  bona  fide  value,  whatever  be 
the  value  of  money,"  is  so  equitable,  and  apparently 
so  easy  of  execution,  that  there  seems  no  little  diffi- 
culty in  accounting  for  its  not  yet  having  found  its 
way  into  practice.  This  has,  we  believe,  been  owing 
to  two  causes ;  the  unfortunate  neglect  of  political 
economy  in  the  education  of  our  public  men  ;  and  the 
interest  of  government,  the  greatest  of  all  debtors,  to 
prevent  the  public  from  fixing  its  attention  on  the 
gradual  depreciation  of  money  that  went  on  during 
the  half  century  previous  to  the  late  peace. 


312 

CHAP.  XI. 

Our  Finances* 

We  now  approach  the  end  of  our  volume,  and  havfc 
arrived  at  the  department  which  forms  at  present  the 
chief  object  of  public  attention.  In  this,  as  in  the 
former  chapters,  we  shall  begin  by  a  statement  of 
facts,  a  retrospect  to  past  events,  and  after  removing, 
or  endeavouring  to  remove,  several  popular  errors, 
we  shall  proceed  to  develope  the  measures  apparent- 
ly best  adapted  to  our  present  situation,  greatly 
altered,  as  it  has  been,  by  the  events  consequent  on 
peace. 

We  propose  dividing  our  discussion  into  the  fol- 
lowing heads : — 

A  historical  sketch  of  finance  operations ; 

Our  prospects  in  regard  to  trade  and  national  in- 
come ; 

The  views  of  finance  suggested  by  such  prospects. 

SECTION  I. 

Our  National  Debt. 

A  public  debt  in  one  form  or  other,  has  been,  in 
almost  every  country,  an  appendage  of  established 
government.  Its  amount,  however,  seldom  exceeded 
an  anticipation  of  one  or  two  years'  revenue,  until 
the  adoption  of  the  funding  system,  or  plan  of  render- 
ing public  obligations  transferable  from  hand  to  hand, 
gave  governments  a  surprising  facility  in  borrowing. 
This,  like  many  other  ingenious  schemes,  both  in 
civil  and  military  affairs,  originated  with  the  Italians, 
and  was  adopted  early  in  Venice,  Genoa,  and  Hol- 
land. In  England,  it  was  not  introduced  until  our 
participation  in  the  great  struggle  made  by  King 
William  against  the  aggrandizement  of  Louis  XIV. ; 


Fluctuations  of  Stock.  31$ 

bat  if  we  were  somewhat  late  in  following  the  ex- 
ample, in  our  ultimate  progress  we  have  far  surpassed 
our  neighbours.     Our  debt  amounted, 


At  the  peace  of  Ryswick              -             in    1697     to 

£21,500,000 

of  Utrecht        -         -           -     1713         -       - 

54,000,000 

ofAixlaChapelle         -       -     1748         -       - 

78,000,000 

of  Paris         -         -         -      -     1763         -       - 

134,000,000 

of  Versailles         -       -          -     1783 

238,000,000 

of  Amiens       -         -                   1802 

452,000,000 

of  Paris            -             -         -     1815  nearly    - 

700,000,000 

To  which,  adding  the  debt  of  Ireland,  somewhat  more 

than                 - 

100,000,000 

Total  present  debt  about 

800,000,000 

These  sums  represent  the  total  of  our  debt  at  each 
period,  without  the  perplexing  distinctions  of  funded 
and  unfunded,  redeemed  and  unredeemed.  Though 
the  figures  express  an  amount,  not  of  money  but  of 
stock,  the  difference  at  peace  prices  is  not  much  more 
than  nominal :  thus,  our  present  debt,  were  it  practi- 
cable to  pay  it  off  at  the  market  price,  would  re- 
quire an  amount  in  money,  not  greatly  below  the 
800,000,000/.  of  stock.  But  as  there  is  no  reason  to 
anticipate  the  liquidation  of  the  debt  of  this  than 
of  other  countries,  the  more  correct  course,  and  that 
which  conveys  the  more  distinct  idea  of  the  extent 
of  the  burden,  is  to  follow  the  French  method  of 
computing,  not  by  the  principal,  but  by  the  sum  re- 
quired to  pay  the  interest ;  a  sum  which,  since  the 
reduction  of  the  five  per  cents.,  may  he  called,  in 
round  numbers,  30,000,000/. 

Fluctuation  in  the  Price  of  Stock. — By  fluctuations  in 
stock,  we  must  be  understood  to  mean  changes  pro- 
ceeding, not  from  the  rumours  perpetually  in  circula- 
tion on  the  Stock  Exchange,  which  are  too  absurd  for 
notice,  and  operate  only  for  a  few  days,  but  from 
causes  of  a  more  comprehensive  and  permanent  cha- 
racter ;  the  credit  or  discredit  of  government ;  scarci- 
ty or  abundance  of  capital ;  the  adequacy  or  inade- 
quacv  of  our  resources  to  our  burdens.     The  extent 

40 


3 1 4  Our  Finances  ; 

of  fluctuation,  has,  of  course,  been  very  great  at  dif- 
ferent periods  of  our  history.  During  the  long  peace 
that  followed  the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  and  under  the 
prudent  administration  of  Walpole,  stocks  rose  great- 
ly, the  three  per  cents,  having  attained  par  in  1732, 
and  being,  in  1739,  the  time  when  that  minister  wras 
forced  by  popular  clamour  to  declare  war  against 
Spain,  at  the  very  high  rate  of  107/.  in  cash  for  100/. 
in  stock.  They  continued  high  during  several  years 
of  the  war ;  and  it  was  not  until  the  range  of  hostili- 
ties widened,  and  assumed  a  serious  aspect,  that  their 
fall  became  great.  The  same  may  be  said  to  have 
applied  to  the  more  successful  contest  begun  in  1756, 
the  three  per  cents,  continuing  between  70/.  and  80/., 
until  1760,  when  our  loans,  in  consequence  of  the  na- 
tional ardour  and  the  confident  character  of  Lord 
Chatham,  were  carried  to  an  amount  at  that  time  un- 
precedented. In  the  American  war  the  fall  was  more 
serious  :  it  was  great  from  the  time  that  France  took 
part  against  us,  and  the  public  became  aware  of  the 
inability  of  our  ministers  to  conduct  the  contest  with 
success. 

Mr.  Pitfs  Administration. — It  was  in  1784  that  Mr. 
Pitt  succeeded  to  his  financial  charge,  and  found  it 
during  several  years  productive  of  great  contention 
and  embarrassment.  Our  prospects,  however,  gra- 
dually brightened,  and  ere  the  expiration  of  the  ten 
years  of  peace  that  preceded  the  war  of  1793,  the  na- 
tion had  risen  superior  to  its  difficulties.  This  was 
the  era  of  the  so  much  applauded  revival  of  the  sink- 
ing fund.  Partly  by  the  effect  of  that  measure,  more 
by  the  general  prosperity  of  the  country,  our  3  per 
cents,  were  carried  in  1792  to  the  high  price  of  97 ;  a 
price  from  which  they  fell  as  soon  as  the  public  be- 
came aware  that  our  government  had  determined  to 
take  part  in  the  coalition  against  France.  But  as 
during  the  first  two  years  of  the  war  our  expenses 
were  comparatively  limited,  the  great  decline  did  not 
take  place  until  1796,  or  rather  1797,  when  the  3  per 
cents,  sunk  to  the  unexampled  low  rate  of  47.  It  was 
then  that  our  minister  felt  the  necessity  of  altering 


Measures  since  181  a.  31 5 

his  financial  plan,  of  lessening  loans  and  augmenting 
taxes :  he  came  forward  accordingly  with  the  bold 
proposition  of  raising  a  large  proportion  of  the  sup- 
plies within  the  year ;  a  course  which,  alarmed  as  the 
nation  was  at  the  aggrandizement  of  France,  obtained 
general  concurrence,  and  soon  received  a  consoli- 
dated form  by  the  imposition  of  the  income  or  pro- 
perty-tax. 

In  consequence  of  this  decided  measure,  and  of  the 
splendid  success  of  our  continental  allies  in  1799, 
our  stocks  revived,  but  they  fell  towards  the  close  of 
the  year,  when  the  fickle  Paul  forsook  the  coalition, 
and  Bonaparte,  arriving  from  Egypt,  gave  new  vi- 
gour to  the  resources  of  France.  Large  loans  be- 
came again  indispensable,  and  our  funds  continued 
comparatively  low,  until  the  signature  of  the  prelimi- 
naries in  October  1801.  That  event  had  a  tendency 
to  reinstate  them,  but  the  peace  was  too  short  and  too 
doubtful  to  admit  of  any  great  rise. 

War  of  1803.— On  the  renewal  of  war  in  1803,  the 
3  per  cents,  fell  from  70  to  57,  and  during  some  time, 
the  general  dread  of  invasion  kept  them  at  a  very 
low  rate.  War  taxes,  however,  were  cheerfully  sub- 
mitted to,  and  in  the  succeeding  years  ( 1 805,  6,  7.), 
these  potent  auxiliaries  enabled  government  to  lessen 
the  loans,  and  to  raise  the  three  per  cents,  to  60  and 
upwards.  The  same  cause  explains  their  continued 
high  price  in  1808,  a  year  of  commercial  distress,  and 
in  1 809,  a  season  of  general  over-trading.  Nor  was 
it  till  the  multiplied  bankruptcies  of  1810,  and  the 
heavy  drain  of  money  for  the  peninsular  war,  that 
the  fall  became  considerable.  Large  loans  were 
now  unavoidable,  and  stocks  were  lowered  not  only 
in  1812,  a  year  of  chequered  fortune  to  our  arms,  but 
during  part  of  1813,  when  our  prospects  were 
equally  cheering  in  Spain  and  Germany.  At  last 
the  balance  inclined  to  the  favourable  side :  the  vic- 
tory of  Leipsic,  and  the  evident  superiority  of  the  al- 
lies, outweighed  the  demands  of  our  Treasury,  enor- 
mous as  they  had  become. 

From  1815  to  1822.— In  the  early  part  of  1815  the 


316 


Our  Finances ; 


3  per  cents,  were  fluctuating  from  62  to  65,  when  the 
return  of  Bonaparte  from  Elba,  produced  a  very  sud^ 
den  reduction.  In  the  contest  that  ensued,  govern- 
ment were  unluckily  obliged  to  contract  for  a  loan 
early  in  June,  and  were  thus  deprived  of  the  benefit 
of  the  rise  which  immediately  followed  the  success 
of  our  arms.  In  1816,  peace  was  consolidated,  but 
the  price  of  commodities  experienced  a  great  fall, 
and  much  distress  prevailing  in  both  trade  and  agri- 
culture, the  funds  recovered  very  slowly.  In  1817, 
appearances  improved,  and  in  the  early  part  of  1818 
the  3  per  cents,  having  risen  above  80,  our  prospect 
became  very  encouraging.  Unfortunately  the  rise 
was  not  of  long  duration :  the  mismanagement  of  the 
French  loan,  the  over-trading  in  this  country,  the  dis- 
tress of  the  United  States  of  America,  all  concurred 
to  depress  the  funds.  They  continued  low  during 
the  two  years  from  the  summer  of  1819  to  that  of 
1821,  after  which,  they  gradually  improved,  so  as  to 
enable  ministers  to  carry  into  effect  an  important  and 
long  contemplated  operation.* 

Reduction  of  the  Five  per  Cents, — The  five  per  cents, 
comprised  a  sum,  which  in  round  numbers  we  shall 
call  140,000,000/.,  and  which  government  were  at 
any  time  at  liberty  to  pay  off,  by  giving  100/.  in  cash 
for  100/.  in  stock.  How  then,  it  may  be  asked,  did  it 
happen  that  the  discharge  was  delayed  so  long  after 
the  peace  ?  Because  the  discharge  of  so  large  a 
sum  could  take  place  only  by  the  substitution  of  one 
security  for  another;  and  as  the  new  fund  to  be 
created,  would,  in  most  of  the  years  that  have  elapsed 


Average  prices  of  the  3  per  cent,  consols  during  the  following  years 


1803 

70,  57,  53. 

1813 

58,  57,  60,  61. 

1804 

55,  56,  58. 

1814 

64,  66,  64. 

1805 

56,  58,  60. 

1815 

65,  after  Mar.  58,  60 

1806 

60,  62,  64. 

1816 

60,  62,  63. 

1807 

61,  62,  64. 

1817 

63,  70,  75,  83. 

1808 

62,  64,  66, 

68. 

1818 

80,  82,  79. 

1809 

67,  68,  70. 

1819 

77,  74,  65,  70,  68. 

1810 

70,  71,  69. 

66. 

1820 

68,  69,  70. 

1811 

65,  64,  63. 

1821 

69,  72,  75,  77. 

1812 

62.  61,  59, 

58. 

1822(toAug. 

)76.  77,  78,  80. 

Measures  since  1315.  All 

cilice  the  peace,  have  fetched  an  indifferent  price, 
ministers  were  from  time  to  time  obliged  to  postpone 
the  measure.  In  the  early  part  of  1818,  circum- 
stances becoming  favourable,  a  new  stock  bearing 
3£  per  cent,  interest,  and  not  reducible  below  that 
rate  during  ten  years,  was  created  evidently  for  the 
purpose  of  supplying  the  desired  substitute.  The 
project,  however,  failed,  in  consequence  of  the  gene- 
ral fall  of  funded  property,  and  there  afterwards  oc- 
curred no  favourable  opportunity  until  the  beginning 
of  the  present  year,  when,  as  is  well  known,  the  re- 
duction was  very  successfully  accomplished. 

There  remains  open  to  reduction  a  farther  portion 
of  our  stock,  viz.  the  old  four  per  cents.,  which,  dis- 
tinguished from  the  four  per  cents,  created  in  the  pre- 
sent year,  amount  to  about  70,000,000/.  This  sum  is 
considerable,  but  in  other  respects  the  question  of 
reduction  stands  on  very  doubtful  grounds.  The 
saving  of  a  half  per  cent,  in  the  interest  would  give 
only  about  300,000/.  clear,  and  it  seems  very  doubtful 
at  what  period  the  course  of  circumstances  will  admit 
of  even  that  diminution. 

Our  other  Financial  Measures. — The  course  contem- 
plated by  government  at  the  close  of  the  war,  was  to 
keep  up  an  efficient  sinking  fund,  and  to  continue 
during  several  years  the  property  tax  on  the  reduced 
scale  of  5  per  cent.  This  plan  fell  to  the  ground  on 
the  rejection  of  that  tax  by  the  House  of  Commons 
on  the  1 8th  March,  1816 ;  a  rejection  altogether  unex- 
pected by  ministers,  and  which  was  afterwards  de- 
clared by  them  to  have  been  productive  of  great  public 
injury.  To  this  opinion,  though  expressed  deliberate- 
ly, and  long  after  the  first  impression  of  disappointment, 
we  can  by  no  means  subscribe.  Had  the  burden  been 
inevitable,  and  had  the  question  been  merely  a  com- 
mutation of  one  payment  for  another,  a  property  tax 
might  have  been  somewhat  less  oppressive  than  se- 
veral of  the  existing  imposts :  but,  under  all  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case,  the  rejection  of  the  bill  was, 
we  are  satisfied,  productive  of  public  good.     Men  in 


318  Our  Finances : 

office,  immersed  in  a  routine  of  business,  are  often 
very  imperfectly  apprised  of  the  circumstances  of 
particular  portions  of  the  community,  In  the  session 
immediately  preceding,  they  had,  by  the  magnitude 
of  their  grants,  shown  themselves  unconscious  of  the 
extent  of  the  loss  attendant  on  the  transition  from  war 
to  peace ;  of  the  approaching  fall  of  prices,  the  in- 
creasing pressure  of  taxation.  To  all  this  they  were 
awakened  by  the  loss  of  the  bill,  and  taught,  for  the 
first  time  in  twenty  years,  the  necessity  of  negativing 
the  importunate  demands  to  which  the  holders  of  of- 
fice are  perpetually  exposed.  Besides,  a  property 
tax,  had  it  been  imposed  in  1816,  would  have  been 
productive,  distressing  as  was  the  time  that  followed, 
of  loud  complaint,  perhaps  of  serious  and  general 
injury. 

The  next  financial  measure  of  importance  took 
place  in  1819,  when  ministers  having  called  on  par- 
liament to  give  efficiency  to  the  sinking  fund,  propo- 
sed and  carried  a  measure  little  expected  in  the 
midst  of  peace, — the  imposition  of  new  taxes  to  the 
amount  of  3,000,000/.  These  were  imposed  chiefly 
on  malt,  spirits,  and  tobacco,  and  paid  with  great  re- 
luctance during  the  interval  of  doubt  and  embarrass- 
ment which  ensued.  Of  late,  however,  brighter  pros- 
pects have  opened,  and  a  diminution  of  expenditure 
has  been  promoted  by  a  concurrence  of  causes, — 
tranquillity  among  our  lower  orders ;  the  reduction 
of  the  5  per  cents. ;  and  the  transfer  of  a  portion  of 
our  half-pay  and  pension  list  to  the  next  generation. 
The  consequence  has  been  important  and  gratifying, 
— a  reduction  of  taxes  in  the  last  two  years  to  the 
amount  of  6,000,000/. 

The  Sinking  Fund. 

The  idea  of  a  Sinking  Fund  is  of  old  date,  having 
been  conceived  more  than  a  century  ago,  by  Sir  R. 
Walpole,  the  only  public  man  of  his  age  who  appears 
to  have  been  conversant  with  finance.  Its  plan  was 
simple,  the  fund  being  formed  in  the  first  instance  of  a 


the  Sinking  Fund.  319 

small  sum  of  surplus  revenue,  and  augmented  pro- 
gressively by  the  interest  of  such  part  of  the  debt  as 
was  paid  off  by  its  operation.  Here  was  no  display 
of  the  wonders  of  compound  interest,  but  the  long 
peace  that  ensued  favoured  the  reduction  of  debt, 
and  the  fund,  though  small,  was  progressively  in- 
creasing. Such  coutinued  the  course  of  circum- 
stances until  1733,  when  the  troubled  aspect  of  the 
Continent,  and  the  difficulty  of  imposing  new  taxes, 
necessitated  an  interference  with  some  disposable 
resource,  and  the  sinking  fund  was  encroached  on. 
A  precedent  once  given,  trespasses  became  frequent, 
and  this  fund,  though  never  abolished,  proved  of  so 
slender  operation,  that  in  the  course  of  half  a  century 
it  had  not  discharged  above  15,000,000/.  of  our  debt. 
At  last,  in  1786,  the  scheme  was  revived  with  aug- 
mented energy,  aided  on  the  one  hand  by  Dr.  Price's 
flattering  calculations  of  the  effect  of  compound  in- 
terest, on  the  other  by  Mr.  Pitt's  declared  determina- 
tion to  consider  its  funds  inviolable.  The  new  plan 
was  in  substance  the  same  as  that  of  Sir  R.  Walpole, 
but  the  reserve  was  invested  with  many  additional 
safeguards,  being  committed  to  a  special  board  of 
commissioners  who  were  independent,  not  merely  of 
the  Treasury,  but  in  some  respects,  of  Parliament. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  public  first  became  fa- 
miliar with  the  term  "Consolidated  Fund,"  which 
meant,  however,  nothing  more  than  our  taxes  formed 
into  an  aggregate,  out  of  which  government  pledged 
itself,  whatever  might  be  the  proportion  of  our  reve- 
nue to  our  expenditure,  to  pay  a  million  annually  to 
the  new  commissioners. 

The  sinking  fund  consisted  consequently  of 

1.  An  annual  million,  to  which  were  added, 

2.  The  amount  of  government  annuities  as  they 
successively  expired ;  and, 

3.  The  interest  of  such  stock  as  was  annually  re- 
deemed. 

The  measure  now  brought  into  operation,  paid  off' 
the'  following  sums : 


320  Our  Finances  ; 

In  1787     £  662,750  Stock.  j      In  1790    £1,558,850  Stock, 

1788  1,456,900  1791        1,587,500 

1789  1,506,350  1792       1,507,110 

These  sums,  small  as  they  were,  could  hardly  be 
considered  bond  fide  reductions  of  the  public  debt, 
since  the  Spanish  armament  in  1790  necessitated  an 
addition  to  our  burdens  of  nearly  half  their  amount. 
In  an  arithmetical  sense,  accordingly,  the  effect  was 
inconsiderable;  in  a  political  sense  it  was  otherwise, 
as  it  excited  the  expectation  of  great  subsequent  de- 
ductions. To  strengthen  this  expectation,  and  to  re- 
move an  apprehension  that  a  renewal  of  war,  by  ne- 
cessitating new  loans,  might  cast  these  annual  liqui- 
dations into  the  shade,  Mr.  Pitt  obtained,  in  1792,  an 
act  of  parliament,  declaring  that  all  future  loans 
should  carry  in  themselves  the  means  of  their  pro- 
gressive extinction,  ministers,  on  contracting  a  loan. 
being  pledged  to  "  provide  taxes,  not  only  for  the  in- 
terest but  for  an  addition  to  the  sinking  fund.*'  This 
provision,  whether  in  reality  judicious  or  not,  was 
very  favourably  received  by  the  public,  and  had,  in 
concurrence  with  the  commercial  prosperity  of  the 
year,  the  effect  of  producing  a  considerable  rise  in 
the  funds. 

But  this  flattering  prospect  was  forthwith  overcast 
by  oqr  participation  in  the  war  against  France,  and 
the  unparalleled  magnitude  of  our  expense.  The 
sinking  fund  was  maintained,  and  operated  a  large 
apparent  reduction,  but  the  result,  in  a  definitive 
sense,  was  null,  our  debt  being  augmented  by  our 
annual  loans  in  a  far  greater  ratio.  After  all  that  we 
have  been  told  of  the  operation  of  the  sinking  fund-; 
after  the  pompous  statements  of  hundreds  of  millions 
redeemed  by  it;  after  all  the  eloquent  effusions  in  its 
praise  by  both  sides  of  the  House,  the  public  will 
learn  with  some  surprise,  that  since  1786,  this  fund  has 
had  a  real  operation  during  twelve  years  only,  and 
that  the  actual  reduction  effected  by  it,  has  not  averaged 
a  single  million  a  year !  In  this  we  are  to  be  under- 
stood, as  leaving  the  twenty-three  years  of  war  wholly 
out  of  the  question,  and  confining  our  calculation  to 


the  Sinking  Fund.  \Yl  i 

the  six  years  preceding  1793,  and  the  six  years  sub- 
sequent to  1815. 

Compound  Interest. — The  surprising  results  ascribed 
in  our  time  to  compound  interest  will  be  cited  by  the 
future  historian,  as  affording  a  striking  example  of 
the  power  of  enthusiasm  in  the  original  calculator, 
and  of  the  extent  of  credulity  on  the  part  of  the 
public.  In  war,  the  sinking  fund  is  supported  by 
loans,  and  is  it  not  apparent,  that  whatever  may  be 
the  beneficial  result  of  accumulation  in  the  hands  of 
the  commissioners  of  the  sinking  fund,  the  loss  to  the 
public  from  the  additional  loans  required  by  it  must 
be  in  the  same  compound  ratio  ?  We  might  even 
add,  that  in  all  cases  of  taxation,  where  the  impost 
has  not  (and  it  very  rarely  has)  the  effect  of  inducing 
economy  in  the  individual,  the  loss  is  to  be  reckoned 
by  compound  interest,  since,  had  the  money  been  left 
in  the  hands  of  the  subject,  the  increase  would  have 
been  in  the  compound  form. 

Without  entering  into  any  arithmetical  statement, 
or  even  pressing  the  argument  in  an  abstract  form, 
Ave  may  safely  make  the  general  assertion,  that  the 
power  of  the  sinking  fund,  whatever  it  may  have  been, 
has  arisen  "  not  from  actual  payments,  but  from  its 
influence  on  the  public  mind ;" — from  its  presenting 
sl  possibility  of  an  ultimate  repayment  of  the  debt; — a 
possibility  transformed  into  confident  expectation  by 
the  ardour  of  the  public,  and  our  natural  inclination 
to  believe  what  we  wish. 

Present  State  of  the  Sinking  Fund. — Such  was  the 
state  of  our  financial  concerns  until  the  beginning  of 
1822,  when,  by  the  double  effect  of  reduction  of  ex- 
penditure and  increase  of  revenue,  an  actual  surplus 
was  produced,  and  the  sinking  fund  was  likely  to  be- 
come efficient  to  the  extent  of  4  or  5,000,000/.  a  year. 
We  seemed  now  on  the  eve  of  attaining  the  result  so 
long  represented  as  desirable  by  ministers ;  the  pos- 
session of  an  engine  for  raising  the  price  of  stocks,  or. 
in  other  words,  for  reducing  the  rate  of  interest  on 
private  securities.     In  what  manner,  it  may  be  asked. 

41 


;J22  Our  Finance* ; 

would  the  latter  prove  a  consequence  of  the  former  ? 
In  France,  where  the  interest  of  the  public  debt  does 
not  form  10  per  cent,  of  the  income  arising  from 
property,  and  government  securities  do  not  command 
general  confidence,  the  interest  of  money  invested  in 
land,  houses,  and  trade,  is  not  materially  affected  by 
the  price  of  the  public  funds.  Land  continues  to  be 
bought  with  eagerness,  though  yielding  only  3,  3i,  or 
4  per  cent,  on  the  purchase  money,  at  a  time  when 
the  same  capital  would  yield  between  5  and  6  per- 
cent, in  the  funds.  In  this  country  the  case  is  other- 
wise. Our  public  dividends  form  a  considerable 
proportion  of  the  income  arising  from  property ;  they 
are  held  by  individuals  in  all  parts  of  the  country? 
and  their  value  naturally  influences  that  of  other  in- 
vestments of  capital.  It  follows  that  a  rise  in  the  price 
of  stock,  in  other  words,  our  obtaining  less  interest 
from  purchasing  in  the  funds,  has  a  direct  tendency 
to  lower  the  interest  on  private  securities,  as  has  been 
exemplified  by  the  general  diminution  of  the  interest 
on  mortgages  during  the  last  and  present  year. 

What,  in  a  statistical  sense,  are  the  characteristics 
or  accompaniments  of  a  lowr  rate  of  interest  ?  It  is 
indicative  of  abundant  capital,  and  of  a  very  advan- 
ced state  of  productive  industry.  It  was  this  which 
formed  the  great  feature  in  the  situation  of  Holland 
during  the  chief  part  of  the  17th  and  18th  centuries, 
and  enabled  her  government  to  lower  toer  dividends 
at  a  time. (1654)  when  France  and  other  states  bor- 
rowed at  very  high  interest.  It  was  this  which,  under 
Sir  R.  Walpole,  afforded  the  strongest  proof  of  the  re- 
vival of  our  financial  credit,  and  which  in  1749  en- 
abled Mr.  Pelham  to  effect  a  well-known  and  highly 
beneficial  reduction.  But,  neither  in  these  cases,  or 
in  any  other  of  which  history  has  preserved  the  re- 
cord, did  the  fall  of  interest  proceed  from  the  opera- 
tion of  a  sinking  fund.  It  rested  on  a  much  broader 
basis :  it  wras  the  natural  consequence  of  confirmed 
peace;  of  the  diminished  demand  for  capital;  of  a 
fall,  or  tendency  to  fall,  in  the  rate  of  interest  on  all 
securities  whether  public  or  private ;  it  was  to  a  con- 


the  Sinking  Fund.  323 

eurrence  of  these  circumstances,  much  more  than  to 
any  surplus  in  the  revenue,  that  we  attributed  the  for- 
tunate accomplishment  of  that  great  operation,  the  re- 
duction of  the  five  per  cents. 

If  our  readers  see  with  some  surprise  these  deduc- 
tions from  the  efficiency  of  a  measure  so  much  vaunt- 
ed, they  will  be  no  less  struck  with  the  farther  part  of 
our  argument ;  viz.  that  a  large  sinking  fund,  or,  to 
describe  it  in  the  most  simple  terms,  a  large  surplus 
revenue  applied  to  the  redemption  of  stock,  would  be 
productive  of  public  injury.  By  lowering  unnaturally 
the  rate  of  interest,  it  would  send  capital  abroad,  and 
operate  as  a  fund  to  raise  the  stocks  of  France  or 
America.  This  result  is  too  obvious  to  have  escaped 
the  observation  of  either  the  Bank  directors  or  mi- 
nisters :  in  fact,  the  readiness  with  which  ministers 
consented  both  in  the  last  and  present  year  to  relin- 
quish their  surplus  revenue  by  remitting  taxes,  seems 
to  indicate  a  conviction,  that  a  rise  in  the  value  of 
stock,  produced  artificially,  would  be  replete  with 
injury  to  the  public.  They  cannot  fail  to  be  aware, 
that  since  the  reduction  of  the  5  per  cents.,  there  re- 
mains no  adequate  motive  for  interfering  with  the 
current  rate  of  interest,  or  for  discovering  a  solici- 
tude on  the  part  of  government,  to  raise  the  value  of 
the  funds  more  than  of  land,  or  any  other  description 
of  property.  If,  in  commercial  affairs,  ministers  have, 
during  the  last  ten  years,  evinced  a  prudent  forbear- 
ance, and  abstained  from  the  intervention  so  unfortu- 
nately exercised  by  their  predecessors,  is  it  likely 
that  in  finance  they  will  follow  a  different  course  ? 
Our  debt  will  hardly  admit  of  direct  reduction :  our 
hope  of  relief  is  in  that  diminution  of  pressure  which 
will  follow  the  increase  of  our  means; — the  augmen- 
tation of  national  income ; — a  result  most  likely  to  be 
promoted,  by  strict  impartiality  as  to  property, 
whether  vested  in  land  or  the  public  funds. 

But,  if  such  be  the  conviction  of  our  rulers,  why,  it 
may  be  asked,  do  they  still  cling  to  a  name,  and  hold 
forth  the  sinking  fund  to  parliament  and  the  country, 
as  an  institution  entitled  to  such  zealous  support  ? 
Partly,  we  believe,  from  a  wish  to  retain  a  surplus  of 


324  Our  Finances : 

revenue  at  their  disposal,  for  the  relief  of  suffering  in- 
terests, or  to  facilitate  measures  of  evident  utility, 
such  as  the  commutation  of  tithe  in  Ireland :  partly 
perhaps,  from  a  deficient  acquaintance  with  the  back- 
wardness of  other  countries,  and  a  consequent  diffi- 
dence in  calculating  the  relative  progress  of  our  own. 
Our  true  sinking  fund  is  to  be  sought  in  the  more  rapid  in- 
crease of  our  national  income,  an  increase  that  rests  on  no 
visionary  basis,  but  on  our  mines,  our  navigation,  our 
capital.  Yet  no  speaker  in  parliament,  whether 
ministerialist  or  oppositionist,  appears  to  have  as  yet 
studied  the  comparative  prospects  of  England  and 
her  neighbours,  or  to  be  sufficiently  aware  of  the  in- 
ferences which  they  justify. 

The  admissions  successively  made  by  the  support- 
ers of  the  sinking  fund  (Appendix,  p.  [103])  have 
removed  part  of  the  mystery  which,  by  the  aid  of  such 
phrases  as  "  inviolability  of  deposit"  and  "  operation 
of  compound  interest,"  had  so  long  encircled  it.  Our 
present  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  has  had  the 
good  sense  to  relinquish  the  nominal  part  of  the  sink- 
ing fund,  and  to  describe  the  remainder  merely  as  a 
surplus  revenue  appropriated  to  the  redemption  of 
stock.  As  such  we  request  our  readers  to  consider 
it,  and  to  enable  them  to  compute  its  amount  without 
unravelling  a  long  list  of  finance  papers,  we  subjoin 
an 

Estimateof  our  Annual  Expenditure  for  1823  and  1824, 

Half  pay  and  pensions  for  the  Army,  Navy, 

and  Ordnance,  about  •  -  £4,800,600 

Of  which  advanced  by  the  Bank,  nearly       -  2,000,000 

Remainder  to  be  paid  out  of  the  current  -    ■ 

revenue  -  -  ...  2,800,000 

Army,  exclusive  of  half  pay  and  pensions     -  7,000,000 

Navy  .-...-.         5,500,000 

Ordnance         -  -  -  -  -         1,200,000 

Miscellaneous  -  1,500,000 

Civil  list:  pensions  for  Civil  Services  ;  Courtsof  Justice ;  Civil 

Government  of  Scotland,  and  some  lesser  heads,  all  charg-ed 

ed  on  the  Consolidated  Fund  ...  -      2,000,000 


Amount  of  expenditure  distinct  from  the  interest  of  the  debt       20,000,000 
Interest  of  the  public  debt  ...  -       30,000,00 

Total         £50.oon.or>n 


the  Sinking  Fund.  ;>2.» 

Such  is  our  present  expenditure ;  and  our  bona  fide 
sinking  fund  can,  of  course,  be  nothing  else  than  the 
surplus  of  our  income  above  it :  it  will  be  found  to 
amount  to  three,  four,  or  more  millions,  according  to 
the  productiveness  of  the  revenue. 

The  next  and  equally  important  question  is, 
whether  a  surplus  when  found  to  exist,  "  ought  to  be 
applied  to  the  redemption  of  stock,  or  made  a  ground 
for  the  further  remission  of  taxes."  We  subscribe, 
without  hesitation,  to  the  latter,  not  merely  for  the 
sake  of  relief  to  the  public,  but  on  the  less-under- 
stood ground  of  the  injurious  consequences  of  inter- 
fering with  the  price  of  stocks.  Against  this,  however, 
it  may  be  urged,  that  men  of  the  most  opposite  views 
in  politics  have  concurred  in  eulogising  the  sinking 
fund — that  Mr.  Fox,  was,  in  this  respect,  no  less 
zealous  than  his  great  antagonist.  Mr.  Fox,  it  is  well 
known,  never  made  a  study  of  finance,  still  less  of 
political  economy;  his  conclusions  in  these,  as  in 
many  other  respects,  when  well  founded,  owed  their 
justness  less  to  continued  research  or  careful  com- 
parison, than  to  rectitude  of  feeling,  to  a  manliness  of 
character,  which,  in  a  question  like  the  present, 
would  prompt  him  to  adopt  without  much  investiga- 
tion that  course,  which  should  place  the  burden  on 
the  shoulders  of  ourselves,  instead  of  our  posterity. 
Again,  Mr.  Pitt,  when  he  introduced  the  sinking  fund, 
was  only  in  his  twenty-seventh  year  and  could  not, 
from  the  pressure  of  other  avocations,  have  been  able 
to  study  very  closely  the  operation  of  a  surplus  reve- 
nue, applied  to  the  purchase  of  stock.  He  was  ne- 
cessarily unacquainted  with  the  statistical  returns 
which  we  possess,  and  which  shall  be  more  fully  no- 
ticed in  the  following  pages.  He  had  before  him  no 
example  of  a  measure  tending,  by  unnatural  interfe- 
rence with  the  rate  of  interest,  to  send  capital  out  of 
the  country :  still  less  could  he  foresee  the  rapid  in- 
crease of  our  numbers,  the  surprising  extension  of 
our  productive  industry,  and  the  consequent  motives 
for  pursuing  a  system,  the  reverse  of  that  which 
maintains  a  sinking  fund — we  meanv  bearing  light  on 


^26  Our  Finances  ;  Distinction  of 

the  present  generation,  and  transferring  a  portion  of 
taxation  to  their  less  burdened  successors. 

If  these  remarks  are  at  all  useful  in  correcting 
popular  misapprehension,  we  shall  hope  somewhat  of 
a  similar  result  from  the  following  paragraphs,  re- 
lating to  the  situation  of  different  classes  of  stock- 
holders. 

Stockholders  :  Distinction  between  Permanent  and  Tem- 
porary Depositors. — Those  of  our  countrymen  who 
have  travelled  and  paid  attention  to  topics  of  this  na- 
ture, must  have  remarked  that  in  France,  Germany, 
Spain,  in  short,  in  every  country  on  the  Continent,  ex- 
cept Holland,  the  public  funds  are  comparatively 
little  resorted  to  as  a  deposit  for  private  property. 
The  governments  of  these  countries  have  not  as  yet 
acquired  the  confidence  attached  to  a  representative 
assembly,  and  the  inhabitants  are  little  acquainted 
with  the  security  conferred  on  property  by  public 
register,  the  power  of  transfer,  the  steady  observance 
of  good  faith  towards  the  public  creditor.  Conti- 
nental lenders  require  the  visible,  and,  as  they  ac- 
count it,  solid  security  of  land  and  houses.  Such,  a 
century  and  a  half  ago,  was  the  case  throughout 
England  generally,  and  such,  in  no  small  degree,  was 
the  case  in  the  provincial  part  of  the  kingdom  at  the 
beginning  of  the  late  war.  The  general  ardour  of 
our  countrymen  in  the  contest,  their  confidence  in 
government,  and  the  comparatively  high  interest  then 
given  by  the  Treasury,  led  to  the  deposit  in  that  ready 
absorbent,  of  sums  of  which  the  magnitude  would 
have  startled  the  caution  of  our  forefathers.  The  re- 
sult of  the  whole  is,  that  funded  property  so  insig- 
nificant in  a  former  age,  when  compared  to  the  gene- 
ral wealth  of  the  kingdom,  is  now  of  an  amount  ap- 
proaching to  the  value  of  our  land,  particularly  if 
we  estimate  it  not  by  capital,  but  (see  p.  238.)  by 
income. 

Annuitants  on  our  public  funds,  instead  of  being 
confined,  as  in  the  last  age,  to  London,  Bristol,  and  a 
few  of  our  principal  towns,  are  now  found  in  every 
district,  and  in  every  variety  of  occupation.     The 


Permanent  and  Temporary  Stockholders.         327 

great  majority  of  them  are   permanent  depositors, 
strangers  to  the  manoeuvres  of  the  stock  exchange, 
speculating  neither  on  buying  or  selling,  and  attentive 
merely  to  the  half-yearly  receipt  of  their  dividends. 
These  persons  consider  the  stocks  as  a  fund  perma- 
nently eligible  for  themselves  and  their  families,  con- 
fiding, on  the  one  hand,  in  the  good  faith  of  Parlia- 
ment, and  aware,  on  the  other,  of  the  serious  draw- 
backs attendant  on  property  in  land  and  houses, — 
the  difficulty  of  collecting  rents,  the  heavy  charge  at- 
tendant on  transfers.     The  funds,  they  are  aware,  in- 
volve neither  delays  nor  lawsuits,  while,  with  a  view 
to  bequest,  they  admit  of  an  easy  and  direct  reparti- 
tion.   It  is  in  results  such  as  these,. that  we  recognise 
all  the  advantage  of  established  institutions,  of  the 
steady  observance  of  good  faith  on  the  part  of  go- 
vernment.    Viewed  in  a  national  sense,  they  render 
a  people  capable  of  efforts  such  as  those  which  main- 
tained the  independence  of  Holland  against  the  suc- 
cessive attacks  of  Spain,  England,  and  France : — 
Viewed  in  regard  to  the  individual,  they  offer  a  mode 
of  investment  almost  as  much  superior  to  that  of  the 
circle   of  private  connexion,  as  is  afforded  by  the 
Saving  Banks,  when  compared  to  the  precarious  de- 
posits to  which  the  lower  orders  were  formerly  ac- 
customed to  trust  their  petty  savings. 

What  proportion  do  these  persons,  the  permanent 
depositors  in  our  funds,  bear  to  the  body  of  stock- 
holders at  large?  Not  less,  we  believe,  than  fair- 
fifths  of  the  whole,  whether  we  look  to  number  or  pro- 
perty. The  temporary  depositors,  however,  few  as 
they  are,  fill  a  more  conspicuous  place  in  the  public 
eye :  it  is  they  who  bustle  on  the  Stock  Exchange, 
who  confer  with  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  and 
who  come  conspicuously  forward  to  bear  a  part  in 
loan  contracts.  But  these  persons  consider  the  funds 
merely  as  a  transient  property,  a  security  in  which,  as 
in  exchequer  bills  or  mercantile  acceptances,  they 
may  vest  a  floating  sum  until  the  occurrence  of  a 
more  eligible  mode  of  appropriation.  Their  calcu- 
lations as  to  the  price  of  stocks  go  no  farther  than 


.'328  Our  Finances  ;  Distinction  of 

the  month  or  the  quarter  which  may  elapse  ere  it 
suit  them  to  withdraw  their  money,  for  the  purpose, 
perhaps,  of  transferring  it  to  the  funds  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  France,  or  the  lesser  Continental 
powers.  Merchants,  it  has  long  been  said,  are  citi- 
zens of  the  world,  but  of  all  mercantile  men,  that  is 
particularly  the  case  with  temporary  stockholders, 
to  whom  London,  Amsterdam,  and  Paris,  present 
but  one  vast  exchange.  How  different  this  from  the 
permanent  depositor  who  exhibits  so  many  charac- 
teristics of  the  retired  capitalist,  of  the  inheritor  of 
real  property,  preferring  British  security,  even  at  a 
reduced  interest,  and  not  seeking  to  escape  his  por- 
tion of  sacrifice,  when  satisfied  that  it  is  conducive 
to  the  general  relief!  These  persons  are  much  more 
interested  in  preserving  than  in  acquiring ;  their  ob- 
ject is  not  a  rise  of  price  for  the  purpose  of  sale,  but 
security  in  regard  to  their  capital  and  strict  punctu- 
ality in  the  payment  of  the  interest. 

This  disposition  has  been  strikingly  exemplified  in 
the  late  reduction  of  the  five  per  cents.,  of  which  not 
a  fiftieth  part  was  sent  out  of  the  country,  notwithstanding 
the  great  temptation  offered  by  foreign  funds.  And 
if  in  the  three  per  cents,  the  permanent  depositors  do 
not  surpass  the  temporary  in  so  great  a  proportion, 
they  form,  even  in  these,  beyond  all  comparison,  the 
majority. 

With  what  view,  it  may  be  asked,  do  we  enter  into 
this  discrimination  of  temporary  and  permanent  de- 
positors ?  Partly  because  it  is  little  understood,  but 
more  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  unimportance  in 
a  national  sense,  of  the  class  who  come  forward  as 
the  representatives  of  the  fundholders  at  large.  It 
follows,  that  any  measures  that  may  be  taken  in  re- 
gard to  the  funds,  should  be  adapted  to  the  unobtru- 
sive, we  may  almost  say,  the  silent  majority  of  stock- 
holders. Persons  circumstanced  as  they  are,  can  de- 
sire no  aid  at  the  expense  of  the  community :  no  addi- 
tion to  the  market  price  of  stock,  except  such  as  shall 
naturally  arise  from  the  continuance  of  peace,  the 
growing  abundance  of  capital. — An  artificial  prop. 


Permanent  and  Temporary  Stockholders.  329 

such  as  the  sinking  fund,  they  will  not  hesitate  to 
forego,  when  apprised,  that  in  peace  it  is  of  injurious 
tendency,  and  should  he  considered  only  as  an  in- 
genious scheme  by  which  the  financier,  in  a  season  of 
difficulty,  seeks  to  stimulate  the  avidity  of  capital- 
ists, and  to  provide  for  the  calls  of  the  Treasury, 
without  an  extravagant  sacrifice. 

After  these  preliminary  explanations,  and  the  re- 
moval from  the  mind  of  the  reader  of  certain  popular 
impressions,  we  shall  proceed  with  advantage  to  our 
farther  illustrations. 


Comparative  Taxation  of  this  Country  and  France, 

GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  IRELAND. 

Computed  for  1823,  after  deducting  the  taxes  on  salt,  leather,  and  malt  lately 
reduced:  also  a  portion  of  the  Assessed  Taxes. 

Gross  amount,  inclusive  of  the  expense  of  collection. 

Assessed  taxes             -  £5,000,000 

Customs           ------  11,000,000 

Excise             ---_.-  27,000,000 

Stamps             ---_->  6,800,000 

Land  tax        -----             -  1,200,000 

Post  office  (nett  amount)          -  1 ,400,000 

Crown  lands   •              -  200,000 

All  other  government  receipts               ...  1,400,000 


£54,000,000 
Tithe  (including  Ireland)  -  -  -  -  5,000,000 

Poor-rate,  after  deducting  the  portion  paid  (see  page  191) 

in  lieu  of  wages        -  5,000,000 


Total  £64,000000 


being  25  per  cent,  on  our  national  income 
as  computed  in  page  238\ 

FRANCE. 

Gross  amount,  inclusive  of  expense  of  collection. 
Fonder,  or  land  and  house  tax  -  -  -  9,000,000 

MobUier,  a  farther  house  tax;  also  the  window  tax 

and  patentes,  or  tax  on  professions  -  3,000,000 

Customs     ----._.  2,?.\)0i(j<Jii 

Excise,  viz.  duties  on  salt,  tobacco,  snuff,  wine,  spirits, 

beer,  and  some  lesser  articles,  the  whole  comprised 

under  the  name  of  droits  re unis  -  -  .      -  9,030,000 

Stamps,  viz.  enregistrement,  domaine  et  timbre,       -  -  6,000,000 

Post  office  (nett  receipt)  -  -  600,000 

Sale  of  wood  from  the  public  forests  ...  800,000 


330  Comparative  Taxation  of 

Brought  forward  30,700,000 
All  other  receipts  and  contingencies,  including  a  large 
municipal  revenue  collected  from  octrois  and  other 
charges  borne  by  the  inhabitants  of  towns  6,300,000 


37,000,000 


Equal,  after  adding  a  fifth  for  the  greater  value  of  mo- 
ney, in  France  than  in  England,  to  45,000,000 


This  forms  nearly  18  per  cent,  on  the  national  income 
of  France,  as  computed  in  page  249. 

In  this  table  of  comparative  taxation,  the  chief  dis- 
tinctive feature  is  the  magnitude  of  our  excise,  cus- 
toms, and  assessed  taxes,  the  proportion  of  which  to 
the  same  taxes  in  France,  is  as  forty  to  twenty  millions. 
This  puts  in  a  striking  light  the  greater  ability  to  pay 
on  the  part  of  a  commercial  community,  of  which  so 
large  a  proportion  are  resident  in  towns,  a  circum- 
stance conducive  equally  to  ease  of  collection  on  the 
part  of  government,  and  to  free  consumption  on  that 
of  the  public.  Hence,  the  magnitude  of  our  receipts 
on  spirits,  beer,  tea,  sugar,  wine,  fruit ;  on  certain  ar- 
ticles of  dress,  as  silk ;  or  on  that  which  more  imme- 
diately marks  a  mercantile  society,  postage.  It  les- 
sens, at  the  same  time,  the  weight  of  an  argument, 
frequently  brought  against  our  taxation,  but  which 
we  are  far  from  adopting  in  a  literal  sense,  viz.  that 
when  computed  at  so  much  a  head,  it  amounts  to 
more  than  twice  the  average  capitation  of  our  neigh- 
bours. 

Com  Laws. — These  laws  may  be  termed  an  indirect 
impost  on  the  public,  payable  to  landholders  as  an  in- 
demnity for  the  land-tax,  tithe,  and  poor-rate.  The) 
have  in  particular  years  formed  an  addition  to  our 
payments  greatly  beyond  the  amount  expended  by 
the  landed  interest  for  these  burdens ;  but  at  pre- 
sent the  case  is  so  different,  that  our  corn  laws  may, 
in  some  measure,  be  considered  a  dead  letter.  In 
our  table  accordingly  we  have  avoided  noticing  their 
operation,  and  have  preferred  introducing  the  amount 
of  the  charges  which  they  are  intended  to  counterbal- 
ance. In  France  also  there  exist  restrictions  on  the 
import  of  foreign  corn,  but  they  are  of  little  conse- 


England  and  France.  331 


■s 


quence  in  a  country  where  the  growth  is,  in  general, 
fully  equal  to  the  consumption,  particularly  as  im- 
port becomes  free  whenever  the  average  of  wheat  of 
home  growth  approaches  to  50.9.  the  Winchester 
quarter. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  object  of  the  prece- 
ding tables?  To  draw  with  distinctness  and  pre- 
cision, that  which  is  so  often  attempted  in  a  loose  and 
exaggerating  manner, — a  comparison  between  the 
burdens  of  this  and  other  countries,  our  competitors 
in  the  sale  of  manufactures.  The  Agricultural  Com- 
mittee of  1821  advanced  an  opinion  (Report  p.  22.), 
that  the  taxation  of  other  countries  compared  to  their 
resources  is  as  high  as  our  own.  This  conclusion 
our  statement  does  not  confirm,  but  it  will  probably 
be  instrumental  in  modifying  a  very  general  impres- 
sion of  an  opposite  nature;  viz.  that  our  burdens  ex- 
ceed those  of  our  neighbours,  to  a  degree  which,  in  a 
manner,  baffles  all  hope  of  approaching  to  an  equality. 
Far  from  joining  in  this  discouraging  view  of  our 
situation,  we  are  inclined  to  augur  very  favourable 
results  from  a  perseverance  in  the  course  of  reduction 
lately  adopted  by  ministers. 

SECTION  If. 

Our  Prospects  in  Commerce  and  Finance. 

Probability  of  continued  Peace.-— The  events  that  have 
recently  occurred  on  the  Continent,  unsatisfactory 
as  they  are  to  the  friends  of  constitutional  freedom, 
have  had  at  least  one  good  effect,  that  of  putting  be- 
yond  doubt  the  determination  of  our  ministers  to 
maintain  peace.  The  debates  of  the  29th  and  30th 
April  last,  will  be  memorable  for  the  declarations  to 
that  effect,  made  by  Mr.  Canning  and  Mr.  Robinson, 
and  confirmed  by  the  votes  of  an  overpowering  ma- 
jority. But  this,  we  may  be  assured,  was  no  new  de- 
termination on  the  part  of  our  rulers,  the  course  of 
circumstances  having  long  singe   shown  to  the  re- 


332  Probability  of 

fleeting  part  of  our  public  men,  that  the  only  effec- 
tual remedy  for  the  national  embarrassment  was  to 
be  sought  in  a  steady  adherence  to  a  pacific  sys- 
tem. It  will  be  in  the  recollection  of  many  of  our 
readers,  that  the  late  Lord  Londonderry,  in  his 
speech  of  29th  April  (1322)  dwelt  strongly  on  the 
improbability  of  our  being  again  called  on  to  bear  a 
part  in  war,  on  a  scale  at  all  similar  to  that  of  our 
late  contest.  Had  the  reserve  of  office  permitted 
his  lordship  to  express  himself  at  large,  he  might,  we 
believe,  have  given  the  most  conclusive  arguments  for 
this  opinion,  avowing  that  the  magnitude  of  our  loss, 
by  the  war,  was  unperceived  at  the  time  it  was  in- 
curred :  that  ministers,  had  they  comprehended  its 
extent,  would  have  followed  a  much  more  cautious 
course,  and  that  no  consideration  should  again 
prompt  them  to  the  once  popular  system  of  vigour. 
Never,  we  may  add,  did  a  contest  close  with  more 
success  in  its  main  objects — the  change  of  govern- 
ment in  France,  and  the  restoration  of  independence 
to  Europe;  while,  as  to  territorial  acquisitions,  it 
rested  with  us  to  retain  or  give  back  whatever  suited 
our  policy.  Would  it  be  easy  to  imagine  circum- 
stances more  calculated  to  heal  the  wounds  of  pro- 
tracted warfare,  or  to  prevent  that  distress  in  which 
we  have,  notwithstanding,  been  so  deeply  involved  ? 
After  such  dear-bought  experience,  is  it  probable 
that  our  government  will  be  easily  led  to  act  an  ag- 
gressive part ;  or  is  it  not  more  likely,  that  its  con- 
duct will,  in  future,  be  stamped  with  a  prudence 
similar  to  that  of  a  Cecil  or  a  Walpole, — to  that 
which  the  unambitious  government  of  Holland  has 
for  ages  studied  to  exemplify. 

How  far  is  this  pacific  prospect  confirmed  by  the 
situation  of  foreign  powers  ?  The  United  States  of 
America  passed,  in  February  1821,  an  act  for  re- 
ducing to  one  half,  an  army  which  already  was  far 
from  numerous ;  and  the  building  of  ships  of  war,  pro- 
secuted only  in  compliance  with  a  temporary  enthu- 
siasm, is  now  also  relaxed.  Next,  as  to  our  great  Eu- 
ropean rival,  France,  is  no  longer  to  us  the  France  of 


continued  Peace.  333 

Louis  XIV.  or  of  Bonaparte :  not  only  is  her  national 
power  comparatively  very  different,  but  the  sptings 
of  court  intrigue,  the  hazard  of  secret  influence  on 
the  executive  branch,  are  checked,  as  in  this  coun- 
try, by  the  freedom  of  parliamentary  discussion.  If 
it  be  urged,  however,  that  though  the  nation  be  inclin- 
ed to  peace,  the  cabinet  may  be  misled  by  foreign 
influence  or  ministerial  prejudices,  and  that  in  the 
varying  scene  of  European  politics,  there  may  arise 
contingencies  calculated  to  draw  France  into  war, 
let  it  be  remembered,  that  her  internal  situation  af- 
fords the  strongest  motives  for  a  return  to  peace. 
Her  ministers  cannot  long  be  blind  to  her  real  situa- 
tion,— to  the  fact,  that  her  population  is  in  a  more 
divided  state,  the  preservation  of  her  present  govern- 
ment less  assured  than  was  the  casein  England  a 
century  ago,  when,  the  Hanoverian  family  being  re- 
cently settled  on  the  throne,  it  required  a  steady  ad- 
herence to  pacific  policy  to  prevent  a  rupture,  of 
which  the  result  might  have  been,  that  the  regal  prize 
would  have  been  fought  for  on  British  ground. 

Causes  of  War  that  no  longer  exist. — On  taking  a  re- 
trospect of  our  history,  we  shall  find  that  several  of 
the  most  popular,  as  well  as  most  substantial  grounds 
of  continental  war,  have  ceased  to  exist.  This  coun- 
try began  to  take  an  active  part  in  foreign  politics 
nearly  a  century  and  a  half  ago,  a  time  when  France 
was  so  preponderant,  that  during  the  reigns  of  Wil- 
liam and  Anne,  continued  exertion  was  necessary  to 
preserve  the  independence  of  Europe.  The  wars  of 
1740  and  1756  owed  their  origin  chiefly  to  peculiari- 
ties in  the  situation  of  Austria  and  Prussia.  If  these 
no  longer  furnish  a  probable  ground  of  war,  it  is  still 
less  likely  that  we  shall  be  involved  in  any  contest 
for  colonies  such  as  that  of  1775,  or  in  an  attempt  to 
regulate  the  government  of  our  neighbours,  such  as 
that  which  called  Europe  to  arms  in  1793.  Those 
liberal  views  in  politics,  that  conviction  of  the  barren 
nature  of  military  trophies,  and   of  the  substantial 


334  Probability  of 

fruits  of  peace,  which  were  so  long  confined  to  the 
philosophic  reader  of  history,  have  at  last  reached 
our  cabinet,  and  have  influenced  it  since  1812,  to  a 
degree  greater  than  is  generally  known.  Neither  the 
troubles  of  Greece  or  of  Spain  have,  for  a  moment, 
shaken  the  pacific  determination  of  our  ministers. 
Add  to  this,  that  the  restrictive  laws,  so  long  connect- 
ed with  our  colonial  system,  have  now  ceased  to  fas- 
cinate our  rulers,  and  will  soon  cease  to  fascinate  our 
merchants.  Our  Board  of  Trade  has  expunged  from 
our  commercial  code,  the  acts  most  offensive  to  fo- 
reigners !  it  no  longer  listens  to  schemes  of  monopoly, 
or  seeks  to  found  our  commercial  prosperity  other- 
wise than  in  concurrence  with  that  of  our  neighbours. 
The  discovery  of  the  real  sources  of  national  wealth, 
has  shown  the  folly  of  wasting  lives  and  treasure  for 
those  colonial  possessions,  which,  during  the  last  cen- 
tury, in  the  reign  of  the  mercantile  theory,  were  ac- 
counted the  chief  basis  of  commercial  prosperity.  It 
is  now  above  forty  years  since  the  United  States  of 
America  were  definitively  separated  from  us,  and 
since  their  situation  has  afforded  a  proof,  that  the  be- 
nefit of  mercantile  intercourse  may  be  retained  in  all 
its  extent,  without  the  care  of  governing,  or  the  ex- 
pense of  defending  these  once-regretted  provinces. 
Mexico,  Peru,  Chili,  Brazil,  the  regions  so  much  co- 
veted by  our  forefathers,  are  now  open  to  every  flag, 
and  never  likely  to  become,  on  commercial  grounds 
at  least,  a  cause  of  war. 

Is  it  necessary  to  add  arguments  to  show  the  falla- 
cy of  expecting  any  national  advantage  from  war  ?  If 
we  cast  our  eyes  on  France,  we  find  her,  after  consi- 
dering herself,  during  many  years,  the  mistress  of  the 
Continet,  brought  back,  in  1814,  to  her  ancient  li- 
mits: if  we  look  at  home,  we  find  our  countrymen, 
after  believing  that  our  naval  superiority,  our  con- 
quests in  the  east  and  west,  had  brought  us  unpa- 
ralleled wealth,  have  made  the  mortifying  disco- 
very that  our  burdens  far  exceed  our  acquisitions, 
and  that  the  only  substantial  addition  to  our  resources, 
arises  from  domestic  improvement  and  augmentation 


continued  Peace.  335 

of  numbers;  circumstances  that  had  little  or  no  con- 
nexion with  a  state  of  hostility.  .Frederic  II.  of  Prus- 
sia afforded,  perhaps,  the  most  striking  example  of 
success  arising  from  keeping  up  a  large  stauding 
army,  having  acquired  by  it,  in  the  first  instance,  Si- 
lesia, and  eventually  part  of  Poland :  yet,  whoever 
will  calculate,  on  the  one  hand,  the  amount  of  his 
sacrifices,  on  the  other,  the  natural  progress  of  popu- 
lation and  wealth  during  so  long  a  period  as  his  reign 
(forty-five  years),  will  find  that  the  increase  of  his 
power  would  have  been  fully  equal,  had  he  confined 
himself  to  the  plain  and  direct  course  of  remaining  in 
peace  and  improving  his  hereditary  dominions. 

To  follow  up  such  a  course,  to  surmount  our  finan- 
cial difficulties,  and  to  heal  the  wounds  of  Ireland, 
are,  doubtless,  the  chief  objects  of  government. 
When  these  grand  points  shall  be  attained,  the  mag- 
nitude of  our  resources  will  be  so  evident  as  to  dispel 
all  apprehension  of  attack,  not  only  on  this  country, 
but  on  the  independence  of  the  Netherlands,  the 
maintenance  of  which  seems  now  to  form  the  only 
sufficient  ground  for  our  interfering  in  a  continental 
contest. 

Our  Prospect  of  increased  Resources. — We  have  al- 
ready expressed  (p,  236.)  a  belief  that  if  we  can  so 
conduct  our  affairs  as  to  get  over  a  few  years  of  diffi- 
culty, our  financial  prospects  would  brighten  beyond 
those  of  any  other  country.  The  mere  we  examine 
our  situation,  the  more  we  shall  find  ourselves  ena- 
bled to  trace  its  evils  to  transition,  derangement,  and 
other  causes  of  a  temporary  character.  Our  recent 
experience  has  shown,  that  a  season  of  peace  will  not 
always  be  a  season  of  stagnation^  and  that  an  increase 
of  population,  producing  consumers  as  well  as  pro- 
ducers, has  no  tendency  to  overstock.  The  order 
of  Providence  evidently  is,  that  the  industrious 
should  be  at  no  loss  for  the  want  of  employment 
And  the  old  adage,  that  «  England  is  England's  best 
customer,"  will  be  exemplified  with  ample  eftect 
whenever  the  course  of  circumstances  shall  restore 


336  Our  Prospect  of 

things  to  their  level,  and  whenever  the  unnatural  ef- 
fect of  war  and  taxation  shall  be  removed. 

In  the  belief  of  several  of  our  countrymen,  we  have 
arrived  at  that  point  beyond  which  we  can  hardly 
expect  to  carry  either  our  numbers  or  our  wealth. 
Their  apprehension,  however,  will  be  found  to  re- 
quire no  lengthened  refutation,  and  is  noticed  here 
chiefly  to  satisfy  those  persons,  necessarily  numerous 
in  a  commercial  country,  who,  immersed  in  their  re- 
spective occupations;  have  little  means  of  generalis- 
ing or  of  reasoning  from  the  past  to  the  future.  The 
fact  is,  that  our  improvements,  whether  in  agricul- 
ture, manufacture,  or  navigation,  are  at  present  no 
more  arrived  at  a  limit,  no  more  threatened  with  ob- 
stacles to  their  farther  progress,  than  they  were  a 
century  ago.  A  negative  impression  of  this  nature 
was  general  thirty  years  since,  yet  no  age  has  been 
so  fertile  in  discovery,  in  invention,  in  increase  of 
productive  power;  and  happily  no  country  pos- 
sesses, in  its  resources,  whether  physical  or  politi- 
cal, greater  means  of  continuing  the  career  of  ad- 
vancement. Our  capital  and  labour,  of  which  so 
large  a  portion  was  long  directed  to  military  purpo- 
ses, are  now  applied  to  objects  of  permanent  utility. 
The  two  great  anomalies  of  our  inland  situation, 
poor-rate  and  tithe,  can  hardly  fail  to  yield  to  the 
intelligence  of  the  age ;  and  their  removal  would  go 
far  towards  healing  the  wounds  of  the  suffering  por- 
tion of  the  community. 

To  bring  our  calculation  to  a  point, — what  annual 
sum  may  we  consider  as  likely  to  be  added  to  our 
national  revenue,  in  a  season  of  peace  ?  This  it  is 
no  easy  matter  to  reduce  to  a  specific  form,  but  after 
establishing  (p.  242.),  the  intimate  connexion  between 
population  and  wealth,  we  may,  we  trust,  on  very  safe 
grounds,  as  far  as  regards  England  and  Scotland, 
(leaving  Ireland,  at  least  the  cottagers  of  Ireland, 
out  of  the  question),  assume  the  increase  of  numbers 
as  the  ratio  of  the  increase  of  our  taxable  income. 
Such  certainly  may  be  taken  for  granted,  when  the 
reduction  oT  our  taxation  shall  have  been  carried 


increased  Resources. 


337 


somewhat  farther,  removing  the  chief  part  of  the 
extra  pressure  on  our  national  industry,  and  placing 
it,  in  regard  to  public  burdens,  more  nearly  on  a 
level  with  that  of  our  continental  competitors. 

We  proceed  to  exhibit  the  result  in  the  form  of 
arithmetical  computation.  First,  as  to  our  num- 
bers : — instead  of  requiring  our  readers  to  assent  to 
the  probability  of  an  addition  annually  augmenting, 
we  shall  confine  ourselves  to  that  which  is  past  and 
ascertained ;  viz.  the  individuals  born  in  the  early 
part  of  the  century  (1802,  3,  4.),  who  are  now  enter- 
ing, year  after  year,  on  the  age  of  productive  labour. 
Next,  as  to  the  fruits  of  their  labour,  represented  in 
the  form  of  money,  wre  have  already  (Appendix, 
p.  77.)  calculated  the  annual  addition  to  our  na- 
tional income  from  that  source  at  3,000,000/.  and  as 
our  taxation,  even  on  a  reduced  scale,  will  be  fully 
20  per  cent,  on  our  income,  the  consequent  addition 
to  our  revenue  is  above  600,000/.  But  here  also  wd 
shall  make  a  large  abatement,  and  shall  call  the  ad- 
dition in  question  only  400,000/. 


Computated  Increase  of  National  Income  from  the  Progress  of  produc- 
tive Industry  and  Population,  assuming  such  Increase  at  400,000/, 
a-year. 


i 

Annual  Increase 

Annual  Increase  j 

Years. 

of  the  Produce 

Years. 

of  the  Produce   ■ 

! 

of  Taxes. 

of  Taxes. 

1823 

£    400,000 

1837 

£6,000,000 

824 

800,000 

1838 

6,400,000 

1825 

1,200,000 

1839 

6,800,00® 

1826 

1,600,000 

1840 

7,200,000 

1827 

2,000,000 

1841 

7,600,000 

1828 

2,400,000 

1842 

8,000,000 

1829 

2,800,000 

1843 

8,400,000 

830 

3,200,000 

1844 

8,800,000 

1831 

3,600,000 

1845 

9,200,000 

1832 

4,000,000 

1846 

9,600,000 

1833 

4,400,000 

1847 

10,000,000 

1834 

4,800,000 

1848 

10,400,000 

1835 

5,200,000 

1849 

10,800,000 

1836 

5,600,000 

1850 

11,200,000 

43 


.'338  Comparative  Resources  of 

This  increase  supposes  neither  new  taxes  or  im- 
proved circumstances  on  the  part  of  those  who  pay 
them :  if  the  latter  merely  escape  deterioration,  the 
increase  of  numbers,  the  acquisition  of  the  additional 
labourers  in  the  productive  field,  will,  by  the  aug- 
mented consumption  of  taxed  articles,  make  the 
computed  addition  to  the  revenue. 

Diminution  of  public  Expenditure. — If  it  be  accounted 
somewhat  confident  to  anticipate  so  regular  an  in- 
crease of  national  income  from  the  mere  augmenta- 
tion of  our  numbers,  we  shall  call  in  an  auxiliary  of 
another  kind — the  effect  of  diminishing  expenditure. 
Economy  is  evidently  the  wish  of  ministers,  and  the 
rising  value  of  money  bids  fair  to  enable  them  to 
carry  reduction  considerably  farther,  without  injury 
to  the  individuals  reduced.  What  is,  in  this  respect, 
the  effect  of  the  repeal  of  6,000,000/.  of  taxes  in  the 
last  two  years  ?  To  lower  prices ;  to  bring  money 
more  nearly  to  the  value  it  bore  in  1792 ;  to  render 
95/.  in  the  present  year  equivalent  to  100/.  two  years 
ago.  Much,  it  must  be  allowed,  remains  to  be  done 
ere  the  long  list  of  charges,  rent,  wages,  professional 
attendance,  &c,  which  constitute  domestic  expendi- 
ture, can  be  brought  to  their  due  level ;  but  the  course 
of  circumstances  cannot  be  resisted ;  a  continuance 
of  peace  must  be  followed  by  a  reduction  of  these 
charges  in  correspondence  with  that  which  has  al- 
ready taken  place  in  regard  to  provisions ;  and  when 
that  is  accomplished,  a  diminution  of  payment  to  the 
servants  of  the  public  maybe  effected  without  injury 
to  the  individuals  reduced. 

Comparison  of  our  National  Income  at  present,  with  its 
Amount  a  Century  ago. — How  far  do  these  encouraging 
anticipations  receive  support  from  the  evidence  of 
the  past,  from  a  parallel  between  the  England  of  the 
present  age,  and  the  England  of  the  early  part  of  last 
century,  of  the  reign  of  George  I.  ?  Since  that  era, 
the  produce  of  our  revenue  has  increased  in  the  pro- 
portion of  more  than  five  to  one ;  but  we  disclaim 
in  toto  this  mode  of  computing  our  national  wealth. 


England  and  France.  33H 

and  shall  build  our  inferences  on  a  surer  foundation. 
Our  population  in  the  reign  of  George  I.  appears  (see 
Preliminary  Observations  to  the  Population  Return 
of  1821)  to  have  been,  including  Ireland,  about 
9,000,000 ;  at  present  it  is  22,000,000,  or  more  than 
double.  But  that  is  not  all:  when  treating  (Appen- 
dix, p.  [75])  of  the  increase  of  national  revenue,  we 
enumerated  among  the  indications  of  an  improving 
society — 

An  increase  in  the  proportion  of  persons  deriving 
their  income  from  property  distinct  from  labour. 

An  increase  in  the  comparative  amount  of  town 
population. 

A  decrease  in  that  of  agriculturists,  in  consequence 
of  the  improvements  in  husbandry,  supplying  the  re- 
quisite produce  with  less  manual  labour,  and  enabling 
the  country  to  send  a  portion  of  its  youth  to  follow 
manufacturing  and  mechanical  pursuits  in  towns. 

Without  professing  to  define  the  amount  of  our  na- 
tional income  a  century  ago,  no  one  will  doubt  thai 
the  proportion  of  "  persons  living  on  income  derived 
from  property,"  has,  in  that  period,  greatly  increased. 
Still  less  will  they  question  the  effect  of  improvement 
in  agriculture,  and  the  probability  that  in  the  reign  ot 
George  I.  above  40  persons  in  100  were  required  to 
raise  the  national  subsistence,  which  we  now  find  to 
be  produced  (see  Appendix,  p.  [72])  by  33  persons 
in  100.  In  estimating  the  whole  of  our  national  in- 
come, we  should  probably  not  exceed  the  mark  by 
assuming  it  to  be  at  present  three  times  its  amount  in 
the  time  of  George  I.,  but  as  it  is  quite  unnecessary 
to  press  our  calculation  to  its  extent,  we  shall  consi- 
der it  only  to  have  doubled.  The  next  question  is, 
what  prospect  is  before  us  for  the  ensuing  age  or 
century  ?  How  far .  useful  discovery  and  invention 
may  or  may  not  be  carried,  we  cannot  venture  to 
calculate,  but  in  other  points,  there  is,  fortunately, 
less  uncertainty.  Can  it  be  doubted  that  our  public 
men  are  more  enlightened  than  their  predecessors 
a  century  ago ;  that  our  productive  labourers,  whe- 
ther merchants,  manufacturers,  or  farmers,  are  better 


340  Comparative  Resources  of 

provided  with  capital ;  that  the  public  in  general  are 
more  experienced  ;  and  the  hope  of  long  periods  of 
peace  established  on  a  better  foundation? — This 
reasoning  will  be  put  in  a  clearer  light  by  a  parallel 
of  the  resources  of  our  country  and  those  of  her  he- 
reditary rival. 

Comparison  of  the  Resources  of  England  and  France. 
— The  reader,  on  referring  to  a  statistical  return  of 
very  remote  date,  (Appendix,  p.  [75])  will  find,  that 
five  centuries  ago,  the  town  population  of  England 
was  so  insignificant  that  the  number  of  places  con- 
taining above  3000  inhabitants,  did  not  exceed 
eighteen.  In  these  days,  France  took  a  decided 
lead  in  population,  as  in  political  power:  and  the 
subsequent  accessions  to  her  territory,  by  the  incor- 
poration of  extensive  provinces  (Brittany,  Dauphine. 
Burgundy,)  rendered  her  for  a  long  period  an  over- 
match for  England.  In  an  age  of  timid  navigation, 
our  ancestors  could  derive  little  advantage  from  their 
extent  of  coast,  or  from  the  richness  of  their  coal 
mines,  which  are  valuable  only  in  as  far  as  their 
bulky  products,  or  the  almost  equally  bulky  manu- 
factures promoted  by  them,  can  be  conveyed  by  wa- 
ter. A  better  prospect  was  opened  by  the  improve- 
ments that  followed  the  era  of  the  reformation,  and 
the  wise  government  of  Elizabeth — the  period  from 
which  we  date  the  effectual  cultivation  of  our  na- 
tional resources.  Still  our  continental  rival  con- 
tinued preponderant,  and  the  revenue  of  Louis  XIV. 
was  computed  at  nearly  three  times  that  of  Charles 
II.  The  alliance  against  France,  cemented  by  the 
perseverance  of  William,  and  rendered  victorious  by 
the  talents  of  Marlborough,  relieved  us  from  the 
dreaded  overthrow  of  the  political  equilibrium;  but 
even  after  our  splendid  successes,  it  continued  a 
common  opinion  among  foreigners  as  among  our- 
selves, that  the  resources  of  the  French  were  more 
solid,  and  that  they  would  soon  equal  or  surpass  us 
in  those  arts  which  form  the  constituents  of  national 
wealth.     But  so  different  has  been  the  result,  that  in 


England  and  France.  341 

no  period  of  our  history  have  we  out-run  so  decid- 
edly the  competition  of  other  countries.  In  the  reign 
of  George  L,  England,  Scotland,  and  Ireland  bore  to 
France,  in  point  of  population,  the  proportion  of 
only  45  to  100,  (See  Napier's  Supplement,  heads  of 
"  England  and  France")  ;  nor  was  that  of  taxable  in- 
come much  more  considerable :  at  present,  in  point 
of  numbers,  we  hold  the  proportion  of  70  to  100, 
and  in  taxable  income  of  100  to  100. 

Such  has  been  our  comparative  progress  during 
the  last  1 00  years ;  but  what,  it  may  be  asked,  is  our 
prospect  for  the  future  ?  This  may  be  in  part  an- 
swered by  observing  the  principal  discoveries  of  late 
date,  and  marking  the  connexion  that  happily  pre- 
vails between  them  and  the  physical  advantages 
which  belong  to  our  country.  Steam  navigation,  for 
instance,  is  evidently  of  greatest  avail  to  the  country 
which  possesses  coals,  iron,  and  extent  of  coast.  But 
even  in  branches  totally  different,  such  as  the  manu- 
facture of  silk,  a  branch  in  which  we  long  despaired 
of  success,  we  have  of  late  years  gained  ground  on 
our  continental  rivals  :  nor  need  we,  since  with  the 
aid  of  Ireland  we  are  assured  of  an  adequate  supply 
of  agricultural  produce,  apprehend  the  recurrence 
of  a  high  price  of  labour,  or  the  emigration  of  our 
master  manufacturers. 

We  proceed  to  bring  our  statement  to  the  test  of 
arithmetical  calculation,  taking  as  our  basis,  the  com- 
parative increase  of  numbers  in  France  and  this 
country.  To  those  who  do  not  clearly  understand  in 
what  manner  increase  of  numbers  conduces  so  di- 
rectly to  increase  of  national  resources,  we  would 
recommend  to  leave  out  of  the  question  the  infantine 
part  of  society,  and  to  confine  their  attention  to  those 
approaching  to  the  age  of  twenty,  the  age  of  pro- 
ductive labour.  Our  population  returns  have,  ever 
since  1801,  exhibited  an  increase  of  17  per  cent,  a 
year ;  these  persons  are  now  attaining  maturity,  and 
entering  the  field  as  new  contributors  to  our  national 
income,  while  in  France  the  proportion  of  such  new 
contributors  is,  and  has  been  ever  since  1801.  not 


342  Comparative  Resources  of 

quite  one  per  cent,  annually.  Assuming  a  similar 
proportion  for  the  future,  the  inference  is,  that  in 
France  the  augmentation  of  national  income,  reck- 
oned at  10  per  cent,  in  ten  years,  will  be  hardly 

£21,000,000 
But  in  this  country,  the  increase,  compu- 
ted by  the  same  rule,  viz.  the  ratio  of  the 
addition  to  population  (15  per  cent,  in  ten 
years)  will  produce  nearly  -  -  30,000,000 
The  increase  of  numbers  in  this  country  takes  place 
chiefly  among  mechanics,  manufacturers,  merchants, 
and  others,  whose  exertion  is  directly  conducive  to 
increase  of  wealth;  but  in  France,  the  increase  of 
numbers  is  as  slow  in  towns  as  in  rural  districts  ;  in  con- 
sequence of  which,  the  augmentation  of  property 
seems  merely  to  keep  pace  with  that  of  population. 
Hence,  the  tardy  increase  of  the  public  revenue,  and 
the  stationary  condition  of  the  inhabitants,  many  of 
whom  follow  no  other  occupation,  and  hold  no  higher 
rank  in  society  than  their  forefathers  two  centuries 

Were  we  inclined  to  continue  the  parallel,  we 
should  find  that  even  as  to  population,  we  shall  pro- 
bably overtake  our  ancient  rival,  ere  another  genera- 
tion pass  away.  Meantime,  those  who  know  that  the 
issue  of  a  military  struggle  depends  not  so  much  on 
population  as  on  disposable  revenue,  will  be  satisfied 
that  at  present  we  should  have  no  cause  to  dread  a 
contest,  single-handed,  with  that  power  against  which 
our  forefathers  were  obliged  to  seek  safety  in  conti- 
nental alliances.  Or,  supposing  that  from  any  unfore- 
seen cause,  our  maritime  force  should  become  less 
predominant,  and  that  a  war  between  the  two  coun- 
tries were  to  be  decided  on  shore,  we  should  have  no 
great  reason  to  dread  the  result,  or  to  regard  inva- 
sion with  the  alarm  that  it  excited  during  the  last 
century.  j 

This  course  of  reasoning  applies  in  a  considerable 
degree  to  Russia,  Austria,  and  other  continental  pow- 
ers :  in  none  is  the  degree  of  increase  in  popula- 


England  and  France. 


343 


tion,  and  certainly  not  in  national  wealth,  on  a 
par  with  this  country.  We  have,  therefore,  little  to 
dread  from  attack;  and  as  we  shall  assuredly  not 
make  our  superiority  a  source  of  aggression,  the 
conclusion  is,  that  our  situation  presents  a  solid  hope 
of  continued  peace,  and  of  all  the  advantages  arising 
from  the  undisturbed  extension  of  our  productive  in- 
dustry.* 

SECTION  III. 

Views  of  Finance  suggested  by  our  Situation  and  Prospects. 

Difference  in  the  Nature  of  our  Resources  since  the 
Peace. — The  radical  difference  in  the  sources  of  our 
financial  supplies,  in  peace  and  in  war,  is,  as  yet, 
very  imperfectly  understood  by  the  public ;  it  may, 
however,  receive  some  illustration,  from  a  reference 
to  the  measures  adopted  during  our  great  contest. 
It  was  in  1797,  in  the  fourth  year  of  the  war,  that  cir- 
cumstances pointed  out  to  Mr.  Pitt,  the  necessity  of 
a  radical  change  in  his  financial  plans — the  substitu- 
tion of  war  taxes  for  loans.  The  length  to  which  the 
latter  had  been  carried,   exceeded   the  disposable 


*  Those  among1  our  readers  who  imagine  that  there  is  still  somewhat  of 
over-confidence  in  the  preceding  reasoning,  will  do  well  to  consult  the  fol- 
lowing sketch  of  "  the  public  revenue  of  the  two  countries,"  which  is,  we 
believe,  sufficiently  accurate,  and  puts  in  a  striking  light  the  progress  of  this 
country  during  the  two  last  centuries. 


1 

Public  Revenue. 

England,  after  de-  j 

Years. 

ducting  for  dif-      j 

France. 

England. 

ference  in  the  value 
of  money. 

1550 

£1,500,000 

£600,000 

£600,000 

1600 

2,500,000 

900,000 

900,000 

1660 

4,000,000 

1,200,000 

1,200,000 

1700 

8,000,000 

4,000,000 

4,000,000 

1750 

12,000,000 

7,000,000 

7,000,000 

1790 

22,000,000 

16,000,000 

13,000,000 

1823 

33,000,000 

52,000,000 

42,000,000 

344         Taxation,  a  Cause  of  Embarrassment. 

funds  of  the  monied  interest;   while,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  increase  of  productive  industry,  the  rise  of 
wages,  salaries,  rents,  all  concurred  to  strengthen 
the  hope  of  a  liberal  supply  from  taxation.     Mr.  Pi  t 
seized  the  distinction  with   his   usual  promptitude, 
and  erected  on  it  a  structure,  the  eventual  magnitude 
of  which,  proved  one   of  the  wonders  of  the  age. 
What  concurrence  of  circumstances  enabled  him  and 
his  successors  to  carry  taxation  so  far?  During  the 
war,  our  capital  and  labour  had  ample  employment : 
competition  from  abroad  on  the  part  of  foreigners, 
or  what  might  have  proved  far  more  formidable,  our 
emigrating  countrymen,  was  wholly  out  of  the  ques- 
tion.    The  transfer  of  English  capital  to  the  conti- 
nent was  prevented,  as  well  by  a  dread  of  lawless 
conduct  on  the  part  of  the  French  government,  as 
by  a  more  gratifying  consideration,  the  profits  realised 
at  home.     Since  the  peace,  circumstances  are  en- 
tirely altered ;  the  competition  of  foreigners   is   to 
be  dreaded;    capital  has   been  placed   in   foreign 
funds,  and  emigration,  had  not  the  price  of  provi- 
sions fallen  among  us,  might  have  been  carried  to  a 
ruinous  length.     The  profit  of  stock,  the  wages  of 
part   of  the  lower   classes,  the  emoluments  of  the 
higher,  most  incomes,  in  short,  except  those  of  the 
annuitant  on  the  public  funds,  have  undergone  dimi- 
nution, the  whole  pointing  as  much  to  the  necessity 
of  reducing  taxation  in  peace,  as  our  situation  during 
war  indicated  the  practicability  of  its  increase. 

How  far  is  Taxation  a  Cause  of  Embarrassment  ? — 
What,  it  may  be  asked,  have  been  the  most  promi- 
nent characteristics  of  our  national  embarrassment 
since  1814?  A  deficiency  of  employment,  among 
part  of  the  lower  orders,  and  distress,  from  insuffi- 
ciency of  wages,  at  those  intervals  when  provisions 
were  high  priced.  In  the  middle  classes,  whether 
merchants,  manufacturers,  or  agriculturists,  the  gene- 
ral ground  of  complaint  has  been  an  inadequacy  of 
profit ;  a  disproportion  of  prices  to  the  cost  of  pro- 
duction.    The  principal  cause  of  these  and  other  dif- 


Injury  arising  from  Taxation.  345 

ticulties  was,  doubtless,  as  explained  in  the  preceding 
chapters,  the  magnitude  of  the  transition,  the  suspen- 
sion of  government  expenditure,  and  the  consequent 
overstock  of  hands.  That  such  would  have  been 
severely  felt  under  a  taxation  as  light  as  that  of  Swit- 
zerland or  the  United  States  of  America,  admits  of 
no  doubt ;  but  it  never  would  have  reached  such  an 
extent,  or  continued  until  the  ninth  year  of  peace,  had 
not  our  public  burdens,  and  consequently  the  expense 
of  living,  been  higher  than  among  our  neighbours. 
Emigration  and  the  export  of  capital  would,  in  a  dif- 
ferent case,  have  been  comparatively  inconsiderable ; 
and  additional  means  of  promoting  productive  indus- 
try would  have  been  possessed  at  home. 

Having  no  wish  to  press  our  arguments  to  an  ex- 
treme, we  disclaim,  without  hesitation,  the  aid  of  cer- 
tain popular  notions,  such  as  that  "  a  taxed  commodi- 
ty after  passing  through  three  or  four  different  hands, 
is  enhanced  by  20  or  30  per  cent,  charged  by  the 
dealers  for  their  advance  on  the  tax."  We  know  too 
well  the  slender  profit  of  either  wholesale  or  retail 
business,  to  give  credit  to  such  loose  assertions ;  a 
dealer  is  in  general  satisfied  with  a  charge  of  2  or  3 
per  cent,  on  his  advance,  so  that  this  argument,  though 
not  undeserving  of  attention,  has  no  claim  to  a  pro- 
minent rank  in  the  objections  to  taxation.  These  will 
be  found  sufficiently  serious  without  the  aid  of  exag- 
geration :  it  can  hardly  be  disputed  that  our  high  du- 
ties tend  to  raise  our  prices  above  the  currency  of 
our  neighbours,  and  we  have  the  sanction  of  Dr.  Smith 
for  saying  that  "  a  rise  in  the  money  price  of  commo- 
dities, when  peculiar  to  a  country,  tends  to  discourage 
more  or  less  every  department  of  industry  carried  on 
within  it,  enabling  other  nations  to  undersell  it,  not 
only  in  the  foreign  but  in  the  home  market ;" — an  opi- 
nion to  which  we  subscribe  in  the  words  of  its  illus- 
trious author,  notwithstanding  all  the  qualifications  of 
it  which  we  have  read  in  the  publications  of  the  po- 
litical economists  of  the  day.  To  bring  this  question 
into  a  more  definite  form,  we  subjoin  a  table  of  the 

44 


346 


Injury  arising 


Taxes  which  bear,  more  or  less  directly,  on  the  comforts  of  life,  or  in- 
terfere, more  or  less  directly,  with  the  extension  of  productive  in- 
dustry. 


Assessed  Taxes 
since  the  late 
reduction 

Malt  and  Beer 
since  the  re- 
duction in  1822 

Stamps 

Sugar 

Tea    -         - 

Foreign  Timber 

Coals      carried 
coastways 

Soap 


£4,500,000 


6,500,000 

6,500,000 
3,000,000 
3,000,000 
1,000,000 

900,000 

900,000 


Leather  since  the  } 

reduction       in  \ 

£300,000 

1822                   ) 

Foreign  Wool 

300,000 

Cotton 

500,000 

Paper 

400,000 

Glass 

400,000 

Candles  and  Tallow 
Bricks  and  Tiles  - 

400,000 

300,000 

Auction  Duties 

240,000 

Hemp 

200,000 

Starch 

50,000 

The  whole  forming  a  sum  of  nearly  30,000,000/.* 

To  draw  the  line  of  distinction  between  the  neces- 
saries and  superfluities  of  life,  between  the  greater  or 
less  injury  arising  from  taxation  to  productive  labour, 
is  a  task  of  great  nicety.  There  can,  it  is  true,  be  lit- 
tle doubt  that  such  imposts  as  those  on  leather,  can- 
dles, green  glass,  bricks,  tiles,  soap,  starch,  coal,  are 
direct  burdens  on  industry ;  charges  which  must  have 
many  bad  effects,  such  as  impairing  personal  comfort, 
raising  the  nominal  rate  of  wages,  or  lessening  our  ex- 
ports. On  the  other  hand,  it  may  happen  that  im- 
posts, the  least  exceptionable  in  the  view  of  individu- 


#  To  give  the  reader  a  compl 
subjoin  the  following,  which  are 

Taxes  which  appear  to  interfere 
Post-office  -  £1,400,000 
Foreign    spirits,     ) 

chiefly  brandy     $ 
British  spirits 
Licenses  for  publi-  ) 

cans,&c.  $ 

Wine     - 
Tobacco  and  snuff  > 

(Excise)  $ 

Tobacco  (Customs) 
Coffee  and  cocoa 
Rum 

Silk,  raw  and  thrown 
East    India   piece ) 

goods  $ 


2,300,000 

3,000,000 

700,000 

1,600,000 

2,400,000 

600,000 
300,000 
200,000 
500,000 


ete  view  of  our  fiscal  burdens,  we 

left  out  of  the  text,  as 

less  with  our  productive  industry. 

Printed      goods    1 
(home     manu- 
facture) 

Foreign  linens 

Foreign    butter 
and  cheese 

Tallow 

Raisins  and  other 
fruits 

Barilla  and  other 
drugs 

Pepper 

Skins  and  furs 

Mahogany 


£570,000 

80,000 
100,000 
100,000 
400,000 

150,000 

150,000 
50,000 
50,000 


Various  other  duties  1,000,000 


from  Taxation.  347 

als,  may,  on  the  ground  of  fiscal  calculation,  have  the 
earliest  claim  to  diminution.  Thus,  wine,  spiritous 
liquors,  and  lace,  appear  fair  objects  of  high  taxation, 
but  if  the  duty  be  so  great  as  to  hold  forth  to  smug- 
glers a  premium  such  as  enables  them  to  prosecute 
their  business  in  spite  of  all  the  vigilance  of  our  cruis- 
ers, an  abatement  of  duty  may  be  found  an  indispen- 
sable alternative.  In  the  case  of  sugar,  the  question 
of  abatement  stands  on  different  grounds.  In  an  ar- 
ticle so  acceptable  to  general  taste,  and  so  innocent 
in  its  effects,  we  are  justified  in  expecting  a  regular 
extension  of  sale,  in  proportion  to  the  diminution  of  price. 
This  has  been  in  a  considerable  degree  exemplified 
at  different  intervals  of  depression  in  the  market,  and 
seems  to  authorize  the  inference,  (and  a  very  impor- 
tant one  it  is,)  that  a  reduction  of  the  duty  would  have 
the  effect  of  extending  the  consumption,  and  of  grati- 
fying the  lower  orders  without  much  injury  to  the  re- 
venue. 

On  these  different  claims  to  priority  in  the  reduc- 
tion of  taxes  we  acknowledge  our  inability  to  decide. 
The  records  of  the  Treasury,  doubtless,  contain  ma- 
terials calculated  to  throw  light  on  these  intricate  in- 
quiries, although  even  with  such  an  aid  the  result  of 
reduction  will,  at  times,  be  found  to  differ  considera- 
bly from  previous  expectation.  We  decline  accord- 
ingly to  enter  on  this  uncertain  field,  and  confine  our- 
selves to  the  general  question  of  the  pressure  of  taxa- 
tion. 

Examples  of  Injury  from  Taxation. — The  unseen  in- 
jury  arising  from  taxation,  its  interference  with  the  free 
course  of  manufacture,  is  much  greater  than  is  sus- 
pected by  the  public.  To  form  a  correct  idea  of  this, 
would  require  an  investigation  into  all  the  branches 
in  which  the  activity  and  invention  of  individuals  are 
repressed  by  the  regulations  of  the  excise.  Of  theiF 
effect  in  the  case  of  distillers,  some  idea  may  be  form- 
ed from  the  evidence  given  before  the  Sugar  Distille- 
ry Committee  in  1808.  To  advert  to  a  very  different 
case,  we  shall  take  an  illustration  familiar  to  those 


348  Injury  arising 

who  transact  business  as  underwriters,  and  who  know 
the  extent  of  the  reduction  produced  by  peace  in  the 
terms  of  insurance.  To  a  war  premium  of  6,  8,  or 
10  per  cent.,  a  policy  duty  of  one-fourth  per  cent,  on 
the  sum  insured  formed  an  addition  of  little  conse- 
quence, but  when  premiums  were  lowered  to  2  or  3 
per  cent,  it  was  found  a  heavy  proportional  charge, 
and  afforded  an  inducement  to  foreign  merchants  to 
effect  their  insurances  at  Hamburgh  and  other  ports, 
where  the  duty  is  comparatively  light.  The  conse- 
quence is,  that  the  recent  reduction  of  our  policy  du- 
ty has,  in  some  degree,  come  too  late. 

Ship-owning,  often  a  losing  investment  of  capital 
during  the  war,  has  been  doubly  so  since  the  peace, 
and  can  hardly  prove  otherwise,  until  by  reducing  the 
attendant  charges,  we  shall  enable  our  builders,  our 
rope-makers,  and  others,  to  meet  foreign  competitors 
on  equal  terms.  Navigation  does  not,  like  home 
trade,  admit  of  control  by  interior  regulation :  its 
scene  of  competition  is  the  ocean,  and  success  in  it 
can  be  attained  only  by  a  clear  superiority  over  fo- 
reigners. Countries  possessing  forests  of  timber  in 
the  vicinity  of  a  navigable  river,  enjoy  already  one 
great  advantage  over  our  ship-builders :  to  increase 
that  by  an  impost  on  the  foreign  timber  used  by  our 
countrymen,  is  to  place  them  on  a  footing  of  inferiority 
inadequately  balanced  by  our  extra  duties  on  goods 
imported  in  foreign  vessels.  A  reduction  of  the  duty 
on  foreign  timber  and  hemp,  seems  an  indispensable 
preliminary  to  our  successful  competition  with  foreign 
ship-builders — a  competition  which  would  not  then 
be  hopeless,  when  we  consider  the  superiority  of  our 
workmen,  and  the  recent  fall  in  the  cost  both  of  their 
maintenance,  and  of  the  conveyance  of  foreign  mate- 
rials to  our  shores. 

It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  examples  of  pressure 
from  taxation,  but  there  can,  we  believe,  be  little 
doubt  on  several  essential  points,  as 

That  it  forms  a  main  obstacle  to  the  general  free- 
dom of  trade,  which  government  seem  so  desirous  to 
introduce ; 


from  Taxation.  349 

That  on  a  considerable  part  of  the  public  it  bears 
harder  now  than  during  the  war ;  and 

That  in  general  its  pressure  is  greater  in  England 
than  on  the  Continent. 

After  all  the  additional  means  conferred  by  our 
navigation,  our  extent  of  town-population,  and  our 
superior  agriculture,  the  payment  of  64,000,000/.  a 
year,  must  bear  harder  on  the  national  income  of 
this  country  than  that  of  45,000,000/.  (see  p.  330  of 
this  chapter)  on  that  of  France.  On  the  Continent, 
the  evils  of  transition  from  war  to  peace  have  not 
been  altogether  so  serious ;  the  failures  among  mer- 
chants and  manufacturers  have  been  less  numerous ; 
while  among  their  agriculturists  the  decline  of  price, 
much  as  it  is  complained  of,  has  been  less  ruinous 
than  in  this  country. 

How  far  would  a  Reduction  of  Taxation  be  productive 
of  Relief? — We  shall  suppose,  for  the  sake  of  giving 
our  argument  a  definite  form,  that  it  is  proposed  to 
discuss  the  expediency  of  making  a  farther  reduction 
of  our  taxes  to  the  extent  in  all  of  6,000,000/.  Were 
that  abatement  directed  in  toto  to  some  specific 
branches  of  industry,  for  example,  those  connected 
with  the  use  of  such  articles  as  leather,  coals,  timber, 
there  seems  little  doubt  that,  though  like  all  other 
changes,  it  would  for  some  time  be  productive  of  a 
derangement  of  work,  the  stock  of  employment  even- 
tually created  would  supply  that  which  in  years  of 
distress  was  our  principal  desideratum — a  sufficient 
demand  for  labour.  We  shall  take,  however,  the 
least  favourable  supposition,  assuming  that  our  pub- 
lic men  are  not  agreed  in  regard  to  the  farther  taxes 
to  be  repealed,  and  that  the  6,000,000/.  of  which  we 
contemplate  the  reduction,  must  be  abated  in  the 
form  of  a  per  centage  on  the  revenue  at  large.  What, 
it  may  be  asked  in  the  next  place,  would  be  the  result 
of  such  abatement  to  the  individual?  A  diminution 
of  charge  to  the  extent  of  two  or  three  per  cent,  on 
his  expenditure — an  object  of  no  great  consequence, 
it  is  true,  to  the  land-holder,  the  retired  capitalist,  or 


350  Reduction  of 

any  person  out  of  business;  but  one  which  in  the 
hands  of  the  merchant,  the  manufacturer,  or  the 
farmer,  would  form  an  engine  of  great  efficiency.  In 
the  case  of  an  individual  out  of  business,  the  amount 
of  annual  disburse  represents  only  the  expenditure 
of  himself  and  family  ;  in  business,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  comprises  wages,  salaries,  and  other  outlay  to  an 
amount  frequently  of  three,  four,  or  five  times  the 
house-keeping  expense.  That  which  in  the  one  case 
wrould  prove  a  saving  of  only  20/.  a  year  might,  and 
generally  would,  amount  in  the  other  to  100/.  Now 
persons  in  business  form  evidently  the  stay  of  a  com- 
mercial country,  the  class  whose  prosperity  is  deci- 
sive of  .that  of  the  community  at  large. 

This  will  be  apparent  on  our  pursuing  our  reason- 
ing  a  step  farther,  and  examining  the  effect  of  a  re- 
duction on  our  means  of  maintaining  a  competition 
with  foreigners.  The  consequence  would  be  that 
our  woollens,  our  cottons,  our  hardware,  might  be 
sent  to  foreign  markets  two  or  three  per  cent, 
cheaper  than  at  present.  To  those  who  have  a  due 
sense  of  the  smallness  of  mercantile  profit,  (Speech 
of  Mr.  Baring,  15th  July  1822,)  even  this  limited  re- 
duction  will  appear  of  great  importance,  enabling  us 
to  compete  with  our  foreign  rivals,  the  manufacturers 
of  France,  Germany,  and  the  Netherlands.  To  these, 
since  the  inauspicious  era  of  our  Orders  in  Council, 
we  must  add  the  inhabitants  of  the  Northern  States 
of  the  American  Union,  the  return  of  the  State  of 
New-York  for  1821,  exhibiting  a  value  of  8  or 
10,000,000/.  sterling,  (chiefly  woollens  and  cottons,) 
manufactured  among  a  population  of  little  more  than 
a  million. 

But  our  national  industry  is,  it  may  be  said,  already 
amply  productive,  whether  in  agriculture  or  manu- 
facture ; — the  evil  lies  in  a  want,  not  of  produce,  but 
of  vent,  and  our  neighbours,  whether  Germans  or 
Belgians,  have  long  complained  of  the  free  admission 
of  our  fabrics.  This,  however,  proves  little  more 
than  that  in  certain  branches  foreigners  are  unable 
1o  compete  with  us,  and  that  our  rivalship,  if  conti- 


Taxation.  351 

nued,  may  induce  them  to  give  a  different  direction 
to  a  part  of  their  labour  and  capital,  manufacturing 
commodities  of  which  we  should  probably  become 
the  purchasers,  in  consequence  of  changes  that  would 
follow  the  increased  freedom  of  trade.  A  state  of 
continued  peace  implies  a  reduced  scale  of  profits, 
a  limited  return  for  capital,  but  not  necessarily  an 
overstock  of  merchandise  or  deficiency  of  employ- 
ment. In  harvest  we  generally  have  an  opportunity 
of  observing,  that  the  supply  of  labourers  is  not  super- 
abundant, and  since  the  beginning  of  last  year,  there 
has  existed  no  overstock  but  in  agriculture.  Even 
in  a  dull  season  the  surcharge  of  hands  is  less  great 
than  is  commonly  supposed.  To  add  a  twentieth  or 
even  a  thirtieth  to  the  existing  demand  for  labour,  in 
other  words  to  find  employment  for  100,000  indivi- 
duals of  the  lower  order,  would,  on  most  occasions, 
prove  a  change  completely  satisfactory. 

If  we  proceed  to  make  an  analysis  of  the  causes 
which  determine  the  quantity  of  produce  prepared 
among  us,  either  by  the  loom  or  the  plough,  we  shall 
find  it  to  depend  mainly  on  the  "  amount  of  capital 
and  number  of  workmen  in  the  country,"  points  in 
which,  of  course,  no  legislative  provision  can  effect 
any  speedy  change.  It  is  a  fact,  that  for  a  series  of 
years  the  quantity  prepared  for  a  losing  market  is 
nearly  as  large  as  for  a  profitable  one;  so  great  is 
the  power  of  habit,  the  necessity  of  following  up  an 
established  trade  or  profession.  This  result,  so  dif- 
ferent from  the  inferences  of  some  political  econo- 
mists, is,  doubtless,  promoted  by  our  poor-law  sys- 
tem; it  was  exemplified  on  the  part  of  our  manu- 
facturers amid  the  continued  distresses  of  1819  and 
1820;  and  experiences  at  present  a  confirmation  in 
the  case  of  our  farmers. 

From  all  these  facts  what  inference  do  we  make, 
and  what  are  we  to  consider  the  probable  result  of  a 
reduction  of  taxation  ?  Not  overstock  in  any  branch  of 
manufacture,  but  security  from  foreign  competition  ? 

Objections  answered. — Various  arguments  may,  we 
are  aware,  be  advanced  as  well  by  men  in  office  as 


352  Taxation : 

others,  against  any  considerable  change  in  our  fiscal 
arrangements.  Taxes  repealed  or  modified,  cannot, 
they  will  say,  be  re-imposed.  Charges  that  have  in- 
terwoven themselves  with  our  habits  ought  not  to  be 
abruptly  removed.  To  this  we  answer,  that  several 
of  our  taxes  are  such  as  ought  never  to  have  been 
imposed,  indicating,  as  they  do,  the  rudest  state  of 
financial  science,  and  betraying  an  almost  total  un- 
consciousness of  the  check  given  by  these  burdens 
to  productive  industry.  As  to  the  question  of  re-im- 
position, we  have,  happily,  good  ground  for  dismiss- 
ing the  apprehension  of  retracing  our  steps;  but, 
supposing,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  such  were 
to  become  in  some  degree  necessary,  the  new  taxes 
would  be  of  an  altogether  different  nature.  A  pro- 
perty-tax to  the  extent  of  2±,  perhaps  5  per  cent., 
would,  doubtless,  receive  the  sanction  of  Parliament, 
in  preference  to  a  revival  of  such  duties  as  those  on 
malt,  salt,  leather,  coals,  or  the  house  and  window- 
tax. 

Next,  as  to  the  evils  apprehended  from  transition. 
— from  that  state  of  change,  which,  to  a  nation  as  to 
an  individual,  is  always  unprofitable  and  frequently 
pernicious.  Evils  of  that  nature,  would,  even  on  a 
diminution  of  our  burdens,  occur  in  a  variety  of 
modes  not  anticipated  by  the  public,  but  their  dura- 
tion would  necessarily  be  temporary,  and  their  amount 
might  be  lessened  by  various  arrangements,  such, 
perhaps,  as  making  our  future  reductions  consist  less 
in  an  absolute  repeal  of  a  few  particular  taxes  than 
in  a  modification,  a  partial  diminution  of  a  number; 
— a  course  which  might,  besides,  have  the  effect  of 
relieving  government  from  much  importunate  solici- 
tation. 

Such  are  the  arguments  for  a  reduction  of  taxation. 
Inconsiderable  as  the  proposed  abatement  may  ap- 
pear, no  one  can  say  how  materially  our  productive 
industry  may  be  promoted  by  it :  but  were  immedi- 
ate relief  not  to  prove  the  consequence,  we  should 
have  at  least  the  satisfaction  of  entering  on  that  path. 


Plan  of M.  Necker.  353 

which  must  eventually  lead  to  a  favourable  issue. 
The  modification  made  last  session  in  our  navigation 
and  corn  laws  have  a  title  to  general  approbation, 
yet  no  one  expects  from  them  immediate  relief,  or  re- 
gards them  in  other  light  than  as  an  approximation  to 
a  better  system.  In  like  manner  a  diminution  of  taxes 
would  bring  us  more  nearly  to  a  level  with  the  rest  of 
the  civilized  world,  giving  our  manufacturers  a  fair 
chance  in  the  field  of  competition,  relieving  our  an- 
nuitants from  the  necessity  of  emigrating,  and  placing 
us  nearer  to  that  equality  of  prices  which  would 
admit  of  unrestricted  trade,  and  establish  our  pros- 
perity on  a  solid  basis. 

Plan  of  Finance  pursued  by  M.  Necker. — The  financial 
concerns  of  France  have  been,  in  general,  badly  con- 
ducted, and  taxation  has,  time  immemorial,  been  a 
subject  of  complaint  among  a  people  whose  national 
character  is  far  from  querulous.  This  was  more  par- 
ticularly the  case  in  the  latter  years  of  Louis  XV., 
after  winding  up  the  arrears  of  the  expensive  and  in- 
glorious war  concluded  in  1763.  The  18,000,000/. 
constituting,  at  'that  time,  the  clear  produce  of  the 
taxes  of  France,  were  levied  in  so  awkward  and  cir- 
cuitous a  mode  as  to  cost  4  or  5,000,000/.  in  the  col- 
lection, and  a  sum  perhaps  equally  large  in  the  in- 
jury arising  from  the  obstructions  which  it  caused  to 
the  free  course  of  industry.  Different  provinces  in 
France  were  subject,  in  those  days,  to  different  im- 
posts; the  frontier  lines  were  discriminated  from 
each  other  by  custom-houses  like  the  boundaries  of 
distinct  kingdoms ;  the  transit  of  merchandise  was 
taxed ;  the  douaniers  or  custom-house  officers  multi- 
plied beyond  all  due  proportion.  At  that  time,  as  at 
present,  the  inlposts  on  consumption  were  compara- 
tively small,  and  a  great  part  of  the  revenue  arose 
from  a  land  tax  similar  in  its  nature,  but  more  une- 
qual in  its  collection,  than  the  present  fonder. 

M.  Necker,  the  first  real  financier  whom  France 
had  seen  for  a  century,  received  his  official  appoint- 
ment in   1776,  and  had  hardly  begun  to  introduce 

45 


354  Taxation  : 

order  into  this  chaotic  mass,  when,   in  1778,  the 
course  of  circumstances  caused  the  French  court  to 
depart  from  its  pacific  policy.     The  humane  charac- 
ter of  Louis  XVI.,  and  the  necessity  of  continued 
economy,  were  strong  arguments  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  peace,  but  the  cause  of  the  American  colo- 
nists, when  opposed  to  England,  could  not  be  other- 
wise than  popular  while  the  French  had  fresh  in  re- 
collection, a  war  in  which  we  had  struck  such  fatal 
blows  at  their  navy,  and  deprived  them  of  so  many 
Irans-atlantic  possessions.     Louis  and  his  ministers 
were  thus  obliged  to  yield  to  the  public  voice ;  fleets 
were  to  be  equipped,  and  considerable  expense  to 
be  incurred.     M.  Necker,  on  whom  the  task  of  pro- 
viding the  pecuniary  supplies  devolved,  was  aware 
of  two  things ;  first,  that  at  that  time  the  imposition 
of  fresh  taxes  would  be   wholly  unadvisable;   and 
next,  that  eventually  the  resources  of  France  would 
be  more  than  equal  to  her  burdens.     He  conceived 
accordingly  the  plan  of  meeting  the  new  demands  by 
annual  loans,  for  the  interest  of  which,  he  made  pro- 
vision, not  by  taxes,  but  by  the  abolition  or  reduction 
of  pensions,  and  of  many  unnecessary  appendages  of 
the  court.     At  that  time,  as  at  present,  France  exhi- 
bited few  sinecures  of  the  first  magnitude,  but  an 
endless  list  of  unmerited  grants,  of  supernumerary 
offices,  of  unauthorized  appropriations  of  the  public 
money.     The  confidence  inspired  by  the  personal 
respectability  of  the  minister,  and  the  prospect  of 
great  improvements   in  the  fiscal  administration  of 
France,  induced  the  monied  interest  on  the  Conti- 
nent to  subscribe  to  the  loans  of  M.  Necker,  without 
the  guarantee  of  a  parliament,  or  the  allotment  of 
specific  funds  for  the  payment  of  the  interest.     In 
this  manner,  he  succeeded  (Hennet  on  French  Fi- 
nance) in  borrowing  15,000,000/.  sterling,  in   three 
years,  at  moderate  interest,  and  would,  doubtless, 
have  conducted  the  war  to  its  close,  without  a  single 
impost,  had  not  circumstances  led  to  his  abrupt  re- 
tirement from  office  in  1781. 

Does  this  example  supply  any  inference  applicable 


Plan  of  M.  Necker.  3.30 

to  our  present  situation  ?  If  the  amount  borrowed 
by  M.  Necker,  appear  small,  it  was  far  from  small 
when  we  consider  the  limited  resources  of  France. 
Then,  as  at  present,  her  towns  were  neither  numerous 
nor  large  :  the  majority  of  her  inhabitants  were  scat- 
tered over  rural  districts ;  her  manufacturers  were 
adequate  only  to  home  consumption ;  the  increase  of 
her  population  was  slow.  How  different  the  present 
state  and  prospect  of  productive  industry  in  this 
country,  possessed  as  it  is,  of  rich  mines,  extensive 
water  communication,  abundant  capital, — the  whole 
with  a  population  rapid  in  its  increase,  and  formed  to 
habits  of  business.  With  such  auxiliaries,  is  it  going 
too  far,  to  ask,  whether  we  are  not  justified  in  looking 
to  the  future  with  the  favourable  expectation  enter- 
tained by  M.  Necker,  especially  as  in  one  material 
point  we  may  reason  with  a  confidence  greater  than 
he  could  feel, — we  mean  the  hope  of  continued 
peace  ? 

Nothing  indeed  can  be  more  flattering  than  our 
prospects,  provided  we  are  enabled  to  give  relief  to 
the  suffering  part  of  the  public.  This,  it  is  evident, 
could  be  best  accomplished  by  cancelling  or  reducing 
the  more  injurious  of  our  fiscal  burdens ;  and  we  now 
proceed  to  inquire  whether  circumstances  justify  our 
imitating  the  example  of  the  French  minister,  and 
substituting  a  small  annual  loan  for  a  portion  of  the 
taxes  repealed.  We  say  a  portion,  because  there 
seems  little  doubt,  that  the  productiveness  of  the  re- 
maining imposts  would  be  so  much  increased,  as  to 
enable  government,  if  they  determined  on  borrowing 
4,000,000/.  annually,  to  repeal  taxes  to  the  extent  of 
5  or  6,000,000/. 

The  Question  of  a  small  Annual  Loan  in  lieu  of  Taxes. 

State  of  the  Monied  Interest. — Amidst  all  the  losses 
and  complaints  of  late  years,  the  monied  interest, 
that  mixed  body  of  bankers,  retired  merchants  and 
capitalists,  have,  in  a  great  measure,  escaped  the 
general  cl  i  stress.     Their  situation  has  exempted  them 


3#6  The  Question  of 

from  the  fluctuations  experienced  by  many  other 
classes ;  by  our  agriculturists,  our  manufacturers,  our 
exporters  of  merchandise  to  the  West  Indies  and 
America.  The  monied  interest  comprises  a  number 
of  old  establishments,  who  conduct  their  business 
more  conformably  to  rule  and  calculation  than  seve- 
ral other  portions  of  the  mercantile  community :  they 
are  strangers  to  the  hazard  of  credit,  and  the  still 
greater  hazard  of  distant  markets.  The  cloud,  which, 
from  the  depreciation  of  our  currency,  overhung  them 
in  the  latter  years  of  the  war,  has  disappeared,  and 
the  late  reduction  of  the  rate  of  interest,  considerable 
as  it  is,  may  be  considered  as  innoxious  to  them,  their 
incomes  having  gained,  or  being  likely  to  gain,  in 
value  what  they  have  lost  in  amount.  The  fact  is, 
that  they  have  periodically  at  their  disposal,  particu- 
larly after  receipt  of  the  public  dividends,  a  fund  of 
ready  money,  which  has  caused  the  rise  in  our  stocks, 
so  idly  ascribed  to  a  sinking  fund,  and  which  has  also 
afforded  large  supplies  to  the  exchequers  of  our 
neighbours. 

Transmission  of  Capital  to  Foreign  Countries. — The 
interest  of  money  is  always  highest  in  the  least  ad- 
vanced communities,  and  capital  has  consequently 
a  tendency  to  move  thither,  not  rapidly,  we  allow, 
but  progressively.  It  is  thus  that  at  present  it  begins 
to  be  withdrawn  from  England,  exactly  as  in  the  17th 
and  18th  centuries  it  was  withdrawn  from  Holland. 
Last  year  was  remarkable  for  the  extent  of  such 
transfers,  and  by  writers  who  do  not  scruple  to  take 
an  extra  latitude  in  a  popular  argument,  the  impru- 
dence with  which  these  advances  were  made,  and 
the  losses  of  which  they  were  productive,  might  be 
made  the  ground  of  a  vehement  appeal  in  support  of 
our  plan  of  exchanging  a  part  of  our  taxation  for  an 
annual  loan.  We  are  desirous,  however,  to  avoid  all 
such  appeals,  and  to  state  deliberately  and  impar- 
tially, the  arguments  on  either  side.  If,  on  the  one 
hand,  it  be  asked  "  Why  should  we  not  render  subser- 
vient to  a  reduction  of  taxes  that  periodical  surplus  of 


a  smalt  Annual  Loan.  .if;  7 

capital  which  has  for  some  years  been  transferred  to 
foreigners?"  the  advocate  of  commercial  freedom 
may  say  on  the  other,  "  You  are  not  at  liberty  to  ex- 
ercise any  interference,  or  to  divert  capital  from  the 
direction  which  it  naturally  takes :  its  tranfer  to 
foreign  countries  may  be,  for  aught  you  know,  the 
most  profitable  means  of  employing  it  in  a  national 
as  in  an  individual  sense.  The  capitalist,  who, 
living  in  England,  draws  a  large  income  from  the 
French  or  American  funds,  is  enabled  to  make  a 
larger  expenditure,  to  be  a  more  liberal  contributor 
to  the  productive  industry  of  his  own  country." 

Between  these  contending  opinions  what  course 
ought  we  to  hold?  The  last  mentioned  argument 
would  be  excellent  against  any  legal  restraint  which 
might  exist,  in  the  shape  of  a  tax  or  otherwise,  on  the 
transmission  of  capital  abroad;  a  restraint  which 
would  be  quite  as  absurd  as  the  lately  repealed  pro- 
hibition to  export  specie.  Farther,  were  our  bur- 
dens no  greater  than  those  of  our  neighbours,  or  were 
the  doctrine  of  freedom  of  trade  generally  adopted, 
we  should  be  inclined  to  look  with  a  favourable  eye 
on  the  most  unreserved  transmission  of  capital.  But 
at  present  we  are  obliged  to  reason  in  a  more  narrow 
circle,  and  to  calculate  what  peculiar  aid  we  can 
oppose  to  peculiar  pressure.  Our  situation  is  unfor- 
tunately anomalous ;  our  taxation  higher  than  that  of 
any  other  country ;  and  if,  as  we  have  reason  to  ap- 
prehend, its  magnitude  be  such  as  to  reduce  the 
profit  of  stock,  and  in  that  manner  to  cause,  or  to  be 
likely  to  cause,  capital  to  leave  us,  the  objection  of 
the  political  economist,  however  true  in  the  abstract* 
ceases  to  apply,  or  becomes  in  a  manner,  lost  in  the 
urgency  of  circumstances. 

Though  we  are  thus  hardly  called  on  to  combat 
objections,  it  may  be  useful,  in  this  day  of  theorising, 
to  remark  that  the  application  of  general  principles 
in  regard  to  money  transactions  is  found  to  require 
no  slight  share  of  the  caution  that  has  proved  neces- 
sary in  other  departments — our  corn  trade,  our  navi- 
gation, our  custom  duties.     To  explain  our  meaning 


358  The  Question  of 

by  example.  In  1815,  Mr.  Robinson,  at  that  time 
President  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  was  as  fully  con- 
vinced as  Mr.  Horner,  or  any  member  of  the  House, 
of  the  radical  impolicy  of  our  corn  laws ;  but  while 
he  regretted  that  they  should  ever  have  been  enacted, 
or  that  agriculturists  should  ever  have  relied  on  so 
unnatural  a  support,  he  felt  that  any  change  must  be 
gradual,  that  the  advantage  from  a  return  to  sound 
principle  would  be  remote,  and  the  evils  of  transition 
immediate.  The  Agricultural  Committee  of  1821 
acknowledged,  in  like  manner,  the  benefit  of  free 
trade,  but  felt  the  inexpediency  of  its  early  adoption : 
while  in  regard  to  our  navigation,  the  bills  brought 
forward  during  the  session  of  1822,  for  repealing  the 
obnoxious  part  of  our  statutes,  experienced,  as  is 
well  known,  much  opposition  and  curtailment  from 
the  same  cause. 

We  must  not,  however,  be  understood  as  proposing 
any  obstacles  to  the  transmission  of  capital  abroad, 
except  that  of  giving  an  additional  opening  for  its  in- 
vestment at  home. 

We  are  perfectly  aware,  that  the  principles  of  pro- 
ductive industry  prescribe,  in  the  words  of  Vauban, 
que  V argent  le  mieux  employe  est  celui  que  le  rot  laisse  entre 
les  mains  de  ses  sujets — that  government  should,  if  pos- 
sible, avoid  draining  it  from  the  pocket  of  the  indivi- 
dual in  the  shape  of  either  a  loan  or  tax.  Were  it 
practicable  to  avoid  both,  we  should  be  reluctant  to 
urge,  or  even  to  listen  to  the  project  of  an  annual 
loan,  however  justified  by  our  prospect  of  increasing 
wealth.  The  question,  however,  has  no  such  scope, 
being  unluckily  confined  to  the  alternative  of  taxing 
or  borrowing;  and  we  appeal  to  those  who  have 
studied  the  nature  of  our  resources,  whether  we 
cannot  at  present  raise  a  given  sum,  for  example, 
£4,000,000,  with  less  injury  as  a  loan  than  as  a  tax. 

Probability  of  Financial  Relief — We  should  on  no 
account  suggest  a  transfer  of  a  portion  of  our  burdens 
to  the  next  generation,  were  it  probable  that  their 
situation  would  partake  of  that  embarrassment  which, 
since  1814,  has  borne  so  heavilv  on  us.     But  whether 


a  small  Annual  Loan,  359 

we  look  to  the  increasing  caution  of  our  rulers,  the 
resources  arising  from  improvements  in  our  national 
industry,  or  the  diminution  of  our  burden  by  its  re- 
partition among  augmenting  numbers,  we  find  reason 
to  consider  the  prospects  of  our  successors  far  supe- 
rior to  our  own.  And  though  the  assertion  may  ex- 
cite a  smile,  it  is,  notwithstanding,  true,  that  to  relieve 
ourselves  from  a  portion  of  our  taxes,  is  an  effectual 
method  of  preventing  loss  to  our  posterity,  inasmuch 
as  the  present  pressure,  if  continued,  would,  by  send- 
ing abroad  the  family  of  the  annuitant,  and,  as  we 
fear,  the  money  of  the  capitalist,  operate  to  curtail 
the  fund  destined  to  become  in  the  hands  of  the  next 
generation  the  basis  of  national  wealth. 

Would  the  proposed  Loan  affect  the  Rate  of  Interest  ? — 
One  of  the  chief  features  in  the  great  transition  from 
war  to  peace,  was  an  increase  of  disposable  capital, 
and  considering  the  magnitude  of  this  increase,  we 
may  well  question,  whether  government  ought  not, 
several  years  ago,  to  have  made  a  demand  on  the 
monied  interest  for  a  loan,  rather  than  on  the  public 
for  taxes.  If  such  would  have  been  at  that  time  a  fit 
application  to  the  national  wound,  there  seems  still 
less  doubt  of  its  being  so  at  present.  To  take  a  few 
millions  annually  out  of  the  money  market  would, 
doubtless,  operate  in  some  measure  to  retard  the  fall 
of  interest,  and  the  advantage  slow,  but  sure,  which 
follows  that  fall ;  but  that  it  would  do  so  in  a  slight 
degree  seems  probable,  whether  we  consider  our 
present  abundance,  or  our  satisfactory  prospects  in 
regard  to  disposable  capital.  The  dread  of  scarcity 
of  currency  from  the  resumption  of  cash  payments 
has  proved  groundless ;  and  there  seems,  assuredly, 
no  reason  to  apprehend  an  early  demand  for  money 
for  the  payment  of  corn  imports,  still  less  for  subsi- 
dies or  military  charges  on  the  continent. 

The  power  of  habit  is  in  nothing  more  strongly  ex- 
emplified than  in  the  appropriation  of  the  disposable 
funds  of  our  monied  men.  Accustomed  to  a  few  sim- 
ple securities,  they  have  no  idea  of  changing  their 


360  The  Question  of 

investments,  even  under  an  alteration  of  circum- 
stances. Our  bankers  and  city  capitalists  confine 
themselves  to  stocks,  exchequer  bills,  or  mercantile 
acceptances,  (all  convertible  into  money  at  short  no- 
tice,) and  have  no  idea  of  investing  money  on  mort- 
gage, still  less  of  adventuring  in  trade,  or  making  a 
permanent  loan  to  a  mercantile  house.  They  look 
more  naturally  to  foreign  stocks,  particularly  since 
business  of  that  kind  is  transacted  so  largely  on  our 
own  exchange.  In  what  manner  does  this  reasoning 
apply  to  the  present  question  ?  It  implies  that  go- 
vernment by  giving  a  new  opening  to  our  capitalists 
in  the  form  of  a  small  annual  loan,  would  withdraw 
comparatively  little  from  the  accommodation  of  our 
merchants  and  landed  interest :  the  diminution,  we 
believe,  would  hardly  be  felt,  except  in  the  demand 
for  foreign  stock. 

Would  it  affect  the  Price  of  Stocks  ? — This  question 
we  shall  answer  first  as  it  regards  the  public,  and 
next  in  respect  to  the  stockholders.  Since  the  re- 
duction of  the  five  per  cents.,  government  appears  to 
have  hardly  any  greater  interest  in  keeping  up  the 
funds  than  in  maintaining  the  price  of  land,  merchan- 
dise, or  any  other  description  of  national  property. 
The  only  direct  advantage  from  a  rise  in  the  funds, 
would  be  the  power  of  reducing  the  old  four  per 
cents,  and  the  farther  power  of  reducing  the  new  four 
per  cents,  five  or  six  years  hence.  Any  diminution 
of  interest  in  the  great  mass  of  our  debt,  the  three 
per  cents.,  is  a  very  doubtful  and  remote  object :  a 
result  not  likely  to  ensue,  until  after  a  long  continu- 
ance of  peace,  and  a  concurrence  of  circumstances, 
which  of  themselves  would  materially  improve  our 
financial  condition.  But,  whatever  may  be  the  pro- 
bable time  of  the  occurrence  of  such  a  power,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  to  endeavour  to  accelerate  its 
arrival,  in  regard  to  either  the  three  or  the  four  per 
cents,  by  artificial  means,  would  be  highly  impolitic. 
The  reasons  against  such  a  course  are,  even  when 
briefly  stated,  (p.  323.)  so  direct  and  substantial,  as 
to  render  it  incumbent  on  everv  well-wisher  to  K*« 


a  small  .Annual  Loan.  361 

country  to  dissuade  it ;  and  nothing  prevents  our  en- 
larging on  the  evils  that  would  attend  it,  except  a  con- 
viction that  it  can  form  no  part  of  the  plans  of  the 
present  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer. 

Next,  as  to  the  effect  of  a  loan  on  the  interest  of 
stockholders.  Dividing  these  into  the  two  classes 
of  temporary  and  permanent  depositors,  and  consi- 
dering the  former  as  loan  contractors,  we  shall  soon 
find  that  they  may  safely  venture  on  such  a  loan  with- 
out the  pledge  of  taxes.  Four  millions,  borrowed  at 
an  interest  of  four  percent.,  would  involve  an  annual 
burden  of  160,000/.  which,  if  the  plan  of  a  sinking 
fund  provision  for  each  loan  were  retained,  might  be 
carried  to  200,000/.  a  sum  not  insignificant  certainly, 
but  not  equal  to  half  the  addition  that  is  annually 
making  to  our  revenue  by  the  increasing  consumption 
of  taxed  articles.  Was  such  security,  we  may  be  al- 
lowed to  ask,  ever  offered  on  a  war  loan  in  the  most 
brilliant  days  of  our  finance  ? 

Lastly,  as  to  permanent  depositors  and  the  proba- 
ble price  of  stocks  for  a  series  of  years.  What  have 
been  the  causes  of  the  slow  rise  of  stocks  since  the 
peace?  The  years  1814  and  1815  required  heavy 
loans;  1815  was  a  season  of  general  distress,  but  no 
sooner  did  our  prosperity  return  in  1817,  than  stocks 
rose  and  continued  high  during  1818,  when  the  mis- 
management of  the  French  loan,  and,  soon  after,  the 
effect  of  overtrading  in  this  country,  produced  a  fall. 
These  causes,  joined  to  the  general  disquietude  dur- 
ing atrial  (in  1820)  of  unfortunate  notoriety,  delayed 
the  rise  of  stocks ;  and  a  farther  delay  took  place 
from  an  apprehension  in  that  and  the  succeeding  year 
that  the  magnitude  of  the  agricultural  distress  would 
necessitate  a  reduction  of  the  public  dividends.  Since 
then,  however,  the  circumstances  of  the  public,  and 
the  amount  of  the  revenue  have  both  materially  im- 
proved. 

Two  points  will  be  readily  admitted  by  the  perma- 
nent depositor  in  our  funds ;  first,  that  whatever  con- 
duces to  the  relief  of  the  suffering  classes  has  a  ten- 
dency to  raise  stocks ;  and  next,  that  a  loan  for  the 

16 


362  The  Question  of 

purpose  of  reducing  taxes  is  altogether  different  in  its 
operation  on  his  property  from  a  loan  for  the  purpose 
of  expenditure.  By  augmenting  the  value  of  money 
it  augments  his  income,  and  affords  him  a  substantial  re- 
turn for  any  delay  of  rise  in  the  market  price  of  stock, 
which  may  be  attributable  to  the  act  of  borrowing. 

Limitation  to  borrowing. — Were  the  plan  of  an  an- 
nual loan  to  be  adopted,  and  found  to  answer,  what 
limit,  it  may  be  asked,  ought  there  to  be  to  our  bor- 
rowing; at  what  time  ought  we  to  suspend  our  de- 
mand on  our  future  resources  ?  Our  answer  is  —  "at 
the  time  when  our  taxation  shall  have  been  brought 
to  a  level  with  that  of  France  and  other  countries, 
our  rivals  in  manufacture."  If  in  these  countries  the 
public  burdens  form  18  or  20  percent,  of  the  national 
revenue,  let  the  same  be  considered  the  limit  of  taxa- 
tion in  England ;  the  point  below  which  we  make  no 
attempt  to  reduce  it,  satisfied  with  the  superiority 
given  to  our  productive  labour  by  our  physical  ad- 
vantages,— our  mines,  and  our  command  of  water 
communication. 

Retrenchment. — Nor  ought  the  adoption  of  the  loan 
system,  though  productive  of  financial  relief,  by  any 
means  to  lessen  the  demand  on  the  part  of  the  public 
for  retrenchment :  on  the  contrary,  it  would  bring  with 
it  a  direct  motive  for  reduction,  the  effect  of  all  abate- 
ment of  taxation  being  to  increase  the  value  of  money ; 
to  add  to  the  emoluments  of  the  servants  of  the  pub- 
lic. The  allowance  to  Prince  Leopold,  for  example, 
has  been  imperceptibly,  but  substantially  increased 
from  50,000/.  to  60,000/.  by  the  fall  in  prices  since 
passing  the  grant ;  and  if  taxes  are  further  reduced, 
it  will,  ere  long,  attain  the  value  of  65,000/.  It  follows, 
that  a  reduction  to  a  sum  representing  the  value  of 
50,000/.  at  the  date  of  the  grant,  might  take  place 
without  injury  to  the  Prince,  and  without  deviating 
from  the  spirit  of  the  act  of  parliament. 

Have  Loans,  in  time  of  Peace,  been  sanctioned  by  exam- 
pie  ? — As  yet,  only  by  that  of  the  United  States  and 
some  continental  powers  who,  seeking  their  supplies 
from  alien  capitalists,  have  no  title  to  be  held  forth  as 


a  small  Annual  Loan,  363 

an  example  to  England.  But,  had  Holland  in  former 
ages  possessed  that  evidence  of  progressive  increase 
of  population  and  income,  which  at  present  happily 
belongs  to  our  country,  her  course  would  probably 
have  been  that  which  we  recommend,  and  without 
any  departure  from  her  habitual  caution;  for  if,  in 
peace,  wages,  salaries,  and  profits  are  lower,  and  the 
power  of  present  payment  less,  the  labourers  in  the 
productive  field  are  more  numerous,  the  results  of 
their  exertion  far  more  conducive  to  eventual  prospe- 
rity. During  the  late  war,  our  national  income  was 
large,  but  of  uncertain  duration :  at  present,  it  is  re- 
duced in  amount,  but  much  improved  in  prospect.  If, 
in  the  former  case,  it  was  politic  in  government  to  de- 
fray a  large  share  of  the  current  expense  out  of  our 
passing  gains,  a  different  course  is  obviously  suited  to 
a  state  of  peace. 

The  Annuity  Bill — These  truths  have  at  last  been 
felt,  and  the  proceedings  of  Parliament  in  the  last  and 
preceding  session,  have  evinced  a  considerable  change 
in  the  measures  of  ministers.  Till  then,  whatever 
might  be  their  merits  in  regard  to  foreign  politics  or 
commercial  regulations,  their  financial  arrangements 
were  unsatisfactory  to  the  attentive  inquirer,  disco- 
vering, apparently,  little  discrimination  between  a 
state  of  war  and  peace,  in  regard  to  the  power  of 
bearing  taxes,  and  a  very  inadequate  impression  of 
the  superiority  of  our  progress  to  that  of  our  neigh- 
bours. The  measures  adopted  previously  to  last 
year,  seemed  to  proceed  from  the  suggestions  of  mere- 
ly practical  men — of  men  accustomed  to  estimate  a 
financial  proceeding  by  its  effect  on  the  Stock  Ex- 
change, on  the  mere  monied  interest,  rather  than  on 
the  productive  industry  of  the  country  at  large.  At 
last  was  brought  forward,  unexpectedly,  the  plan  for 
exchanging  life-interests  in  half  pay  and  pensions  for 
long  annuities ;  a  plan,  which,  since  the  moment  of  its 
announcement,  we  have  considered  indicative  of  con- 
sequences considerably  beyond  the  anticipation  of 
the  public.  Its  temporary  failure,  or,  as  we  may  now 
say,  the  delay  of  its  success,  was  owing  to  the  engage- 


364  The  Question  of 

ment  being  brought  before  the  public  on  too  extend- 
ed a  scale :  the  duration  of  the  contract  being  such 
as  naturally  to  startle  men  not  then  apprised  of  all  the 
reasons  which  determine  our  rulers  to  adhere  to  a  pa- 
cific course.  But  our  confidence  in  it  was  unshaken, 
connected  as  it  is  with  considerations  on  which  we 
build  the  hope  of  farther  and  extensive  relief.  The 
adoption  of  such  a  measure  confers  a  kind  of  official 
sanction  on  views  such  as  those  we  have  endeavour- 
ed to  take,  and  shows  that  in  the  highest  quarter  there 
prevails  a  conviction  of  the  promising  nature  of  our 
prospects ;  an  assurance  that  our  only  desideratum  is 
present  relief. 

Of  our  suggestions  in  this,  as  in  a  previous  chapter 
(p.  310.)  it  may,  we  trust,  be  said,  that  we  propose  to 
do  nothing  by  surprise,  by  contrivance,  or  by  plausi- 
ble calculation;  all  may  be  gradual,  voluntary,  and 
open,  where  necessary,  to  recall.  From  circumstances 
beyond  the  power  of  foresight,  a  great  pressure  has 
fallen  on  the  present  generation :  it  is  proposed  to 
transfer  a  part  of  it  to  future  years,  but  on  a  plan  that 
will  leave  those  on  whom  it  may  devolve,  whether  of 
the  present  or  of  the  next  age,  far  less  burdened  than 
we  now  find  ourselves.  How  singular,  that  in  all  our 
distress  since  the  peace,  amid  all  the  schemes  for  our 
relief,  none  of  this  nature  should  have  been  brought 
forward  until  the  recent  transfer  of  life  interests  into 
long  annuities.  Had  our  finances  been  administered 
by  a  statesman  of  the  bold,  inventive  mind  of  Pitt,  the 
increase  of  our  population  and  the  connexion  between 
it  and  the  increase  of  taxable  income,  would,  ere  this, 
have  been  made  the  ground-work  of  some  decisive 
measure.  Let  it  not  be  objected  that  such  was  not  his 
course  during  the  period  of  his  administration  that 
passed  in  peace,  and  that  the  plan  pursued  for  the 
support  of  our  credit  after  the  American  war,  was  the 
imposition  of  additional  taxes.  At  that  time  the  in- 
crease of  our  numbers  was  less  rapid,  and  for  want  of 
regular  returns,  was  unperceived.  The  recent  loss  of 
our  colonies  forbade  the  expectation  of  a  progressive 


a  small  Annual  Loan.  363 

extension  of  trade,  and  there  were  feW  examples  in 
our  history,  of  taxes  repealed  in  the  hope  of  stimulat- 
ing productive  industry.  Mr.  Pitt  pursued,  therefore, 
the  only  expedient  within  his  knowledge ;  but  had 
peace  been  preserved  after  1792,  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  the  result  of  the  favourable  state  to  which 
circumstances  had  brought  our  finances,  would  have 
borne  the  stamp  of  his  discriminating  mind,  and  of  the 
example  given,  under  circumstances  somewhat  simi- 
lar, by  Sir  R.  Walpole :  it  would  have  been,  not  the 
support  of  the  sinking  fund,  to  an  extent  that  would 
have  afforded  an  inducement  to  send  capital  out  of 
the  country,  but  the  repeal  or  reduction  of  the  taxes 
which  interfered  most  directly  with  productive  indus- 
try, in  conformity  to  the  course  recommended  many 
years  before  by  Dr.  Smith.* 

The  period  from  1784  to  1793. — To  mention  the 
name  of  Pitt,  is  to  recall  the  attention  of  the  financial 
inquirer  to  the  time,  unluckily  too  short,  when  the 
plans  of  that  minister  were  undisturbed  by  the  ex- 
penditure of  war ;  we  mean  the  interval  from  1784  to 
1793.  No  period  of  our  history  is,  as  far  as  regards 
our  productive  industry,  entitled  to  an  equal  share  of 
our  attention.  The  circumstances  of  that  interval  of 
peace  were  in  many  respects  similar  to  those  of  the 
present  time.  Beginning  in  financial  embarrassment, 
our  prospects  gradually  brightened,  and  our  trade 
flourished  without  the  aid,  as  in  a  period  of  war,  of 
artificial  causes :  all  was  the  legitimate  result  of  the 
application  of  capital  and  industry  to  the  improve- 
ment of  our  national  advantages.  Agriculture  pros- 
pered without  a  rise  of  prices :  the  revenue  increased 
without  new  taxes  :  labour  was  paid  not  largely  but 
satisfactorily,  and  the  addition  to  the  poor-rate  was 
Very  gradual.  Let  us  not  imagine  that  the  period  in 
question  possessed  peculiar  advantages ;  or  that  the 
progress  of  our  cotton  manufacture,  and  the  troubles 

*  Wealth  of  Nations,  vol.  iii. 


366     •        The  Question  of  an  Annual  Loan, 

of  France,  placed  our  countrymen  in  those  days  on 
commanding  ground :  they  felt  severely  the  pressure 
of  taxation,  and  were  not  altogether  exempt  from  the 
pernicious  operation  of  corn-laws.  With  confidence, 
therefore,  may  we  conclude,  that  could  but  a  part  of 
our  present  burdens  be  removed,  we  should  follow 
the  career  of  productive  industry  with  equal  or  supe- 
rior advantage. 


CONCLUSION. 


We  have  now  brought  our  labour  to  a  close,  after 
endeavouring  to  exhibit  a  picture  of  our  national  situ- 
ation, and  enumerating  its  various  advantages  and 
drawbacks,  in  a  manner  which,  whatever  may  be 
thought  of  the  degree  of  ability,  will  hardly  be  ar- 
raigned on  the  score  of  partiality.  Political  allusions 
have  been  avoided  as  much  as  was  at  all  practica- 
ble, in  an  inquiry  in  which  statistical  results  were 
frequently  affected  by  the  decisions  of  the  cabinet. 
If  we  have  ventured  on  questions  of  great  difficulty, 
and  occasionally  expressed  opinions  with  a  degree 
of  confidence,  it  has  proceeded  from  no  other  feeling 
than  a  consciousness  of  the  advantage  arising  from 
command  of  time,  and  the  opportunity  of  giving  long- 
continued  attention  to  a  few  select  subjects. 

Summary. — Our  first  chapter  was  appropriated  to 
a  much  disputed  question,  the  causes  of  the  unex- 
pected abundance  of  our  financial  resources  during 
the  war,  and  their  still  more  unexpected  deficiency 
since  the  peace.  This  was  followed  by  an  inquiry 
into  the  subject  of  "  currency  and  exchange,"  which, 
uninviting  and  intricate  as  it  is,  could  not  with  pro- 
priety be  omitted  in  a  work  requiring  such  frequent 
reference  to  changes  in  the  value  of  money.  The 
state  of  agriculture  claimed  a  longer  chapter  and 
more  ample  details,  as  well  from  sympathy  for  a  very 
numerous  and  respectable  class,  as  from  the  impor- 
tance of  the  subject  to  the  nation  at  large.  The 
price  of  produce  influencing  so  directly  the  price  of 


368  Conclusion. 

labour,  it  became  an  object  of  great  solicitude  to  ar- 
rive at  an  opinion  as  little  doubtful  as  possible  in  re- 
gard to  our  prospect  of  the  supply  of  corn  both  as  to 
quantity  and  price.  On  that  must,  in  all  probability, 
depend  a  variety  of  future  measures  :  the  regulation 
of  wages,  salaries,  and  money  incomes,  generally ; 
the  degree  of  equality  in  the  means  of  competition 
between  our  manufacturers  and  those  of  the  conti- 
nent ;  and  the  latitude  which  may  consequently  be 
taken  by  government  in  removing  the  restrictions 
on  our  commercial  intercourse. 

From  these  doubtful  and  anxious  points  we  turned 
with  satisfaction  to  the  evidence  of  our  progressive 
advance  in  agriculture,  manufacture,  and  the  useful 
arts  generally,  accompanied,  as  it  is,  by  a  large  in- 
crease in  our  population.  Augmentation  of  national 
power ;  the  prospect  of  continued  peace ;  the  means 
of  reducing  taxes — are  all  consequences  of  our  decid- 
ed superiority  to  other  nations  in  the  progress  of  na- 
tional improvement. 

The  examination,  in  a  subsequent  chapter,  of  the 
fluctuations  in  the  value  of  gold  and  silver,  was 
prompted  by  a  double  cause — the  revolutions  in  the 
value  of  money  during  the  last  thirty  years  ;  and  the 
evident  disproportion  existing  at  present,  particularly 
in  the  metropolis,  between  the  rate  of  wages  and  the 
cost  of  the  maintenance  of  the  individual.  A  hope  of 
being  instrumental  in  correcting  these  anomalies  led 
to  researches  of  which  the  object  is  to  give  a  perma- 
nent and  uniform  value  to  money  contracts ;  to  lessen 
the  prevailing  objection  to  leases ;  to  give  facilities 
to  the  commutation  of  tithe  ;  and  finally,  to  show  an- 
nuitants that  it  is  possible  for  them  to  make  an  abate- 
ment in  the  numerical  amount  of  money  income  with- 
out incurring  a  sacrifice. 

In  our  concluding  chapter  we  have  conveyed  our 
ideas  in  regard  to  the  operation  of  a  sinking  fund ;  the 
comparative  weight  of  English  and  French  taxation ; 
the  growing  nature  of  our  resources,  and  the  prospect 
of  a  farther  and  considerable  reduction  of  our  bur- 
dens. 


Conclusion.  369 

It  may  appear  somewhat  singular  to  our  readers 
that  subjects  of  such  general  interest  should  not  long 
ere  this  have  been  fully  discussed ;  that  questions  of 
such  importance  to  our  welfare  should  not  have  been 
decisively  answered.  But  in  such  researches  the 
magnitude  of  the  labour  is  found  to  exceed  all  pre- 
vious calculation :  the  number  of  persons  fitted  for  it 
by  situation  or  habits  is  not  great ;  and,  immersed  as 
they  generally  are  in  official  or  professional  pursuits, 
a  long  period  elapses  in  this,  as  in  the  province  of 
general  history,  before  an  individual  is  enabled  to 
bestow  on  such  topics  the  time  and  attention  they 
require. 


Comprehensive  as  the  preceding  investigations 
may  appear,  there  still  remain  for  discussion  several 
subjects  of  great  interest. 

Our  Trade. — Of  our  commercial  history  during  the 
last  thirty  years,  we  propose  a  sketch  as  circumstan- 
tial, and  as  carefully  grounded  on  official  documents 
as  that  which  has  been  given  of  our  Finances  and  our 
Agriculture.  The  fluctuations  in  our  trade,  the  over- 
rating of  our  profits  during  the  war,  the  distinction 
between  real  and  nominal  additions  to  property,  are 
all  subjects  which  require  examination  and  perspi- 
cuous statement. 

Emigration. — Though  the  recent  improvement  in 
the  state  of  our  productive  industry  has  lessened  the 
necessity  of  emigration,  a  disquisition  into  that  sub- 
ject would  open  views  connected  with  the  diffusion 
of  civilization,  not  only  in  our  colonies,  but  in  many 
districts  in  Europe.  The  state  of  these  is  more  back- 
ward than  can  well  be  conceived  by  the  untravelled 
part  of  our  countrymen.  Though  to  send  settlers  to 
these  neglected  tracts  would  form  no  part  of  our 
policy,  their  improvement  would  be  of  interest  to  us, 
both  as  opening  markets  for  our  manufactures,  and 

47 


APPENDIX 


CHAPTER  II. 


(Page  41.)     Expense  of  the  late  Wars,  reckoning  from  the 
beginning  of  1793  to  the  beginning  of  1816. 


MONEY  RAISED, 


War  of  1793 


Years. 

•  By  Taxes. 

By  Loans. 

Total. 

£ 

£ 

£ 

1793 

17,170,400 

4,500,000 

21,670,400 

1794 

17,308,811 

11,000,000 

28,308,811 

1795 

17,858,454 

18,000,000 

35,858,454 

1796 

18,737,760 

25,500,000 

44,237,760 

1797 

20,654,650 

32,500,000 

53,154,650 

1798 

30,202,915 

17,000,000 

47,202,915 

1799 

35,229,968 

18,500,000 

53,729,968 

1800 

33,896,464 

20,500,000 

54,396,464 

1801 

35,415,096 

28,000,000 

63,415,096 

1802 

37,240,213 

25,000,000 

62,240,213 

I  *263,714,731 

|  200,500,000 

I  464,214,731 

Deduct 

sums  for  the  ser- 

vice 

of  Ireland  .  .  . 

.  13,000,000 

13,000,000 

187,500,000 

451,214,731 

*  Dr.  Hamilton  on  the  National  Debt,  pp.  157.  269. 

M 


[2] 

The  I 

ate  Wars; 

[App. 

War  of  1803. 

Years. 

By  Taxes. 

By  Loans. 

Total. 

£ 

£ 

£ 

1803 

37,677,063 

15,202,931 

52,879,994 

1804 

45,359,442 

20,104,221 

65,463,663 

1805 

49,659,281 

27,931,482 

77,590,763 

1806 

53,304,254 

20,486,155 

73,790,409 

1807 

58,390,225 

23,889,257 

82,279,482 

1808 

61,538,207 

20,476,765 

82,014,972 

1809 

63,405,294 

23,304,691 

86,709,985 

1810 

66,681,366 

22,428,788 

89,110,154 

1811 

64,763,870 

27,416,829 

92,180,699 

1812 

63,169,854 

40,251,684 

103,421,538 

1813 

66,925,835 

54,026,822 

120,952,657 

1814 

69,684,192 

47,159,697 

116,843,889 

1815 

1 

70,403,448 

46,087,603 

116,491,051 

770,962,331 

388,766,925 

1,159,729,256 

Deduct 

the  proportion  of 

the  above 

raisec 

I  for  the  service  ol 

'Ireland  .  .  . 

.  .  46,612,106 

1,113,117,150 

Note. — See  a  very  short  but  clear  summary,  entitled,  "  Statement  of 
the  Revenue  and  Expenditure  of  Great  Britain,  in  each  year,  from  1803  to 
1814,  by  C.  Stokes.* 

Summary. — Instead  of  dwelling  on  these  complicated  state- 
ments, we  invite  the  reader  to  fix  his  attention  on  the  following 
abstract  in  round  numbers  : 


War  of  1793. 

Total  mone}'  raised  by  loans  and  taxes,  exclu- 
sive of  the  loans  for  the  service  of  Ireland, 
about £450,000,000 

Deduct  the  probable  charge  in  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  had  peace  been  preserved, 
18,000,000/.  a-year 180,000,000 


Balance  constituting  the  war  expenditure, 


270,000,000 


App.]  Amoiqit  of  our  Expenditure.  [3] 


War  of  1803. 

Total  money  raised,  exclusive  of  the  sums 

for  the  service  of  Ireland,  about    .     .     £1,11 3,000,0QQ 
The  deduction  for  the  probable  expense 

of  a  peace  establishment,  may,   after  , 

1803,  be  called  22,000,000/.  a-year, 

as  well  on  account  of  our  augmented 

population,  as  because  in  the  table  of 

the  war  of  1803,  the  charge  of  collect- 
ing the  revenue  is  not  deducted  j  say 

22,000,000/.  for  13  years 286,000,000 


Balance  constituting  the  war  expenditure    .     827,000,000 


Average  war  expenditure  from  1793  to 

1802,  both  inclusive 27,000,000 

Average  war  expenditure  from  1803  to 

1815,  both  inclusive 63,500,000 

Total  charge  of  the  two  wars,  exclusive 

of  an  ample  allowance  for  a  supposed 

peace  establishment,  nearly    ....     1,100,000,000 

Explanatory  Remark. — This  amount,  adopted  in  the 
text,  as  representing  the  total  of  our  war  expenditure,  may 
require  some  explanation.  It  is  exclusive  of  the  sums 
raised  for  the  service  of  Ireland  during  the  twenty-three 
years  in  question,  whether  by  taxes  in  that  country,  or  by 
loans  in  England  ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  comprises  a  large 
sum  appropriated  in  England,  not  to  the  war,  but  to  the 
reduction  of  the  national  debt.  Still,  as  the  amount  of 
money  thus  applied  did  not  materially  exceed  the  sums 
raised  for  the  service  of  Ireland,  and  as  it  forms  no  part  of 
our  object  to  aim  at  fractional  accuracy,  we  may  safely  con- 
sider the  sums  thus  left  out  as  balancing  each  other,  and 
assume  the  1,100,000,000/.  as  a  representation  of  our  total 
war  expenditure. 

Addition  to  the  Public  Debt. — Though  the  expenditure  of 
the  war  of  1803  exceeded  that  of  the  war  of  1793,  in  the 
ratio  of  more  than  three  to  one,  the  addition  made  to 
our  public  debt  was  not  at  all  ill  that  proportion  ;  the  war 
of  1793  having  added  to  it  fully  200,000,000/.,  that  of 


[4]       Comparison  of  Exports  in  War  and  in  Peace.  [App* 

1803  about  260,000,000/.  In  the  war  of  1803,  the  far 
greater  part  of  the  expense  was  defrayed  by  the  property- 
tax  and  other  supplies  raised  within  the  year. 

Such  were  the  total  sums  raised  for  our  war  expenditure  : 
but  it  is  fit  to  recollect  that  they  do  not  indicate  with  ac- 
curacy the  extent  of  sacrifice  connected  with  the  war. 
There  remain,  as  we  shall  see  presently,  considerations  of 
great  importance  on  either  side  of  the  account ;  such,  on 
the  one  hand,  as  the  loss  arising  from  the  transition  to 
peace  ;  on  the  other,  the  amount  of  supply  derived  from  the 
extra  profits  attendant  on  a  state  of  war. 


(Page  47.) — Explanation  of  the  "  official  Value  of 
Goods." — The  "  official  value  of  goods"  means  a  compu- 
tation of  value  formed  with  reference,  not  to  the  prices  of 
the  current  year,  but  to  a  standard  fixed  so  long  ago  as 
1696,  the  time  when*  the  office  of  Inspector-general  of  the 
Imports  and  Exports  was  established,  and  a  Custom-house 
Leger  opened  to  record  the  weight,  dimensions,  and  value 
of  the  merchandise  that  passed  through  the  hands  of  the 
officers.  One  uniform  rule  is  followed  year  after  year  in 
the  valuation,  some  goods  being  estimated  by  weight,  others 
by  their  dimensions ;  the  whole  without  reference  to  the 
current  or  market  price.  This  course  has  the  advantage  of 
exhibiting  with  strict  accuracy  any  increase  or  decrease  in 
the  quantity  of  our  exports. 

Next,  as  to  the  value  of  these  exports  in  the  market. 
In  1798,  there  was  imposed  a  duty  of  two  per  cent,  on  our 
exports,  the  value  of  which  was  taken,  not  by  the  official 
standard,  but  by  the  declaration  of  the  exporting  mer- 
chants. Such  a  declaration  may  be  assumed  as  a  repre- 
sentation of,  or  at  least  an  approximation  to,  the  current  or 
market  price  of  merchandise  ;  there  being,  on  the  one  hand, 
no  reason  to  apprehend  that  merchants  would  pay  a  per 
centage  on  an  amount  beyond  the  market  value  ;  while,  on 
the  other,  the  liability  to  seizure  afforded  a  security  against 
under-valuation. 

These  two  scales  of  valuation,  we  mean  the  official  regis- 
ter and  the  current  price,  afford  the  means  of  solving  a 
question  of  no  slight  importance,  viz.  the  comparative 
value  of  merchandise  in  the  present  age  and  at  the  re- 
mote date  of  1696.     Some  articles,  in  particular  coffee, 

*  Chalmers's  Historical  View  of  the  Domestic  Economy  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland.  1812. 


App.]   Comparison  of  Exports  in  War  and  in  Peace.      [5] 

cottons,  hardware,  are  cheaper  than  in  the  reign  of  King 
William  ;  but  the  great  majority  were,  during  the  late  war, 
so  much  dearer,  that  it  is  usual  to  calculate  the  real  or  mar- 
ket value  at  50  per  cent,  above  the  official  value.  Since 
the  peace,  the  case  is  greatly  altered,  the  market  price  of 
goods  having,  as  we  shall  perceive  from  the  following  state- 
ment, been  greatly  reduced. 

Comparison  of  Exports  in  War  and  in  Peace. 

I.  Total  Exports  from  Great  Britain,  comprising  home  pro- 
duce and  manufacture,  as  well  as  foreign  and  colonial 
goods,  the  whole  according  to  the  official  value. 


1814.  .  .  £56,591,000 

1815.  .  .  60,984,000 

1816.  .  .  51,260,000 

1817.  .  .  53,125,000 


.1818^  .  .  £56,851,000 

1819.  .  .  46,912,000 

1820.  .  .  51,731,000 

1821.  .  .  56,445,000 


Annual  average  of  the  eight  years  of  peace, 

above £54,200,000 

This  is  the  average  referred  to  in  the  text,  p.  47. 

We  subjoin,  in  the  next  place,  the  declared  value  of  our 
exports  since  the  peace  ;  in  other  words,  their  value  accord- 
ing to  the  state  of  the  markets  in  each  year. 

Exports  from  Great  Britain,  taking  home  produce  and  ma- 
nufactures at  the  value  declared  by  the  merchants,  and 
adding  in  the  case  of  foreign  or  colonial  goods  25  per 
cent,  to  the  official  value,  an  addition  considerably  less 
than  that  which  was  made  in  war. 


1818.  .  .  £64,263,000 

1819.  .  .    52,031,000 

1820.  .  .    52,982,000 

1821.  about  54,000,000 


1814.  .  .  £73,489,000 

1815.  .  .  74,372,000 

1816.  .  .  61,138,000 

1817.  .  .  58,032,000 

Annual  average  of  the  eight  years  of  peace, 
from  1814  to  1821,  both  inclusive,  men- 
tioned in  the  text,  p.  48 £63,787,500 

In  either  way,  the  value  of  our  exports  is  greater  since 
the  peace  than  during  the  war. 

II.  For  those  who  may  wish  to  carry  farther  these  calcu- 
lations of  our  exports,  and  of  their  effect  on  our  productive 
industry,  we  add  a  return  of  that  part  of  our  exports  which 
is  illustrative  of  the  extent  of  our  home  trade. 


[6]       Comparison  of  Exports  in  War  and  in  Peace,    [Apf 


War.     Exports  of  Home  Produce  and  Manufacture  from 
Great  Britain,  previous  to  and  during  the  late  wars. 


In  Money  of 

the  particular 

year. 


Supposed  to  be 

equivalent  at 

the   prices  of 

1792  to 


Average  of  six  years  ending  with  1 792 
Ditto  -  -  t  -  1793 
Ditto  -  -  -  -  1804 
Ditto         -  1810 


£22,131,000 
25,658,000 
36,817,000 
43,575,000 


£22,131,000 
23,325,000 
30,681,000 
33,519,000 


These  sums  are  calculated  by  adding  50  per  cent,  to  the 
official  value,  so  that  ample  prices  are  allowed  for  the  period 
of  war. 


Exports  of  Home  Produce  and  Manufacture  from  Great 
Britain  since  the  peace,  according  to  the  value  declared 
by  the  exporting  merchants. 


Years. 

Money  of  the  par- 
ticular year. 

Supposed  to  be  equi- 
valent at  the  prices 
of  1792  to 

1814     .     . 

£47,851,453 

£37,000,000 

1815 

53,217,445 

42,000,000 

1816 

42,955,256  . 

34,000,000 

1S17 

43,626,253 

35,000,000 

1818 

48,903,760 

39,000,000 

1819 

37,940,000 

35,000,000 

1820 

38,620,000 

38,000,000 

1821,  about 

40,000,000 

40,000,000 

The  returns  for  these  years  of  peace,  when  compared 
with  years  of  war,  sufficiently  establish  the  greater  value  of 
our  exports  since  the  peace.  They  may  appear  at  variance 
with  a  statement  published  in  a  work  of  very  wide  circu- 
lation, (Quarterly  Review,  No.  LI!.,  p.  534.)  in  which  the 
exports  of  three  years  of  war,  1811,  1812,  1813,  are  con- 
trasted with  three  years  of  peace,  1819,  1820,  1821,  and 
the  amount  of  the  former  found  to  be  considerably  greater. 
This,  however,  is  to  be  understood  of  foreign  merchandise, 
and  was  owing  to  the  extent  of  our  transit  trade  during  the 


App.]   Comparison  of -Exports  in  War  and  in  Peace.      [7] 

years  when  neutrals  had  very  little  direct  navigation,  and 
were  obliged  to  carry  almost  every  article  through  the  me- 
dium of  this  country.  But  a  transit  trade  may  be  very 
large,  without  making  any  great  addition  to  the  productive 
powers  of  a  country,  and  our  object  being  to  show  the  con- 
nexion between  the  amount  of  our  exports  and  the  degree 
of  activity  existing  among  our  population,  our  tables  are 
confined  to  returns  of  our  home  produce  and  manufac- 
tures. 

The  reduction  to  money  of  a  uniform  value  (that  of  1792) 
is  expedient  for  a  period  in  which  money  has  varied  so 
greatly  :  it  removes  a  part  of  the  exaggeration  to  which  we 
habituated  ourselves  during  the  war,  and  simplifies  the 
comparison  with  years  of  peace. 

Decline  in  the  Price  of  Goods. — We  subjoin  a  further  ex- 
tract illustrative  of  the  general  fall  in  the  price  of  merchan- 
dise since  1818. 

Exports  from  Great  Britain,  of  Home  Produce  and 
Manufactures. 


Years. 

Official  Value. 

The  declared  or  mar- 
ket value. 

1818  . 

1819  . 
1820 

1821,  exclusive  of 
our  export  to  Ireland 

£44,564,000 
35,634,000 
40,240,000 

I    40,195,000 

£48,904,000 
37,940,000 
38,620,000 

35,826,000 

Prices,  as  our  readers  may  remember,  began  to  fall  very 
soon  after  the  peace  :  yet  in  1818,  they  were  still  from  10  to 
12  per  cent,  above  the  official  value.  In  1819,  a  year  of 
stagnant  trade,  the  market  value  fell  to  within  7  per  cent,  of 
the  official  value,  and  since  1820  it  has  been  below  it.  By 
this  we  are  to  understand,  not  that  all  merchandise  is  cheaper 
than  in  the  reign  of  King  William,  when  the  standard  of  offi- 
cial value  was  formed,  but  that  cottons  and  hardware  (in 
particular  cottons)  form  so  very  large  a  proportion  of  our 
exports  as  to  counterbalance  the  rise  in  woollens,  leather, 
and  other  articles,  which  are  still  somewhat  dearer  than  they 
were  a  century  ago.  Returns  such  as  these  ar£  of  the  high- 
est interest  to  the  political  arithmetician. 


[8]     Connexion  between  Expenditure  and  Revenue.  [App. 

Effect  of  Taxation. — Taxation  is  injurious  chiefly  in  two 
ways  :  in  an  individual  sense,  when  the  parties  assessed  have 
not  the  means  of  indemnifying  themselves  ;  and  in  a  national 
sense,  when  the  magnitude  of  the  burden  is  such  as  to  reduce 
the  profits  of  labour  and  capital  materially  below  those  of 
other  countries.  The  former  receives  at  present  a  distress- 
ing exemplification  in  the  case  of  our  agriculturists ;  the 
latter  has  long  prevailed  in  the  Dutch  provinces,  at  least  in 
the  maritime  provinces  of  Holland  and  Zealand,  in  which 
the  charge  for  defence  against  the  sea  is  superadded  to 
heavy  demands  of  a  political  nature.  Such  also  has  been, 
in  a  considerable  degree,  our  own  situation  since  the  peace  ; 
that  it  was  by  no  means  so  during  the  war,  has,  we  trust, 
been  satisfactorily  shown  in  the  text. 

We  consider,  therefore,  our  taxes  during  the  war  in  the 
light  of  circulation,  without  ascribing  to  them  all  the  detri- 
mental effects  alleged  by  the  majority  of  political  econo- 
mists, and  still  less  the  beneficial  operation  attributed  to 
them  by  others.  The  latter  opinion,  singular  as  it  may 
seem,  is  nearly  a  century  old,  and  was  supported  by  re- 
peated references  to  the  case  of  Holland  before  her  decline. 
In  this  country  it  seemed  to  receive  a  striking  confirmation 
from  the  stagnation  that  followed  the  peace,  as  the  public 
did  not  take  sufficiently  into  account  how  much  the  circula- 
tion of  borrowed  money  had  been  the  cause  of  the  genera! 
activity  during  the  war. 


APPENDIX 

TO 

CHAPTER  111. 


Rise  of  Prices  during  the  War. 

Country  Labourer. — Computation  of  the  annual  expense 
of  the  family  of  an  agricultural  labourer,  supposed  to  consist 
of  5f  persons ;  calculated  chiefly  from  a  table  of  the  expense 
of  66  families  of  labourers,  in  different  parts  of  England, 
collected  by  Sir  F.  Eden. 


In  the  year  1792. 

In  1813. 

In  1823. 

Bread,  butcher  meat,  beer,  and  )  £     s. 

£      s. 

£ 

s. 

other   provisions    of 

home  >  16     0 

32     0 

17 

0 

growth     - 

-  ) 

Tea,  sugar,  and  foreign 

articles      2     0 

3     0 

3 

0 

Rent          - 

1   13 

2     0 

2 

0 

Fuel  and  candles 

2   10 

3  10 

3 

0 

Clothes  and  washing  - 

4     7 

6  10 

6 

0 

Contingencies    - 

0  10 
£27     0 

1     0 

£48     0 

1 

0 

£32 

0 

Town  Mechanic. — Computed  expense  at  different  dates, 
of  the  family  of  a  mechanic  living  in  a  provincial  town,  and 
supposed  to  consist,  as  in  the  case  of  the  agriculturists,  of 
51  persons. 

In  the  year  1 792.       In  1 8 1 3.       In  1 823. 
Bread,  butcher  meat,  beer,  and  }  £     s.        £     s.        £     s. 

other  provisions    of    home  >  20     0       38     0       210 

growth  -         -         -         -    ) 
Groceries  and  other  provisions  \    *   in         7     (]         a     o 

imported         -         -         -    $ 
Rent  of  cottage  or  rooms      -         2  10         4     0         4     0 
Fuel  and  light    -         -         -         3     0  5     0         4     0 

Clothes  and  washing  -         -         70       110        10     0 
School  fees,  apothecary's  bill,  )    r     0         an         -     n 

and  other  contingencies    -    ) 

£42     0    £73     0    £52     0 
[»] 


[10]                  Rise  of  Prices  during  the  War.  [App. 

The  Middle  Classes. — Comparative  estimate  of  the  ex- 
pense in  different  years  of  house-keeping  in  a  family  of  the 
middle  class,  supposed  to  reside  in  London. 

In  the  year  1792.  In  1813.  In  1823. 

£     s.  £      s.  £      s. 

House  rent         -         ->      -       60     0  100     0  90     0 

Assessed  taxes  and  poor  rate        18     0  47     0  40     0 

Wages;  two  women  servants       18     0  22     0  22     0 

Clothes      -         -         -         -       60     0  85     0  70     0 

Boots  and  shoes          -         -         90  180  160 

Wine,  spirits,  and  strong  beer       16     0  35     0  30     0 

Table  beer         -         -         -         7     0  11     0  9     0 

Tea,  sugar,  and  other  groceries  22     0  38     0  35     0 

Fuel          -         -         -         -       24     0  35     0  30     0 

Light,  viz.  candles  and  oil    -         60  100  80 

Washing   -         -         -         -160  25     0  22     0 

Bread        -         -         -         -       25     0  50     0  25     0 

Butcher  meat     -         -                 25     0  45     0  30     0 

Milk,  butter,  fish,  cheese       -       50     0  85     0  70     0 

Education           -         -         -140  22     0  20     0 

Medical  attendance     -         -        140  20     0  20     0 

Furniture;  annual  repairs,  and  >  H     Q  24     0  20     0 

purchases        -         -         -    y 
Incidents,  such  as  postage,  sta-  ^ 

tionary,  charity,  pocket  dis-  >  35     0  55     0  50     0 

bursements     -         -         -    ) 
Expenses  of  a  less  necessary"} 

character,  such  as  excursion  !  ~ft     „  ^o     0  40     O 

to    the    sea    side,    or    the  | 

country  -         -         -   J 

Expense  of  company  -                 35     0  60     0  50     0 
Furniture ;  interest  on  the  mo-  ) 

ney  invested  in  its  purchase ;  >  42     0  63     0  53     0 

also  its  insurance  against  fire  ) 


£540     0  £900     0  £750     0 


We  are  next  to  exhibit  these  charges  in  a  more  concise 
form,  classing  them  under  specific  heads,  and  showing  the 
per-centage,  or  proportion  borne  by  each  head  ;  thus  : 


App.] 


Hise  of  Prices  during  the  War. 


[H 


Bread,  butcher  meat,  beer, 
and  other  provisions  of  home 
growth  or  manufacture     - 

Provisions,  such  as  groceries, 
of  foreign  produce  - 

Clothes  and  washing   - 

Rent         - 

Fuel  and  light   - 

Continececies       - 


Bread,  butcher  meat,  beer,  and  } 
other  provisions  of  home  > 
growth  -         -         -         -    ) 

Provisions,  such  as  groceries  of) 
foreign  growth         -         -    ) 

Clothes  and  washing  - 

House  rent         - 

Assessed  taxes  and  poor  rate 

Fuel  and  light  - 

Education,  medical  attendance,  ) 
repairs,  and  occasional  pur-  > 
chases  of  furniture  -         -    ) 

Travelling,  entertaining  com-  } 
pany,  and  other  less  neces-  > 
sary  expenses  -         -         -    ) 

Servants'  wages 

Incidents  -         -         - 


Expense  of   the 
family  of  a  coun- 
try labourer. 
Parts  in  100. 


55 


Expense     oi 
the  town  me- 
chanic. 
Parts  in  100. 


42 


10 


20 

19 

6i 

8 

10 

8 

3£ 

13 

100 

100 

A  family  of  the 

middle  class  ex- 

A   family  oL 

pending  between 

larger        in- 

500   and     800/. 

come,  expen- 

a-year in  Lon- 

ding     1000/. 

don,    or    nearly 

and  upwards. 

500  in  a  provin- 

cial town. 

Parts  in  100. 

Parts  in  100. 

25 

20 

8 

5 

18 

14* 

10 

10 

7 

4| 

6 

3 

100 


13 


14 

5-i 
lOh 

100 


In  calculating  these  proportions,  we  have  taken  the  re- 
sults, not  of  any  particular  year,  but  of  a  number  of  years. 


[12J  Rise  of  Prices  during  the  War,  [App. 

Comparative  Comfort  of  the  labouring  Classes  in  War  and 
Peace. — The  expense  of  the  labouring  classes  is,  of  course, 
confined  to  the  necessaries  of  life,  and  the  above  summary 
shows  clearly  the  greater  proportion  of  their  income  that  is 
appropriated  to  the  purchase  of  food.  Now  as  food  rose 
during  the  war  more  than  any  other  head  of  expense,  it 
follows  that  the  ratio  of  enhancement  was  greater  in  the 
case  of  the  working  classes,  than  in  that  of  their  superiors. 
On  the  part  of  the  middle  and  upper  ranks,  160/.  or  170Z. 
were  required  to  make  those  purchases  for  which  100/. 
sufficed  in  1792 ;  but  on  the  part  of  the  lower  orders  180/, 
were  probably  not  more  than  adequate.  It  thus  becomes 
a  question  whether,  after  all  the  rise  that  took  place  in 
wages,  the  condition  of  the  labouring  classes  during  the 
war  was  more  comfortable  than  in  1792.  That  at  present 
it  is  much  better,  will  at  once  appear  from  an  inspection 
of  the  preceding  tables,  for  while  wages  have  been  but  little 
lowered,  provisions  have  fallen  greatly,  and  the  reduction  of 
housekeeping  since  1814,  which  to  the  middle  classes  has 
been  only  about  20  per  cent.,  is  nearly  twice  as  much  to 
their  inferiors. 

Rise  in  the  Price  of  Corn. — Towards  the  close  of  the  war 
the  price  of  corn,  butcher  meat,  and  most  articles  of  country 
produce,  became  double  that  of  the  year  1792,  which,  con- 
sidering the  proportion  borne  by  provisions  to  our  total 
consumption,  might  have  justified  our  computing  at  33  per 
cent.,  the  addition  thus  made  to  our  national  expenditure. 
But  as  this  extreme  rise  lasted  only  a  few  years,  we  have 
called  it  in  the  text  30  per  cent. 

Causes  of  this  Rise  in  Corn. — These  shall  be  fully  ex- 
plained in  our  chapter  on  agriculture  :  at  present  we  state 
them  very  briefly  ;  viz, 

1 .  The  rise  in  labour  and  other  farming  charges  attends 
ant  on  the  war. 

2.  The  occurrence  of  a  series  of  bad  or  indifferent  sea- 
sons, 1794,  1795,  1799,  1800,  1811. 

These  two  causes  raised  the  quarter  of  wheat  from  50s. 
to  80s.,  where  in  all  probability,  it  would  have  stopped, 
had  not, 

3.  The  depreciation  of  our  currency  after  1809,  sub- 
jected our  import  of  corn  to  an  enhancement  so  great  as  to 
carry  our  averaere  from  80s.  to  100s. 


App.]  Rise  of  Prices  during  the  fVar.  [13] 

Are  such  Causes  likely  to  be  operative  in  future? — Inter- 
ference with  our  currency  is,  in  all  probability,  excluded 
from  the  creed  of  our  rulers,  and  a  rise  in  the  price  of  la- 
bour seems  out  of  the  question  in  a  season  of  peace.  Of  the 
remaining  cause  of  enhancement,  the  occurrence  of  bad  or 
indifferent  seasons,  nothing  can  be  said,  except  that  so  long 
as  peace  shall  continue,  the  degree  of  rise  proceeding  from 
it,  will  be  greatly  checked  by  the  facility  of  import. 

Enhancement  of  Labour. — The  proportion  of  rise  attri- 
buted in  the  text  to  "  Labour,"  may  appear  somewhat  be- 
low the  mark,  since  the  rate  of  wages  and  salaries  was  dou- 
bled, or  nearly  doubled,  in  the  course  of  the  war,  while  our 
table  of  housekeeping  expenditure  is  found,  on  comparing 
the  years  1792  and  1813,  to  exhibit  a  large  addition  under 
the  different  heads,  (clothes,  furniture,  house-rent,  &tc.) 
affected  by  rise  of  labour.  These  considerations,  however, 
are  subject  to  material  qualifications.  They  apply  only  to 
the  upper  classes,  since  our  humbler  countrymen  perform 
service  for  themselves,  aud  exclude  wages  from  the  list  of 
their  charges.  Next,  in  regard  to  one  very  extensive  de- 
partment, agriculture,  the  rise  proceeding  from  "  Labour"  is 
comprised  in  the  30  per  cent,  attributed,  in  our  summary,  to 
the  enhancement  arising  from  "  Provisions."  Add  to  this,  in 
the  third  place,  that  in  various  manufactures,  such  as  cot- 
ton and  hardware,  the  additional  cost  proceeding  from  rise 
of  wages,  was  balanced  by  improved  methods  of  working, 
and  by  the  application  of  machinery.  On  the  whole,  there- 
fore, it  seems  that  we  may  account  an  addition  of  20  per 
cent,  to  our  general  expenditure,  a  fair  representation  of  the 
rise  of  prices  during  the  war,  as  far  as  such  rise  is  attribu- 
table to  enhancement  of  labour. 

Paper  Currency — its  Depreciation. — It  may  occur  to 
our  readers,  that  in  the  summary  of  the  causes  of  enhance- 
ment in  the  text,  paper  currency  ought  to  have  found  a 
place  along  with  taxation,  rise  of  labour,  he.  Allowance, 
however,  is  made  for  its  operation  in  our  estimate  of  the 
enhancement  of  corn,  and  of  the  other  imported  articles, 
cotton,  wool,  tobacco,  the  cost  of  which  was  so  greatly 
increased  towards  the  close  of  the  war  by  the  decline  of 
our  paper. 

Annuitants  on  Mortgage. — After  explaining  in  the  text 
the  loss  sustained  by  such  annuitants  in  one  point  of  view. 


[14]  Rise  of  Prices  during  the  War,  [App. 

it  is  fit  to  add  that  in  another,  viz.  keeping  up  the  rate  of 
interest,  the  effect  of  the  war  proved  favourable  to  them. 
Had  peace  continued  after  1792,  their  debtors,  instead  of 
continuing  to  pay  them  5  per  cent,  interest,  would  have  ob- 
tained loans  at  4  \  or  4  per  cent.,  and  would,  doubtless,  have 
availed  themselves  of  the  power  of  paying  off  or  reducing 
the  interest  on  their  mortgages,  in  the  manner  so  generally 
practised  during  the  last  and  present  year. 


[15] 


APPENDIX 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Our  Currency  and  Exchanges. 

On  the  Amount  of  Bank  of  England  Notes  in  Circulation. 
— The  circulation  of  money  is  generally  considered  under 
two  heads  ;  that  of  the  larger  sums,  which  takes  place  be- 
tween wholesale  dealers ;    and  that  of  the  smaller,  which 
applies  to  retail,  the  payment  of  wages,  and  other  petty 
transactions.     Between  wholesale  dealers  money  circulates 
with  rapidity :  bank  notes,  like  coin,  being  wholly  unproduc- 
tive, any  superfluous  stock  of  them  is  exchanged  as  quickly 
as  possible  for  mercantile  acceptances,  the  purchase  of  govern- 
ment stock,  or  other  securities  readily  controvertible  into  cash. 
In  London,  the  vicinity  of  bankers  to  each  other,  and  the 
power  of  receiving  an  immediate  supply  on  a  deposit  of 
securities,  enable  banking-houses  (Bullion  Report,  p.  26. 
and  Evidence,  p.  123.)  to  lessen  greatly  the  amount  kept  by 
them  as  a  reserve  or  unproductive  fund.     Add  to  this,  that 
whatever  renders  money  abundant  in  the  metropolis  has  a 
speedy  effect  on  the  kingdom  at  large ;    so  intimate  is  the 
connexion  between  town  and  country,  so  extensive  the  cor- 
respondence (Evidence  Bullion  Report,  pp.  123,  124,  125.) 
of  bill  and  money  agents.     If  we  assume  six  weeks  as  the 
medium  term  of  bills  discounted  at  the  bank,  and  suppose 
the  money  to  change  hands  once  in  two  days,  the  result  is 
that  100,000/.  thus  obtained  will,  in  the  course  of  the  six 
weeks  that  the  bill  remains  uncalled  for,  circulate  about 
2,000,000/.  of  merchandise.     How  great,  then,  must  have 
been  the  distress  of  trade  in  the  latter  months  of  1796,  and 
the  early  part  of  1797,  when  our  circulating  medium  was 
contracted  by  two  or  three  millions :    how  seasonable  the 


[16]  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  [Afp. 

relief  afforded  in  the  course  of  1797,  by  the  resumption  of 
discounts  on  their  former  scale ! 

An  increase  of  Bank  of  England  notes  is  not  conclusive 
proof  of  an  increase  of  our  circulating  medium  at  large. — If 
our  readers  are  reluctant  to  admit  this,  we  must  remind 
them  of  a  point  in  which  the  public  opinion  was  long 
equally  positive,  viz.  that  we  received  an  annual  sum  of 
money  from  foreign  countries,  in  payment  of  our  profits  or 
balance  of  trade.     This  was  a  favourite  notion  with  our 
ancestors,  and  is  still  a  prevalent  impression  among  our 
practical  men.     The  balance  was  even  reduced  to  specific 
computation,  the  received  mode  of  calculating  it  having 
been  to  deduct  the  amount  of  our  imports  from  that  of  our 
exports,    and  assume  that  the  difference  must  be  profit, 
payable  to  us  in  hard  cash  :  a  comfortable  doctrine,  cer- 
tainly, and  one  which,  had  it  been  well  founded,  would  have 
brought  among  us,  in  the  course  of  the  last  century,  a  sum 
little  short  of  400,000,000/.  sterling.     This  is  mentioned 
merely  as  an  example  of  the  hazard  of  deducing  an  infer- 
ence from  appearances  :  in  regard  to  the  present  question, 
the  increase  of  Bank  of  England  paper,  the  doubt  arises 
from  our  having  no  power  to  discriminate  how  far  such 
increase  forms  an  addition  to  our  circulation,  or  is  merely 
a  substitution  of  paper  for  coin  sent  abroad.     Or,  if  the 
state  of  exchange  be  considered  as  affording,  in  some  mea- 
sure, an  index  in  that  respect,  what  means  have  we  of  as- 
certaining another  material  point ;  viz.  how  far  an  extra 
issue  of  Bank  of  England  notes  may  not  be  a  substitution 
for  a  corresponding  amount  of  country  bank  paper  with- 
drawn from  circulation  ?     This  was,  doubtless,  the  case  in 
1810  and  1811,  a  time  when  a  number  of  country  banks 
became  either  insolvent  or  discredited  by  the  insolvency  of 
their  neighbours.     Again,  on  the  fall  of  prices  in  1815  and 
1816,  there  took  place  in  our  paper  currency  a  reduction  of 
several  millions  ;  but  as  the  Bank  of  England  experienced 
no  variation  of  consequence,  the  inference  is,  that  its  paper 
must   have   been  substituted   in   various   districts  for  the 
diminished  circulation  of  the  country  banks.     Finally,  we 
have  the  authority  of  both  the  Bullion  Report,  (p.  26.)  and 
of  that  of  the  Bank  Committee  of  1819,  that  no  satisfactory 
conclusions  are  to  be  drawn  from  the  amount  of  Bank  of 
England  paper  in  circulation ;  a  declaration  of  great  im- 
portance, since  the  increase  of  that  circulation  formed,  all 
along,  to  the    antagonists    of  the  bank,  the  fundamental 
argument  for  the  charge  of  over  issue. 


App.J  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  [17  j 

Fluctuations  in  the  Circulation  of  Bank  of  England  Notes. 
— Were  we  to  attempt  calculation  on  a  subject  necessarily 
conjectural,  we  mean  how  far  additions  to  the  circulation  of 
the  Bank  of  England  formed  an  increase  of  our  currency, 
or  were  merely  a  substitution  for  coin  sent  abroad,  we 
should  begin  by  considering  in  the  latter  sense  all  notes  of 
11.  and  21.,  and  confine  our  attention  to  the  fluctuations  in 
notes  of  5Z.  and  upwards.  The  addition  made  to  the  latter, 
in  the  years  1797  and  1798,  appears  to  have  done  little 
more  than  replace  the  contraction  caused  by  the  general 
embarrassment  and  distrust  of  the  early  years  of  the  war. 
In  1799,  1800,  and  1801,  there  took  place  an  increase  of 
nearly  two  millions,  proceeding  from  several  causes,  par- 
ticularly the  export  of  coin,  and  the  general  rise  in  the  price 
of  commodities.  From  the  end  of  1802  to  that  of  1808, 
there  was  hardly  any  increase ;  a  circumstance  in  a  high 
degree  remarkable,  when  we  consider  the  extension  of  our 
productive  industry,  the  farther  rise  of  prices,  and  the  con- 
tinued exemption  of  the  Bank  from  cash  payments.  From 
1809  to  1814  the  case  was  altogether  different,  the  circu- 
lation increasing  four,  five,  six,  and  even  seven  millions 
above  its  amount  in  the  preceding  period.  Of  this  the 
causes  were  various  ;  first,  the  almost  complete  export  of 
our  metallic  currency  ;  next,  the  discredit  ofcountry  banks 
after  the  insolvencies  of  1810;  but,  above  all,  the  rise  of 
prices  which,  at  this  period  of  the  war,  was  owing  chiefly 
to  the  depreciation  of  our  bank  paper. 

The  next  era  of  fluctuation  (1815  and  1816)  was  of  a 
very  different  character  :  it  affected  chiefly  the  country- 
banks,  and  was  evidently  a  consequence  of  the  general  fall 
of  prices,  multiplied  failures,  and  stagnation  of  business. 
The  amount  of  this  contraction  has  not  been  ascertained 
with  any  accuracy  ;  but  from  the  returns  inserted  towards 
the  close  of  the  Report  of  the  Bank  Committee  of  1819, 
it  seems  to  have  exceeded  8,000,000/. ;  a  sum  which,  large 
as  it  was,  appears  to  have  been  nearly  counterpoised  by  the 
re-extension  of  country-bank  circulation  on  the  rise  of  prices 
in  1817  and  1818. 

Since  the  peace,  what  have  been  the  causes  affecting  the 
circulation  of  the  Bank  of  England  ?  The  substitution,  on 
a  greater  or  less  scale,  of  coin  for  paper  ;  the  rise  or  fall  of 
prices  ;  and,  what  is  closely  connected  with  that  rise  or  fall, 
the  credit  or  discredit  of  our  provincial  banks. 

Circulation  of  Provincial  Banks. — To  ascertain  the 
amount  of  country-bank  paper  in  circulation  would  be  an 


[18]  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  [App. 

object  of  great  interest  and  importance ;  at  present  our 
means  of  calculating  it  are  very  inadequate,  and  must  con- 
tinue so  while  private  banks  are  so  numerous  and  on  so 
small  a  scale.  The  Bank  of  England,  placed  above  the 
hazard  of  discredit,  declares  openly  its  circulation  :  private 
bankers  require,  or  conceive  that  they  require,  the  aid  of 
secrecy.  This  will,  in  all  probability,  continue  until 
the  arrival  of  the  much-desired  period,  when  the  coun- 
try at  large  shall  be  admitted  to  the  advantage  at  present 
enjoyed  by  Scotland  alone,  we  mean  that  of  having  an  un- 
limited number  of  partners  in  country  banks.  The  con- 
sequence would  be,  a  stability  beyond  all  doubt ;  and  the 
accumulation  in  a  limited  number  of  great  establishments 
(chartered  banks)  of  that  business  which  is  at  present 
broken  into  small,  and  frequently  insecure  fragments.  (See 
the  evidence  of  E.  Gilchrist  before  the  Bullion  Commit- 
tee, 1810  ;  also  Mr  Joplin's  pamphlet  on  Country  Banks.) 

The  Exemption  from  Cash  Payments. — To  exempt  banks 
from  cash  payments  was  a  measure  altogether  new  in  the 
history  of  finance,  and  the  necessity  for  it  is  to  be  sought 
in  difficulties  that  were  peculiar  to   ourselves.      France, 
Austria,  and  most  other  countries,  know  no  mode  of  carry- 
ing on  war  but  by  furnishing  men  and  military  stores  ;  but 
after  1795,  England,  in  a  great  measure,  exchanged   this 
plan  for  the  payment  of  subsidies.    Then  as  to  an  occasional 
demand  for  a  very  different  purpose,  the  supply  of  corn, 
the  lower  classes  in  most  countries  of  the  Continent,  on  the 
occurrence  of  scarcity,  have  recourse  to  coarse  substitutes, 
or,  being  immersed  in  a  poverty   of  which   we   have  no 
idea,  often  fall  victims  to  unhealthy  food,  sometimes  to  ab- 
solute want ;  while,  in  a  wealthy  community  like  England, 
an  export  of  the  circulating  medium  is  made  the  means  of 
obtaining  relief.     Now,  though  the  sums  sent  abroad  are 
in  either  case  less  great  than  they  appear,  our  subsidies 
being  furnished  in  a  great  degree,  in  stores,  and  our  corn 
paid,  in  some  measure,  by  manufactures,  the  drain  takes 
place  from  a  stream  already  sufficiently  small  for  its  channel ; 
for  in  no  country  is  there  more  of  circulating  medium  than 
is  indispensable  for  the  transaction  of  business.     This  is  ap- 
parent from  various  circumstances  ;  from  the  rapidity  with 
which  money  is  made  to  circulate  from  dealer  to  dealer  ; 
also,  from  a  recent  and  striking  fact,  the  distress  that  oc- 
curred in  France  in  the  autumn  of  1818,  when,  notwith- 
standing the  enjoyment  of  peace  and  free  trade,  the  abstrac- 
tion of  a  part  of  the  metallic  currency  led  to  the  most 


App.J  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  [19] 

distressing  results;  an  immediate  reduction  of  discounts,  a 
general  fall  of  prices,  and  a  long  list  of  bankruptcies. 

From  difficulties  of  this  nature  we  were  relieved  by  that 
decisive  measure,  the  exemption  of  our  banks  from  cash  pay- 
ments :  after  its  adoption  no  scarcity  of  money  was  expe- 
rienced in  the  years  of  our  heaviest  continental  demands  :  its 
effect,  in  fact,  was  to  remove  present  pressure  by  incurring 
the  hazard  of  depreciation,  and  of  a  great  ultimate  addition 
to  our  debt. 

The  Time  of  its  Operation, — A  considerable  time  elapsed 
before  the  operation  of  the  act  was  fairly  tried.  In  1797 
and  1 798,  our  financial  affairs  were  prosperous ;  our  con- 
tinental exchanges  were  favourable  ;  and  the  suspension  of 
subsidies  and  corn  imports  would,  without  the  exemption, 
have  restored  confidence  in  our  money  market :  when 
concurrent  with  it  and  with  a  vigorous  increase  of  tax- 
ation, they  raised  the  funds  and  added  largely  to  the 
command  of  money  on  the  part  of  our  merchants,  our 
manufacturers,  our  agriculturists.  It  was  not  till  the 
autumn  of  1799,  that  the  aid  expected  from  the  act  was 
put  fairly  to  the  test ;  our  allies  required  large  payments  ; 
our  deficient  harvest  necessitated  a  great  import ;  and  both 
were  supplied  without  the  pecuniary  embarrassment  expe- 
rienced before  the  exemption.  The  means  now  adopted 
were,  the  export  of  our  coin  to  the  Continent,  and  the 
substitution  of  bank  paper :  the  result  a  partial  depreci- 
ation (between  3  and  5  per  cent.)  of  bank  notes  relatively 
to  coin. 

In  1800,  notwithstanding  the  continuance  of  continental 
demands  both  for  subsidies  and  the  purchase  of  corn, 
both  government  and  the  mercantile  world  still  escaped 
pressure  from  scarcity  of  money,  and  thus  got  over  an 
interval  of  greater  pressure  than  any  in  the  early  years  of 
the  war.  The  experiment  had  not,  indeed,  been  made 
with  impunity  :  we  had  exhausted  our  coin,  and  could  not 
have  undergone  such  another  trial  without  a  great  depre- 
ciation of  our  paper.  This  was,  doubtless,  felt  by  Mr  Pitt, 
and  may  be  ranked  among  his  principal  motives  for 
resigning  and  advising  peace  ;  but  the  shock  was  not  per- 
ceived by  the  public,  and  was  evidently  of  a  nature  to  be 
repaired  in  a  season  of  tranquillity. 

Increase  of  Discounts  explained. — The  Bullion  Committee 
in  their  Report  (p.  26.)  animadverted  emphatically  on  the 
Great  increase  that  had  taken  place  in  Hie  amount  of  c\\*- 


[20]  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  [Apr. 

counts  by  the  Bank  of  England,  between  1797  and  1810. 
This  they  ascribed  to  over-issue,  but  they  omitted  to  make 
allowance  for  the  operation  of  several  causes  of  a  wholly  dif- 
ferent nature.  Thus,  after  the  Exemption  Act,  the  notes 
of  the  Bank  of  England  were  made  to  replace  the  cash 
reserve  of  every  banker  in  the  kingdom,  and  supplies  of 
these  notes  could  be  obtained  only  by  discount.  Hence, 
the  adoption  of  a  practice,  which,  in  the  last  age,  would 
have  been  deemed  not  a  little  extraordinary  by  the  cautious 
veterans  of  Lombard  Street, — that  of  London  bankers 
opening,  like  merchants,  accounts  with  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land ;  and,  when  in  want  of  money,  sending  thither  bills 
for  discount,  in  preference  to  a  sale  of  Exchequer  bills  or 
stock.  If  the  reserve  fund  of  all  the  country  banks  of  the 
kingdom,  previous  to  the  Exemption  Act,  be  calculated 
at  4,000,000/.,  we  need  be  at  no  loss  to  account  for  a  very 
large  addition  to  the  demands  for  discount  on  the  Bank  of 
England. 

The  Rate  of  Interest. — Our  last  reference  to  facts,  or, 
as  the  French  express  it,  to  les  choses  positives,  regards  the 
rate  of  interest  which,  notwithstanding  the  magnitude  of 
our  war  expense,  rose  only  one  per  cent,  above  its  average 
rate  in  peace.  This  was  certainly  a  very  moderate  differ- 
ence, and  owing,  in  a  great  measure,  to  the  substitution  of 
war  taxes  for  loans  ;  to  our  raising  so  large  a  portion  of 
our  supplies  within  the  year.  It  was  owing,  also,  in  a  very 
considerable  degree,  to  the  advantage  arising  to  bankers, 
from  the  Exemption  Act ;  an  advantage  founded,  in  the 
case  of  provincial  banks,  on  the  saving  of  their  reserve 
or  dead  fund,  and  wholly  distinct  from  a  power  to  in- 
crease their  issues  ad  libitum.  Had  the  latter  been  prac- 
ticable, would  not  so  gainful  a  business  have  been  followed 
more  extensively,  and  would  not  interest  soon  have  been 
reduced  by  an  eager  competition,  from  five  to  four  per 
cent.?* 

The  Exemption  Act  considered  as  an  economising  Expe- 
dient.-.— The  use  of  bank  paper  is  a  refinement  enabling 
a  community  to  turn  to  account  a  large  proportion,  sup- 
pose the  half,  of  a  currency  which  would  otherwise  be 
wholly  unproductive.     The  exemption  from  cash  payments 

*  For  farther  arguments  on  the  limited  power  of  banks,  see  a  pam- 
phlet entitled  "  Observations  on  the  Depreciation  of  Money ;"  also,  a- 
second  pamphlet,  entitled  "  Farther  Observations ;"  both  published  in 
1811,  by  Robert  Wilson,  Esq.  Accountant:,  and  one  of  the  Directors  of 
the  Bank  of  Scotland. 


App.]  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  [21] 

is  a  farther  refinement,  enabling  bankers  to  hold,  at  the  dis- 
posal of  their  customers,  the  chief  part  of  their  reserve 
fund ;  which,  for  the  sake  of  precision,  we  shall  consider  a 
fourth  of  the  paper  currency  in  the  country.  Now,  to  keep  the 
reserve  fund  as  low  as  is  compatible  with  security,  has  long 
been  the  wish  of  our  bankers,  and  the  object  of  a  variety  of 
arrangements  :  of  these,  by  far  the  most  effectual  is  that  by 
which  they  settle  their  daily  balances  against  each  other, 
amounting  (Evidence  to  the  Bullion  Report,  p.  151.)  to  the 
very  large  sum  of  5,000,000Z.  daily,  by  an  exchange  of 
cheques,  without  having  occasion  to  use  more  than  a  tenth 
of  the  sum  in  bank  notes.     Of  the  same  nature,  are  certain 
facilities  given  at  the  Bank  of  England,  in  regard  to  the 
hour  at  which  a  banking  house  makes  its  payment  for  the 
day ;  as  well  as  the  employment  of  money  agents  or  middle- 
men (Evidence,  Bullion  Report,  p.   124.)    in    obtaining 
sums  from  one  banker  for  another,  at  very  short  notice. 
These  various  modes  of  lessening  the  amount  of  a  dead 
stock  are  both  ingenious  and  legitimate,  affording  a  striking 
proof  of  the  advantages  attendant  on  a  great  commercial 
community,  on  mutual  confidence,  and  vicinity  of  position. 
A  farther  saving  of  this  nature  would  have  formed  one  of 
the  leading  features  of  Mr.  Ricardo's  "  plan  for  an  econo- 
mical and  secure  currency."     Now,  the  result,  which,  on  a 
comparative  small  scale,  was   attained  by  these  arrange- 
ments, was  accomplished,  en  grand,    by  the  Exemption 
Act ;  which,  by  one  decisive  provision,  enabled  bankers  to 
dispense  with  the  most  expensive  and  anxious  part  of  their 
business.     So  far  as  regarded  circulation  at  home,  its  effect 
partook  of  the  beneficial  character  of  the  economising  ex- 
pedients; its  weak  side  was  towards  the  Continent,  and 
there  accordingly  was  received  the  wound  which  proved  the 
source  of  so  much  pain  and  disquietude  after  1809. 

Report  of  the  Bullion  Committee. — This  document,  the 
merits  of  which  have  been  so  differently  estimated,  may  be 
read  with  interest  even  at  present,  when  the  subject  has  re- 
ceived so  much  additional  elucidation,  both  from  research 
and  from  events  that  have  intervened.  The  passages  in  the 
Report  which  treat  of  the  regulation  of  money  and  ex- 
change, whatever,  in  short,  can  be  termed  an  exposition  of 
general  principles,  are  remarkable  for  accuracy  and  clear- 
ness :  those  of  a  different  character  are  to  be  found  in  the 
latter  part  (pp.  23,  24.),  and  are  open  to  censure,  chiefly 
as  implying:  a  belief  that  the  Bank  had  the  means  of  in- 


[22]  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  [App. 

creasing  its  issues  at  discretion,  as  if  the  public  were  wholly 
without  the  power  of  checking  the  circulation,  a  power  so 
clearly  illustrated  by  Mr.  Bosanquet,  in  his  "  Practical  Ob- 
servations on  the  Report." 

Of  the  extent  of  misconception  conveyed  by  disseminat- 
ing the  opinion  that  "  the  rise  of  prices  was  owing  chiefly  to 
our  bank  paper,"  some  idea  may  be  formed  from  one  simple 
fact.  The  total  rise  of  prices  between  1797  and  1810  was 
above  30  per  cent. ;  and  of  that  not  more  than  5  or  6  per 
cent,  was  at  that  time  attributable  to  the  non-convertibility 
of  our  paper.  (See  the  Essay  on  Money  in  Napier's 
Supplement,  p.  526.)  In  this,  we  refer  to  the  declaration 
of  an  eminent  bullionist,  (Mr.  M'Culloch,)  and  cite  his  au- 
thority in  contradiction  to  that  of  the  Bullion  Committee 
itself. 

Another  serious  error,  or  rather  omission  in  the  Report, 
is  an  inattention  to  the  "  effect  on  the  exchange  of  our  sub- 
sidies and  corn  purchases."  An  admission  is,  indeed,  made 
(p.  16.)  in  general  terms,  of  the  effect  of  political  and  mer- 
cantile transactions ;  but  the  impression  conveyed  by  it  is 
lessened  by  other  passages  (p.  21,  he.)  in  which  the  effects 
in  question  are  treated  as  slight,  and  the  result  of  the  stop- 
page of  American  intercourse  with  the  Continent  is  wholly 
passed  over. 

That  the  authors  of  the  Report  had  deferred  for  a  season 
the  formation  of  their  conclusions  on  a  subject  so  new  and 
complex,  had  certainly  been  desirable  ;  but  there  seems  no 
ground  for  the  suspicion  of  their  being  actuated  by  party 
feeling.  Their  labours  give  evidence  of  great  research  and 
solicitude  for  truth  ;  while  the  imperfections  in  their  rea- 
soning admit  of  explanation  from  circumstances  similar  to 
those  to  which  we  have  alluded  in  the  text ;  in  particular, 
the  fact,  that  so  much  of  the  information  now  before  the 
public  was  either  unknown  or  very  imperfectly  disclosed  to 
them.  Thus,  a  witness  of  evident  ability,  and  in  the  habit 
of  very  extensive  discount  transactions,  gave  (p.  124.)  the 
following  evidence  : 

"  Do  you  know,  in  point  of  fact,  whether  such  transac- 
tions as  you  have  now  described,  were  in  practice  previous 
to  the  suspension  of  the  cash  payments  of  the  Bank  ? — Yes  ; 
tiiey  were. 

"  Do  you  know  whether  they  were  practised  to  a  similar 
extent  ? — No  ;  they  were  not. 

"  In  what  proportion,  compared  with  the  present  time  ? — 
I  cannot  form  anv  exact  criterion. 


App.J  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  [23] 

"  Crfn  you  state  to  the  Committee,  the  cause  of  such  dif- 
ference ? — I  believe  it  to  be  on  account  of  the  increase  of 
country  paper,  and  also  Bank  of  England  paper." 

When  a  witness  of  such  intelligence,  in  accounting  for 
the  augmentation  of  discounts,  leaves  out  of  consideration 
the  effects  of  the  increase  of  our  population  and  productive 
industry  from  1797  to  1810,  we  need  hardly  wonder  that 
they  should  have  escaped  the  attention  of  the  Committee. 
In  fact,  the  errors  of  the  latter  may  be  easily  accounted  for. 
The  chief  writer  of  the  Report,  however  temperate,  impar- 
tial, and  likely  to  rise  in  reputation,  had  his  life  been  pro- 
longed, was  a  stranger  to  the  practice  of  business  ;  and 
could  not,  from  his  youth,  have  had  much  acquaintance 
with  the  state  of  our  money  transactions  previous  to  1797. 
Of  his  coadjutors,  one  was  a  banker,  never  remarkable  for 
clearness  or  accuracy ;  another,  a  man  of  undoubted  ability, 
but  at  that  time  new,  as  he  has  himself  admitted,*  to  ques- 
tions of  this  nature.  Accordingly,  in  historical  and  com- 
mercial matter  the  Report  is  very  defective ;  no  notice  is 
taken  in  it  of  the  pecuniary  embarrassments  of  1795  and 
.1796,  arising  from  the  double  drain  of  specie  for  subsidies 
and  corn;  nor  is  tHe  recurrence  of  these  causes  in  1799  or 
1 809  adverted  to,  although  it  was  to  them  that  we  owed  the 
chief  increase  of  our  bank  notes.  Nothing  would  have  con- 
tributed so  much  to  obtain  the  conviction  of  the  mercantile 
body,  we  may  say  of  the  public  at  large,  as  a  course  of  rea- 
soning supported  by  facts.  Such  an  inquiry,  conducted 
with  the  candour  that  marks  the  Report,  and  was  so  con- 
spicuous in  the  general  parliamentary  conduct  of  Mr.  Hor- 
ner, would  have  led  to  several  very  important  conclusions  ; 
— to  an  estimate  of  the  share  in  depreciation  to  be  ascribed 
in  the  first  place  to  the  expenditure  then  making  in  Spain  ; 
next,  to  the  corn  imports  then  in  progress  from  the  Conti- 
nent ;  and,  lastly,  to  the  interruption  of  the  trade  of  the 
United  States.  Had  the  effect  of  the  last  been  proved  to 
be  considerable,  the  inquiry  might  perhaps  have  led  to  a 
most  desirable  measure — the  repeal  of  our  Orders  in  Coun- 
cil before  the  United  States  resorted  to  the  alternative  of 
war. 

Questions  at  issue  between  the  Opponents  and  Supporters  of 
the  Bullion  Report. — The  points  most  strongly  contested 
between  the  opposite  parties  in  the  bullion  question  were 

*  Huskinson  on  the  Depreciation  of  our  Currency,  l'JIO. 


[24 j  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  [Apf. 

two ; — first,  the  cause  of  the  fall  of  our  exchanges ;  and, 
next,  the  cause  of  the  progressive  enhancement  of  commo- 
dities. As  to  the  former,  the  events  of  1815  showed,  be- 
yond doubt,  that  the  primary  cause  of  fluctuations  in  the 
exchange  was  to  be  sought  in  continental  transactions,  how- 
ever much  the  non-convertibility  of  our  paper  might  affect 
the  degree  and  duration  of  the  fall.  The  second  question 
is  more  complicated,  and  there  is  still  no  small  difficulty  in 
convincing  the  bullionists  that  the  operation  of  our  non- 
convertible  paper  was  passive,  and  necessarily  posterior  to 
the  rise  of  prices.  They  will  not,  however,  refuse  their 
attention  to  facts,  or  deny  that  a  very  general  rise  of  prices 
took  place  prior  to  1797  ;  nor  will  they  object  to  admit  in- 
ferences from  the  case  of  the  agriculturists,  the  class  whose 
circumstances  operate  most  directly  on  the  circulation  of 
country  banks. 

Connexion  between  the  Circumstances  of  our  Agriculturists 
and  the  Circulation  of  Country  Banks. — The  continued  in- 
adequacy of  our  growth  of  corn  rendered  the  war  a  period 
of  activity  in  regard  to  enclosures,  drainages,  and  other  ag- 
ricultural improvements  :  prices  were  carried  to  30,  50,  and 
in  the  latter  years  of  the  war  to  100  per  cent,  beyond  those 
of  peace,  requiring  thus  twice  the  sum  to  purchase  the  same 
commodities.     Wages  rose  progressively  ;  the  style  of  living 
of  the  farmer,  and  even  of  their  labourers,  was  visibly  im- 
proved.    Observe  the  reverse  of  the  picture  as  exhibited  in 
1815  and  1816  :  prices  and  wages  had  fallen  surprisingly; 
enclosures,  drainages,  and  other  improvements,  were  discou- 
raged ;  the  style  of  house-keeping  on  the  part  of  the  farmers 
was  lowered,  and  a  far  smaller  sum  of  currency  was  found 
sufficient  for  their  transactions.     In  1817  the  high  prices  of 
corn  brought  back  activity  in  agricultural  improvements,  and 
(see  the  Report  of  the  Bank  Committee  of  1819)  a  renewed 
increase  of  paper  currency.    During  the  last  four  years  the 
picture  has  been  for  the  fourth  time  reversed ;  prices  have 
fallen  greatly,  and  with  them  the  circulation  of  bank  paper. 

Prices  of  Merchandise. — In  regard  to  these  also,  a  simi- 
lar course  of  reasoning  will  be  found  to  hold  :  the  adoption 
of  a  paper  currency  tended,  doubtless,  to  promote  en- 
hancement ;  but  the  primary  causes  of  it  are  to  be  sought  in 
the  war  demand,  or  (see  Tooke  on  High  and  Low  Prices) 
in  unfavourable  seasons  and  obstructions  to  mercantile  in- 
tercourse. It  is  a  fact  that  almost  all  articles  experienced 
<i  fall  at  the  peace  before  the  reduction  of  bank  paper. 


App.J  Our  Currency,  and  Exchanges.  [25] 

The  power  of  Banks  overrated. — We  thus  consider  our 
banks  as  following  the  course  of  circumstances,  and  as 
taking  no  lead,  either  in  extending  or  contracting  their  issues. 
Those  who  think  otherwise,  and  who  regard  our  banks  as 
both  possessing  and  exercising  the  power  of  over-issue,  are 
pledged  to  show  how  it  happened  that  these  potent  associ- 
ations did  not  thus  act  at  a  much  earlier  period.  Why  did 
our  banks  defer  until  1809,  that  which  they  might  have  done 
in  1797,  at  all  events  in  1803  ?  On  referring  to  the  Bullion 
Report,  we  shall  find  (p.  25.)  that  this  difficulty  is  noticed, 
but  not  explained ;  and  that  the  Committee,  in  pointing 
out  two  periods  of  extended  issue,  at  the  distance  of  more 
than  seven  years  from  each  other  (1801  and  1809),  were 
wholly  unable  to  give  reasons  for  the  circulation  remaining 
stationary  during  that  long  interval.  Farther,  if  our  banks 
possessed  this  lucrative  power,  why  suspend  its  exercise  at 
the  peace  of  1814,  so  long  before  the  act  for  the  resump- 
tion of  cash  payments  ? 

Inefficacy  of  an  Exemption  from  Cash  Payments  in  Peace. 
— We  proceed  to  address  a  few  sentences  in  the  same  style 
to  a  very  different  class  of  persons ;  to  those  who,  suffering 
under  the  depressed  price  of  merchandise  or  agricultural 
produce,  regret  that  the  exemption  from  cash  payments 
should  not  have  been  made  a  permanent  part  of  our  policy. 
These  persons  cannot  be  aware  that  in  peace  this  exemp- 
tion would  be  of  very  rare  and  limited  operation :  it  was  in 
existence  during  1819  and  1820,  yet  our  prices  continued 
progressively  falling  ;  in  other  words,  the  value  of  money 
progressively  rose.  The  exemption  from  cash  payments 
was,  then,  in  one  point  of  view,  unnecessary  ;  in  another,  it 
was  inoperative.  That  it  was  unnecessary,  was  shown  by  the 
ease  with  which  discounts  were  obtained ;  that  it  was  inoper- 
ative, appeared  from  our  exchanges  keeping  at  or  above 
par.  Yet  so  little  is  this  understood,  that  in  the  various  de- 
bates on  the  subject  in  the  House  of  Commons  (e.  g.  9th 
April,  1821,)  the  majority  of  our  parliamentary  guides 
attribute  the  great  fall  in  prices  to  the  return  to  a  metallic 
standard  ;  as  if  a  state  of  peace  and  a  favourable  harvest 
were  of  little  account,  and  the  power  of  keeping  up  prices 
was  actually  vested  in  our  banks. 

Is  it  not  apparent  that  in  peace,  when  our  exchanges 
are  brought  down  by  only  one  great  cause,  an  occasional 
necessity  for  importing  corn,  the  exemption  from  cash  pay- 
ments would  be  available  only  in  a  year  like  1817.  when 

w 


[26]  Our  Currency  md  Exchanges.  [Aff 

the  deficiency  of  the  preceding  crop  led  to  a  sudden  de- 
mand on  our  neighbours,  and  when  the  exemption  from 
cash  payments  would  enable  us  to  send  abroad  several  mil- 
lions of  our  metallic  currency  ? 

Mr  PeeVs  Bill. — Those  who  ascribe  our  present  embar- 
rassments to  Mr.  Peel's  Bill,  and  the  resumption  of  cash- 
payments,  would  do  well  to  consider  that  no  legislative 
arrangement  has  the  power  of  converting  a  banker  into  a 
capitalist.  The  object  of  the  latter  is  to  obtain  interest  for 
his  money,  without  the  trouble  or  hazard  of  active  business  ; 
while  a  banker  is  necessarily  a  man  of  business,  and  sel- 
dom a  man  of  large  capital.  His  funds,  arising  chiefly 
from  deposit,  and  being  subject  to  sudden  demands,  must 
be  vested  in  securities  easily  vendible,  such  as  mercantile 
acceptances,  exchequer  bills,  or  government  stock.  Any 
deviation  from  this  course,  any  advance  of  money  made  on 
land,  houses,  or  property  of  doubtful  sale,  is  at  variance 
with  the  rules  of  his  business,  and  never  fails  to  be  attended 
with  embarrassment  or  loss. 

Publications  on  the  subject  of  Exchange. —The  present 
age  has  been  fertile  in  essays  on  the  principles  of  exchange, 
among  which  the  most  entitled  to  attention  are  :  the;  remarks 
in  the  Bullion  Report,  (pp.  10,  1 1. )  ;  Mr.  W.  Blake's  pam- 
phlet, entitled  "  Observations  on  Exchange,"  published 
in  1810;  and  an  essay  by  Mr.  J.  R.  M'Culloch,  under  the 
head  of  "  Exchange,"  in  the  Supplement  to  the  Encyclo- 
paedia Britannica.  The  last  claims  our  attention,  not  only 
as  an  able  and  comprehensive  treatise,  but  as  differing  in  its 
general- tone  from  the  arguments  advanced  in  the  text;  a 
difference,  however,  which  on  an  attentive  examination, 
will  be  found  less  considerable  than  it  appears. 

Correspondence  between  our  reasoning  and  that  of  Mr. 
M*  Gulloch. — Mr.  M.  in  maintaining  (Essay  on  Exchange, 
p.  220.)  that  corn  purchases  or  expenditure  abroad  have 
no  permanent  effect  on  the  exchange,  does  not  deny  that 
their  temporary  effect  is  great.  Such  is  also  our  doctrine, 
as  exemplied  in  the  tabular  statement  in  the  text :  the  fall 
in  our  exchange  was  not  permanent  at  all  till  1800,  nor 
permanent  in  a  high  degree,  till  1809;  and  in  both  cases  it 
became,  after  a  certain  time,  nominal. 

Farther,  a  fall  in  the  computed  exchange,  when  there  is 
no  exemption  from  cash  payments,  is  recovered  during  the 
continuance  of  the  pressure,  but  when  such  exemption  sub- 


Vpp.  j  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  [27} 

sists,  the  currency  loses  its  reinstating  potver,  and  becoming 
depreciated,  the  exchange  continues  depressed  until  the  re- 
action of  causes,  mercantile  or  political,  restore  the  value 
of  the  currency.  Of  both  we  have  had  striking  examples 
in  the  present  age  :  the  fall  of  our  exchange  in  1795  and 

1796,  was  redressed  in  the  end  of  1796,  and  beginning  of 

1797,  before  the  termination  of  our  subsidy  to  Austria; 
whereas  the  fall  in  1800,  and  still  more  that  in  1809,  and 
continued,  until  the  conclusion  of  peace  entirely  altered  the 
nature  of  our  connexion  with  the  Continent. 

Fluctuations  in  the  Exchange  in  1815. — We  have  dwelt 
in  the  text  on  the  fluctuations  of  the  exchange  in  1815, 
viz.  on  its  sudden  fall  on  the  renewal  of  continental  hos- 
tilities, and  its  no  less  sudden  rise  on  the  prospect  of  their 
termination.  Both  are  evidently  accordant  with  the  gene- 
ral admission  in  the  Essay  in  question  (p.  220.),  of  the 
great  temporary  effects  of  foreign  demand.  They  require, 
therefore,  no  farther  notice,  except  as  to  the  extent  of  the 
fall  in  April  and  May,  1815,  which  (nearly  20  per 
cent.)  was  very  great,  open  as  the  Continent  then  was  to 
our  exports. 

But  does  not  this  extent  of  fall  furnish  a  strong  presump- 
tion in  favour  of  another  part  of  our  reasoning  on  this  in- 
tricate subject,  viz  :  our  mode  of  accounting  for  the  great 
and  continued  depression  of  the  exchange  during  the  years 
1811,  1812,  1813?  The  demands  on  us  from  the  Conti- 
nent, say  the  bullionists,  were  not  great  in  these  years  ; 
but  admitting  the  correctness  of  Mr.  M'Cu) loch's  statement 
(Essay  on  Exchange,  p.  222.),  that  our  remittances  to  the 
Continent  for  corn  and  subsidies  did  not  much  exceed 
2,000,000/.  sterling,  in  each  of  these  years,  we  consider 
even  that  sum  sufficient  to  continue  the  depression,  England 
being  then  wholly  exhausted  of  the  precious  metals,  the 
counterpoising  effect  of  the  American  trade  removed,  and 
our  exports  to  the  Continent  greatly  cramped. 

Reduction  of  Country-Bank  Paper. — In  regard  to  the  di- 
minution of  country-bank  paper,  which  took  place  in  1815 
and  1816,  we  agree  with  Mr.  M'Culloch  as  to  the  fact,  and 
are  not  disposed  to  dissent  from  his  estimate  of  the  extent 
of  the  reduction  :  the  difference  lies  in  our  considering  this 
reduction  as  posterior  to  a  fall  of  prices,  exactly  as  we  con- 
sider the  augmented  issue  during  the  war  and  in  1817  as 
posterior  to  their  rise. 


[28]  Our  Currency  and  Exchanges.  [App. 

Depreciation. — Lastly,  as  to  the  extent  of  depreciation 
arising  from  the  Exemption  Act.  That  the  unfavourable 
balance  of  exchange  from  1809  to  1814  was  chiefly  nomi- 
nal, and  that  in  regard  to  continental  payments  our  bank 
paper  was  depreciated  to  the  extent  denoted  by  the  course 
of  exchange,  we  readily  admit.  But  as  the  use  of  our 
bank  paper  was  to  circulate  commodities  at  home,  and  as 
the  rise  of  prices  consequent  on  its  continental  deprecia- 
tion was  by  no  means  immediate,  we  have,  we  conceive, 
made  a  fair  allowance  in  taking  the  average  of  home  de- 
preciation at  somewhat  more  than  the  half  of  the  foreign  : 
meaning,  that  if  in  Spain  or  Germany  125/.  in  notes  were 
required  in  1812,  to  pay  for  that  which  might  have  been 
purchased  for  100/.  in  metallic  currency,  the  proportion  at 
home  was  probably  10  per  cent,  less  ;  115/.  in  notes  pur- 
chasing what,  without  the  exemption  from  cash  payments, 
might  have  been  had  for  100/. 


[29] 


APPENDIX 


TO 


CHAPTER  V. 


Effect  of  increasing  Population  on  the  Price  of  Corn, — 
The  reasoning  in  the  text  enables  us  to  correct  a  very  ma- 
terial part  of  the  Report  of  the  Agricultural  Committee. 
The  writers  of  that  Report,  in  adverting  (p.  11.)  to  the 
chance  of  a  future  deficiency  of  harvest,  advance  an  opinion 
that  the  magnitude  of  our  consumption,  as  compared  with 
that  of  former  periods,  must  render  the  pressure  of  defi- 
ciency more  severe,  and  the  means  of  providing  against  it 
more  difficult. 

"  A  harvest,"  they  add,  "  which  should  be  one-third 
below  an  average  in  wheat,  would  bring  on  this  country  a 
very  different  degree  of  suffering,  and  would  require  a  very 
different  degree  of  exertion  and  sacrifice,  to  supply  the 
deficiency,  from  what  would  have  been  required  under  a 
similar  failure  fifty  years  ago."  But  to  this  opinion  of  the 
Committee  we  must  oppose  a  recent  and  highly  important 
fact ;  viz.  that  though  the  harvest  of  1 816  was  (Evidence  of 
Mr.  Hodgson,  p.  264.)  a  full  third  below  the  average  of  our 
wheat  crop,  yet  the  degree  of  public  suffering  was  less  intense 
than  would  have  been  experienced  under  a  similar  failure 
fifty  years  before.     For  this  there  are  several  reasons  : — 

1st.  If  the  agricultural  part  of  our  countrymen  increase 
their  numbers  in  proportion  to  the  consumers ;  if  the 
amount  of  produce  depend  on  the  extent  of  labour  and 
capital  applied  to  cultivation  ;  and  if  a  recourse  to  the  in- 
ferior soils  mentioned  repeatedly  in  the  Report  (and  in 
Mr.  Ricardo's  well-known  work  on  Political  Economy  and 
Taxation)  be  far  less  necessary  than  an  improved  cultivation 
of  the  better  soils  ;  we  stand  nearly  in  the  situation  of  our 
forefathers,  and  find  the  prospect  of  adequacy  of  supply 
very  little  affected  by  the  increase  of  our  numbers;  becar^ 


[30 j  On  Agriculture.  [Apr. 

that  increase  brings  with  it  the  power  of  augmenting  our 
labour,  and,  consequently,  our  produce. 

2dly.  If  such  be  the  case  at  home,  the  chance  of  relief 
from  abroad  is  decidedly  improved  since  the  extension  of 
tillage  in  the  course  of  the  last  and  present  age.  The  sur- 
face of  corn  country  in  Europe,  we  mean  of  country  pro- 
ducing corn  in  sufficiency  for  export,  was  formerly  far 
from  large  ;  comprising  only  Great  Britain,  Ireland,  the 
North  of  France,  and  North  of  Germany,  with  part  of 
Denmark  and  Poland.  We  have  explained  in  the  text 
(p.  150.)  the  similarity  of  temperature  prevalent  throughout 
this  tract,  which  is  almost  all  maritime,  and  presents  no 
very  material  difference  of  latitude.  Hence  a  deficiency  of 
crop,  whether  arising  from  blight  as  in  1811,  or  from  ex- 
cess of  rain  as  in  1809  and  1816,  was  more  or  less  com- 
mon to  the  whole.  But  in  the  last  and  present  age,  tillage 
has  been  extended  in  the  interior  of  Poland,  and  on  the 
shores  of  the  Euxine  ;  countries  differing  considerably  from 
ours  in  climate,  and  not  likely  to  be  affected  by  the  causes 
which  create  disappointment  in  the  north-west  of  Europe. 
As  yet  the  produce  in  these  countries  is  far  from  large,  but 
the  improvements  now  taking  place  in  river  navigation  bid 
fair  to  facilitate  the  access  to  several  fertile  tracts  hitherto 
in  a  manner  excluded  from  communication  with  the  sea. 
Add  to  this,  that  a  similar  prospect  is  presented  by  the 
increased  cultivation  of  the  United  States  of  America.  To 
expect  a  very  extensive  supply  from  either  would,  on  account 
of  the  distance,  be  absurd ;  but  in  a  year  of  scarcity,  an  im- 
port to  the  extent  of  only  a  week  or  a  fortnight's  consump- 
tion has  a  very  sensible  effect  on  our  corn  market. 

It  follows  that  the  result,  in  the  present  age  at  least,  is 
very  different  from  the  anticipation  of  the  Committee.  The 
progress  of  improvement,  and  the  extension  of  communi- 
cation between  different  countries,  which  are  the  accom- 
paniments of  augmented  population,  have  a  very  beneficial 
effect  on  the  supply  of  corn  :  they  widen  the  range  of  pur- 
chase, enable  one  nation  to  come  to  the  relief  of  another, 
and  convert  into  the  mitigated  form  of  scarcity  those  failures 
of  harvest,  which,  in  remote  ages,  were  followed  by  all  the 
horrors  of  famine. 

National  Disadvantage  of  a  high  Price  of  Corn. — After 
all  that  we  have  urged  on  the  vital  importance  to  the 
country  of  the  prosperity  of  agriculture,  we  may,  without 
suspicion  of  underrating  that  importance,  subjoin  a  few 
remarks  on  a  subject  at  present  very  seldom  mentioned  : — 


App.j  (Question  of  a  Free  Trade  in  Corn.  [31] 

the  evils  that  would  attend  a  price  of  corn  materially  higher 
than  that  of  our  neighbours  ;  we  mean  a  price  between 
70s.  and  80s.  a  quarter,  while  that  of  France,  the  Nether- 
lands, or  German}',  was  at  45s.  or  50s.  The  war  closed,  in 
a  political  sense,  with  so  much  success,  with  so  great  an 
appearance  of  national  triumph,  as  to  blind  us  for  a  season 
to  the  evils  of  transition,  and  to  the  embarrassment  conse- 
quent on  high  prices.  The  injurious  effect  of  the  latter 
was,  indeed,  shown  in  part  by  the  emigration  of  half-pay 
officers,  annuitants,  and  persons  with  large  families,  who 
drew  their  income  from  this  country  and  expended  it  abroad, 
giving  to  our  neighbours  the  stimulus  arising  from  repro- 
duction, and  subjecting  England  to  an  injury  of  the  kind  so 
long  inflicted  on  Ireland  by  her  absentee  proprietors.  The 
amount  thus  drawn  by  emigrants  and  travellers  has  been, 
we  believe,  moderately  computed,  for  some  time,  at 
5,000,000/.  at  present  at  4,000,000/.  a  year  ;  but  how 
much  greater  would  have  been  the  evil  had  a  continuance 
of  high  prices  induced  master  manufacturers,  or  their  work- 
men, to  seek  an  establishment  on  the  Continent  ?  Those 
of  our  countrymen,  who  have  travelled  since  the  peace, 
remark,  and  apparently  with  justice,  that  continental  ma- 
nufacturers are  as  yet  far  from  formidable  ;  but  they  fail  to 
take  into  account  the  surprising  change  that  might  have 
been  effected  by  a  transfer  of  British  capital  and  master 
workmen.  With  these  potent  aids  the  inhabitants  of  Nor- 
mandy, the  Netherlands,  or  the  banks  of  the  Rhine,  would 
soon  become  dangerous  rivals,  for  we  ought  steadily  to  keep 
in  mind  that  our  superiority,  as  a  nation,  lies  not  in  the 
individual,  but  in  our  establishments  ;  in  the  operation  of  col- 
lective bodies  :  as  workmen,  our  neighbours  would  soon 
attain  an  equality,  were  they  placed  on  a  par  with  us  in 
regard  to  machinery,  and  the  division  of  employment. 
Their  merchants  have  not,  it  is  true,  the  capital  necessary 
to  give  long  credit  to  customers,  such  as  the  Americans  ; 
but  that  want  would  have  been  supplied  by  our  exporters, 
who,  whether  they  emigrated  personally  or  not,  would  have 
made  a  point  of  purchasing  goods  in  those  towns  or  districts 
of  the  Continent,  where  they  could  have  been  most  cheaply 
manufactured. 

Would  our  government  have  possessed  any  means  of 
counteracting  the  tide  of  emigration  ?  None  ;  if  our  corn- 
market  had  been  kept  at  an  exorbitant  height,  the  tide 
would  have  flowed  in  various  directions,  according  to  the 
respective  advantages  of  particular  situations.  One  part  of 
*he   Continent  possesses  mines  of  iron,  another  mines'   of 


[32]  On  Agriculture.  [App. 

coal,  a  third  abounds  in  timber,  while  several  tracts  of  coast 
approach  to  ours  in  the  number  and  capacity  of  their  sea- 
ports. Happily  no  part  of  the  Continent  could  offer  these 
advantages  collectively,so  that  although  inquiries  were  made 
and  calculations  formed  by  many  of  our  speculative  men, 
no  emigration  of  consequence  took  place  among  our  labour- 
ing classes,  and  the  present  prices  of  the  necessaries  of  life 
among  us  seem  to  remove  such  unwelcome  enterprises  to 
an  indefinite  date. 

Subsistence  of  the  lower  Orders. — In  reasoning  on  the 
means  of  supporting  the  lower  orders,  we  have  not  laid 
stress  on  the  effects  of  spade  husbandry,  of  deep  ploughing, 
or  other  agricultural  experiments  described  in  late  publica- 
tions. Nor  do  we  dwell  on  the  practicability  of  subsisting 
an  increased  population  by  the  more  general  use  of  pota- 
toes, although,  in  1817,  a  case  in  point  was  established  by 
the  French  government,  who  recommended  in  public  orders 
the  more  general  cultivation  of  that  root ;  and,  in  regard  to 
Ireland,  it  is  a  curious  fact,  that  the  export  of  corn  has  be- 
come large  since  the  great  increase  of  the  population.  Our 
object,  however,  is  not  to  dwell  on  the  means  of  reducing 
the  expense  of  subsistence ;  it  is  merely  to  show  that  in- 
crease of  population  has  no  necessary  tendency  to  raise  it. 

Uncertainty  of  speculative  Opinions. — In  treating  of  the 
prospects  of  our  agriculturists,  our  wish  is  less  to  press  a 
particular  opinion,  than  to  show  the  uncertainty  of  many 
of  the  allegations  advanced  of  late  years  with  so  much  con- 
fidence. After  the  revolutions  we  have  witnessed  in  statis- 
tics as  in  politics,  it  would  be  idle  to  attempt  predictions  as 
to  what  is  likely  to  be  either  the  amount  or  the  price  of  our 
produce.  In  this  season  of  profound  peace,  agriculture 
occupies  a  very  large  share  of  the  national  capital  and  in- 
genuity ;  discoveries  and  inventions  are  successively  occur- 
ring to  modify  established  methods  and  alter  received  opi- 
nions. Take,  for  example,  the  subject  on  which  so  much 
was  urged  in  parliament  lately, — a  high  protecting  duty. 
If  during  peace  our  growth  continue  adequate  to  our 
consumption,  what  will  have  been  the  use  of  these  pro- 
tracted discussions,  and  where  would  be  the  advantage  so 
confidently  promised  to  our  farmers  from  the  protection  in 
question  ?  From  these  various  considerations,  ought  we 
not  to  conclude,  that  the  only  safe  course  is  to  be  guided, 
as  far  as  circumstances  at  all  permit,  by  general  principles, 
expecting  little  from  any  deviation,  however  plausible,  and 
calculating  that  in  the  price  of  our  produce,  as  in  other 


App.]  Question  of  a  free  Truck  in  Com.  [33] 

results,  this  country  cannot  long  differ  from  tW  civilized 
world  at  large  ?  This  naturally  leads  to  a  brief  notice  of 
the 

Arguments  in  favour  of  a  free  Trade  in  Corn. — Without 
any  wish  to  discuss  this  question  at  length,  we  lay  before 
our  readers  the  opinion  of  several  well-informed  writers. 

Extract  from  a  pamphlet  entitled  "  Observations  on  the 
Commerce  of  grain,  by  Dugald  Bannatyne,  Esq.  Secretary 
to  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Glasgow,"  1816. 

"  All  great  authorities"  (says  Mr.  B.,  p.  10.)  "  were  in 
favour  of  a  free  trade  in  corn,  until  Mr.  Malthus  demanded 
the  same  protection  for  the  home  grower  of  corn,  as  for 
the  home  manufacturer  of  particular  commodities  ;  but 
these  manufactures  (such  as  lace  and  silk)  are  productive 
of  no  benefit  to  the  public,  being  all  carried  on  in  contra- 
diction to  the  natural  and  inherent  obstacles,  while  our  la- 
bour and  capital  would  find  a  more  beneficial  direction,  if 
transferred  to  the  woollen,  cotton,  hardware,  or  other 
branches ;  in  which,  particularly  in  the  latter,  we  possess 
local  and  permanent  advantages  over  our  continental  neigh* 
bours. 

"  It  seems  extraordinary,  that  we  should  be  so  much 
alive  to  the  advantages  we  gain  from  the  division  of  employ- 
ment in  the  prosecution  of  our  home  industry,  and  not  see 
the  benefit  to  be  obtained  from  the  more  extended  division 
of  employment  in  the  case  of  nations  ;  a  division  pointed 
out  by  the  separate  facilities  for  carrying  them  on,  which, 
from  climate,  soil,  or  natural  productions,  different  coun- 
tries possess.  By  keeping  up  the  price  of  corn,  we  oblige 
ourselves  to  labour  in  our  manufactures  at  a  great  disad- 
vantage, when  compared  with  other  nations," 

Extract  from  a  pamphlet,  by  Major  (now  Colonel)  Tor- 
rens,  published  also  in  1816,  and  entitled,  "  Letter  to  Lord 
Liverpool  on  the  State  of  Agriculture  :" — 

"  To  any  persons  who  will  either  investigate  first  princi- 
ples v  or  recur  to  the  experience  of  countries  which,  like 
Holland,  have  given  freedom  to  trade,  it  must  be  evident, 
that  this  natural  state  of  things  is  greatly  preferable  to  any 
artificial  system  which  can  be  substituted  in  its  stead.  As 
we  extend  the  area  from  which  subsistence  is  drawn,  the 
inequality  in  the  productiveness  of  the  seasons  diminishes. 
Hence  when,  under  a  free  intercourse,  a  deficient  harvest 
required   an    unusual   import,   abundant  harvests   in  some 

M 


[34]  O*  Agriculture.  \Avr. 

other  country  of  the  world  would  supply  the  deficiency  by 
an  extraordinary  export.  On  the  other  hand,  a  succession 
of  unusually  abundant  years  could  occasion  no  deep  de- 
pression in  our  markets,  because  this  extraordinary  quantity 
of  corn  of  home  growth  could  not  (as  when  abundant  har- 
vests occur  in  the  case  of  a  country  forcing  in  average  years 
an  independent  supply)  much  exceed  the  consumption  of 
the  season." 

To  these  opinions  we  add  that  of  Mr.  M'Culloch,  who 
has  inserted  an  Essay  on  the  Corn  Laws,  in  the  same  work 
as  his  Essay  on  Exchange,  viz.  the  Supplement  to  the  En- 
cyclopaedia Britannica.  After  regretting  that  the  corn  trade 
was  not  definitively  laid  open  in  1815,  a  time  when,  as  at 
present,  our  prices  were  so  low  that  our  agriculture  had,  in 
a  manner,  felt  all  the  evils  of  transition,  and  the  public 
would  have  reaped  the  greatest  advantage  from  a  return  to 
unrestricted  freedom,  Mr.  M.  adds, — 

"  When  this  happy  event"  (a  free  trade  in  corn)  "  shall 
have  taken  place,  it  will  be  no  longer  necessary  to  force 
nature.  The  capital  and  enterprise  of  the  country  will  be 
turned  into  those  departments  of  industry  in  which  our 
physical  situation,  national  character,  or  political  institu- 
tions, fit  us  to  excel.  The  corn  of  Poland,  and  the  raw 
cotton  of  Carolina,  will  be  exchanged  for  the  wares  of  Bir- 
mingham and  the  muslins  of  Glasgow.  The  genuine  com- 
mercial spirit,  that  which  permanently  secures  the  prosperity 
of  nations,  is  altogether  inconsistent  with  the  dark  and  shal- 
low policy  of  monopoly.  *  The  nations  of  the  earth  are  like 
provinces  of  the  same  kingdom — a  free  and  unfettered 
intercourse  is  alike  productive  of  general  and  of  local  ad- 
vantage." 

Political  economists  are  more  accustomed  to  deal  in  ge- 
neral reasoning,  than  to  analyze  the  circumstances  of  a  case, 
or  to  go  through  the  details  necessary  to  the  suggestion  of 
a  specific  remedy.  This  blank  we  shall  now  endeavour  to 
supply,  and,  by  way  of  supplement  to  the  preceding  argu- 
ments, add  a  sketch  of  the  preliminaries  indispensable  to 
freedom  in  our  corn  trade.  By  these  we  mean  the  exemp- 
tion of  our  agriculturists  from  such  burdens  as  press  on 
them  either  exclusively,  or  in  a  greater  degree  than  on  the 
rest  of  the  public.     Thus  : — 

Computation  of  Poor-Rate  and  Tithe. — Of  the  sums 
levied  for  rates  in  England  and  Wales,  the  average  annual 
amount  will  probably  be,  ere  long,  reduced  to — 


App.]  Question  of  a  free  Trade  in  Corn.  [35] 

Highway  rate,  county  rate,  church  rate       -      £1,200,000 

Law  suits,  removal  of  paupers,  and  expense 

of  parish  officers  -  300,000 

Maintenance  and  relief  of  the  poor,  after  as- 
suming a  reduction  from  the  present  charge 
of  somewhat  more  than  1 ,000,000/.  -         4,500,000 


In  all    £6,000,000 


Of  this  amount  what  part  bears  exclusively  on  agricul- 
ture ?     To  calculate  that  we  begin  by  excluding 

1 .  The  proportion  that  appears  to  be  raised  in 
towns,  including  smaller  towns  than  those 
mentioned  in  the  Poor-Rate  Report  of 
1821,  p.  13,  and  referring  to  the  assess- 
ment of  1815,  in  which  a  distinction  is 
made  between  the  contribution  of  land- 
holders and  householders         -  £1,500,000 

2.  A  large  sum,  which  in  fact  is  but  nominally 
paid  by  agriculturists,  the  wages  of  country 
labour  being  lower  than  they  would  be  with- 
out the  rates :  this  sum  we  estimate  conjec- 

turally,  in  war  at  2,000,000/. ;  in  peace  at         1,000,000 
Remainder,  being  the  actual  burden  on  agri- 
culture arising  from  rates,  supposing  the 
whole  on  a  reduced  scale         -  3,500,000 


Total  (agreeing  with  the  preceding)  £6,000,000 

Now,  were  all  classes  equal  contributors  to 
the  rates,  the  quota  of  the  land  would  be 
only  a  third,  or  2,000,000/.  making  a  de- 
duction from  the  3,500,000/.  of      -  £1,500,000 

Next,  as  to  Tithe. — Amount  of  tithe  of  Eng- 
land, Wales,  and  Ireland,  computed  at  the 
reduced  price  of  produce,  but  including 
tithe  paid  to  laymen,  about      5,000,000Z. 

If  tithe  also  were  rendered  a  national  burthen, 
the  land  ought  to  pay  only  a  third 
(1,700,000/,)  which  would  form  a  deduc- 
tion from  its  present  burden  of  3,300,000 

Total  deduction  that  would  then  be  made  from — 

the  burdens  on  agriculture  -         -      £4,800,000 


It  is  a  remarkable  coincidence  that  this  sum  (4,800,000/.) 


[36]  Oa  Agriculture.  [Ar*', 

is  little  more  than  the  excess  of  the  burdens  on  British  over 
those  on  French  agriculture.     See  the  text,  p.  167. 

As  our  allowance  of  4,500,000/.  for  the  poor  may  ap- 
pear below  the  mark,  we  shall  compare  it  with  the  rate  as 
it  stood  before  the  late  wars : — 

In  1792  our  poor-rate,  exclusive  of  law  ex- 
penses, and  of  highway  or  county  rate, 
amounted  to  about  -         -  £2,000,000 

Add  an  increase  of  50  per  cent,  proportion- 
ed to  the  increase  of  population       -         -  1,000,000 

Remains  to  add,  as  a  kind  of  allowance  for  the 
greater  embarrassment  of  the  present  time, 
and  for  abuses  introduced  into  the  system  1,500,000 


Total    £4,500,000 


Tithe  :  Mode  of  computing  its  Resent  Amount. — Our 
estimate  in  the  preceding  page  is  founded  on  the  property- 
tax  returns  for  the  year  1812,  (Nos.  248.  and  250.  for 
1814-15.)  Viewing  the  question  historically,  we  find  a 
very  close  connexion  between  the  increase  of  our  popula- 
tion and  the  increase  of  our  tithe.  As  there  are  no  means 
of  ascertaining  the  amount  of  our  agricultural  produce, 
our  reference  must  be  to  the  increase  of  consumers  ;  and 
though  our  population  returns  go  no  further  back  than 
1801,  we  may  with  tolerable  certainty  compute  the  total 
addition  to  have  been  nearly  50  per  cent,  on  our  numbers 
as  they  stood  in  1792.  In  fact,  were  we  possessed  of  a 
correct  return  of  tithe  for  that  year,  we  should  calculate  its 
present  amount  by  merely  adding  50  per  cent.,  to  such  re- 
turn ;  for  the  prices  of  produce  being  now  similar  to  those 
of  1792,  the  comparative  estimate  becomes  narrowed  to  a 
calculation  of  quantity. 

Rent  of  Land. — Can  we  with  any  confidence  observe  a 
similar  rule  when  calculating  the  progressive  increase  of 
rent  ?  In  that  the  connexion  between  augmented  produce 
and  augmented  payment  is  less  apparent  than  in  the  case 
of  tithe  :  yet  it  would  be  obviously  vain  to  attempt  a  mode 
of  computation,  which  may  at  first  claim  attention,  we  mean 
one  founded  on  the  extent  of  additional  surface  brought 
into  tillage.  In  proof  of  this  we  have  merely  to  consi- 
der that  the  50  per  cent,  added  to  our  produce  in  the 
Jast  thirty  years  has  been  raised  with  an  addition  of  pro- 


App.]  Question  of  a  free  Trade  in  Corn,  [37] 

bably  less  than  fifteen  per  cent,  to  the  number  of  acres 
under  corn  culture,  and  has  been  chiefly  the  fruit  of  the 
additional  labour  and  improved  methods  applied  to  the 
surface  previously  under  the  plough.  The  extension  of 
tillage  over  inferior  soils  is  rather  an  index  of  augmented 
rent,  than  a  basis  for  its  calculation  :  the  latter  we  should 
seek  by  preference  in  the  new  methods  that  have  been  dis- 
covered, the  old  that  are  improved,  the  consequent  abridg- 
ment of  labour,  and  the  additional  quantity  of  corn  produc- 
ed at  the  same  expense  ;  for  the  effect  of  all  improvements, 
whether  they  ameliorate  quality  or  augment  quantity,  is  to 
cheapen  production  :  they  are  otherwise  not  entitled  to  the 
name  of  improvements. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  benefit  to  the  nation  from 
such  improvements  ?  The  power  of  supporting  an  addi- 
tional population  on  the  same  territorial  surface. — And 
what  is  the  advantage  to  the  proprietors  of  that  surface  ? 
An  increase  of  rent  which  there  are,  it  seems  to  us,  various 
reasons  for  calculating  in  proportion  to  increase  of  popula- 
tion. Were  the  number  of  consumers  stationary,  the  result 
of  agricultural  improvements  would  be  a  fall  of  market 
price  :  with  an  increase  of  consumers,  the  results  are  the 
maintenance  of  price  and  the  rise  of  rent.  If  the  surface 
which,  a  century  ago,  produced  wheat  for  the  support  of 
two  millions  of  inhabitants,  be  now  sufficient  to  maintain 
twice  the  number,  the  price  of  wheat  being  the  same,  we 
shall  probably  deviate  little  from  the  truth  in  assuming  that, 
in  the  natural  course  of  things,  the  rent  also  ought  to  be 
doubled  ;  and  that  any  excess  or  deficiency  in  this  propor- 
tion of  increase  is  to  be  sought  in  causes  temporary,  pecu- 
liar, or  in  some  cases,  little  more  than  apparent. 

How  far  is  this  confirmed  by  historical  evidence?  It 
seems  to  have  long  been  the  case  in  France,  a  country  where 
corn  still  sells  for  the  price  it  bore  a  century  and  a  half  ago, 
and  the  agricultural  history  of  which  is  more  simple  and 
regular  than  that  of  England,  being  unembarrassed  by  fluc- 
tuations in  the  value  of  the  currency,  or  by  insufficiency 
in  the  average  growth  for  the  average  consumption.  But 
even  in  England,  the  proportion  between  increase  of  popu- 
lation and  rise  of  rent  will  be  found  to  hold  in  a  consider- 
able degree.  It  might,  perhaps,  be  traced,  were  our  docu- 
ments complete,  during  the  long  period  from  1650  to  1792  ; 
in  which  the  price  of  corn  bore,  with  casual  and  temporary 
exceptions,  a  character  of  uniformity.  Even  in  the  present 
age,  we  should  not  despair  of  finding  a  confirmation  of  our 
rule,  could  we  succeed  in  clearing  our  calculation  of  the 


[38]  On  Agriculture.  [App. 

temporary  effect  of  bank  paper  and  of  seasons  unusually  ad- 
verse. Such  an  attempt  might,  some  years  ago,  have  been 
ridiculed  ;  but  at  present  the  temporary  part  of  the  increase 
has  disappeared,  and  left  us  with  the  prices  of  1792,  along 
with  a  discovery  in  regard  to  rent  not  a  little  at  variance 
with  the  high-flown  language  of  those  who  saw  in  the  war 
a  source  of  unparalleled  wealth  ; — that  the  present  rental  of 
the  United  Kingdom  is,  as  far  as  we  can  judge,  little  more 
than  50  per  cent,  above  that  of  1792,  or  36,000,000Z.,  in- 
stead of  24,000,000/.,  its  supposed  amount  before  our  rup- 
ture with  France. 

This  sober  result,  if  it  fall  below  the  sanguine  expecta- 
tion of  those  who  still  cling  to  high  prices,  and  still  put 
faith  in  the  efficacy  of  corn  laws,  leaves,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  rise  fair  and  legitimate.  We  have  no  argument  to  found 
on  the  principle  of  calculating  the  future  rise  of  rent  by  the 
increase  of  our  numbers,  but  it  seems  to  be  just  towards  both 
parties.  Our  landlords  certainly  would  have  no  reason  to 
complain  of  it ;  for  it  presents  to  them  the  cheering  prospect 
of  being  not  only  permanent  but  progressive. 

Use  of  Salt  in  Agriculture. — We  cannot  forbear  adding 
a  few  words  on  a  topic  closely  connected  with  the  freedom 
of  productive  industry,  we  mean  the  increased  use  of  salt  in 
agriculture.  If  there  be  any  accuracy  in  the  arguments  of 
the  late  Sir  Thomas  Bernard,  and  of  several  others  who 
have  written  on  the  subject,  how  sensible  must  be  the  bene- 
fit to  our  farmers  and  graziers,  now  that  government  has 
given  the  means  of  so  decided  an  extension  to  the  use  of 
salt,  either  as  a  manure  or  for  feeding  cattle.  Our  inland 
navigation  will  enable  almost  every  district  to  profit  by  the 
relaxation  ;  and  the  injury  to  the  revenue  in  one  sense  will, 
we  trust,  soon  be  compensated  by  benefit  in  another,  since 
the  only  solid  basis  of  taxation  is  the  extension  of  the  na- 
tional industry. 

There  is  thus  little  or  no  doubt,  that,  were  our  farmers 
relieved  from  their  extra  burdens,  they  would  be  enabled 
to  raise  produce  on  as  low  terms  as  our  continental  neigh- 
bours, and  might,  ere  long,  allow  the  public  to  reap  all  the 
benefit  arising  from  unrestricted  freedom  in  the  corn  trade. 
For  the  present,  however,  we  consider  "  unrestricted  free- 
dom" as  wholly  out  of  the  question,  and  shall  confine  our 
speculations  to  the  effect  of  relaxation ;  of  a  protecting  duty 
on  a  reduced  scale. 


App.]  On  Agriculture.  [39] 

Comparative  Burdens  on  British  and  Foreign  Agriculture. 
— Abstract  of  the  Evidence  before  the  Agricultural  Com- 
mittee (April  and  May,  1821)  of  Mr.  Tooke,  partner  in  a 
mercantile  house  extensively  connected  with  the  Baltic  : — 

Mr.  T.,  aware  how  greatly  the  untravelled  part  of  our 
countrymen  overrate  the  cheapness  of  foreign  countries, 
laid  before  the  Agricultural  Committee  (Evidence  p.  224.) 
tables  of  the  price  of  wheat  from  1814  to  1820,  at  Peters- 
burgh,  Riga,  and  Archangel ;  the  result  of  which  is,  that 
it  could  seldom,  in  these  years  of  peace,  have  been  deli- 
vered in  an  English  port  for  less  than  from  505.  to  60s.  a 
quarter.  At  Odessa  the  price  is  occasionally  very  low,  but 
the  freight  to  England  is  high ;  and  the  hazard  of  damage 
on  so  long  a  voyage  is  such  as  to  put  that  port  almost  out 
of  the  question  for  the  British  market.  And  as  to  another 
point,  the  amount  of  supply  to  be  expected  from  the  Con- 
tinent at  large,  Mr.  T.  concurs  with  Mr.  Jacob,  (Evidence, 
pp.  232.  260.)  that  it  is  in  general  overrated. 

In  regard  to  our  own  agriculture,  Mr.  T.  differs  mate- 
rially from  those  who  imagine  th&t  a  continuance  of  the 
present  low  prices  would  throw  much  land  out  of  cultiva- 
tion. As  a  fall  in  the  price  of  corn  necessarily  reduces  the 
cost  of  production,  he  sees  no  great  reason  (pp.  232.  288.) 
why  we  should  not  as  half  a  century  ago,  raise  corn  as 
cheaply,  or  almost  as  cheaply,  as  on  the  Continent,  particu- 
larly now  that  the  agriculture  of  Ireland  is  relieved  from 
restraint. 

Mr.  T.  is  also  the  only  witness  who  brings  forward 
(p.  2S8.)  an  argument  which  we  have  been  at  pains  to 
enforce  in  the  text,  viz.  that  an  import  limit,  if  high,  would 
induce  extended  cultivation,  and  prove  injurious  to  our 
farmers.  We  have  his  concurrence,  likewise,  in  another 
important  point,  in  accounting  (p.  344.)  for  the  great  fall 
in  the  price  of  commodities  since  the  peace,  less  by  a  re- 
currence to  cash  payments,  than  by  the  application  of  a 
great  addition  of  labour  and  capital  to  productive  purposes. 
Lastly,  he  is  favourable  to  a  protecting  duty  on  corn,-  pro- 
vided (Evidence  p.  297.)  it  be  no  greater  than  the  direct 
taxes  that  operate  on  our  own  production. 

The  opinion,  that  our  corn  is  likely  to  be  raised  at  a  rate 
(between  50s.  and  60s.  the  quarter)  nearly  as  cheap  as  on 
the  Continent,  has  a  claim  to  particular  attention ;  and  we 
proceed  to  inquire  how  far  it  is  confirmed  by  a  considera- 
tion of  either  our  past  or  present  circumstances. 


[40]  On  Agriculture.  [Aft- 

Prices  during  last  Century. — If  in  the  history  of  our  corn 
trade  we  go  back  sufficiently  far  to  reach  a  period  of  pro- 
found peace,  we  shall  find  little  reason  to  expect  that  in  such 
a  season  our  prices  can  be  kept  much  above  those  of  the 
Continent.  Throughout  the  hundred  years  that  elapsed 
between  the  accession  of  Charles  II.  and  of  George  III., 
corn  was  as  low,  or  nearly  as  low,  in  England  as  in  France, 
the  Netherlands,  or  other  adjacent  parts  of  the  Continent. 
After  1764,  the  case  was  different;  but  of  the  85.  or  10s. 
per  quarter  of  additional  price  obtained  in  this  country,  the 
half  may  safely  be  ascribed  to  temporary  causes  ;  we  mean 
the  American  war,  the  extension  of  our  manufactures,  and 
the  general  aversion  to  vest  capital  in  farming,  after  the 
discouraging  experience  of  the  preceding  age.  But  our 
taxation,  it  may  be  said,  is  greater  compared  to  that  of 
continental  countries,  than  it  was  in  the  last  century,  and 
France  is  now  exempt  from  tithe  5 — important  consider- 
ations certainly,  but  balanced  by  others  of  great  weight  on 
our  side  ;  by  the  fact  that  the  tillage  of  Ireland  is  no  longer 
in  fetters,  that  our  machinery  and  implements  have  received 
much  more  improvement,  our  inland  navigation  a  much 
greater  extension  than  that  of  our  neighbours.  The  ad- 
vantage of  all  these  to  agriculture  can  be  appreciated  by 
those  only  who  have  seen  the  wretched  roads,  the  clumsy 
implements  and  vehicles  of  the  Continent,  or  who  have 
duly  weighed  the  cheapness  of  our  canal  carriage;  by  which 
salt,  manure,  or  bulky  commodities  generally,  can,  in  many 
parts,  be  transported  ten  or  fifteen  miles  at  the  insignificant 
charge  of  a  shilling  a  ton. 

Our  present  Prospect. — The  arguments  in  favour  of  Mr. 
Tooke's  opinion  derived  from  our  present  situation  are  as 
follow  : — 

1.  During  the  war,  rents  rose  without  care  or  exertion 
on  the  part  of  our  landlords ;  at  present  land  affords  a  rent 
of  consequence  only  when  cultivated  with  skill — the  most 
substantial  of  all  arguments  ibr  the  diffusion  of  the  improv- 
ed husbandry. 

2.  The  evils  that  now  bear  so  hard  on  our  agriculture 
are  evils  of  transition  ;  the  degree  of  pressure  will  be  ma- 
terially different  when  farming  charges  shall  have  been 
reduced  (as  reduced  they  must  be)  in  proportion  to  the 
market  price  of  corn. 

3.  As  to  the  comparative  burdens  on  our  agriculture  and 
that  of  other  countries,  we  have  in  the  text  taken  France 


App.J  A  Protecting  Duty.  |41] 

as  a  fair  specimen  of  the  Continent  generally  :  if  in  Poland 
and  Russia  the  burdens  are  less  heavy  than  in  France,  hus- 
bandry^ as  an  art,  is  far  more  backward,  and  the  chargf 
of  freight  to  England  is  heavier.  A  reference  to  the  pas- 
sage (p.  164.)  containing  the  comparison  with  France,  will 
much  simplify  the  present  statement,  enabling  us  to  leavr- 
out  of  the  question  the  advantage  of  cheaper  labour  on 
the  part  of  the  French,  and  on  ours  of  better  machinery, 
lower  interest  of  money,  a  more  advantageous  size  of  farm>. 
&c.  After  enumerating  the  respective  burdens,  we  found 
the  difference  confined  to  a  portion  of  our  excise  duty  on 
malt,  beer,  and  corn  spirits ;  a  difference  which,  when,  as 
at  present,  the  corn  laws  are  in  a  manner  inoperative,  left 
a  sum  of  4  or  5,000,000/.  to  the  disadvantage  of  our  coun- 
trymen. This  difference  forms  a  charge  of  7  or  8  per  cent, 
on  the  rental  of  our  landlords,  and  the  income  of  our  farm- 
ers taken  collectively. 

Competition  of  continental  Agriculturists. — Supposing 
that  the  effect  of  a  protecting  duty  is  merely  to  keep  our 
market  from  6s.  to  8s.  a  quarter  above  that  of  France,  or 
the  Netherlands,  would  there  be  reason  to  apprehend  that 
English  capital  would  find  its  way  abroad,  and  be  applied 
to  the  extension  of  culture  on  the  Continent,  with  a  view  to 
import  into  this  country  ?  To  such  a  question  our  answer 
three  years  ago  might  have  been  in  the  affirmative  ;  but  our 
charges  are  now  so  much  reduced,  and  the  advantages  of 
Ireland  in  regard  to  cheap  labour,  command  of  water 
communication,  and  fertility  of  soil,  are  found  to  approach 
so  nearly  to  those  of  the  most  favoured  tracts  of  the  Conti- 
nent, that  we  much  doubt  whether  any  transfer  of  capital 
would  take  place  to  the  latter,  particularly  as,  on  referring 
to  the  evidence  annexed  to  the  Agricultural  Report,  we 
find  (p.  364.)  that  the  cost  of  raising  a  quarter  of  wheat  in 
Prussia  or  Poland,  including  the  conveyance  to  Dantzic. 
but  exclusive  of  rent,  is  about  36s.  the  quarter,  an  expense 
little  greater  than  the  cost  of  raising  it  (p.  335.)  free  of  rent, 
in  East  Lothian. 

Next,  as  to  the  storing  or  warehousing  of  foreign  corn, 
with  a  view  to  import. — The  interest  of  the  money  vested 
in  the  purchase  of  corn  forms  so  considerable  a  part  of  the 
annual  charge  of  keeping  it  in  granary,  that  were  our  prices 
to  rise  materially,  it  might  enter  into  the  views  of  our  corn 
merchants  to  purchase  in  remote  countries,  like  the  interior 
of  Poland  or  the  south-west  of  Russia,  where  the  average 

M 


i'42]  Our  Agriculture.  [Avt, 

price  of  wheat  is  not  above  30s.  and  in  some  years  (Evi- 
dence, p.  364.)  lower.  At  present  such  a  course  is  out  of 
the  question,  the  inland  provinces  in  these  countries  being 
unprovided  either  with  proper  warehouses,  or  with  the 
means  of  giving  security  to  deposited  property.  Were 
these  defects  supplied  by  the  erection  of  suitable  build- 
ings in  a  town  adjacent  to  a  navigable  river,  and  by  the 
protection  of  a  military  guard,  a  large  supply  of  corn 
might  be  warehoused  in  cheap  years,  and  on  the  occur- 
rence of  a  rise,  sent  to  a  market  in  this  country  or  else- 
where. The  transport  to  Dantzic  or  Odessa,  added  to  the 
freight  from  Dantzic  to  England,  or  from  Odessa  to  the 
south  of  France,  might  be  averaged  at  20s.  the  quarter, 
carrying  the  total  cost,  when  brought  to  market,  to  some- 
what more  than  50s.  exclusive  of  our  protecting  duty  ;  a 
price  which,  if  not  high,  is  greatly  above  that  which  is 
assigned  by  vague  rumour  (see  Mr.  Curwen's  speeches  in 
the  session  of  1821)  to  the  Polish  market. 

The  United  States  of  America. — The  great  distance  of  that 
country  from  Europe  has  long  led  to  the  practice  of  ship- 
ping its  produce  in  the  form  of  flour,  rather  than  of  grain  ; 
thus  accomplishing  a  saving  in  freight,  and  avoiding  the 
shifting  and  heating  to  be  apprehended  in  a  long  and  tem- 
pestuous passage.  Among  other  recent  discoveries,  we  are 
apprised  (p.  437.  Revue  Encyclopedique,  for  August,  1821, 
printed  at  Paris)  of  a  method  of  preserving  flour  during 
several  years  in  perfect  condition,  by  means  of  air-tight 
casks  ;  but  whether  the  expense  of  this  or  other  methods  of 
the  kind  be  not  too  great  for  the  chance  of  profit,  remains 
to  be  ascertained. 

Compared  to  these,  what  means  are  possessed  by  our  own 
agriculturists  in  regard  to  keeping  corn  in  the  granary,  and 
making  the  plenty  of  one  season  conducive  to  the  supply 
of  the  next  ?  They  have  the  command  of  better  buildings  ; 
they  pay  a  lower  interest  on  capital ;  and  are  exempt,  in 
a  great  measure,  from  the  charge  of  conveyance  to  mar- 
ket :  their  chief  disadvantage  lies  in  the  prime  cost  of  their 
produce. 

Improvements  in  Husbandry. — Those  who  are  inclined 
to  subscribe  to  the  efficacy  of  some  lately-promulgated 
methods  of  penetrating  more  deeply  into  the  soil,  whether 
by  the  plough  or  spade,  may  consider  the  Continent 
likely  to  benefit  more  largely  from  them  in  consequence  of 
its  cheaper  labour,  its  greater  agricultural  population.    But 


Afp.J  Our  Agriculture.  [43 J 

in  any  improvement  arising  from  such  a  process,  this  coun- 
try can  hardly  fail  to  share  equally,  superior  as  we  are  in 
horses,  ploughs,  and  iron-work  generally  ;  while,  in  regard 
to  labour,  Ireland  is  as  cheaply  and  abundantly  supplied  as 
any  part  of  the  Continent. 

Probable  Amount  of  Import. — A  low  rate  of  duty  on 
foreign  corn  would  doubtless  prevent  any  considerable  rise 
ia  our  market ;  but  it  by  no  means  follows  that  our  tillage 
would  be  materially  circumscribed,  or  that  the  amount  of  our 
import  would  be  large.  Of  barley,  our  growth  is  in  general 
equal  to  our  consumption  :  a  considerable  import  takes  place 
only  in  particular  years,  and  after  seasons  unfavourable  to 
this  kind  of  grain,  such  as  the  summers  of  1816  and  1817. 
In  oats  the  case  has  hitherto  been  different,  our  growth  being 
habitually  below  our  consumption,  and  large  imports  being 
required  both  from  Ireland  and  the  Continent :  the  amount 
has  varied,  of  course,  in  different  years,  but  has  not  for  a 
long  time  averaged  so  little  as  half  a  million  of  quarters 
from  either.  In  future  our  import  of  oats,  at  least  in  peace, 
is  likely  to  be  confined  to  Ireland.  Of  beans,  pease,  and 
rye,  our  growth  is  in  general  adequate,  and  our  imports  in- 
significant :  in  regard  to  wheat,  our  imports,  formerly  on  so 
large  a  scale,  are  at  present  suspended  ;  nor  are  they  likely 
to  be  renewed  during  peace,  except  on  the  accidental  occur- 
rence of  an  indifferent  season. 

What  appears  to  be  the  average  growth  of  corn  of  all 
kinds  in  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  ?  According  to  Mr. 
Colquhoun,  it  seems  in  1812  to  have  been,  including  the 
corn  used  as  seed,  about  40,000,000  of  quarters,  to  which 
may  be  added  for  increase  in  the  period  that  has  intervened 
about  20  per  cent.,  or  8,000,000  of  quarters.  In  reasoning 
on  years  to  come,  with  the  prospect  of  a  progressive  in- 
crease, we  shall  not  greatly  err  in  taking  our  growth  at  an 
average  of  nearly  50,000,000  of  quarters,  of  corn  of  all 
kinds.  Then,  as  to  import — now  that  we  are  in  the  enjoy- 
ment of  peace,  and  possess  so  ample  a  command  of  capital 
and  labour,  we  may  calculate  our  average  demand  for 
foreign  corn  at  a  very  moderate  amount.  It  must  necessa- 
rily vary  greatly,  according  to  the  seasons  ;  but  the  aver- 
age of  a  series  of  years  of  peace  will  perhaps  not  exceed  a 
million  of  quarters  of  grain  of  all  kinds,  or  2  per  cent,  on 
the  total  of  our  annual  growth. 

"  All  undue  protection  to  agriculture,"  says  Mr.  Ricardo 
in  his  pamphlet   on   Agriculture,    (p.   81.)  <:  should    be 


[44]  Our  Agriculture  [Apf. 

gradually  withdrawn.  The  policy  which  we  ought,  at  thi> 
moment  of  distress  to  adopt,  is  to  give  the  monopoly  of  the 
home  market  to  the  British  grower  till  corn  reaches  70s. 
per  quarter.  When  it  has  reached  70s.,  a  duty  of  20s.  per 
quarter  on  the  importation  of  wheat,  and  other  grain  in 
proportion,  might  be  imposed. 

"  J  should  further  propose,  that  the  duty  of  20s.  should 
t  very  year  be  reduced  one  shilling,  until  it  reached  ten 
hillings.  A  duty  of  ten  shillings  per  quarter,  on.  importa- 
tion, to  which  I  wish  to  approach,  is,  I  am  sure,  rather  too 
high  as  a  countervailing  duty  for  the  peculiar  taxes  which 
;ire  imposed  on  the  corn  grower,  over  and  above  those 
which  are  imposed  on  the  other  classes  of  production  in  the 
country  ;  but  I  would  rather  err  on  the  side  of  a  liberal  al- 
lowance than  of  a  scanty  one." 

Ought  a  Protecting  Duty  to  be  suspended  in  a  dear  Season'! 
— However  adverse  in  general  to  high  prices,  we  are  by 
no  means  inclined  to  give  this  question  an  affirmative 
answer.  The  temperature  which  causes  a  partial  failur;; 
in  England  being  likely  to  prevail  throughout  the  north- 
west of  Europe,  can  hardly  fail  to  raise  the  corn  market 
in  the  Netherlands,  the  Danish  dominions,  and  the  north 
of  Germany,  in  the  same  manner,  though  not  in  an  equal 
degree,  as  in  this  country.  Prices  may  thus  be  brought, 
by  a  natural  course,  to  the  limit  at  which  the  protecting 
duty  ceases :  if  not,  a  suspension  of  it  would  be  impolitic, 
as  well  from  the  general  inexpediency  of  tampering  with 
an  established  law,  as  for  another  reason,  viz.  that  a  rise  of 
price  does  not  (Evidence,  p.  36.)  in  a  year  of  deficiency  form 
an  equivalent  to  a  farmer  for  short  quantity ;  he  can  be 
indemnified  only  by  the  continuance  of  the  advanced  price 
during  the  succeeding  year.  To  that  he  is  fairly  entitled  : 
to  deprive  him  of  it  by  a  suspension  of  the  protecting  duty, 
would  be  to  cast  on  tillage  a  discouragement  similar  to  what 
it  has  experienced  from  unlimited  import  under  the  corn 
law  of  1815. 

But  in  what  manner,  it  may  be  asked,  should  we  theii 
lessen  to  the  poor  the  pressure  of  a  dear  season  ?  By 
charitable  contributions;  which,  when  limited  to  an  interval 
of  real  want,  have  few  or  none  of  the  bad  consequences  oi 
an  established  poor-rate.  And  in  what  way  are  the  public 
indemnified  for  taking  this  burden  on  themselves  instead  of 
suspending  the  protecting  duty?  By  the  moderate  rat 
which  that  dutv  is  fixed. 


App.]  Our  Agriculture.  [45] 

To  these  observations  we  subjoin  the  opinion  of  a  writer 
who  differs  in  many  points  from  the  political  economists  of 
the  school  of  Smith  : — 

Observations  of  Mr.  S.  Gray  on  the  Corn  Trade. — Mr.  G. 
has  given,  in  the  papers  added  in  1819  to  his  work  entitled 
"  The  Happiness  of  States,"  an  opinion  (pp.  34,  35.)  on 
the  corn  trade,  similar  in  most  points  to  that  of  the  Agri- 
cultural Committee  of  1821.  He  always  considered  our 
late  corn  law  as  likely  to  make  importation  affect  the  home 
price  suddenly  or  violently  ;  while  a  protecting  duty  would 
make  it  flow  in  a  gentle  stream,  tending  to  keep  prices  fair, 
and  inducing  the  foreign  cultivator  to  look  to  England  as 
a  market,  on  certain  conditions  ;  according  to  which  he 
would  regulate  his  purchase  of  our  colonial  goods  and 
manufactures.  This  opinion  proceeds  from  a  writer  by  no 
means  inclined  to  regard  low  prices  as  a  public  advantage, 
but  who  considers  (Happiness  of  States,  p.  665.)  fluctuating 
gains  as  highly  pernicious,  tending  to  raise  rents  and  labour 
extravagantly,  and  to  produce  a  premature  change  in  the 
style  of  living.  The  true  interest  of  the  farmer  is  in  a 
steady  price,  tending  to  rise  gradually  with  the  national 
improvement,  and  proportioned  consequently  to  the  prices 
of  other  commodities. 

Tenants  on  Lease,  and  Debtors  on  Mortgage. — The  case 
of  a  tenant  on  lease,  on  the  occurrence  of  a  rapid  fall  of 
prices,  is  peculiarly  hard;  the  evil  overtakes  him  in  all  its 
extent,  while  the  relief  is  but  partial,  the  grand  charge  of 
rent  remaining  unadapted  to  the  altered  state  of  things. 
He  must  in  the  first  instance  lay  his  account  with  a  sacri- 
fice of  part  of  his  capital,  with  refunding  the  gains  arising 
from  the  previous  depreciation  of  money.  This,  it  must 
be  confessed,  is  but  fair,  since  the  profit  arising  during 
the  war  from  depreciation  was  reaped  chiefly  by  the  tenant. 
But  after  a  certain  period  of  suffering,  a  liberal  landlord 
will  consider  what  is  due  to  equity,  and  what  in  many 
cases,  where  the  covenants  of  the  lease  are  not  drawn  in 
the  anticipation  of  such  a  change,  is  necessary  to  prevent 
injury  to  his  land. 

Debtors  on  mortgage  are,  in  like  manner,  heavy  suf- 
ferers, their  means  of  payment  generally  diminishing  as  the 
value  of  their  money  debt  increases.  They  have,  however. 
in  one  respect  a  substantial  ground  of  hope ;  the  prosper? 


j_46j  Our  Agriculture.  [App. 

of  reducing  their  interest  to  4|,  and  some  time  hence  to  4 
per  cent. 

Interference  by  Courts  of  Justice. — During  the  half  cen- 
tury from  1764  to  1814,  the  change  in  the  value  of  money 
was  all  on  the  opposite  side,  commodities  tending  to  a  rise  : 
gradual,  and  almost  imperceptible  during  thirty  years,  it 
was  after  1794  so  regularly  progressive,  that  in  the  course 
of  twenty  years  160/.  became  equivalent  to  only  1001.  of 
1794.  During  the  latter  years  of  the  war,  annuitants,  and 
the  landlords  who  had  granted  long  leases,  received  hardly 
two-thirds  of  the  original  value ;  yet  no  appeal  on  the 
ground  of  depreciated  currency  was  brought  before  parlia- 
ment or  our  courts  of  justice.  Any  attempt  of  that  kind 
in  parliament  would  have  been  resisted  by  government, 
partly  from  an  aversion  to  interfere  with  private  contracts  ; 
more  from  a  solicitude  to  prevent  the  public  attention  being 
fixed  on  the  depreciation  then  going  on  in  the  greatest  of  all 
debts,  that  of  the  nation. 

Since  1814,  we  have  had  a  reaction,  and  of  so  rapid  a 
nature,  that  in  trade  100/.  are  equal  to  130/.  at  the  close 
of  the  war ;  in  farming  to  much  more.  How,  it  may  be 
asked,  does  this  sudden  change  affect  the  question  of  judi- 
cial interference  ?  In  equity,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
all  engagements  ought  to  continue  payable  in  money  of  the 
value  at  which  they  were  contracted  :  the  objections  to  inter- 
ference arise,  therefore,  from  considerations  of  expediency  ; 
from  a  dread  of  exciting  litigation  among  individuals,  and 
a  still  greater  dread  of  shaking  indirectly  the  credit  of  our 
funds,  open  as  are  the  exchequers  of  other  countries  to  our 
capitalists.  Some  time  hence  it  may,  perhaps,  be  found 
practicable  to  combine  two  very  nice  points — a  farther  re- 
duction of  our  burdens  with  the  preservation  of  the  divi- 
dends at  their  present  value.  But  on  this  we  cannot  now 
enter ;  and  any  intervention  on  the  part  of  our  courts  of 
justice  seems  at  present  out  of  the  question.  It  could  be 
seriously  expected  only  in  the  case  of  our  corn  trade  being 
thrown  open,  and  the  continuance  of  low  prices  being  thus 
put  beyond  all  doubt.  In  any  event,  it  would  probably  not 
go  beyond  the  suspension  of  legal  process  for  a  given  period 
of  years,  against  a  debtor  who  should  have  paid  or  tendered 
in  money  the  chief  part  (perhaps  three-fourths)  of  his  pre- 
viously contracted  debt:  a  sacrifice  apparently  large  on 
the  part  of  creditors,  but  which,  in  very  many  cases,  may 
be  unavoidable  without  such  intervention,  since  a  continu- 


App.]  Our  Agriculture.  [47] 

ance  of  low  prices  would  involve  the  majority  of  agricultu- 
ral debtors  in  insolvency. 

Dr.  Smith  on  Agricultural  Improvers. — In  the  Wealth  of 
Nations  (Book  V.  Chapter  II.)  Dr.  Smith  discusses  the  ex- 
pediency of  inducing  landlords  to  cultivate  for  their  own 
account  a  portion  of  their  lands,  with  a  view  to  the  disco- 
very and  diffusion  of  improvements  in  husbandry.  He 
remarks,  in  another  part,  that  men  of  mercantile  habits 
frequently  become  successful  agriculturists,  being  more  ac- 
customed than  the  hereditary  farmer  to  calculate  eventual 
advantages,  and  to  hazard  an  outlay  for  a  remote  return. 
Had  his  life  been  prolonged,  he  would  have  seen,  during 
the  war,  an  ample  addition  to  the  list  of  gentlemen  farmers, 
and  have  had  occasion,  since  the  peace,  to  qualify  very 
materially  his  favourable  opinion  of  agricultural  under- 
takings when  in  the  hands  of  men  of  other  professions. 
In  his  time  the  practical  farmers  were  comparatively  poor 
and  uneducated  ;  the  hope  of  improvement  in  husbandry 
seemed  to  rest  m  the  occasional  adoption  of  a  country  life 
by  men  of  different  habits.  Had  the  case  been  otherwise, 
and  had  our  northern  and  eastern  counties  possessed  half 
a  century  ago  a  tenantry  equal  to  the  present,  Dr.  Smith 
would  probably  have  taken  a  different  view  of  the  subject, 
recommending  that  agriculture,  like  other  pursuits,  should 
be  confined  to  those  who  had  made  it  their  business  for 
life,  and  accounting  for  the  success  of  gentlemen  farmers 
during  the  twelve  or  thirteen  years  previous  to  the  pub- 
lication of  his  book  (1776)  by  a  cause  unforeseen,  and,  in 
some  measure,  accidental, — we  mean  the  progressive  rise 
of  the  price  of  corn. 

Value  of  Land  during  last  Century.— -In  treating  histori- 
cally of  the  value  of  land,  Mr.  Arthur  Young,  in  his  "  In- 
quiry into  the  Progressive  Value  of  Money,"  1812,  ex- 
presses an  opinion,  that  about  the  year  1770,  estates  sold 
at  thirty-two  years'  purchase ;  a  rate  higher,  compared  to 
the  rent,  than  they  bore  during  the  preceding  forty  years. 
The  reason,  doubtless,  was,  that  during  that  long  period 
we  had  not  an  interval  of  peace  of  sufficient  length  to  re- 
duce the  interest  of  money.  Next,  as  to  rents,  it  is  a  re- 
markable fact,  that  from  the  beginning  of  last  century  until 
towards  1770,  they  had  experienced  hardly  any  rise.  "  A 
neighbour  of  mine  in  Suffolk,"  says  Mr.  Young,  (Inquiry, 
p.  102.)  u  who  inherited  a  considerable  landed  property, 
informed  me,  that  in  various  conversations  which  he  had. 


[4b]  Our  Jigriculturt.  [Ai1^ 

between  thirty  and  forty  years  ago,  (between  1 770  and  1780,) 
with  a  relation  far  advanced  in  years,  and  from  whom  much 
of  that  property  was  derived,  that  much  surprise  was  ex- 
pressed at  the  rise  of  rents,  which  then  began  to  take  place. 
Through  the  long  period  of  his  relation's  experience,  no 
rise  was  ever  thought  of;  and  lease  after  lease,  in  long 
succession,  was  signed,  without  a  word  passing  on  the 
question  of  rent :  that  was  an  object  considered  as  fixed  ; 
and  grandfather,  father,  and  son,  succeeded  without  a 
thought  of  any  rise  :  in  many  cases  landlords  were  much 
more  apprehensive  of  losing  a  tenant  at  the  old  rent, 
than  having  the  smallest  conception  of  raising  it  to  a  new 


Comparative  Price  of  Wheat  on  the  Continent,  and  in  Eng- 
land, previous  to  the  French  Revolution. 

Official  Return  of  the  price  of  Wheat  at  the  Rosoy,  o>* 
Paris  Market,  by  the  Septier  of  240lbs.  French. 

livrts.       t  a'. 

Average  of  the  10  years  preceding  1776          -     28     7  9 

Average  of  the  10  years  preceding  1786          -     22     4  7 

The  year  1786              -         -         -         -          -     20  12  6 

1787              22     2  0 

1788  -         -         -         -         -     24     0  0 


Average  per  septier,  during  the  23  years  pre- 
ceding 1789  24  18     2 


Reducing  this  to  English  measure  and  money,  the  ex- 
change being  then  twenty-four  livres  for  the  pound  ster- 
ling, the  result  is  an  average  for  these  twenty-three  years, 
per  Winchester  quarter,  of  38s.  6d.  sterling. 

At  Dantzic  the  average  price  of  wheat  in  the  twenty 
years  from  1770  to  1789,  both  inclusive,  after  adding  7s. 
per  quarter  for  freight  and  charge  to  England,  was  (Evi- 
dence, Agricultural  Report,  p.  366.)  about  41s. 

But  in  England,  the  annual  returns  of  purchase  at  Eton 
market,  during  the  same  period,  give  an  average  of  49s.  : 
the  whole  computed  by  the  Winchester  quarter. 

This  difference  was  not  a  little  remarkable  at  a  time 
when  our  taxation  was  hardly  greater  than  that  of  our 
neighbours.  Arising,  in  the  first  instance,  from  bad  sea- 
sons, it  owed  its  continuance  partly  to  our  corhxlaw  ;  more 
to  the  extension  of  our  manufactures,  and  to  our  war  with 
our  American  colonies  while  the  continent  of  Europe  re- 
mained in  peace, 


^ 


^.pp.]  Our  Agriculture.  [49] 

Average  Prices  of  Grain  in  England  in  the  year  1 822,  taken 

from  the  Official  Return. 
Wheat  -         43*.     3d.  |  Rye  -         20s.     3d. 

Barley  -         21*.     Sd.      Beans  -         23s.     9d. 

Oats  -         17s.     Id.  I  Pease  -         25*.     Id. 

Export  and  Import  of  Corn. 
(From  the  Agricultural  Report  of  June  1821.) 

Quarters. 

Exporting  period. — In  the  seventy-six  years 
between  1697  and  1773,  the  amount  of  our 
export  of  corn  of  all  kinds  above  our  import 
was  -  30,968,000 

Importing  period. — During  the  forty-two  years 
from  1773  to  1815,  the  amount  of  our  import 
above  our  export  was  about  -  24,630,000 

Ireland. — The  import  of  corn  of  all  kinds 
from  Ireland  to  Great  Britain,  in  the  thirty- 
two  years  prior  to  1806,  was  only  7,534,000 

But  after  *he  act  of  1806  had  rendered  such 
import  free,  it  amounted  in  fifteen  years  (to 
1821)  to  ...  12,304,000 


REMARKS 


The  Agricultural  Report  of  1821. 

No  public  document  was  ever  more  eagerly  expected,  or 
more  generally  perused,  than  the  Agricultural  Report  oi 
1821.  How  far,  it  may  be  asked,  did  it  fulfil  the  public 
expectation  ?  On  the  ground  of  impartiality  and  liberality 
of  view,  no  reasonable  disappointment  could  have  been 
experienced,  but  the  composition  of  the  Report  was  by  no 
means  of  equal  merit  with  its  substance.  We  do  not 
allude  to  a  deficiency  of  those  graces  of  style  which  custom 
does  not  require  in  a  parliamentary  paper,  and  which 
would  probably  b^  misplaced  there,  but  to  a  want  of  that 

M 


[50]  Agricultural  Report  of  1 82 1 .  [Ar  p. 

brevity  and  arrangement  which  in  any  composition  are  in- 
dispensable to  a  distinct  conception  of  the  language  of 
business.  The  Report  begins  without  any  sketch  or  out- 
line of  its  objects,  and  terminates  with  a  very  limited 
summary  of  its  conclusions.  The  consequence  has  been, 
that  many  have  read,  while  few  have  understood  it ;  for 
he  who  aims  at  understanding  it  thoroughly,  or  at  viewing 
it  in  its  ensemble,  must  go  over  the  whole,  not  as  a  reader, 
but  as  an  analyzer  ;  forming  an  arrangement  for  himself, 
frequently  altering  the  succession  of  the  arguments,  and 
collecting  them  under  general  heads. 

The  object  of  the  Committee  was,  to  express  ourselves 
in  official  language,  "  to  consider  the  various  petitions 
complaining  of  the  depressed  state  of  our  agriculture, 
to  inquire  into  the  allegations  of  the  petitioners,  and  to 
report  their  observations  thereupon."  In  pursuance  of 
this  authority,  they  examined  a  number  of  witnesses, 
and  composed  the  Report  partly  from  the  evidence, 
but,  in  a  far  greater  proportion,  from  their  own  views  and 
conclusions  on  the  corn-trade,  considered  as  a  general 
question.  The  whole  may  be  said  to  embrace  the  follow- 
ing topics. 

Admission  of  the  distress  of  the  Agriculturists  ;  Attempt 
to  ascertain  its  course,  and  to  define  its  extent ;  Reference  to 
former  periods  of  distress. 

Principles  of  our  corn-trade  :  Historical  retrospect :  its 
prosperous  state  from  177 3  to  1814,  a  period  comparatively 
exempt  from  legislative  interference.  Various  disadvantages 
of  our  present  corn-law  ;  Modifications  suggested,  particu- 
larly a  moderate  fixed  duty  on  foreign  corn. 

Examination  of  the  petitions  of  the  Agriculturists  with 
regard  to  taxes  ;  of  the  high  duty  (40s.  per  quarter)  which 
they  propose  on  foreign  wheat ;  and,  lastly,  their  objections 
to  the  unlimited  warehousing  of  foreign  corn. 

Such  are  the  topics  discussed  in  this  long  and  interesting 
Report :  the  principal  inferences  from  the  reasoning  are, 

That  the  bounty-system,  whatever  might  be  its  early 
operation,  was  accompanied  by  a  torpid  state  of  agriculture 
for  the  half  century  previous  to  1773  ; 

That  one  cause  of  the  prosperity  of  our  agriculture  from 
1773  to  1814,  was  its  comparative  exemption  from  legisla- 
tive interference. 

That  the  high  import-limit  established  in  1815  tended  in 
some  degree  to  excess  of  home-growth. 

The  advice  of  the  Committee  was  to  return,  by  cautious 


App . J  Agricultural  Report  of  1 82  J . .  [5 1  ] 

steps  to  an  unrestricted  state  of  intercourse  ;  reducing  our 
import  limit ;  and  substituting  a  duty  of  such  an  amount  as 
should  afford  protection  to  the  present  cultivators  of  our 
inferior  soils,  but  holding  out  no  encouragement  for  the 
farther  appropriation  of  these  ungrateful  occupancies. 
After  this  return  to  sound  principle,  the  Committee  hope 
that  our  increasing  population,  and  the  general  improve- 
ment of  circumstances  attendant  on  confirmed  peace,  will 
relieve  the  distress  of  our  agriculturists ;  but  they  anticipate 
no  relief  from  such  measures  as  the  proposed  high  duty 
(40s.  per  quarter)  on  foreign  wheat,  or  from  a  restriction  on 
the  warehousing  of  foreign  corn  in  our  sea-ports.  The 
former  would  lead  to  an  excess  of  home-growth  ;  and  the 
latter  would  merely  transfer  the  deposites  of  the  corn-mer- 
chants from  our  warehouses  to  those  of  Holland,  Flanders, 
and  other  parts  of  the  Continent  which  are  convenient  for 
shipping  it  to  London. 

To  the  general  spirit  of  the  Report  we  subscribe,  in 
common  with  all  who  acknowledge  the  principles  of  free 
trade,  and  who  lament  that  our  legislature  deviated  from 
them  so  materially  in  the  case  of  our  corn-laws.  Next  as 
to  the  language,  the  manner  of  expressing  an  opinion  is 
a  consideration  of  great  nicety  hi  an  official  report ;  in 
which,  far  different  from  the  unauthorized  publication  of 
an  individual,  confidence  of  tone  may  lead  to  serious 
results.  In  the  present  case,  it  was  of  great  importance  to 
avoid  all  assertions  which  might  be  construed  into  inter- 
ference between  landlord  and  tenant ;  into  a  discourage- 
ment of  the  continuance  of  tillage  at  its  present  extent ;  or, 
finally,  into  a  protection  of  the  consumer  at  the  expense  of 
the  agriculturist.  Against  all  this  the  Committee  carefully 
guarded  ;  enjoining  nothing  with  respect  to  a  point  so  deli- 
cate as  the  adjustment  of  wages  or  rent  to  the  reduced  price 
of  corn,  but  leaving  the  change  to  the  natural  operation  of 
circumstances.  In  like  manner,  with  regard  to  our  import- 
limit  for  foreign  corn,  while  a  modification  of  its  amount 
and  the  introduction  of  a  fixed  duty  were  suggested,  no 
confident  calculation  or  authoritative  prescription  were 
given  as  to  the  rate  of  either.  In  short,  the  Report  was 
calculated  to  awaken  the  landed  interest  to  the  folly  of  the 
late  system  ;  and  to  the  injurious  tendency  of  those  inter- 
ferences, to  which,  formerly  in  the  shape  of  bounty,  and 
late!}*  in  that  of  discouragement  to  import,  they  have 
clung. 

If,  on  the  whole,  however,  we  think  thus  favourably  of 
the  Report  of  the  Agricultural  Committee,  we.  are  by  no 


[52]  Agricultural  Report  of 1821.  [Apr. 

means  blind  to  its  defects ; — to  the  omission  of  several  to- 
pics, and  to  the  imperfect  illustration  of  others. 

We  have  already  noticed  in  the  text  (p.  155.) 

The  omission  by  the  Committee  of  the  grand  argument, 
that  the  cost  of  raising  corn  has  a  tendency  to  fall  with  the 
fall  of  the  market;  and  we  have  mentioned  (App.  p.  [29]). 

Our  dissent  from  the  opinion  of  the  Committee,  that  in- 
crease of  population  augmented  the  difficulty  of  providing 
subsistence.  In  fact,  the  chief  defect  of  the  Report  arises 
from  the  belief  that  the  cultivation  of  an  additional  surface 
becomes  necessary  in  proportion  to  the  increase  of  our 
numbers.  So  much  do  the  Committee  appear  to  have 
taken  this  for  granted,  that  they  addressed  very  few  ques* 
tions  to  the  witnesses  on  the  practicability  of  augmenting 
crops  by  bestowing  additional  labour  on  the  same  soil.  We, 
on  the  other  hand,  account  the  effect  of  labour  in  augment- 
ing produce  so  great,  the  connexion  between  the  hands 
which  raise  and  the  mouths  which  consume,  so  direct,  that 
in  an  attempt  to  calculate  the  relative  productiveness  of 
different  countries,  we  should  be  guided  chiefly  by  the  re- 
turns of  population.  Almost  every  part  of  Europe  raises 
subsistence  enough  for  its  inhabitants,  with  the  exception 
of  the  maritime  tracts  of  the  Dutch  provinces,  or  rather  of 
the  single  province  of  Holland,  which  happens  to  have  both 
an  unusually  large  population,  and  a  soil  less  adapted  to 
tillage  than  pasture. 

The  Committee  have  allowed  this  theory  to  influence 
their  reasoning  in  several  points,  such  as  (Report,  p.  10.) 
the  question  of  a  remunerating  price  ;  the  extent  (p.  11.)  of 
our  probable  suffering  after  a  deficient  harvest  ;  the  argu- 
ment (p.  24.)  against  a  high  protecting  duty.  It  may,  in 
short,  be  said,  that  the  effect  of  this  impression  is  almost  as 
perceptible  in  their  labours,  as  was  in  those  of  the  Bullion 
Committee  the  notion  that  the  bank  possessed  the  power  of 
keeping  an  undue  quantity  of  paper  in  circulation. — These 
drawbacks  on  the  merit  of  the  Report  are  neither  few  nor 
inconsiderable :  they  do  not,  however,  prevent  us  from  rank- 
ing it  among  the  most  important  and  instructive  documents 
of  the  kind  that  have  appeared  for  many  years. 

Corn-Law  of  1815. — The  Committee  very  properly 
stigmatized  the  corn-law  of  1815  as  adverse  to  the  con- 
nexion which  it  is  our  interest  to  keep  up  with  the  Continent, 
for  the  purpose  of  meeting  our  occasional  deficiencies.  Far 
from  inducing  our  capitalists  to  purchase  foreign  corn,  when 
it  was  cheap  and  abundant,  that  law  discouraged  all  inter- 


App.] 


Agricultural  Report  of  1821, 


[53] 


course  with  our  neighbours,  except  in  years  which,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  similarity  of  latitude  and  climate,  were  likely 
to  be  seasons  of  dearth  with  them  as  with  us.  The  foreigner 
was  thus  prevented  from  buying  our  manufactures,  at  least 
from  reckoning  with  any  confidence  on  his  means  of  pay- 
ment. Hence  the  advantage  of  the  Act  of  the  present  year, 
whichj  imperfect  as  it  is,  opens  a  prospect  of  eventual  inter- 
course with  our  neighbours,  and  of  lessening  the  extremes 
of  rise  and  fall  in  our  market. 


Corn-Law  of  1822  ordered  to  be  printed  20th  June. 

Abstract. — The  Corn-Law  of  1815  permitted  import  free 
df  duty,  whenever  our  own  corn,  as  returned  by  the  ave- 
rages, was  at  or  above 

Per  Quarter.  Per  Quarter. 

Wheat      -  80s.  I  Barley  -         -     40s, 

Rye,  Pease,  and  Beans      53s.  |  Oats       -  -     26s. 

When  our  currency  was  below  these  prices,  the  import 
was  prohibited. 

The  present  Act  repeals  that  of  1815,  and  permits  the 
import  for  home  consumption  of  foreign  corn,  whenever 
our  own  corn  shall  be  at  or  above 

Wheat  -         -         70s.  I  Barley         -         -         35s. 

Rye,  Pease,  and  Beans     46s.  |  Oats  -         -         25s. 

subject  to  certain  duties,  the  amount  of  which  is  regulated 
not  by  these  prices,  but  by  the  following  table  : 


SCHEDULE  (A.) 

Wheat. 

Rye,  Pease, 
and  Beans. 

Barley, 
Bear  orBigg. 

Oats. 

If  the  average  of  British 

Corn   be   under,   per 

Quarter 

80s.      .     . 

53.?.     .     . 

40s.      .     . 

285. 

Hith  Duty 

.     .      12s. 

.     .        8s. 

.     .        65. 

, 

45. 

11  at  or  above,  per  Quar- 

ter 

80s.      .     . 

53s.      .     . 

40s.      .     . 

28*. 

But  under        do. 

85s.      .     . 

5Ss.      .     . 

425.  Gd.     . 

305. 

First  Low  Duty 

.     .        5s. 

.     3s.  6d. 

.       2s.  Gd. 

. 

25. 

If  at  or  above,  per  Quar- 

ter            ... 

85s.      .     . 

55s.      .     . 

42s.  Gd.     . 

30.?. 

Second  Low  Duty 

.     .        1*. 

.     .       8d. 

.    .       6d. 

•     • 

4d. 

[54] 


Corn-Law  of  June  1822. 


[App 


Colonial  Corn. — Corn  from  Quebec,  or  our  other  North 
American  Colonies,  is  admitted  to  consumption  in  this 
country  whenever  our  own  averages  are  at  or  above 


Wheat     -         -         -         595. 

Rye,  Pease,  and  Beans       395. 

At  the  following  duties  : 


Barley 
Oats 


305. 
205. 


SCHEDULE  (B.) 

!                           |    . 

\                                              Wheat. 

1 

Rye,  Pease, 
and  Beans. 

Barley, 
Bear  orBigg 

Oats. 

If  British  com  be  under,] 

per  Quarter       .         .67s.      .     . 

44s.      .     . 

33s.      .     . 

22s.  6d. 

High  Duty              .         .1     .     .      12s. 

.     .        8s. 

.     .        6s. 

.    .        4s. 

If  at  or  above,  per  Quar-| 

ter              .        .        .67s.      .     . 

44s.      .     . 

33s.      .     . 

22s.  6rf. 

But  under,  per  Quarter   71s.      .     . 

46s.      .     . 

35s.  6rf.     . 

24s. 

First  Low  Duty              .1     .     .        5s. 

.      3s.  6rf. 

.       2s.  6d. 

.     .        2s. 

If  at  or  above, per  Quar- 

ter             .        .        .i71s.      .     . 

46s.      .     . 

35s.      .     . 

24s. 

Second  Low  duty          .      .     .        Is. 

.     .       8d. 

.     .       M. 

.     .       4rf. 

Additional  Duty  for  the  first  three  Months  after  Admission 
to  sale  for  Home  Consumption. — To  prevent  an  abrupt  im- 
port, or  lowering  of  the  market,  it  has  been  judged  advise- 
able  to  impose  by  the  present  act  an  additional  duty  on 
Wheat  -         -       55.  Od.     Barley     -         -       25.  6d- 

Rye,  Pease,  and  Beans  85.  Gd.  Oats  -  -  25.  Od. 
On  all  corn,  colonial  as  well  as  foreign,  payable  in  addition 
to  those  in  the  Schedules,  during  the  first  three  months  of 
admission  to  home  consumption,  whether  the  corn  be  taken 
from  the  warehouse  or  from  on  board  of  ship. 

Corn  in  Warehouse. — Foreign  or  colonial  corn  at  present 
in  warehouse  may  be  taken  out  and  sold  for  home  con- 
sumption, as  soon  as  our  averages  shall  be  at  or  above  the 
preceding  rates  respectively,  of  70.s.  for  foreign,  595.  for 
colonial  wheat,  &c,  but  subject  to  the  highest  duty  in  the 
Schedules  A.  and  B.     And 

Corn  at  present  in  warehouse  may  be  admitted  to  home 
consumption  in  conformity  with  the  Act  of  1815,  that  is 
free  of  duty,  whenever  our  averages  rise  to  the  rates  fixed 
in  that  Act,  viz. 

Wheat       -  8O5.  I  Barley  -         -       405. 

Rye,  Pease,  and  Beans       535.  I  Oats      -  26s*. 


App.]  Corn-Law  of  June  1822.  [55] 

Flour,  whether  of  wheat  or  oats,  is  subject  to  duties 
proportioned  to  the  above-mentioned  duties  on  grain.  In 
this  respect  also  our  North  American  colonies  have  a  pre- 
ference, which  to  them  is  a  point  of  considerable  import- 
ance, since  the  shipments  on  the  opposite  shore  of  the 
Atlantic  take  place  more  frequently  in  the  shape  of  flour 
than  of  grain. 

Flour  made  from  wheat, 

Per  cwt.  Per  cwt. 


The  high  duty 
First  low  duty 

-  3s.  Sd. 

-  Is.  Id. 

Additional  during  the 

first  three  months  Is. 
Second  low  duty      05. 

Id. 

Ad. 

Oatmeal  per  boll : 

High  duty     - 
First  low  duty 

-  As.   10c?. 

-  2s.     2d. 

Additional  for  first 

three  months    -     2s. 
Second  low  duty     Os. 

2d. 
6d. 

Additional  labour  bestowed  on  Tillage  since  1814. — To 
our  arguments  in  the  text  on  this  head  it  is  objected  in  a 
respectable  quarter,  (Farmer's  Magazine,  published  at 
Edinburgh,  November  1822,)  that  the  years  since  the  peace 
have  been  in  general  a  period  of  discouragement  to  farmers, 
and  that  the  "  amount  of  labour  applied  to  tillage  is  more 
likely  to  have  been  reduced  than  augmented."  To  this, 
however,  we  cannot  assent,  and  must  observe  in  answer, 

1.  That  several  years  since  the  peace,  in  particular  1817, 
1818,  and  1819,  were  years  either  of  high  price,  or  of 
favourable  expectation  on  the  part  of  our  farmers,  who  at 
that  time  experienced  no  inadequacy  of  means  for  the  pay- 
ment of  labour. 

2.  That  throughout  England,  the  produce  of  which 
forms  fully  three-fourths  of  the  corn  brought  to  market  in 
the  United  Kingdom,  farmers  frequently  employ  labourers 
at  a  loss,  to  avoid  an  increase  of  poor-rate.  Declarations 
to  this  effect  are  found  in  various  parts  of  the  Evidence 
before  the  Agricultural  Committee  of  1821,  where  also,  we 
find  that  it  is  not  unusual  for  landlords  in  England  to  pay 
a  portion  of  the  farming  charges,  on  condition  of  the  tenant 
keeping  up  the  productiveness  of  the  land,  by  applying 
lime,  manure,  &,c. 

3.  A  powerful  circumstance  of  the  same  tendency  is  the 
difficulty  of  withdrawing  labour  and  capital  from  tillage : 
a  truth  so  strongly  urged  by  Mr.  Cleghorn,  in  his  lately 


[56]  Corn-Law  of  June  1822.  [App* 

published  "  Essay  on  the  Causes  of  the  Depression  of 
Agriculture,"  (pp.  51,  52,)  and  proved  by  the  experience  of 
•half  a  century  (from  1714  to  1764,)  during  which  the 
quantity  produced  was  kept  up,  although  prices  continued 
very  low. 

4.  Population  returns  1811  and  1821.  These,  it  is  true, 
appear  to  favour  the  opinion  that  the  number  of  labourers 
engaged  in  agriculture  has  not  kept  pace  with  the  increase 
of  consumers  ;  for  while  the  latter  were  augmented  in  the 
course  of  the  ten  years  in  question  15  per  cent.,  the  former 
appear  to  have  increased  hardly  10  per  cent.  It  is  how- 
ever to  be  remembered,  that, 

5.  The  distinction  in  the  Population  returns  is  made,  not 
by  individuals,  but  by  families,  and  that  the  discharges 
from  the  army  and  militia,  or  rather  the  suspension  of 
drain  by  enlistment,  by  leaving  the  able-bodied  at  home, 
gives  greater  efficiency  to  the  same  number  of  families. 
Also,  that, 

6.  From  the  progress  of  improvement  in  husbandry  the 
same  number  of  labourers  raise  a  considerable  larger  share 
of  produce  than  they  did  ten  or  twelve  years  ago. 


Aim-! 


V  P  P  E  N  D  I  X 


CHAPTER  VI. 


On  Poor-Rate, 


(From  the  Reports  on  the  Poor  Laws  in  1817  and  1821.) 

Table  of  the  Amount  expended  at  different  dates  on  the  Poor 
of  England  and  Wales,  making  the  year  close  at  Easter, 
and  adding  the  corresponding  average  Price  of  the  Bushel 
of  Wheat. — These  sums  are  distinct  from  church,  county, 
or  highway  rates. 


Price  of 

Wheat  per 

Bushel. 

\ 

£ 

s.     d. 

1748-49-50       -     -  average 

689,971 

4     5 

1776       ---     -        — 

1,521,732 

6     9 

1783-84-85       -     -        — 

1,912,241 

7     7 

1803       -     -     -     -       — 

4,077,891 

8     1 

1813-14-15       -     -       — 

6,129,844 

12     8 

1816-17-18       -     -       — 

6,844,290 

]0     0 

1819-20       -     -     -       — 

7,430,627 

9     6 

1821       -     -     -     -       — 

6,947,660 

7   10 

W 


[58] 


On  Poor-Hate. 


[Apr. 


Amount  of  'Expenditure  in  each  Tenth  Year  since  the  middle 
of  last  Century,  together  ivith  the  Price  of  Wheat. 


Years. 

Expenditure. 

Wheat  per  bushel. 

£ 

s.     d. 

1750 

713,000 

4     2 

1760 

965,000 

4  10 

1770 

1,306,000 

6     5 

1780 

1,774,000 

5   11 

1790 

2,567,000 

6     4 

1800 

3,861,000 

10     2 

1810 

5,407,000 

12     4 

The  following  are  given  in  successive  years. 
Expended  on  the  Maintenance  of  the  Poor. 


Wheat  per 

bushel. 

£ 

s.     d. 

Year  ending  25th  March,    1813 

6,656,105 

16     8 

1814 

6,294,584 

12     3 

1815 

5,418,846 

8  10 

1816 

5,724,507 

7     9 

1817 

6,918,247 

10  11 

1818 

7,890,148 

11     3 

1819 

7,531,651 

10     4 

1820 

7,329,594 

8     8 

1821 

6,947,666 

7   10 

London,  Westminster,  and  Southwark. 


EXPENDITURE.. 

Number  of  poor  relieved  perma- 
nently in  work-houses    -    - 

Out  of  work-houses,  without 
reckoning  the  children     -     - 

Parishioners  relieved  occasion- 
ally either  in  or  out  of  work- 
houses   ------- 

Total    - 

Year  ending 
Easter,  1813. 

Easter,  1814. 

25th  March, 
1815. 

£ 

13,389 
12,654 

40,993 

£ 

13,373 
13,762 

69,332 

£ 

12,341 
13,341 

70,322 

67,036  ' 

96,467 

96,004 

> 


App.]  On  Poor-Rate.  [59] 

Highway,  Church,  and  County  Rate. — These  minor 
charges  form  collectively  somewhat  more  than  a  fifth  of  the 
large  sum  which  passes  currently  under  the  name  of  poor- 
rate.  Are  they,  it  may  be  asked,  likely  to  experience  a 
reduction  corresponding  to  that  of  the  fund  applied  to  the 
relief  of  the  poor  ?  As  the  chief  constituent  of  charge  in 
these  lesser  rates  is  the  price  of  labour,  it  is  evident  that 
at  the  reduced  wages  of  the  present  day,  a  smaller  sum  will 
suffice  for  an  equal  extent  of  work  :  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
very  probable  that  from  a  sense  of  the  necessity  of  provid- 
ing employment  for  the  lower  orders,  and  of  the  advantage 
of  carrying  farther  the  improvement  of  our  roads,  a  con- 
siderable extension  may  be  given  to  such  undertakings  ; 
none,  it  is  evident,  can  be  more  advantageous  to  the  public , 
if  conducted  with  judgment  and  economy. 

Report  of  1 9th  July  1822,  on  the  Poor-Rate  Returns. — 
This,  the  latest  labour  of  the  Committee  on  the  manage- 
ment of  the  poor,  puts  in  a  striking  light  both  the  differ- 
ence of  plan  followed  in  different  parts  of  the  kingdom,  and 
our  imperfect  acquaintance  with  the  system  as  a  whole. 
There  continues,  says  the  Report,  an  evident  connexion 
between  the  rise  or  fall  of  the  price  of  wheat,  and  the  rise 
or  fall  of  expenditure  for  the  poor ;  the  total  decrease  in  the 
latter  since  1818  being  22  per  cent.  The  appointment  of 
select  vestries  and  assistant  overseers  goes  on  in  different 
parts  of  the  kingdom,  but  more  slowly  than  might  have 
been  expected  after  the  recommendation  of  the  Poor-law 
Committee  of  1817.  But  the  present  mode  of  keeping 
parish  accounts  presents  a  very  imperfect  check  on  the  ex- 
penditure, and  ought,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Committee,  to 
be  rendered  much  more  specific.  All  charges  either  for 
law,  or  for  such  purposes  as  building  or  repairing  work- 
houses, ought  to  be  discriminated  from  the  great  head  of 
"  money  expended  for  the  relief  and  maintenance  of  the 
poor  :" — while  in  regard  to  the  latter  the  return  ought  to 
be  very  explicit,  when  aid  is  afforded  according  to  the  num- 
ber of  children,  or,  in  particular  cases,  to  able-bodied 
persons. 


[60]  \Avr. 


APPENDIX 


CHAPTER  VII. 


On  Population. 


Employment  :  its  subdivision  as  Society  advances. — We 
follow  up  the  reasoning  in  the  text  (page  202.)  by  a  few 
familiar  illustrations,  for  several  of  which  we  are  indebted 
to  Mr.  Gray's  Remarks  on  Population. — In  a  primitive 
state  of  society,  like  that  of  England  in  the  days  of  the 
Britons  and  Anglo-Saxons,  or  like  that  of  the  interior  of 
Norway  in  the  present  day,  we  find  the  inhabitants  dis- 
tributed into  detached  cottages  or  petty  hamlets,  each 
family  being  obliged  to  provide  almost  every  thing  for 
itself.  To  cultivate  a  lot  of  ground  is,  in  such  a  state  of 
things,  indispensable  ;  since  no  employment,  not  even  those 
of  first  necessity,  such  as  the  business  of  the  baker,  the 
tailor,  or  the  mason,  would  occupy  the  whole  of  their  time, 
or  prove  adequate  to  their  support.  Each  household  is 
therefore  obliged  to  build,  to  bake,  to  brew,  to  make  and 
to  mend  for  itself;  how  awkwardly  and  how  imperfectly  it 
is  needless  to  say.  To  rear  a  family  is  to  them,  whatever 
the  imaginatian  of  poets  may  figure  of  these  days  of  sup- 
posed enjoyment,  a  task  of  greater  difficulty  than  in  this 
iron  age  of  rents  and  taxes.  Let  us  beware  of  forming  our 
ideas  of  the  condition  of  our  ancestors  from  the  ease  of 
acquiring  subsistence  in  countries  such  as  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope,  Upper  Canada,  or  the  United  States  of  Ame- 
rica. These  enjoy  all  the  advantages  of  colonies ;  they 
profit  by  the  capital,  the  activity,  the  knowledge  of  Europe, 
exhibiting  the  application  of  the  skill  and  formed  habits  of 
the  old  world  to  the  improvement  of  vast  tracts  of  unoccu- 
pied land.     They  exemplify,  in  short,  almost  all  the  circum- 


App.J  Population,  fyc.  [61] 

stances  which,  in  ancient  days,  led  to  the  rapid  growth  of 
the  Grecian  colonies  in  Italy  and  Asia  Minor. 

To  revert  to  the  characteristics  of  a  primitive  state  of 
society.  In  the  course  of  ages  the  hamlet  becomes  a  vil- 
lage, and  as  its  population  increases,  a  separation  of  employ- 
ment gradually  takes  place  ;  a  process  which  goes  on  in  an 
augmented  ratio  as  the  village  becomes  a  small  town,  a 
large  town,  and  eventually  a  city.  How  far  is  this  sub- 
division carried  in  the  case  of  a  population  of  between  1 500 
and  3000  f  The  more  common  species  of  labour,  such  as 
that  of  the  builder,  the  baker,  the  butcher,  the  tailor,  the 
shoemaker,  are  separated  ;  but  in  other  lines  the  division 
is  not  complete,  the  shopkeeper  is  a  linen  and  a  woollen- 
draper,  a  grocer,  a  druggist,  a  stationer ;  the  doctor  is 
apothecary,  surgeon,  physician ;  the  lawyer  unites  the  func- 
tions of  conveyancer,  land-steward,  and  general  agent.  This 
mixture  undergoes  a  decomposition  as  the  inhabitants  in- 
crease from  5  to  10,000;  and  in  a  population  of  from  10  to 
15,000,  the  various  classes,  whether  of  mechanics  or  dealers, 
are  tolerably  subdivided,  at  least  in  our  country ;  for  in 
France  and  most  parts  of  the  Continent,  the  subdivision, 
even  in  large  towns,  is  far  less  complete. 

Subdivision  of  Employment  in  great  Cities. — To  mark  this 
subdivision  in  all  its  extent,  the  observer  must  repair  to  the 
French,  or  rather  to  the  English  capital,  where  the  mercan- 
tile, the  manufacturing,  the  mechanical  professions,  all  as- 
sume the  most  simple  form.  A  London  banker,  different 
from  his  provincial  brethren,  issues  no  notes,  and  keeps  no 
interest  account  with  his  customers  :  a  merchant  confines 
his  connexions  to  a  few  foreign  sea-ports,  perhaps  to  a  parti- 
cular colony  or  town  ;  and  the  name  of  general  merchant, 
though  not  yet  disused,  is  hardly  applicable  even  to  our 
greatest  houses.  But  it  is  in  the  mechanical  arts  that  the 
subdivision  of  employment  takes  a  form  the  most  familiar 
and  most  intelligible  to  ordinary  observation.  In  London 
the  class  of  shoemakers  is  divided,  says  Mr.  Gra}r,  into 
makers  of  shoes  for  men,  shoes  for  women,  shoes  for  chil- 
dren :  also  into  boot-cutters,  boot-closers,  boot-makers. 
Even  tailors,  though  to  the  public  each  appears  to  do  the 
whole  of  his  business,  are  divided  among  themselves  into 
makers  of  coats,  waistcoats,  breeches,  gaiters.  In  other 
lines  an  equally  minute  repartition  takes  place  ;  and  as  to 
the  ornamental  or  elegant  arts,  such  as  those  of  jeweller, 
painter,  engraver,  nothing  would  be  more  easy  than  to  ex- 


[62]  Population:  [Ai»i». 

hibit  a  long  list  of  professions  limited  to  large  towns,  and 
wholly  unknown  in  a  thinly  peopled  district. 

Effect  of  this  Subdivision. — What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the 
practical  result  of  this  minute  subdivision,  this  nice  distinc- 
tion of  employment  ?  By  fixing  the  attention  of  the  work- 
man on  a  sjngle  part  of  his  business,  it  renders  him  sur- 
prisingly correct  and  expeditious  :  his  performance  gains 
equally  in  quality  and  in  despatch.  This  is  the  result  of  a 
mechanical  dexterity,  acquired  without  any  particular  effort 
of  the  mind  ;  for  we  must  by  no  means  infer  that  the 
quickness  characteristic  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  large  town, 
that  promptitude  which  distinguishes  the  Londoner  and 
the  Parisian  from  the  hesitation  and  circumlocution  of  the 
countryman,  is  the  consequence  of  any  innate  superiority  : 
those  who  walk  in  a  crowd  must  adopt  the  step  of  others, 
and  advance  with  the  rapidity  of  the  moving  mass.  The 
attainments  of  these  persons,  meaning  such  attainments  as 
they  possess  accurately  and  thoroughly,  are  often  confined 
to  a  few  branches  :  but  these  are  the  objects  of  their  profes- 
sion or  business  ;  and  the  result  is,  that  their  work  proceeds 
straight  forward,  very  little  time  being  lost  by  them  in  plan- 
ning, altering,  or  correcting. 

Proportion  borne  by  different  Classes  in  our  JYational 
Income. — In  consequence  of  our  insular  position,  our  canals, 
and  our  mines,  the  proportion  of  our  national  income,  de- 
rived from  manufacture  and  trade,  is  greater  than  in  most 
other  countries.  The  following  table  is  taken,  as  far  as 
regards  its  plan,  from  a  publication  by  Mr.  Gray  ;  but  it  is 
subjected  to  several  modifications,  arising  in  one  respect 
from  the  late  population  return,  in  another  from  the  fall  in 
the  price  of  commodities.  It  is  founded  partly  on  conjec- 
ture, partly  on  official  documents. 


App.] 


Ratio  of  its  Progressive  Increase. 


[63] 


Great  Britain  distinct  from  Ireland. 

Proportion  of  thej 
income  of  the  clas^ 
to  the  national   in- 
come at  large. 

Agriculturists  and  all  engaged  in  the  supply  of  sub- 
sistence, whether  farmers,  labourers,  or  dealers 

Manufacturers  and  all  persons  occupied  in  making 
clothing,  hardware,  and  other  articles  for  home 
consumption             >_-__. 

Mechanics,  masons,  and  all  engaged  in  supplying 
houses  with  furniture         - 

The  professional  classes,  viz*  lawyers,  clergy,  me- 
dical men,  artists,  and  teachers,  to  whom  is  added 
a  very  numerous,  though  not  an  affluent  class, 
that  of  domestic  servants            - 

The  army,  the  navy,  the  civil  servants  of  govern- 
ment, the  annuitants  drawing  an  income  from  our 
dividends  ;  all,  in  short,  who  are  paid  through  the 
medium  of  taxes                - 

The  classes  receiving  parish  support  and  other  cha- 
ritable aid        

Total     - 

30  per  cent. 

20  do. 
10  do. 

17  do. 

20  do. 
3  do. 

100 

j 

The  proportion  allotted  to  the  agricultural  classes  has 
unfortunately  not  been  earned  by  them  in  the  depression 
that  has  prevailed  since  1820  ;  but  the  case  must  ere  long- 
alter  ;  and  in  a  table  intended  to  be  referred  to  for  years,  it 
is  fit  to  keep  temporary  irregularities  out  of  sight. 

In  Ireland  the  distribution  of  productive  industry  is  very 
different  from  that  of  England  :  were  it  added  to  our  esti- 
mate, there  would  be  a  great  augmentation  of  the  agricul- 
tural proportion. 


Population  ;  its  different  Degrees  of  Increase. 

in  a  primitive  stage  of  society  the  rate  of  increase  is, 
doubtless,  very  slow,  since  no  advantage  arising  from  the 
boundless  command  of  territory,  can  counterbalance  the 
anti-population  habits  of  the  hunter  state.  This  is  suffi- 
ciently exemplified  among  the  North  American  Indians, 
and  proves  that  in  the  early  peopled  regions  of  Asia,  the 
increase,  even  with  the  aid  of   a  fine  climate,  could  not 


[(34]  Population  :— -  [App. 

have  been  considerable  until  the  adoption  of  pastoral  ha- 
bits ;  nor  great,  until  these  gave  way  to  the  agricultural 
state,  in  which  the  augmentation  of  subsistence  concurs 
so  directly  with  health  of  occupation  to  augment  our  num- 
bers. 

The  Mercantile  or  Manufacturing  Stage. — The  last  stage 
in  the  progress  of  society  may  be  termed  the  mercantile  ; 
the  stage  in  which  a  large  proportion  of  the  inhabitants  of 
a  country  are  assembled  in  sea-ports  and  manufacturing 
towns.  Manufactures  and  trade  are  by  many  accounted 
adverse  to  population,  the  former  leading  to  sedentary 
habits,  the  latter  occasionally  prompting  a  resort  to  dan- 
gerous climates.  These,  we  admit,  are  serious  objections  ; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  commercial  state  is  favourable 
to  early  marriage,  as  will  be  readily  allowed  by  all  who 
have  resided  in  an  agricultural  country  like  France,  and 
marked  how  slowly  population  increases  amidst  the  pe- 
nury, the  ignorance,  and  unenterprising  habits  of  the 
tenants  of  the  soil.  Add  to  this,  that  many  of  the  irregu- 
larities of  the  manufacturing  state  have  arisen,  not  from 
permanent  causes,  but  from  the  fluctuation  of  wages  inci- 
dent to  a  state  of  war,  or  from  the  insalubrity  of  antiquated 
and  ill-planned  structures.  Evils  such  as  these  are  in  a 
state  of  progressive  cure  from  various  causes,  and  from 
none  more  than  that  distribution  of  population  throughout 
provincial  towns  which  canal  communication  so  directly 
promotes,  by  enabling  a  particular  place  to  confine  itself 
to  a  particular  manufacture,  instead  of  accumulating,  as  on 
the  Continent,  a  multitude  of  workmen  in  a  crowded  and 
overgrown  city.  Paris  and  Vienna  are,  far  more  than 
London,  the  centre  of  manufacture  for  their  respective 
countries  ;  for  France,  Germany,  and  the  Netherlands, 
united,  do  not  exhibit  provincial  towns  to  be  compared 
to  Manchester,  Glasgow,  Birmingham,  Leeds,  Sheffield. 
These,  and  other  places  of  the  kind  in  England,  while 
exempt,  in  a  great  measure,  from  the  drawbacks  of  a  me- 
tropolis, in  regard  to  health  and  expense,  possess  advan- 
tages nearly  equal,  in  access  to  markets  and  division  of 
employment.  The  district  of  Birmingham  in  particular, 
inhabited  as  it  is  by  several  hundred  thousand  persons,  af- 
fords a  striking  proof  that  a  numerous  population  may  pro- 
secute manufacture  without  crowding  themselves  into  nar- 
row streets  or  lanes. 


App.]  Ratio  of  its  Progressive  Increase.  [65] 

Effect  of  the  Enlargement  of  Farms. — Increase  of  popu- 
lation is  conducive  to  increase  of  employment  in  many 
respects,  in  which,  at  first,  we  should  hardly  suppose  it  to 
exert  such  an  influence.  Thus  the  common  notion  of 
small  farms  being  conducive  to  increase  of  numbers,  is  far 
from  correct ;  it  being,  in  the  first  place,  impracticable  in 
these  petty  occupancies  to  do  justice  to  the  productive 
powers  of  the  soil,  while  farms  of  larger  size  (from  300  to 
500  acres)  have  many  advantages,  admitting  of  the  appli- 
cation of  machinery  and  the  beneficial  employment  of 
capital.  In  the  next  place,  it  is  a  remarkable  fact,  that 
while  the  quantity  of  subsistence  disposable  for  the  market 
is  augmented  beyond  comparison,  the  number  of  persons 
supported  on  the  spot  is  (as  we  find  from  the  population 
returns  of  counties  so  highly  cultivated  as  Norfolk  and 
East  Lothian)  greater  than  it  was  in  the  age  of  small 
farms. 

Effect  of  Machinery  on  the  Condition  of  the  working  Classes. 
— The  effect  of  mechanical  improvement  in  adding  to  the 
income  of  a  community  admits  of  no  doubt,  its  result  being 
to   afford   a  commodity   frequently   of  better  quality,  and 
always  at  a  cheaper  rate.     To  be  satisfied  of  the  latter,  we 
have  merely  to  compare  the  prices  of  either  our  cottons  or 
hardware  of  the  present  day  with  those  of  similar  articles 
made  by  us  thirty  years  ago,  or  with  those  made  at  present 
on  the  Continent,  where  machinery  is  as  yet  but  partially 
adopted.      But  what,  it  will  be  asked,  is  the  effect  of  ma- 
chinery on  the  income  and  comfort  of  the  workman  ?     At 
first  injurious,  bringing  with  it  the  evils  of  transition,  which 
are  very  serious  in  a  time  marked,  like  that  which  followed 
the  peace  of  1814,  by  a  great  reduction  in  the  demand  for 
hands  for  the  public  service.     To  take  an  instance  familiar 
to  those  of  our  countrymen  who  have  resided  in  France  :    in 
that  country  coal  is  very  little  used,  and  the  general  fuel, 
whether  in  town  or  country,  is  wood  :  the  trees,  after  being 
felled,  are  cut  into   short  but  thick  blocks,  carted  into  the 
towns,  sold  in  the  public   markets,  and  broken  up  by  men 
who   make  a  business  of  it,  but  whose  labour,  aided  only 
by  the  wedge  and   saw,  is  tedious   and  fatiguing,   adding 
nearly  ten  per  cent,  to  the  cost  of  the  article.      To  break 
these  solid  blocks  by  machinery  would  cause  a  consider- 
able saving  of  both  time  and   expense,  but  in  the  present 
stagnation  of  the  demand  for  labour,  it  would  be  harsh,  and 
indeed  unsafe  to  resort  to  such  an  alternative,  without  pro- 

M 


[o6]  Population: —  [Aff. 

viding  for   the   thousands  who  would  thus  be  deprived  of 
employment. 

Such,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  is  the  case  in  almost 
every  transition  of  importance.  Eventually,  however,  the 
hardship  is  overcome,  and  the  use  of  machinery  becomes 
productive  of  great  additional  comfort  to  the  lower  orders. 
To  prove  that  its  beneficial  effects  are  general,  it  is  not 
enough  to  cite  the  prosperity  of  a  few  manufacturing  dis- 
tricts, as  the  success  of  these  may  be  accompanied  by 
distress  in  other  parts  ;  the  prosperity  of  Lancashire  may 
cause  embarrassment  in  Saxony,  Flanders,  or  the  banks  of 
the  Rhine.  The  advantage,  then,  arising  from  the  use  of 
machinery,  rests  on  a  broader  basis  ;  on  that  law  in  pro- 
ductive industry  which  makes  every  real  reduction  of  cost 
an  addition  to  individual  income,  or,  what  is  the  same 
thing,  to  the  comforts  procured  by  that  income.  The 
benefit  of  such  reduction  is  enjoyed  by  the  public  at  large  : 
the  evil,  on  the  other  hand,  is  partial,  being  confined  to 
the  manufacturer.  He,  however,  is  benefited  in  his  capa- 
city of  consumer,  and  experiences  relief  from  his  distress 
as  soon  as  it  is  found  practicable  to  transfer  to  a  new- 
branch  a  portion  of  the  capital  and  industry  hitherto  em- 
ployed on  his  own.  Such  transfers  are,  it  is  true,  tasks  of 
great  time  and  difficulty  :  we  have  felt  them  to  be  so  in  our 
own  country,  while  in  others  less  advanced,  they  can  hardly 
be  accomplished  in  the  lifetime  of  a  generation. 

Increase  of  Population  in  the  present  Age. — The  recent 
increases  of  our  numbers,  so  greatly  beyond  that  of  any 
former  age,  is  ascribed  by  many  persons  to  the  excitement 
attendant  on  the  war,  and  to  the  encouragement  it  afforded 
to  early  marriage  in  the  case  of  so  many  classes,  the  agri- 
cultural, the  manufacturing,  the  mercantile.  This,  how- 
ever, applied  chiefly  to  the  mechanical ;  all,  in  short,  except 
the  fixed  annuitants,  the  middle  classes  :  among  the  lower 
the  advantage  in  wages  was  balanced,  or  nearly  balanced,  by 
the  rise  of  provisions.  We  must  also  put  in  the  opposite 
scale  the  serious  injury  to  population  arising  from  war,  as 
well  by  the  loss  of  lives  in  the  field  and  in  tropical  cli- 
mates, as  by  the  removal  from  home  of  many  who  would 
otherwise  have  become  fathers  of  families.  When  to  this 
we  add,  that  since  the  peace  the  ratio  of  increase  is  not  less 
great  than  during  the  war,  we  are  led  to  attribute  the  aug- 
mentation of  our  numbers  to  causes  more  permanent  and 
satisfactory  :  to  the  preservation  of  the  lives  of  children  by 


A  pp.]  Ratio  of  its  progressive  Increase.  [07] 

vaccination  ;  to  the  better  lodging,  the  greater  cleanliness 
and  sobriety  of  our  lower  classes.  This  result,  already  ex- 
emplified in  the  return  of  deaths  inserted  in  a  subsequent 
page,  will,  we  believe,  be  found  to  rest  on  a  broad  basis, 
whenever  our  official  documents  shall  become  more  ample. 
Similar  causes  prevail,  though  in  a  less  degree,  on  the 
Continent :  in  France  the  increase  of  population,  formerly 
so  slow  as  hardly  to  yield  an  addition  of  30  per  cent,  in  a 
century,  may  now  be  computed  at  somewhat  more  than 
twice  that  proportion.  In  that  country  sobriety  was  always 
prevalent ;  but  the  abolition  of  monasteries,  the  improve- 
ment of  medical  practice,  the  ameliorated  condition  of  the 
peasantry,  are  all  peculiar  to  the  present  age.  In  Ger- 
many the  degree  of  increase  is  probably  not  very  different 
from  that  of  France.  Of  Russia  we  have  as  yet  no  accu- 
rate returns ;  Spain,  Italy,  and  the  south  of  Europe 
generally,  are  also  on  the  increase,  but  in  a  ratio,  which, 
when  we  consider  the  general  indolence  and  poverty  of  the 
lower  orders,  is,  doubtless,  slower  than  that  of  France. 
And  in  the  countries  subject  to  the  Turks,  the  frequency 
of  the  plague,  and  all  the  pernicious  effects  of  bad  govern- 
ment, are  likely  still  to  counteract  the  natural  tendency  of 
population  to  increase. 

Marriages. — The  proportion  of  marriages  to  that  of  our 
population  does  not  appear  to  have  increased  during  the 
late  wars  : 

From  1780  to  1789,    marriages,   compared   to   the   whole 
population,  were  as  1  in  117 
1790  to  1799        -         -         -         1  in  1191 
1800  to  1809         -         -         -  1  in  119  * 

[Barton  on  the  Labouring  Classes.) 

We  shall  be  more  successful  in  searching  for  an  expla- 
nation of  the  rapid  increase  of  our  numbers  in  other  causes  ; 
none  can  be  more  gratifying  than  the  decrease  of  mortality 
in  consequence  partly  of  the  introduction  of  vaccination, 
but  partly  too  of  the  greater  sobriety  and  comfort  of  the 
poor. 

Progressive  Decrease  of  Deaths  in  Great  Britain. 

From  1785  to  1789         -    -    1  in  436 

1790  to  1794     -    -    -    1  in  447 

1795  to  1799  1  in  465 

1800  to  1804     -    -    -    1  in  474 

(Barton,  ut  supra.) 


[88] 


Population . 


[App. 


To  Mr.  Rickman,  Clerk-Assistant  of  the  House  of 
Commons,  who  has  prepared  the  successive  Population  Ab- 
stracts of  1801,  1811,  1821,)  I  am  indebted  for  much  use- 
ful information,  in  particular  for 

A  Comparative  View  of  the  Area  and  Productive  Power  of 
the  several  Counties  of  England  and  Wales. 

COUNTIES  ACCORDING  TO  THEIR  AREA. 


Square 

Square 

Counties. 

Statute 

Counties. 

Statute 

Miles. 

Miles; 

1.  York 

5,961 

30.  Surrey 

758 

2.  Lincoln 

2,748 

31.  Berks 

756 

3.  Devon 

2,579 

32.  Oxford 

752 

4.  Norfolk 

2,092 

33.  Bucks 

740 

5.  Northumberland 

1,871 

34.  Worcester    - 

729 

6.  Lancaster     - 

1,831 

35.  Hertford 

528 

7.  Somerset 

1,642 

36.  Monmouth 

498 

8.  Hampshire    - 

1,628 

37.  Bedford 

468 

9.  Kent 

1,537 

38.  Huntingdon 

370 

10.  Essex 

1,532 

39.  Middlesex    - 

282 

11.  Suffolk 

1,512 

40.  Rutland 

149 

12.  Cumberland 

13.  Sussex 

1,478 
1,463 

England    - 

50,535 

13.  Wilts 
15.  Salop 

1,379 
1,341 

16.  Cornwall 

1,327 

1.  Carmarthen 

974 

17.  Gloucester   - 

1,256 

2.  Montgomery 

839 

18.  Stafford 

1,148 

3.  Glamorgan 

792 

19.  Durham 

1,061 

4.  Brecon 

754 

20.  Chester 

1,052 

5.  Cardigan 

675 

21.  Derby 

1,026 

6.  Merioneth 

663 

22.  Northampton 

1,017 

7.  Denbigh 

633 

23.  Dorset 

1,005 

8.  Pembroke    - 

610 

24.  Warwick     - 

902 

9.  Carnarvon   - 

544 

25.  Hereford      - 

860 

10.  Radnor 

426 

26.  Cambridge   - 

858 

11.  Anglesea      - 

271 

27.  Nottingham 

837 

12.  Flint 

244 

28.  Leicester 

804 

29.  Westmoreland 

763 

Wales    - 
Total    - 

7,425 

57,960 

Scotland  and  Ireland  are  nearly  equal  to  each  other  in  area,  and  to- 
gether are  equal  to  or  somewhat  larger  than  England  and  Wales.  The 
Assessed  Rental  of  Scotland  in  1811  was  £3,899,364. 


App.J 


Population. 


[69] 


COUNTIES  ACCORDING  TO  THEIR  PRODUCTIVE 
POWER. 

Rent  and  Tithe  paid  in  each   County  in   1810,  per  square 
Mile  of  640  Acres. 


Merioneth     - 

£137 

Cambridge 

-     £571 

Brecon 

154 

Huntingdon    - 

574 

Cardigan 

173 

Hereford 

585 

Carnarvon 

192 

Lincoln 

594 

Montgomery 

198 

Salop 

610 

Radnor 

229 

Berks 

611 

Carmarthen 

244 

Bedford 

619 

Glamorgan     - 

284 

Derby 

624 

Pembroke 

284 

Kent     - 

651 

Anglesea 

288 

Wilts 

652 

Westmoreland 

299 

Nottingham   - 

659 

j  Durham 

300 

j  Gloucester    - 

680 

J  Cumberland 

327 

Cheshire 

684 

|  Denbigh 

331 

Essex 

692 

Hampshire    - 

435 

Rutland 

692 

Monmouth     - 

446 

Stafford 

693 

Sussex 

445 

Northampton 

702 

Cornwall 

470 

Oxford 

709 

Norfolk 

509 

Bucks 

713 

Devon 

616 

Lancaster 

718 

Northumberland    - 

520 

Hertford 

734 

Flint 

536 

Warwick 

744 

Suffolk 

537 

Worcester     - 

772 

Dorset 

538 

Somerset 

876 

York 

541 

Leicester 

891 

|  Surrey 

550 

Middlesex     - 

-       1,325 

The  area  of  the  counties  was  measured  on  Arrowsmith's 
last  map  (date  1815 — 1816,)  which  was  formed  on  the  trigo- 
nometrical survey.  The  process  of  squaring  and  comput- 
ing the  miles,  as  well  as  of  estimating  the  parts  of  miles  on 
the  borders  of  each  county,  having  been  performed  with 
much  care  and  labour,  the  inaccuracies  are  few  and  incon- 
siderable. 

Annual  Value  of  Land  by  the  square  mile  o/640  statute 
acres. — This  is  computed  from  the  "rent  and  tithe  collective- 
ly," and  the  average  of  England  and  Wales  in  1811  was 
17s.  2d.  per  acre  :  the  counties  which  take  the  lead  are 
Leicester  and  Somerset,  and  the  chief  cause  of  superiority  is 
the  extent  of  good  pasture  ground,  which,  of  course,  yields 
a  return  at  little  expense. 


'-«] 


Population. 


[App. 


The  Rental  is  taken  from  the  Property-tax  return  for  the 
year  ending  April  1811,  (seep.  66.  of  the  Property-tax 
Accounts,  printed  26  Feb.  1813.)  The  fall  of  rent  on  the 
one  hand,  and  extension  of  culture  on  the  other,  probably 
render  this  return,  though  comparatively  of  old  date,  a  tole- 
rably accurate  representation  of  the  present  rental  of  the 
kingdom. 

One  method  of  computing  the  productiveness  of  land 
under  tillage  is  to  "  take  for  each  county  the  number  of  fa- 
milies employed  in  husbandry,  and  to  divide  by  it  the 
amount  of  rent  and  tithe."  The  result  may  be  said  to  ex- 
hibit the  "  average  net  produce  of  the  labour  and  capital  of 
each  family  thus  engaged,"  and  indicates,  we  believe  with 
tolerable  accuracy,  the  progress  of  the  improved  husbandry. 
For  England  and  Wales  the  average,  in  1811,  was  4lZ.  per 
family  of  agriculturists.  The  proportion  was  by  no  means 
greatest  in  the  counties  adjacent  to  the  metropolis  ;  for 
while  in  Hertfordshire  and  Surrey  it  varied  from  SOL  to  40/. 
per  family  of  agriculturists,  in  Lincoln  and  Durham  it  ex- 
ceeded 50/.,  and  in  Northumberland  went  considerably  be- 
yond that  amount.  A  return  of  this  nature,  made  after 
rents  assume  a  settled  form,  would  be  a  very  interesting  do- 
cument, particularly  if  combined  with  a  similar  return  from 
Scotland,  where  tithe  and  poor-rate  happily  form  so  slight 
a  deduction  from  the  income  of  the  landlord. 

Rank  of  our  different  Counties  in  Point  of  Density  of 
Population. 


1  Middlesex 

2  Lancaster 

3  Surrey 

4  York,  W.  Rid. 

5  Kent 

6  Warwick 

7  Gloucester 

8  Nottingham 

9  Chester 
10  Worcester 
U   Durham 

12  Somerset 

13  Suffolk 

14  Derby 

15  Cornwall 

16  Leicester 

1 7  Northampton 

18  Essex 


19  Berks 

20  Norfolk 

21  Oxford 

22  Bedford 

23  Flint 

24  Buckingham 

25  Hertford 
2G  Wilts 

27  Southampton 

28  Cambridge 

29  Anglesea 

30  Huntingdon 

31  Stafford 

32  Salop 

33  Devon 

34  Sussex 

35  Rutland 

36  York,  E.  Rid. 


37  Denbigh 

38  Dorset 

39  Glamorgan 

40  Hereford 

41  Pembroke 

42  Carnarvon 
13  Monmouth 

44  Northumberland 

45  York,  N.  Rid. 

46  Lincoln 

47  Cumberland 

48  Carmarthen 

49  Montgomery 

50  Cardigan 

51  Westmoreland 

52  Merioneth 

53  Radnor 

54  Brecon 


App.] 


Population. 


71 


CENSUS  OF  1821. 

England,  Scotland  and  Wales  ;  Increase  of  the  Population 
since  1811,  exhibited  by  Counties. 


Increase 

Increase 

Increase] 

per  cent. 

per  cent 

per  cent 

Coun'ies 

from 

Counties 

from 

Counties. 

from 

1811  to 

1811  to 

1811  to  ! 

1821. 

1821; 

1821.     I 

Peebles 

1 

York,  E.  Rid- 

Durham 

17 

Sutherland   - 

1 

ing  - 

14 

Linlithgow  - 

17 

Perth  - 

3 

Aberdeen 

15 

Somerset 

17 

Forfar- 

6 

Bute    - 

15 

Banff  - 

18 

Kincardine  - 

6 

(Derby  - 

15 

Gloucester  - 

18 

Salop   - 

6 

!  Devon  - 

15 

Norfolk 

18 

Kinross 

7 

Essex  - 

15 

Bedford 

19 

Berwick 

8 

Inverness 

15 

Chester 

19 

Nairn  - 

9 

Kirkudbright 

15 

Cornwall 

19 

Clackmannan 

10 

!  Montgomery 

15 

Denbigh 

19 

Merioneth    - 

10 

Northampton 

15 

Lincoln 

19 

Hereford 

10 

Nottingham 

15 

Glamorgan  - 

20 

Radnor 

10 

Orkney  &Shet- 

Middlesex    - 

20 

Roxburgh     - 

10 

land  - 

15         ; 

Warwick 

20 

Elgin  - 

11 

Hampshire    - 

15 

1 

York,  N.  Rid- 

Argvle 

12 

Wilts  - 

15 

ing  - 

20 

Berks  - 

12 

Worcester    - 

15 

Cambridge  - 

21 

Stirling 

12 

Brecon 

16 

Renfrew 

21 

Westmoreland 

12 

Dorset 

16 

Anglesea 

22 

Dumbarton  - 

13 

Flint    - 

16 

Ayr 

22 

Dumfries 

13 

Hertford 

16 

Pembroke    - 

22 

Fife     - 

13 

Huntingdon  - 

IQ 

Surrey 

23 

Haddington  - 

13 

Leicester 

16 

Sussex 

23 

Ross  and  Cro- 

Monmouth   - 

16 

York,  W.Rid- 

marty 

13 

Northumber- 

ing - 

23 

Oxford 

13 

land- 

16 

Wigton 

24 

Rutland 

13 

Stafford 

16 

Lanark 

27 

Selkirk 

13 

Suffolk 

16 

Lancaster    - 

27 

Buckingham 

14 

Cumbertand 

17 

Caithness 

29 

Cardigan 

14 

Carmarthen  - 

17     ! 

Edinburgh    - 

29 

Kent    - 

14 

Carnarvon    - 

17     1 

The  ratio  of  most  frequent  occurrence  is  15  per  cent., 
or  an  average  between  13  and  17  per  cent.  In  several 
counties  the  augmentation  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  increase 
of  the  principal  towns  ;  thus  the  increase  of  Middlesex  is  the 
increase  of  London,  Surrey  of  Southwark,  Warwickshire 
of  Birmingham,  Lanarkshire  of  Glasgow,  and  Lancashire 
of  Manchester,  Liverpool,  Preston,  &c.  In  the  remote 
county  of  Caithness,  the  increase  is  owing  to  the  extension 
of  the  herring  fishery ;  while  the  almost  stationary  condition 
of  the  adjoining  county  of  Sutherland  is  owing  to  the  emi- 


[72] 


Population, 


App.] 


gration  of  cottagers,  and  the  conversion  of  their  petty  occu- 
pancies into  pasture  ground. 

England  and  Wales :  Progressive  increase  of  our  population. 

Its  amount  in  1801  -         -         -  9,343,578 

Ditto  1811  -         -         -         10,791,115 

Ditto  1821  -         -         -         11,977,663 

Progressive  increase  in  the  ten  principal  towns  of  England. 


Year  IgOl. 

Year  1811. 

Year  1821. 

London  - 

900,000 

1,050,000 

1,225,964 

Manchester     - 

81,020 

98,573 

133,788 

Liverpool 

77,653 

94,376 

118,972 

Birmingham    - 

73,670 

85,753 

106,722 

Bristol    - 

63,645 

76,433 

87,779 

Leeds     - 

53,062 

62,534 

83,796 

Plymouth 

43,454 

56,060 

61,212 

Portsmouth     - 

32,166 

40,567 

45,648 

Norwich 

36,532 

37,256 

50,288 

Newcastle-on-Tyne 

28,365 

37,587 
1 

46,948 

Scotland. — Here  the  ratio  of  increase  in  the  towns,  par- 
ticularly Edinburgh  and  Glasgow,  has  been  equally  great. 
Ireland. — The  returns  previous  to  1811  were  too  im- 
perfect to  afford  the  means  of  calculating  the  progressive 
increase  of  population,  nor  have  those  of  1821  as  yet  been 
given  to  the  public  in  a  satisfactory  form:  the  general  re- 
sult is,  that  the  population  of  all  Ireland  amounts  in  round 
numbers  to  7,000,000 

That  of  the  principal  towns, 

Dublin         .....        186,276 

Cork 100,535 

Limerick     -         -         -         -         -  66,042 

Great  Britain:  Return  o/*1821. 


Distribution  into  Classes. 

Families. 

Proportions  to 
the  whole  pop- 
ulation inparts 
of  100. 

Employed  chiefly  in  agriculture 
Do.  in  trade,  manufactures,  me- 
chanical employment,  &c. 
In  all  other  situations 

978,656 

1 ,350,293 
612,488 

33 

46 
21 

100 

App.] 


Population. 


[73] 


Proportion  of  Agricultural  Population. — This  varies 
greatly,  according  to  the  particular  county.  In  a  highly 
manufacturing  county,  such  as  Lancashire,  it  is  not  half  the 
average  of  33  in  100;  in  Yorkshire,  which  in  the  West 
Riding  is  manufacturing,  and  in  other  parts  agricultural, 
the  return  approaches  to  the  average,  but  is  still  somewhat 
below  it ;  while  in  Sussex,  Essex,  Suffolk,  where  there  are 
so  [ew  manufactures,  it  greatly  exceeds  it,  being  above  50 
in  100;  in  Cambridgeshire,  Bedfordshire,  and  Hereford- 
shire, the  proportion  is  the  largest  of  all,  being  above  60  in 
100. 

Comparison  of  the  Population  Returns  of  1811  and  1821. 


England. 

Wales. 

Scotland. 

Totals. 

Increase 
per  cent. 

Families  chiefly  employed  ) 
in  agriculture,         1811  $ 
1821 
Do.   in    trade,    manufac-) 
tures,    and    mechanical  > 
employment,            1811 ) 
1821 
In  all  other  situations,  1811 
1821 

697,353 
773,732 

923,588 

1,118,295 
391,450 
454,690 

72,846 
74,225 

36,044 

41,680 
20,866 
30,801 

125,799 
130,699 

169,417 

190,264 
106,852 
126,997 

895,998 
978,656 

1,129,049 

1,350,239 
519,168 
612,488 

19& 
18 

The  most  important  reflection  suggested  by  these  returns, 
is  the  great  superiority  of  increase  in  our  town  population 
over  that  of  the  agriculturists.  This  is  remarkable  on  two 
accounts  ;  first,  as  indicating  a  rapid  increase  of  productive 
power,  and  next  as  peculiar  to  our  island  ;  the  augmentation 
in  France  and  the  Continent  generally  being  no  greater  in 
town  than  in  the  country. 

Wales. — Here  agricultural  employment  predominates. 
Among  persons  out  of  business  there  appears  a  remarkable 
increase  ;  the  consequence,  probably,  of  Wales  being  found 
a  comparatively  cheap  residence  by  half-pay  officers  and 
other  annuitants. 


M 


[74] 


Population. 


[App. 


Indications  of  an  Increase  of  National  Wealth,  taken  from 
Population  Returns. — These  are, 

1.  An  increase  in  the  proportion  of  persons  who  are 
independent  of  labour  ;  we  mean  of  those  who  derive  their 
income  from  property,  whether  land,  houses,  or  money 
lent. 

2.  A  greater  comparative  increase  of  town  population. 

3.  It  follows  that  under  such  circumstances  agriculturists 
will  increase  in  a  ratio  inferior  to  that  of  the  other  classes  : 
still  the  augmentation  of  produce  may,  and  probably  will, 
keep  pace  with  the  augmentation  of  the  consumers,  the  im- 
provements in  husbandry  and  the  increased  use  of  machinery 
(such  as  threshing  mills)  contributing  greatly  to  lessen  the 
manual  labour  employed  in  raising  corn. 

Census  o/1377. — As  a  matter  of  historical  curiosity,  we 
subjoin  the  population  of  the  principal  towns  of  England  in 
the  year  1377,  when  an  enumeration  was  made  on  account 
of  a  poll-tax : 


London 

- 

- 

-  35,000 

York        - 

- 

- 

-  11,000 

Bristol     - 

- 

- 

-     9,000 

Plymouth 

- 

- 

-     7,000 

Coventry 

- 

- 

-     7,000 

Norwich 

- 

- 

-     6,000 

Lincoln 

- 

- 

-     5,000 

Sarum,  Wiltshi 

ire, 

-     5,000 

Lynn 

- 

- 

-     5,000 

Colchester  -  -  - 
Canterbury  -  -  - 
Beverley  -  -  - 
Newcastle-on-Tyne 
Oxford  -  -  -  - 
Bury,  Suffolk  -  - 
Gloucester    (  } 

Leicester      <  somewhat  > 
Shrewsbury  (morethan) 


4,500 
4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
3,500 
3,500 


3,000 


In  that  remote  age,  the  total  population  of  England  was 
2,300,000  ;  but  the  proportion  of  town  population  was  far 
smaller  than  at  present,  since  the  number  of  towns  contain- 
ing above  3000  inhabitants  was  only  18. 


App.]  [75 


APPENDIX 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


National  Revenue  and  Capital. 

Is  our  annual  Consumption  equal  to  our  annual  Produc- 
tion ? — In  adverting  to  this  subject,  our  limits  prevent  our 
enlarging  on  the  distinction  between  productive  and  unpro- 
ductive consumption,  as  explained  by  M.  Say  and  Mr.  Mill, 
or  the  much  greater  latitude  given  to  the  term  productive 
by  Mr.  Gray.  We  have,  in  fact,  room  for  little  more  than 
answering  the  plain  practical  question,  "  What  part  of  our 
national  income  appears  to  be  saved  or  invested,  so  as  to 
form  a  permanent  addition  to  the  national  property  ?" 

The  part  of  our  income  thus  appropriated  will  be  found 
very  small,  if  considered  in  the  limited  sense  of  investments 
in  money  securities,  such  as  the  funds  or  mortgage,  trans- 
actions of  that  nature  being  confined  in  a  great  measure  to 
annuitants,  or  rather  to  the  comparatively  small  portion 
of  them  that  are  opulent.  If  to  these  we  add  the  invest- 
ments in  the  form  of  money  in  the  part  of  all  other  classes, 
including  the  saving  banks  of  the  lower  orders,  we  shall 
probably  find  for  the  kingdom  at  large,  an  annual  appropri- 
ation of  9  or  10,000,000/.,  the  interest  of  which,  at  the  pre- 
sent reduced  rate,  affords  an  addition  of  only  3  or  400,000/. 
to  our  national  income. 

But  if  we  take  in  a  more  liberal  sense  the  difference  be- 
tween the  revenue  and  expenditure  of  the  nation,  if  we 
consider  as  saving  or  as  increase  of  our  stock,  all  that  is 
laid  out  on  the  improvement  of  land,  the  building  or  re- 
pair of  houses,  the  increase  of  furniture,  and  if  to  these  we 
add  interest  of  money  saved,  we  shall  find  on  the  whole,  an 


\ 

[76]  National  Revenue  and  Capital:  Correspondence  [Apr. 

addition  to  our  national  capital  of  50  or  60,000,000,  making 
an  increase  in  our  taxable  income  of  nearly  3,000,000/. 
a  year,  and  rendering  it  probable  that  the  260,000,000/. 
of  this  year  will  in  1824  become  263,000,000/. ;  in  1825 
266,000,000/.,  &c.  This  result  will  be  confirmed,  if  we 
take  as  a  criterion  the  increase  of  our  population,  confining 
our  estimate  to  those  who  annually  attain  the  age  of  twenty, 
the  age  of  efficient  labour,  and  whose  number  we  calculate 
as  follows  : 

In  1802  the  population  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland 
was  about  16,000,000,  the  annual  increase  by  births  over 
deaths,  1J  per  cent,  or  240,000.  The  individuals  then 
born,  whether  male  or  female,  have  now  attained  the  age 
of  useful  labour,  and  must  be  considered  as  bearing  the 
same  share  as  the  rest  of  the  population,  in  augmenting  the 
national  income.  In  what  manner  ought  the  result  of  their 
exertions  to  be  calculated  ?  Our  national  income,  taken  in 
the  largest  sense,  is  (see  p.  238)  350,000,000/.  a  year,  and 
the  average  contribution  to  it,  reckoned  per  head  of  popu- 
lation, is  nearly  17/.  Estimated  in  that  proportion,  the  ad- 
dition from  our  new  cultivators  of  the  field  of  national  in- 
dustry would  be  little  short  of  4,000,000/.  a  year  ;  but  we 
prefer  the  safer  course,  and  reckon  as  a  bond  fide  addition 
to  our  resources  only  that  income  which  is  subject  to  taxes. 
Now,  on  dividing  the  taxable  income  of  the  nation  by  the 
number  of  our  population,  the  result  is  about  12/.  a  head 
as  the  product  of  each  individual,  and  the  quota  of  our  new 
contributors,  reckoned  by  that  scale,  approaches  to  the 
3,000,000/.  mentioned  above. 

This  will  be  found  a  fair  and  moderate  estimate  of  the 
annual  addition  to  our  national  income.  If  it  be  objected, 
that  a  deduction  ought  to  be  made  from  our  assumed 
number  of  240,000,  on  account  of  the  deaths  occurring 
ere  our  new  contributors  attain  the  age  of  labour,  we 
answer,  that  that  is  amply  balanced  by  the  following  con- 
siderations : 

1 .  The  growing  increase  of  our  numbers,  which,  follow- 
ing the  scale  of  our  population  returns  for  1803,  4,  &c. 
will  be  next  year  244,000  ;  the  year  after  250,000,  and 
seven  years  hence,  270,000. 

2.  The  fact  that  our  new  labourers  living  chiefly  in  towns 
where  wages  are  higher  than  in  the  country,  their  contri- 
butions might  fairly  be  estimated  at  somewhat  more  than 
12/.  a  head. 

3.  Particularly  as  that  sum  forms  the  average  contri- 


App.]         between  Production  and  Consumption.  [77] 

bution  of  our  population  including  all  ages>  whereas  the 
240,000  on  whom  we  calculate  have  attained  the  age  of  la- 
bour. 

A  Table  of  annual  Consumption  substituted  for  a  Table 
of  Production. — Since  all,  or  nearly  all,  that  is  produced, 
is  consumed  in  one  form  or  other,  whether  productively 
or  otherwise,  and  since  the  taxes  of  this  country  are 
imposed  chiefly  on  consumption,  it  will  be  more  suitable 
to  our  reasoning  to  exhibit  the  amount  in  the  form  of  con- 
sumption. 

JYational  Expenditure  or   Consumption  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland  for  1823. 

Expended  on  the  produce  of  the  soil  for  the 
food  of  man,  or  for  purposes  of  manufac- 
ture -  £120,000,000 

On  the  produce  of  the  mines     -  -  10,000,000 

On  manufactures  for  home  consumption  70*000,000 

On  houses  built  or  repaired  ;  on  furniture  ; 
and  on  improvement  of  land  on  whatever 
is  termed  in  law  real  property  -  30,000,000 

On  all  goods  imported,  whether  for  con- 
sumption, such  as  tea,  sugar,  coffee ;  or 
for  manufacture,  as  wool,  hemp,  iron  70,000,000 

On  all  commodities  or  products  not  com- 
prised in  the  preceding  -  -  50,000,000 

Totd  consumption  -     £350,000,000 

Correspondence  of  this  Sketch  with  the  Calculation  of  other 
Writers. 
Mr.  S.  Gray,  in  his  addition  to  the  Happiness  of  States, 
(p.  636.)  computes  the  total  expenditure  or  consumption  of 
the  population  of  Great  Britain  in  1818  at  £280,000,000 
To  which,  if  we  add  for  Ireland  -  70,000,000 


The  result  is  as  above     £350,000,000 


Mr.  Colquhoun's  table  of  property  annually  created,  will 
be  found  to  differ  in  a  few  particulars  only  from  our  sketch 
of  consumption.     We  leave  out  in  the  latter 

The  produce  raised  for  the  food  of  horses,  cattle,  and 
the  lesser  animals  ;  also 


[78]  National  Revenue  and  Capital:  Correspondence  [Apr- 

The  amount  of  manufactures  exported ;  while  in  lieu  of 
the  latter,  and  of  some  other  heads  in  Mr.  C.'s  table,  we 
insert  the  value  of  imports. 

Our  next  inquiry  relates  to  a  topic  of  considerable  intri- 
cacy. 

Proportion  of JYational  Expenditure  exempt  from  Taxation, 
— In  France  and  other  countries  of  limited  trade,  the 
governments  are  obliged  to  impose  their  taxes  chiefly  on 
production,  exacting  from  the  landlord  and  farmer  a  pay- 
ment equivalent  in  general  to  20  per  cent,  of  their  incomes. 
With  us  the  form  of  impost  is  different :  the  direct  taxes 
since  the  peace  are  not  considerable,  but  those  on  con- 
sumption have  long  been,  and  still  are  so  multiplied,  that 
many  persons  imagine  that  hardly  any  portion  of  our  ex- 
penditure escapes  the  visitation,  direct  or  indirect,  of  the 
exchequer.  In  various  cases,  however,  the  transit  from 
production  to  consumption  is  too  direct  to  admit  of  assess- 
ment, particularly  in  regard  to  the  lower  orders.  The 
oats,  the  potatoes,  the  kitchen  vegetables  reared  by  the 
cottager  for  his  family,  or  by  the  farmer  for  his  labourers, 
though  all  comprised  in  our  estimate  of  national  consump- 
tion, are  subject  to  very  slight  demands  on  the  score  of 
taxation. 

Case  of  Ireland. — This  is  strikingly  exemplified  in  the 
sister  island,  where  the  taxed  expenditure,  limited  as  it  is 
to  the  disburse  of  the  gentry,  the  merchants,  professional 
men,  and  the  comparatively  small  portion  of  the  lower 
classes  residing  in  towns,  cannot  with  confidence  be  com- 
puted at  more  than  25,000,000/.  But  a  population  of 
7,000,000,  supposing  their  average  rate  of  subsistence  not 
to  exceed  that  of  the  English  cottagers,  as  calculated  by  Sir 
F.  Eden,  (between  6  and  7/.  a  head,)  could  not  -exist  with 
out  an  annual  produce  of  nearly  50,000,000/.  ;  and  if 
in  forming  a  calculation  for  Ireland,  we  make  allowance 
for  the  better  circumstances  of  her  town  population,  and 
for  the  comparative  comfort  of  her  linen  manufacturers, 
we  may,  perhaps,  without  exaggeration,  carry  the  total 
property  created  in  that  island  to  70,000,000/.  a  year,  which 
is  in  the  proportion  of  nearly  3  to  1  to  the  sum  we  have 
assumed  as  representing  her  taxable  income. 

That  the  supposed  amount  of  the  latter  cannot  be  much 
above  25,000,000/.  is  unfortunately  too  clear  from  the 
state  of  the  revenue,  the  amount  of  which,  before  making 
any  deduction  for  collection,  hardly  exceeds  5,000,000?., 


App.]         between  Production  and  Consumption.  [79] 

or  20  per  cent,  on  25,000,000/.,  although  levied  of  late 
years  on  nearly  the  same  scale  of  duties  as  in  England, 
where  taxation,  distinct  from  poor-rate,  exceeds  20  per 
cent,  of  the  national  income.  How,  it  may  be  asked,  does 
it  happen  that  the  two  countries  differ  so  greatly  in  the 
proportion  of  their  taxed  and  untaxed  consumption  ?  Be- 
cause three-fourths  of  the  population  of  Ireland  are  cot- 
tagers, whose  consumption  eludes  the  visit  of  the  tax- 
gatherer,  their  clothing  being  of  home  manufacture,  their 
food  the  potatoes  of  the  neighbouring  field,  their  fuel  the 
turf  of  the  common  bog.  One  generation  thus  succeeds 
to  the  poverty  of  another  ;  and  in  the  eye  of  the  political 
arithmetician,  Ireland  is  rich  only  in  recruits. 

France. — This  country  bears  a  considerable  resem- 
blance to  Ireland  in  the  density  as  in  the  poverty  of  her 
agriculturists  ;  their  total  consumption  (exclusive  of  the  food 
of  horses  and  cattle)  is  not  over-rated  at  180,000,000/., 
but  as  in  the  rural  districs  of  France  the  excise  duties  are 
very  light,  taxation  in  these  districts  is  in  a  manner  confined 
to  the  45,000,000/.  of  rent  and  farmers'  income  returned 
as  subject  to  fancier.  The  assessment  under  that  head, 
heavy  as  it  is,  would  not,  if  calculated  on  the  produce  of 
agriculture,  exceed  5  or  6  per  cent. ;  yet  to  increase  the 
amount  of  this  tax  is  a  matter  of  great  difficulty,  and  the 
contribution  of  French  agriculturists  to  their  government 
takes  place  much  more  in  men  than  in  money.  Thus  in 
1793,  when  the  cause  of  the  revolution  was  highly  popular, 
and  the  greatest  efforts  were  necessary  to  repel  invasion,  the 
demand  of  the  government  was  directed  not  to  pecuniary 
aid,  but  to  levies.  And  after  the  discredit  of  the  Assignats, 
the  finances  of  France  owed,  in  a  great  measure,  their  sup- 
port to  the  resources  of  the  Netherlands. 

Such  is  the  state  of  taxation  in  regard  to  agriculturists ; 
the  next  question  respects  the  situation  of  manufacturers. 
Among  them  the  proportion  of  expenditure  subject  to  tax- 
ation may  at  first  appear  large,  the  majority  of  the  work- 
men residing  in  towns ;  however,  a  great  part  of  them  are 
indigent,  and  though  the  wages  of  the  unmarried  are  ex- 
pended in  a  great  measure  on  taxed  articles,  such  as  beer, 
spirits,  and  tobacco,  those  of  women,  children,  or  the 
fathers  of  families,  are  more  strictly  confined  to  the  pur- 
chase of  the  necessaries  of  life. 

Lastly,  in  regard  to  the  expenditure  of  merchants,  pro- 
fessional men  and  traders,  foreign  commerce,  transacted  as 
it  is  in  sea-ports,  and  by  persons  in  the  command  of  capital, 


[80]  National  Revenue  and  Capital ;  Correspondence  [App. 

creates  for  the  limited  number  employed  by  it,  a  great 
consumption  of  taxed  articles.  Of  professional  income  the 
appropriation,  from  the  respectable  station  of  the  individu- 
als, is  similar,  but  inland  traffic  comprises  many  persons  of 
a  very  humble  rank,  mechanics,  labourers,  and  others,  of 
whose  consumption  a  considerable  part  is  but  slightly  pro- 
ductive to  the  exchequer. 

It  would,  we  believe,  answer  no  useful  purpose  to  enter 
on  a  more  minute  distinction  of  the  expenditure  of  parti- 
cular classes.  Speaking  generally,  we  may  assume  that 
about  25  per  cent,  of  our  national  expenditure  seems  ex- 
empt from  taxation,  and  that  if  the  whole  be  computed  at 
350,000,000/.,  the  taxable  part  may,  agreeably  to  the 
table  in  the  text,  be  put  down  at  somewhat  more  than 
260,000,000/. 

We  may  perhaps  throw  some  light  on  this  intricate  topic 
by  adding  a  few  sentences  containing  the  amount  of  national 
income  in  several  of  our  great  departments,  with  some  re- 
marks on  its  appropriation. 

Income  from  the  Produce  of  the  Soil,  120,000,000/. — Of 
this  very  large  sum,  the  portion  constituting  the  income  of 
the  landlord  and  of  the  higher  class  of  farmers,  is  evidently 
expended  in  articles  subject  to  taxation  ;  in  regard  to  the 
smaller  farmers  or  labourers  the  case  is  otherwise,  their 
principal  consumption  of  taxed  articles  being  confined  to 
malt  liquor. 

Produce  of  the  Mines,  10,000,000/. — Here  similar  re- 
marks apply  in  regard  to  the  rent  of  the  proprietor,  the 
salary  of  the  superintendant,  or  the  wages  of  the  workman. 
As  to  the  raw  material,  a  considerable  duty  is  raised  from 
coal,  but  this  charge  is  avoided  on  all  that  is  not  carried 
coastways,  or  in  a  particular  direction  by  canal. 

Manufactures  for  home  Consumption,  70, 000,000/. — The 
expenditure  on  taxed  articles  in  this  case  arises  from  the 
income  of  master  manufacturers,  the  salaries  of  clerks, 
and  the  wages  of  the  less  indigent  workmen.  The  same 
may  be  said  to  apply  to  the  expenditure  (computed  at 
30,000,000/.)  on  buildings,  furniture,  and  agricultural  im- 
provements. 

Income  from  Trade,  Professions,  and  all  other  Sources, 
100,000,000/. — Under  this  very  comprehensive  head,  the 
expenditure  more  particularly  subject  to  taxation  consists 


Apr. J  Estimate  of  National  Capital.  [81] 

of  the  profit  of  merchants  and  bankers  ;  of  the  income  of 
professional  men  ;  salaries  of  clerks ;  income  of  shop-keep- 
ers ;  wages  of  ship-builders,  seamen,  &c. 

National  Capital. — Calculations  of  national  capital  are 
not,  perhaps,  of  great  importance  in  a  direct  sense,  since 
taxation  has  seldom  been  imposed  with  reference  to  the 
amount  of  capital.  A  table  of  this  nature  is,  however,  of 
interest  when  viewed  in  connexion  with  a  return  of  our  na- 
tional income,  and  rendered  subservient  to  establishing  the 
accuracy  of  the  latter  ;  this  will,  we  believe,  be  the  effect  of 
the  subjoined  sketch. 

The  fall  of  prices  attendant  on  a  state  of  peace  is,  from 
causes  which  shall  be  explained  presently,  productive  of 
much  less  diminution  in  regard  to  our  capital  than  our  in- 
come ;  and  Mr.  Colquhoun's  calculation  having  been  made 
on  an  estimate  extremely  moderate  for  a  state  of  war,  the 
difference  between  the  present  year  and  the  year  1812,  as 
calculated  by  him,  is  not  considerable.  Our  table  for  the 
present  year  is  consequently  little  more  than  a  re-statement 
of  his  results,  with  a  few  modifications. 


w 


[82J 


Estimate  oj  National  Capital. 


[Api 


Calculation  of  National  Property. 


Computation  foi 

1812,    nearly  in 

A  similar  com- 

Great Britain  and  Ireland. 

the  form  adopted 

putation  for 

by    Mr.    Colqu- 
houn. 

1823. 

Land  under  cultivation,  whether  in 

pasture,  tillage,  or  gardens 

£1,280,000,000 

£1,200,000,000 

Farming  capital,  whether  vested  in 

implements     of    husbandry    and 

farming   stock,    or  in    corn  and 

other  produce    - 

228,000,000 

200,000,000 

Dwelling  houses,    warehouses,  and 

manufactories    - 

400,000,000 

400,000,000 

Manufactured  goods  in  progress  or 

read}7  for  sale,   whether  in  manu- 

factories,  warehouses,  or  shops : 

also     foreign     merchandise    on 

hand 

160,000,000 

140,000,000 

British  shipping  of   every  descrip- 

tion            

27,000,000 

20,000,000 

Here  it  seems  fit  to  make  an  ad- 

dition to  Mr.  Colquhoun's  statements 

on  account  of 

Mercantile  and  manufacturing  ca- 

pital not  specified  by  him,  viz.  mo- 

ney in  hand  ;  advances  to  corres- 

pondents abroad :  manufacturing 

machinery  ;  tools  and  implements 

of  mechanics      - 

130,000,000 

]3o,ooo,ooo| 

This  carries  to  nearly  300,000,000/. 

our  mercantile  and  manufacturing 

capital  employed  in  current  business 

and  exclusive   of  whatever  capital 

our   merchants   may  have  in  fixed 

i 

property,  such  as  the  funds,  land  or 

houses. 

Such  are  the  great  heads  of  our 

national  property :  the  lesser  as  gi- 

ven by  Mr.  Colquhoun,  are 

Mines  and  minerals         - 

75,000,000 

65,000,000 

Canals,  tolls,  and  timber 

Total         -         -         - 

50,000,000 

45,000,000 

£2,350,000,000 

£2,200,000,000) 

This  table  is  to  be  understood  as  representing  private 
property,  and  exclusive  of 

1.  All  public  property,  such  as  military  stores,  churches, 
hospitals ;  also  of 


Yi'i'.J  Estimate  of  National  Capital.  [83] 

2.  Such  private  property  as  is  unproductive;  viz.  waste 
lands,  furniture,  or  wearing  apparel ;  and,  finally,  of 

3.  Whatever  is  expressive  of  a  debt  from  one  part  of  the 
community  to  another,  such  as  the  stocks,  mortgages,  or 
mercantile  acceptances. 

How,  it  may  now  be  asked,  does  it  happen  that  the  de- 
crease of  our  national  property  since  the  peace  is  so  much 
less  than  is  commonly  supposed  ?     The  reasons  are — 

Land,  as  a  property,  is  worth  in  peace  from  thirty-two  to 
thirty-five  years'  purchase ;  in  war,  only  twenty-seven  or 
twenty-eight  years'  purchase  ;  so  that  though  on  our  rental 
we  reckon  a  fall  of  fully  30  per  cent.,  the  principal  has  not 
sunk  above  1 5  or  20  per  cent. 

Farming  capital  experiences  at  present  a  depression  of 
value  far  beyond  the  reduction  in  our  table  ;  but  its  amount 
in  1812  was,  we  believe,  under-rated  by  Mr.  Colquhoun, 
while,  in  point  of  quantity,  whether  of  implements,  cattle,  or 
corn  on  hand,  it  has  increased  probably  20  per  cent,  since 
that  year. 

As  to  buildings,  whether  warehouses,  manufactories,  or 
dwellings,  the  surprising  increase  in  the  number  appears 
fully  to  have  balanced  the  decrease  of  rent,  particularly  as 
such  decrease  appears  to  have  been  much  smaller  in  this 
kind  of  property  than  in  land. 

In  our  manufactured  and  foreign  goods  on  hand  the  fall 
of  price,  great  as  it  has  been,  is  nearly  equalled  by  the  in- 
crease of  quantity.  In  our  shipping  the  case  is  otherwise, 
and  we  have  accordingly  made  a  large  deduction. 

Such  is  the  comparative  amount  of  our  national  proper- 
ty in  1812  and  1822,  when  represented  in  money  of  the  re- 
spective years.  But  were  the  calculation  for  both  made  in 
money  of  equal  value,  the  balance  would  be  in  favour  of  the 
present  year ;  we  mean,  that  the  valuations  for  the  present 
vear,  if  made  in  the  money  of  1812,  would  not  be  short  of 
2,500,000,000/. 

Were  we  to  take  a  retrospective  view  of  the  value  of  our 
national  property  since  1792,  we  should,  in  the  absence  of 
satisfactory  returns  for  the  earlier  years,  estimate  it  at  two- 
third's  of  the  present  amount. 


[84]  Estimate  of  National  Capital.  [App. 

Public  Burdens  in  the  present  Year  (1823.) — Particulars 
of  the  64,000,000/.  assumed  in  the  text,  p.  248. 

Taxes,  gross  amount,  including  both  the 
charge  of  collecting  and  the  repayments 
in  the  form  of  drawbacks,  discounts,  and 
allowances  £58,000,000 

Deduct,  not  the  charge  of  collection,  but  the 
repayments,  which  form  in  fact  no  part  of 
our  burdens 4,000,000 


Remain        -         -       54,000,000 

This  is  after  a  full  deduction  for  the  dimi- 
nution in  the  duties  on  malt,  salt,  leather ; 
also  in  the  assessed  taxes. 

Add  for  tithe,  including  Ireland*         -         -         5,000,000 
Poor-rate,  after  deducting  such  portion  as  be- 
longs properly  to  wages  (see  text,  p.  193.)         5,000,000 

In  all       -         -     £64,000,000 


This  amount,  reduced  to  money  of  1792  in 
the  proportion  of  nearly  130Z.  to  100/., 
gives  the  sum  expressed  in  the  text,  viz.         £50,000,000 
Or,  compared  to  our  national  income, 
a  proportion  of  25  to  100. 

•  Tithe.    All  our  tables  include  the  tithe  paid  to  lay  impropriators. 


[85] 


APPENDIX 


CHAPTER  X. 


On  Fluctuation  of  Prices. 


(From  Mr.  Arthur  Young's  Inquiry  into  the  Value  of 
Money,  1812.) 

Abstract  of  part  of  Sir  G.  Shuckburgh's  Table. 
The  Prices  of  the  Year  1550  are  taken  for  the  Integer ;  viz.  100. 


Twelve 

1 

Years. 

Wheat. 

Miscellaneous 
Articles,  viz. 
an  Ox,  Cow, 
Poultry,  &c. 

Butcher 
Meat. 

Day 
Labour. 

Mean  of  all.' 

1 

1550 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

1600 

— 

— 

— 

— 

144 

1650 

— 

239 

— 

— 

188 

1675 

246 

— 

166 

118 

210 

1700 

— 

— 

— 

— 

238 

1720 

— 

434 

— 

— 

257 

1740 

197 

492 

266 

250 

287 

1760 

203 

— 

400 

275 

342 

1780 

— 

— 

— 

— 

427 

1790 

— 

752 

— 

— 

496 

1795 

426 

— 

511 

436 

531 

1  1800 

— 

— 

— 

— 

562 

This  table  represents  a  very  great  rise  in  prices,  but  the 
grounds  of  calculation  are  far  from  accurate.  Butcher 
meat  is  put  on  a  par  with  meat,  although  with  the  mass  of 


[S6] 


Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.  [App. 


the  population  it  does  not  form  a  fifth  part  of  the  consump- 
tion. Each  of  the  twelve  miscellaneous  articles,  whether 
poultry  or  cattle,  are  considered  of  equal  importance,  and 
manufactures  of  every  sort  are  omitted.  There  are,  be- 
sides, a  number  of  inaccuracies  in  the  authorities  from  which 
the  table  is  compiled. 

Comparison  of  the  17th  and  18th  Centuries. — Bishop 
Fleetwood,  whose  inquiries,  in  regard  to  the  particular  pe- 
riod to  which  he  confined  them,  were  very  accurate ;  and 
Dr.  Henry,  the  author  of  the  History  of  England,  both  ex- 
hibit results  very  different  from  Sir  George  Shuckburgh. 
From  these  Mr.  Young  attempted  an  estimate  on  the  fol- 
lowing plan. 


17  th 

18th 

Rise  per        , 

Century. 

Century. 

Cent. 

£     *.     d. 

£T~sT~a\ 

Wheat     - 

1   18     2 

1   18     7 

Par. 

Barley  and  oats 

1     9     54 

2     0     04 

33 

ButGher  meat,  butter, 

cheese,  or   whatever 

is  the  produce  of  grass 

land      - 

0     1     9 

0     2     3 

284 

Labour 

0     0  10* 

0     1     3 

46* 

Wool       - 

1     9     14 

0   17     8* 

394  fall. 

Iron         - 

0     0     14 

0     0     11 

164  rise. 

Coals      - 

1      5   104 

1    16     0 

39* 

Repeating  wheat  five  times,  on  account  of  its  import* 
ance,  barley  and  oats  twice,  the  produce  of  grass  land  four 
times,  labour  five  times,  and  reckoning  wool,  coals,  and 
iron,  each  but  once,  while  iron  is  considered  the  repre- 
sentative of  all  manufactures,  the  rise  from  the  prices  of  one 
century  to  those  of  the  other  will  amount  to  no  more  than 
224  per  cent. ;  or  only  the  tenth  part  of  the  rise  stated  by 
Sir  George  Shuckburgh. 

Manufactures. — Under  the  important  head  of  metals, 
and  particularly  of  iron,  Mr.  Y.  found  that  the  rise  for 
several  centuries  had  been  inconsiderable,  the  improve- 
ments in  the  process  of  preparing  them  sufficing,  in  a  great 
measure,  to  counterbalance  the  enhancement  of  labour. 
But  the  great  argument  against  Sir  G.  Shuckburgh's  alle- 


App.J 


Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money. 


[87] 


gation  of  general  depreciation  is  to  be  found  in  the  price  of 
manufactures,  in  the  production  of  which,  far  more  than 
in  agriculture,  free  scope  is  given  to  the  application  of  all 
the  auxiliaries  called  forth  by  the  progress  of  society  ;  v  e 
mean  increase  of  capital,  division  of  labour,  and  aid  from 
machinery.  The  following  short  list  is  taken  from  the 
books  of  Greenwich  Hospital. 


Proportions 

Average  of  the  Years  from 

Shoes. 

Stockings. 

Hats. 

in  twenty, 
when  taken 
collectively. 

s.    d. 

s.     d. 

s.     d. 

1729  to  1765     -     - 

3  11 

1     7 

2    21 

144 

1770  to  1785     -     - 

3  10 

1     54 

2    34 

14 

1770  to  1800     -     - 

4  n 

1     51 

2    4 

151 

1790  to  1800     -     - 

4     64 

1     6 

2    4 

154 

1805  to  1810     -     - 

5     5 

2     2  - 

3    0 

20 

These  are  articles  of  subordinate  importance  ;  but  the 
fact  is,  that  in  almost  all  manufactured  commodities,  we  are 
supplied  cheaper  than  our  ancestors,  and  that  a  rise,  when 
it  has  taken  place,  is  to  be  ascribed  either  to  a  tax  on  the 
raw  commodity,  or  to  some  cause  which  may  be  termed 
particular  or  incidental.  In  regard  to  the  quality  of  our 
manufactures,  we  must  speak  with  more  hesitation,  and  can 
hardly  decide  whether  the  balance  be  in  favour  of  the  pre- 
sent or  of  a  former  age ;  for  if  our  fabrics  are  now  much 
more  neat  and  convenient,  they  are  in  a  considerable  de- 
gree less  durable. 

Horses  and  Cattle. — In  these  the  improvement  in  point 
of  quality  admits  of  no  doubt.  In  comparing  the  present 
price  of  sheep  and  oxen  with  those  of  a  century  ago,  a  great 
part  of  the  difference  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  inferior  size  of 
the  animal,  at  a  time  when  the  art  of  grazing  was  not  under- 
stood ;  the  same  will  be  found  to  hold  in  regard  to  horses, 
and  at  a  later  date  than  is  commonly  imagined.  The  only 
quarter  affording  authentic  information  in  regard  to  the 
price  of  horses  is  the  War  Office,  from  the  records  of  which 
Mr.  Young  extracted  the  following  averages. 


[88] 


Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.  [App. 


Years. 

Price. 

1766  and  1767            - 

From  1768  to  1792,  both  inclusive 

1793  to  1802             - 

1803  to  1812 

£     s.     d. 
21     0     0 
23     2     0 
26     5     0 
26     5     0 

The  rise  of  price  in  this  period  of  forty-six  years  was 
much  less  than  might  have  been  supposed  from  the  rate  paid 
by  individuals.  But  the  War  Office,  looking  chiefly  to 
strength  and  the  power  of  standing  fatigue,  bought,  through- 
out the  whole  period,  horses  of  nearly  equal  value.  Pri- 
vate purchasers  were  not  so  easily  satisfied ;  and  of  the 
higher  prices  so  generally  paid  by  them,  a  considerable 
part  is  to  be  ascribed  to  a  size  and  beauty  in  the  animal 
which  half  a  century  before  was  comparatively  rare. 

Sketch  of  the  progressive  Rise  of  Prices  since  the  Thirteenth 
Century,  taking  20  for  the  Integer  or  highest  Sum,  and 
exhibiting  the  other  Parts  by  their  proportion  to  it.  (Ab- 
stracted from  a  Table  of  Arthur  Young.) 


Beef  and 
Pork,  from 

Manufac- 

Trade, 
calcu- 

Periods. 

Wheat 

the  Books 
of  the 

Labour. 

Green- 
vvich 

Popu- 
lation. 

lated 
from 

Victual- 

our Ex- 

ling Office. 

Hospital. 

ports. 

13th  Century 

5h 

__ 

34 

_ 





14th  ditto 

H 

— 

4$ 

— 

— ■ 

— 

15th  ditto 

3 

— 

H 

■— . 

— 

— 

16th  ditto 

6 

— 

5h 



— 

— 

17th  ditto 

n 

— 

8 



— 

— 

18th  ditto 

H 

— 

12* 



— 

— 

66  years  from  1701 

to  1766 

n 

n 

10 

144 

11 

5* 

23   ditto   from    1767 

to  1789 

ii 

ii 

m 

14 

13* 

H 

34  ditto   from  1767 

to  1800 

12 

12J 

14 

15| 

15f 

» 

14  ditto    from   1790 

to  1803 

13 

17 

16| 

15* 

18| 

!5| 

7  ditto  from  1804  to 

1810 

20 

20 

20 

20 

20 

20 

App.j  Fluctuation m  the  Value  of 'Money.  [89  J 

Annual  Consumption  of  Gold  and  Silver  for  Plate,  orna- 
mental Manufacture,  and  Furniture — Calculations  of  this 
nature  have  hitherto  been  founded  on  returns  from  towns 
which,  like  Geneva,  were  remarkable  for  the  manufacture 
of  watches,  or  like  Paris  and  Birmingham,  for  gilding, 
trinkets,  and  other  ornamental  fabrics.  At  present,  how- 
ever, we  are  inclined  to  draw  our  inferences  from  a  wider 
field,  from  a  calculation  of  the  probable  amount  of  indi- 
vidual income  founded  on  the  public  burdens  of  this  and 
other  countries.  If  we  refer  to  our  property-tax  returns 
during  the  war,  and  make  allowance,  on  the  one  hand,  for 
the  reduction  of  income,  on  the  other,  for  the  increase  of 
numbers  that  have  since  taken  place,  we  shall  find  reason 
to  estimate  the  number  of  \ 

Families  in  England,  Scotland,  and  Wales, 
possessing  200/.  a  year  and  upwards,  at  1 00,000 

And  taking  our  island,  as  representing,  in 
point  of  such  incomes,  a  fourth  of  the  ci- 
vilized world,  we  add  for  the  latter,  that 
is,  for  the  rest  of  Europe  and  the  United 
States  of  America  -  -  -  300,000 


Together  400,000 

Families  whose  incomes  are  be- 
tween 60/.  and  200/.  a  year 
amount  in  Great  Britain  to 
nearly    -  -  -  400,000 

Add  for  the  rest  of  Europe  and 

the  United  States  of  America      1 ,200,000 

Together         -  -         1,600,000 

Now  a  consumption  on  the  part  of  the  for- 
mer class  at  the  conjectural  average  of  10/. 
a  family  annually,  would  give         -         -      £4,000,000 

The  same  for  the  second  class  at  the  rate  of 

somewhat  less  than  2/.  per  family  -  3,000,000 

Add  for  the  consumption  of  the  lower  or- 
ders in  watches,  ear-rings,  buckles,  &c.  1,000,000 

Total         -         -         £8,000,000 

These  large  sums  include  loss  by  accident 

and  wear ;  but,  as  a  considerable  amount 

of  old  plate  or  old  manufacture  is  annually 

melted  and  wrought  up,  we  deduct  as  not 

forming  a  demand  on  the  mines       -         -         2,000,000 

M 


[90]  Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.  |  App. 

Remainder,  being  the  conjectural  amount  of 
specie  from  the  mines  annually  required 
for  plate  and  ornamental  manufacture  or 
furniture    ------       £6,000,000 

Comparative  Expense  of  France  and  England. — Not- 
withstanding our  great  intercourse  with  the  Continent  of 
late  years,  the  public  are  not  yet  in  possession  of  a  correct 
comparison  of  the  expense  of  living  in  France  and  England. 
Nothing  is  more  vague  and  unsatisfactory  than  the  notices 
on  this  subject  in  books  of  travels,  proceeding,  as  they  ge- 
nerally do,  from  persons  who  have  little  idea  of  compre- 
hensive calculation,  and  who  allow  themselves  to  dwell  with 
undue  emphasis  on  a  few  particular  points  in  which  France 
happens  to  differ  materially  from  England.  Such  persons 
seldom  make  allowance  for  a  countervailing  tendency  in 
other  items  of  the  account.  The  proper  mode  is  to  frame 
a  general  table,  including  not  only  provisions,  house-rent, 
fuel,  wages,  but  manufactures,  and  professional  charges. 
After  ascertaining  these  material  points,  there  will  remain 
to  be  made  a  distinction  between  different  periods ;  thus, 
during  the  war,  particularly  in  the  latter  years,  the  difference 
between  the  two  countries  was  very  great,  100/.  in  France 
being  equivalent  to  140/.  or  150/.  in  England.  Since  tho 
peace,  this  difference  has  progressively  decreased,  the  fall 
of  prices  in  France,  though  not  inconsiderable,  being  mucli 
inferior  to  that  which  has  taken  place  in  England.  A  com- 
parison made  in  1819  would  have  exhibited  100/.  in  France 
as  equal  to  fully  130/.  in  England;  at  present  (1823)  it 
would  not  exceed  the  proportion  of  100/.  to  120/. 

After  attending  to  these  preliminaries,  the  progress  of 
comparison  becomes  less  difficult,  and,  by  balancing  one 
point  against  another  is  made  to  assume,  at  last,  a  clear 
and  simple  form.  This,  as  to  the  respective  capitals,  Paris 
being  inferior  in  water  communication  incurs  a  greater 
enhancement  than  London  in  the  conveyance  of  bulky 
commodities,  such  as  corn,  coal,  wood ;  while,  in  respect  to 
number  of  consumers,  the  cause  of  enhancement  is  consi- 
derably less,  the  population  of  the  French  metropolis  being 
less  than  two-thirds  of  that  of  ours.  These  causes  may  be 
said  to  neutralize  each  other  :  and  the  inferences  are, — 

First,  that  Paris  is  as  much  dearer  than  the  provincial 
part  of  France,  as  London  is  dearer  than  the  provincial  part 
of  England. 

Secondly,  that  the  proportion  mentioned  above  as  con- 


Aep.j  Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.  [91] 

stituting  the  difference  with  England,  viz.  30  per  cent,  in 
1819,  and  20  per  cent,  at  present,  is  applicable  to  the  two 
countries  throughout,  provided  we  confine  our  parallel  to 
places  similarly  circumstanced,  comparing  Paris  with  Lon- 
don, and  Touraine  or  Lower  Normandy,  each  about  150 
miles  from  Paris,  with  Shropshire,  Derbyshire,  or  other 
counties,  at  a  similar  distance  from  London. 

Another  point  to  which  travellers  are  seldom  sufficiently 
attentive  is,  that  the  degree  of  difference  between  one  pro- 
vince and  another,  and  even  between  one  country  on  the 
Continent  and  another,  is  much  smaller  than  it  at  first  ap- 
pears. Take,  for  example,  the  north  and  south  of  France* 
countries  very  different  in  climate,  produce,  and  habits, 
At  first  the  south  appears  much  cheaper,  affording  in  abun- 
dance wine,  fruit,  and  other  articles,  for  which  we  are  made 
to  pay  so  extravagantly  in  England  ;  but  these,  on  a  closer 
examination,  are  found  to  be  counterbalanced  by  the  price 
of  corn,  always  higher  there  than  in  the  northern  districts 
of  France.  Again,  the  lower  wages  of  labour,  in  a  back- 
ward province  like  Brittany,  make  a  very  slight  difference 
ultimately,  when  we  take  into  account  the  inferiority  of  the 
labourers.  Similar  remarks  are  applicable  to  Germany. 
Italy,  Switzerland  :  in  none  of  these  countries  are  the 
amount  of  taxation,  the  interest  of  money,  the  state  of  hus- 
bandry, or  any  of  the  main  constituents  of  price  so  mate- 
rially different  as  to  cause  any  great  difference  in  the  expense 
of  living.  Accordingly,  after  all  the  assertions  and  exag- 
gerations of  travellers,  the  distinctions  on  the  Continent  are 
little  more  than 

1 .  That  provincial  towns  are  considerably  less  expensive 
than  capitals. 

2.  That  by  living  in  a  petty  town,  or  in  the  country,  a 
farther  reduction  of  expense  may  be  accomplished,  but  with 
a  greater  sacrifice  of  comfort,  a  greater  removal  from  busi- 
ness and  society,  than  is  implied  by  a  country  residence  in 
England. 

3.  That  in  consequence  of  the  want  of  water  commu- 
nication, the  price  of  bulky  commodities,  such  as  corn  or 
wood,  varies  more  in  the  provinces  of  the  Continent  than 
in  the  counties  of  England  ;  still  the  difference  is  less  great 
than  is  often  asserted,  (Edinburgh  Review,  Vol.  LXI V. 
p.  362.)  land  carriage  on  the  Continent  being  moderate 
in  consequence  of  the  insignificance  of  tolls  and  turnpike 
dues. 

4.  That  taking  France  as  the  representative  of  the  Con- 
tinent at  large  in  point  of  expense,   the  difference  with 


[92]  Fluctuation  in  the  Value  of  Money.  [Apr. 

England,  great  during  the  war,  (particularly  from  1809  to 
1814),  is  at  present  not  more  than  20  per  cent.  ;  any  dis- 
burse beyond  that  proportion  being  attributable,  not  to 
difference  of  prices,  but  to  additional  comfort  or  luxury  on 
our  side. 

To  what  degree  did  a  difference  of  prices  exist  between 
France  and  England  prior  to  the  French  Revolution  r 
Our  materials  for  such  a  comparison  are  far  from  complete  ; 
the  tables  collected  by  the  late  Arthur  Young  in  1789  in- 
dicate a  considerable  inferiority  of  price,  but  the  articles 
quoted  are  chiefly  agricultural ;  and  had  manufactures 
been  included,  the  general  result  would  have  been  less  un- 
favourable to  England.  If  we  revert  to  a  prior  date,  such 
as  the  middle  of  the  last  century,  we  shall  find  reason  to 
consider  the  two  countries  nearly  on  a  par.  At  that  time 
England  was  not  much  more  heavily  taxed  than  France, 
nor  were  our  manufactures  or  corn  dearer,  for  both  were 
articles  of  export.  The  result  accordingly  is,  that  prior  to 
1760  the  only  material  distinction  between  the  two  coun- 
tries consisted  in  the  style  of  living  ;  the  proportion  of 
English  population  in  towns  being  even  then  considerably 
greater,  and  the  inhabitants  consequently  requiring  com- 
forts little  known  or  thought  of  in  the  provincial  part  of 
France. 

Mr.  M'Culloch,  in  his  "  Essay  on  reducing  the  Interest 
on  our  National  Debt,"  published  in  1816,  maintains,  in 
contradiction  to  common  opinion,  that  the  rise  in  the  price 
of  corn  on  the  Continent  during  the  last  half  century  has, 
on  the  whole,  been  inconsiderable.  He  goes  into  the  ques- 
tion at  great  length,  treating  in  succession  of  France,  Spain, 
Italy,  and  the  countries  on  the  Baltic,  and  adducing  several 
cogent  arguments  in  opposition  to  those  who  maintain, 
that  there  took  place  on  the  Continent  a  rise  of  prices 
nearly  correspondent  to  the  rise  in  this  country.  His  con- 
clusions are,  that  in  France  there  was  no  rise  in  the  price 
of  corn  :  that  in  Italy  the  rise  was  a  consequence  of  the  ex- 
tension given  to  the  freedom  of  trade  ;  and  that  the  partial 
advance  which  he  admits  to  have  taken  place  in  Russia 
and  Poland  was  a  necessary  result  of  the  degree  of  im- 
provement introduced  in  the  present  age  into  these  very 
backward  countries.  To  this  statement  we  have  merely 
to  offer  the  qualifications  naturally  arising  from  a  state  of 
war.  In  the  long  period  from  1793  to  1814,  every  state  on 
the  Continent  was  either  engaged  in  hostilities,  or  obliged 
to  increase  its  taxes  and  militarv  establishment.    In  all  these 


App.]  Fluctuation  in  the  lvalue  of  Money.  [93] 

was  felt  a  portion  of  the  activity  or  excitement  so  conspi- 
cuous in  England  during  the  war,  followed  in  all  by  a  stag- 
nation similar,  though  not  equal  in  degree,  to  that  which 
we  have  experienced  since  the  peace.  The  consequence 
was,  that  prices  rose  during  one  period  and  fell  in  the  other ; 
but  to  ascertain  the  extent  of  change  is  a  matter  of  great 
difficulty,  there  being  few  official  returns  in  any  part  of  the 
Continent,  and  the  question  being  somewhat  perplexed  by 
the  circulation  of  government  paper  so  general  during  the 
war.  On  the  whole,  however,  there  took  place,  in  family 
expenditure,  calculated  on  a  comprehensive  plan,  and  in- 
cluding along  with  corn  and  butcher  meat,  wages,  house- 
rent,  fuel,  &tc.  a  rise  of  from  25  to  30  per  cent,  on  the 
prices  of  1792  ;  a  rise  which  has,  in  a  great  measure,  dis- 
appeared in  the  continued  reduction  since  the  peace. 

In  forming  conclusions  on  the  price  of  corn,  allowance 
ought  evidently  to  be  made  for  particular  causes  operating 
in  particular  countries  : — thus,  in  France,  the  abolition  of 
tithe,  and  the  sale  of  the  church  lands,  promoted  tillage  to 
a  degree  which  nearly  counteracted  the  rise  of  labour  at- 
tendant on  the  war. 


Annual  Expense  of  the  family  of  an  Agricultural  Labourer, 
supposed  to  consist  of  h\  persons  ;  being  an  average  of  the 
expense  of  65  families  of  labourers,  in  different  parts  of 
England,  collected  by  Sir  F.  Eden,  in  1796. 

Provisions  (as  dear  then  as  in  1823)     - 

Rent 

Fuel  and  candles        - 

Clothes  and  washing  - 

Contingencies  - 


The  same  table,  adapted  to  the  present  time  by  an  ad- 
dition of  25  per  cent,  to  the  respective  heads  of  expense, 
with  the  exception  of  provisions. 

Provisions         ----- 


£27  1 

8 

1  13 

3 

2  10 

7 

4  18 

0 

0  10 

10 

£36  14 

4 

Rent 

Fuel  and  candles 
Clothes  and  light 
Contingencies   - 


-  £27 

1 

8 

2 

1 

7 

3 

3 

3 

6 

2 

6 

0 

13 

i 

£39 

2 

7 

[94] 


Plan  for  giving  a  steady  Value  to 


[A  pp. 


Table  comprising  articles  of  general  consumption,  to  each  of 
which  is  affixed  the  probable  amount  of  money  expended  on 
it  by  the  public,  referred  to  in  the  text,  p.  300. 


Articles. 

Quantity 
consumed. 

Average 
price. 

Expended  by 
the  public  od 
each  article. 

Produce  of  the  Soil. 

Qrs. 

s. 

£ 

Wheat 

12,000,000 

50 

30,000,000 

Barley(used  chiefly  in  the  brewery 

and  distillery) 

7,200,000 

25 

9,000,000 

Oats   (the  portion  appropriated  to 

human  food)  - 

10,000,000 

20 

10,000,000 

Butcher    meat    and  animal  food 

generally       - 

— 

1 

35,000,000 

Manufactures. 

The  following  sums  representing 

1 

the  value,  exclusive  of  exports, 

- 

are,  of  course,  considerably  be- 

low the  total  of  the  value  an- 

nually prepared                        - 

— 

— 

— 

Woollens 

— 

— 

22,000,000 

Cottons,     (the    exports    exceed 

20,000,000/.) 

— 

— 

20,000,000 

Linen        

— 

— 

15,000,000 

Silk 

— 

— 

8,000,000 

Leather 

— 

— 

15,000,000 

Hardware          - 

— 

— 

9,000,000 

Foreign  Articles,  such  as 

Sugar       

— 

— 

9,000,000 

Tea 

— 

— 

8,000,000 

Various  other  articles  of  sufficient 

importance  to  be  specified,  and 

the  amount  of  which  it  would 

probably  be  practicable  to  ascer- 

tain from  official  documents 

— 

— 

100,000,000 

A  multiplicity  of  articles  of  less 

importance,  which  being  in  a 

great  measure  superfluities,  and 

dependent  for  their  consump- 

tion on  the  taste  of  individuals 

require  to  be  noticed  no  farther 

than  by  assigning  to  them  col- 

lectively their  proportion  to  the 

aggregate :  this  proportion  we 

shall  at  present  suppose  to  be 

about  17  per  cent.,  or    - 
j Total  annual  consumption  - 

: 

60,000,000 

350,000,000 

Such  is,  or  rather  would  be  when  completed,  a  table  of 
our  annual  consumption  at  the  present  time.     In  framing 


App.] 


Money  Contracts. 


95. 


or  correcting  such  a  table,  we  have  evidently  to  consider 
two  main  points ;  the  quantities  consumed,  and  the  price. 
As  to  quantity,  a  variation  can  take  place  only  with  in- 
crease of  population  or  change  of  habits,  and  any  alteration 
of  that  kind  must  be  so  gradual,  that  we  run  very  little  ha- 
zard in  assuming  a  similarity  of  amount  during  a  given  pe- 
riod, which,  for  the  sake  of  precision,  we  shall  suppose  to 
be  five  years.  As  to  price,  the  case  is  different ;  the  pro- 
duce of  the  soil  may,  from  casualty  in  the  season,  rise  10  or 
20  per  cent.,  while  our  manufactures  may  experience  a  fall. 
The  result,  as  far  as  founded  on  prices,  must  therefore  un- 
dergo some  change  annually :  for  the  sake  of  illustration 
we  shall  suppose  in  one  year  a  change  differing  in  different 
articles,  but  ending  in  an  average  rise  of  5  per  cent. : 
thus, — 


Articles. 


Produce  of  the  soil  computed  on  the 
same  quantities ;  but  with  an  ad- 
dition of  10  per  cent,  to  the 
prices. 

Wheat 

Barley 

Oats 

Butcher  meat  and  animal  food 
enhanced  in  the  same  propor- 
tion     - 

^Manufacturers ;  here  we  suppose 

I    a  decrease  of  5  per  cent-:  thus, 

|  Woollens  - 

Cottons 

Linen       - 

Silk 

Leather  - 

Hardware        - 

Foreign  Articles. 

Sugar  the  same        - 

Tea  the  same  - 

In  the  other  component  parts  of 
the  table  the  fluctuations  are 
supposed  to  change  the 
amount  of  170,000,000/.  to     - 

Total 


Quantity 
consumed. 


Qrs. 


12,000,000 

7,200,000 

10,000,000 


Average 
price. 


55 

27 

22 


Expended  bj- 
the  public  on 
each  article. 


33,000,000 

9,000,000 

11,000,000 


38,500,000 


19,000,000 
11,400,000 
14,250,000 

7,600,000 
14,250,000 

8,500,000 

9,000,000 
8,000,000 


181,100,000 


367,500,000 


The  final  change  supposed  in  this  statement  is  that  1057. 
are  required  to  effect  the  purchases  for  which  1007.  sufficed 
in  the  preceding  year.     We  proceed  next  to  the 


;  90J  Plan  for  giving  a  steady  Value  to  \  wr , 

Apportionment  of  the  respective  Articles  in  the  former  Table. 


Articles  consumed. 


(Wheat 

iBarley  -         -         - 

'Oats 

-Butcher  meat  and  all  animal  food    - 

Woollens         - 

[Linen      ------ 

i  Leather 

jCottons 

jSilk 
'Hardware        - 

(Sugar 

jTea 

All  other  heads  of  national  consumption 

Total 


Expenditure 
on  each 
Article. 


£ 
30,000,000 
9,000,000 
10,000,000 
35,000,000 
20,000,000 
15,000,000 
15,000,006 
12,000,000 
8,000,000  j 
9,000,000  i 
9,000,000  | 
8,000,000  I 
170,000.000 

350,000,000  I 


Proportion  of 
the  expendi- 
ture on  eachar- 
ticle  to  the  total 
expenditure  of 
the  public,  cal 
culated  in  parts 
of  tOO. 


8.57 

2.57 
2.85 

10. 
5.71 
4.28 
4.28 
3.42 
2.28 
2.57 
2.57 
2.28 

48.62 


100 


To  those  who  apprehend  complexity  in  such  calculations, 
we  would  observe,  that  the  details  would  rest  with  persons 
employed  for  the  purpose  ;  and  that  the  public  would  re- 
quire to  know  only  the  result,  which,  as  in  the  present  re- 
turns of  the  averages  of  sugar  and  corn,  might  be  commu- 
nicated in  a  few  sentences. 

Ought  a  Table  of  National  Consumption  to  comprise  the 
smaller  Heads  of  Expenditure  ? — To  calculate  the  smaller 
items  of  expenditure  would  be  a  task  of  great  difficulty,  and, 
as  far  as  we  can  judge,  of  little  utility,  since  it  is  easy  to 
make  an  allowance  for  the  proportion  omitted.  Besides, 
we  ought  to  introduce  into  the  table  no  sum  of  which  the 
accuracy  is  not  ascertained  with  considerable  confidence 
from  official  documents,  and  of  which  the  importance  is 
not  such  as  to  reward  the  labour  of  inquiry  and  comparison. 
Were  the  articles  enumerated  to  form  only  50  per  cent,  of 
the  total  national  consumption,  the  result,  supposing  them 
to  be  articles  of  general  use,  would  afford  a  very  fair  scale 
for  comparing  the  prices  of  different  years.  A  table  com- 
plete in  all  its  parts  would,  doubtless,  be  preferable ;  but  as 
the  heads  of  our  public  offices,  like  our  individual  in- 
quirers, are  as  yet  in   only  an    early   stage   of  statistical 


Arr.]  Money  Contractu,  [97] 

research,  a  considerable  time  must  elapse  ere  their  materials 
acquire  a  finished  form. 

In  the  case  of  the  lower  orders,  a  knowledge  of  the  cost 
of  a  few  great  heads  of  expenditure,  such  as  corn,  coarse 
clothing,  beer,  fuel,  would  be  found  sufficient.  There  ought 
evidently  to  be  a  material  difference  in  the  plan  of  a  table 
lor  them  and  of  one  for  their  superiors,  a  consideration 
which  leads  us  to  another  query  in  this  interesting  but  some- 
what intricate  discussion. 

How  far  are  particular  Tables  required  for  particular 
Classes0? — A  scale  formed  on  the  table  in  the  text  is 
adapted  to  very  many  persons  in  the  middle  and  upper 
classes, — to  the  receivers  of  annuities,  whether  from  the 
public  funds  or  mortgages, — the  landlord  who  depends  on 
his  rent, — the  clerk  who  depends  on  his  salary.  But  in  re- 
gard to  several  of  the  classes  currently  termed  productive, 
the  question  is  different,  as  will  appear  from  a  reference  to  a 
specific  case,  such  as  that  of 

Farmers  on  Lease. — The  situation  of  the  farmer  onlease> 
though  materially  affected  by  the  value  of  money  in  pur- 
chases generally,  depends  still  more  on  the  price  of  the  pro- 
duce he  raises  ; — of  corn,  if  his  occupancy  be  chiefly  under 
the  plough  ;  of  butcher  meat,  butter,  cheese,  if  it  be  chiefly 
grass  land.  Leases  ought  thus  to  be  drawn  with  a  reference 
to  the  market  price  of  produce,  computed  on  the  average 
of  a  series  of  years.  Or,  if  a  regulator  of  a  more  com- 
prehensive character  be  desired,  the  price  of  the  produce 
might  be  combined  with  a  table  of  the  price  of  commodities 
generally,  (Appendix,  p.  [95])  taking  the  latter  as  the  ba- 
sis ;  but  modifying  its  result  by  repeating  the  price  of  corn 
or  of  butcher  meat  a  certain  number  of  times,  so  as  to  give 
due  weight  to  these  main  constituents  of  the  income  of  the 
lessee. 

The  average  rate  of  labour,  an  object  of  the  first  import- 
ance in  farming,  might,  in  like  manner,  be  added  to  the  ta- 
ble, and  repeated  several  times. 

Mines, — In  an  undertaking  of  this  nature,  the  profit  evi- 
dently depends  on  two  points  :  the  market  price  of  the  arti- 
cles produced  (whether  coal,  iron,  tin,  or  copper) ;  and  the 
average  rate  of  the  labour  by  means  of  which  it  is  rendered 
saleable.  There  are  thus  two  ways  of  stipulating  the  con- 
ditional amount  of  the  rent :  by  a  table  confined  to  the  rate 
of  labour  and  the  price  of  the  article  produced ;  or  by  a  ta- 
ble of  the  price  of  commodities  generally,  (as  in  p.  [05]) 
with  such  renetitions  of  the  rate  of  labour,  or  price  of  the 

M 


[98]  Plan  for  giving  a  steady  Value  to  [Apr, 

article  produced,  as  the  contracting  parties  might  think  ex- 
pedient. 

Tithe. — The  case  of  tithe  is  different  from  that  of  rent. 
It  is  evidently  more  convenient  to  clergymen  that  the  price 
of  commodities  generally  should  be  the  standard,  than  the 
price  of  agricultural  produce.  The  latter  determines,  it  is 
true,  the  ability  of  the  payers  of  tithe ;  but  as  the  payers 
are  many,  and  the  receivers  comparatively  few,  as  that  which 
to  the  latter  forms  the  whole  of  income  is  to  the  former  only 
a  portion  of  their  disburse,  the  circumstances  of  the  clergy 
have  a  claim  to  prior  consideration  :  that  is,  without  show- 
ing the  slightest  partiality  to  either  party,  equity  suggests 
that  the  regulation  of  clerical  income  should  be  made  with 
a  view  to  the  value  of  money  in  the  purchase  of  commodi- 
ties generally,  and  not  exclusively  in  the  purchase  of  corn, 
which  can  form  hardly  a  fifth  of  their  expenditure. 

It  would  be  no  difficult  task  to  suggest  farther  modifica- 
tions for  different  lines  of  business  ;  but  to  enter  into  detail 
seems  wholly  unnecessary,  since  every  thing  in  the  proposed 
plan  is  voluntary,  and  may  be  adopted  or  omitted  as  may 
suit  the  interest,  or  imagined  interest,  of  the  contracting  par- 
ties. We  shall,  therefore,  take  leave  of  the  question,  after 
answering,  by  anticipation,  a  few  objections,  as  follows: — 

1.  Need  there  he  any  apprehension  of  a  combination  to 
produce  undue  returns  of  prices  for  the  purpose  of  affecting 
the  standard  of  particular  contracts'? — Attempts  of  that  na- 
ture are  very  little  to  be  dreaded  injjso  extensive  a  coun- 
try as  this  :  they  could  be  effectual  only  if  undertaken 
throughout  the  whole  kingdom,  and  persevered  in  during 
a  series  of  years  ;  a  course  which  would  suppose  a  com- 
mand of  capital,  and  a  degree  of  concealment,  wholly  at 
variance  with  probability. 

2.  Would  a  measure  of  this  nature  be  likely  to  affect  the 
sale  price  of  other  property,  in  particular  of  lands  and 
houses? — The  majority  of  fundholders  are,  as  we  shall 
explain  subsequently,  permanent  depositors ;  strangers  to 
the  manoeuvres  of  the  Stock  Exchange,  and  almost  as  little 
inclined  as  our  landholders  to  engage  in  speculative  sales 
and  purchases.  But  there  is  another  class,  persons  retiring 
from  business,  succeeding  to  property,  or  having,  from 
any  other  cause,  funds  of  which  they  are  desirous  to  make  the 
investment.  To  these  persons  stock  Mould,  by  the  measure 
m  contemplation,  be  rendered  more  eligible  as  a  permanrn' 


Aph.j  Money  Contracts.  [99  J 

deposit,  and  the  motives  for  purchasing  landed  property 
would  in  some  degree  be  lessened.  But  the  complaint  of 
the  country  gentlemen  does  not  regard  inadequacy  of  sale 
price :  instead  of  the  26  or  27  years'  purchase  to  which 
they  were  accustomed  during  the  war,  land  will  now  sell  for 
34  or  35  years'  purchase  :  their  desideratum  is  an  assured 
income, — relief  from  present  pressure ;  and  such,  to  a  cer- 
tain extent,  would  be  the  result  of  the  proposed  measure. 

3.  It  may  be  objected  to  our  table,  that  "  it  does  not 
comprise  any  heads  of  expenditure,  except  those  repre- 
sented by  commodities ;"  while  a  considerable  part  of  the 
disburse  of  the  middle  classes  (not  less  than  a  third,)  is  of 
another  description,  as  appears  from  the  concluding  line  in 
the  following  sketch : 

Proportions  in  100  ot 
each  head  of  expense 

Provisions  -  -  33 

Clothing  and  washing  -  -         18 

Fuel  and  light  6 

House  rent  -  -  -10 

Other  charges,  namely,  wages,   as-  ) 

sessed  taxes,    education,   medical  >  33 

attendance,  &c.  -  )      

100 


To  the  objection  that  might  be  founded  on  a  statement 
like  this,  our  answer  would  be,  that  the  money  paid  for 
wages,  education,  professional  aid,  he.  is  ultimately  ex- 
pended on  commodities ;  and  were  the  case  otherwise, 
there  seems  no  necessity  that  a  scale  should  comprise  aU 
the  items  of  expenditure. 

Extract  of  a  Letter  to  the  Author  from  a  respectable  Farmer 
in  Hampshire,  dated  June  1,  1823. 

"  During  the  low  prices  of  last  autumn,  I  was  led  to 
consider  of  the  plan  suggested  in  your  book  for  regulating 
the  wages  of  my  labourers,  by  a  reference  to  the  price  of 
their  subsistence,  in  other  words,  to  the  market  price  of 
corn.  This  plan  met,  at  first,  with  considerable  oppo- 
sition, but  the  equUy  of  it  became,  in  the  course  of  a  few 
weeks,  so  apparent,  as  to  remove  all  objections.  My  rule 
was  to  take  the  rate  of  wages  (75.  a  week)  currently  given 
in  my  neighbourhood,  to  explain  to  how  much  wheat  this 
was  equivalent,  and  to  pay  my  people  in  wheat  or  in 
money,  at  their  option.  They  soon  preferred  the  former, 
to   the  extent  of  their  consumption,  and  took  in  money 


[100]  Plan  for  giving  a  steady  Value,  fyc.  \Av?. 

only  what  they  required  for  their  lesser  purchases.  On 
taking  an  average  of  their  weekly  receipts,  during  the 
winter,  and  reckoning  them  in  wheat,  on  the  plan  adopted 
by  Mr.  Barton,  and  stated  in  your  book,  (in  the  chapter 
on  Poor  Laws,)  I  find  it  to  have  been  about  80  pints  of 
wheat,  which  forms  a  kind  of  medium  of  the  wages  of  the 
country  labourer,  computed  in  wheat  for  the  last  seventy 
years. 

"  This  was  found  sufficient  for  the  maintenance  of  the  fa- 
milies of  my  labourers,  which  averaged  five  persons  :  viz. 
the  man,  his  wife,  and  three  children.  During  the  whole 
winter  none  of  my  labourers,  who  were  from  16  to  18  in 
number,  had  recourse  to  the  parish. 

"  My  inference  is,  that  80  pints  of  wheat,  or  its  value  in 
money,  would  form  a  fair  permanent  rate  of  wages  for  the 
country  labourers  throughout  all  that  part  of  England  in 
which  wheat  is  the  usual  food  of  the  country  people." 

On  high  and  low  Prices  since  17 '92.  By  Thomas  Tooke,Esq. 
Part  I. — It  was  after  writing  our  chapter  on  the  Rise  of  Prices 
during  the  War,  that  Mr.  Tooke's  Treatise  fell  intoour  hands. 
This  first  Part  relates  chiefly  to  the  effect  of  the  currency, 
and  Mr.  T.  maintains  that  the  bullionists  overrate  greatly 
the  effect  on  prices  of  the  substitution  of  bank  paper  for 
coin  ;  while  their  opponents  are  almost  equally  erroneous  in 
refusing  to  admit  a  partial  enhancement  (about  20  per  cent, 
in  the  latter  years  of  the  war)  arising  from  that  cause.  Hr 
is  not  disposed  to  allow  that  the  war  had  so  great  or  general 
an  effect  on  prices  as  has  been  supposed  :  the  rise  of  corn 
he  attributes  chiefly  to  an  extra-proportion  of  indifferent 
seasons;  and  after  recapitulating  the  events  affecting  other 
commodities  of  consequence,  such  as  cotton,  sugar  or  wool, 
his  inference  is,  that  the  fluctuation  in  the  price  of  each  de- 
pended less  on  any  general  cause  than  on  circumstances  of 
demand  and  supply  peculiar  to  the  particular  article.  He 
steers  a  middle  course  throughout,  and  concludes  (p.  201.) 
by  reminding  the  bullionists  of  the  remarkable  fact,  that 
money  was  less  abundant  during  the  bank  restriction  than 
at  present,  when  prices  are  so  much  lower ;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  he  assures  the  agriculturists  that  as  the  fall  of 
prices  since  1819  may  be  explained  by  favourable  seasons, 
they  may  safely  forbear  their  complaints  against  Mr.  Peel's 
Bill. 

This  publication  is  valuable  as  a  collection  of  materials, 
as  a  specimen  of  reasoning  founded  on  specific  documents, 
instead  of  the  mania  for  generalizing,  so  common  in  the  pre- 
sent age. 


J  01 


APPENDIX 


CHAPTER  XL 


On  Finance. 


Sinking  Fund. — On  this  subject  a  few  explanatory  pa- 
ragraphs may  be  acceptable  to  those  of  our  readers  who 
are  not  initiated  in  the  mysteries  of  the  Treasury  or  Stock 
Exchange. 

The  Supplies  constituting  our  Sinking  Fund. — The  com- 
plex form  of  our  budget,  and  the  appearance  of  inviolability 
given  to  the  sinking  fund,  may  induce  persons  in  common 
life  to  imagine  that  that  fund  derived  part  of  its  income 
from  taxes  vested  in  the  commissioners,  and  managed  by 
them  without  reference  to  the  rest  of  the  revenue.  The 
appropriation,  however,  never  went  so  far  :  the  income  of 
the  sinking  fund,  paid  to  the  commissioners  at  the  bank, 
arose  chiefly  from — 

1st.  The  1,000,000/.  (increased  in  1792  to  1,200,000/.) 
annually  payable  out  of  the  general  revenue. 

2d.  The  dividends  of  redeemed  stock,  which,  standing 
in  the  name  of  the  Sinking  Fund  Commissioners,  were 
considered  as  entitled  to  interest  at  the  quarterly  payments 
at  the  Bank,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  rest  of  the  public 
debt. 

3d.  The  surplus  interest  provided  on  contracting  each 
loan  since  1793.  This  provision,  adopted  by  Mr.  Pitt  on 
the  suggestion  of  Dr.  Price,  will  be  understood  by  sup- 
posing that  the  loan  for  a  particular  year  is  10,000,000/., 
at  5  per  cent.,  for  which  stock  given  in  the  5  per  cents,  at 
par  involves  an  annual  charge  of  500,000/.  Now  the  plan 
was.  to  provide  taxes  yielding,  not  500,000/..  but  600.000/. 


[102]  On  Finance  ;  the  Sinking  Fund.  [App. 

a  year,  the  100,000/.  forming  a  fund  for  the  gradual  ex- 
tinction of  the  principal— a  purpose  which  in  the  case  in 
question  would  be  accomplished  in  37  years. 

The  merits  or  demerits  of  this  plan  of  surplus  interest 
are  now  only  matters  of  historical  curiosity,  the  season  of 
loans  being  past,  or  at  least  suspended.  The  question, 
however,  is  not  merely  arithmetical ;  it  is  in  a  great  mea- 
sure similar  to  that  of  the  expediency  or  inexpediency  of 
war  taxes ;  and  if  the  war  was  a  season  of  large  profits, 
it  was  evidently  politic  to  make  it  bear  as  large  a  portion  as 
possible  of  our  burdens.  It  is  in  a  consideration  of  this 
nature,  and  not  in  the  imaginary  advantage  of  compound 
interest,  that  we  are  to  seek  for  a  justification  of  the  mea- 
sure of  providing  a  surplus  revenue ;  we  mean  for  a  coun- 
terpoise to  the  sacrifice  with  which  it  may  easily  be  shewn 
to  have  been  attended. 

The  nominal  Sinking  Fund. — Our  sinking  fund  exhibit- 
ed until  the  late  change  a  surplus,  which,  for  illustration, 
we  shall  call  17,000,000/.,  and  the  revenue  at  the  same 
time  a  deficiency  which  we  shall  term  12,000,000/.  It 
was  for  some  time  a  question  whether  the  better  plan  was 
to  leave  the  17,000,000/.  to  operate  in  weekly  purchases 
for  the  redemption  of  stock,  and  supply  the  revenue  defi- 
ciency by  a  loan,  or  to  adopt  the  more  simple  course  of 
receiving  from  the  sinking  fund  the  12,000,000/.,  and  con- 
lining  the  redemption  purchases  of  the  commissioners  to 
5,000,000/.  This  gave  rise  to  considerable  discussion 
after  1815,  the  former  plan  being  maintained  by  the  con- 
verts to  the  doctrine  of  compound  interest,  the  believers 
in  the  arithmetical  wonders  of  Dr.  Price.  But  in  1819 
ministers  consented  to  adopt  the  latter  course,  and  found  in 
it  (see  Ricardo  on  the  Funding  System,  in  Napier's  Supple- 
ment to  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,)  a  degree  of  advan- 
tage which  may  be  said  to  have  given  the  first  blow  to  the 
complex  plan  of  paying  with  one  hand,  while  we  borrowed 
with  the  other. 

The  topic  was  again  brought  under  discussion  in  the  ses- 
sion of  1822,  in  the  debates  on  the  plan  for  converting  our 
half-pay  and  pensions  into  long  annuities.  On  that  occa- 
sion Mr.  Vansittart,  unwilling  to  part  with  the  semblance 
after  he  had  relinquished  the  substance  of  the  sinking  fund, 
urged  for  a  time  the  expediency  of  making  the  requisite 
loans  from  the  public,  but  was  at  last  persuaded  to  follow 
the  direct  course,  and  to   admit   of  the  loans  beincr  made 


App.J  On  Finance.  [l^J 

from  the  portion  of  revenue  at  his  disposal.  This  plan  has 
been  confirmed  by  Mr.  Robinson  ;  so  that  the  sinking  fund 
is  now  divested  of  its  complexity,  and  brought  back  to  a 
form  from  which,  as  far  as  we  can  judge,  it  ought  never  to 
have  been  made  to  deviate — that  of  the  balance  of  cur- 
rent revenue  applied  to  the  redemption  of  stock. 


Comparison  of  our  present  Burdens  with  those  of  1792. 

Amount  of  taxation,  tithe,  and  poor-rate,  in 

Great  Britain  and  Ireland  in  1792  -         -    £22,000,000 

The  increase  of  our  population  since  then 
(nearly  50  per  cent.)  enables  us,  without 
additional  pressure  on  the  individual,  to 
bear  a  farther  burden  of         -  11,000,000 

Continental  countries,  our  competitors  in 
productive  industry,  having,  in  general, 
increased  their  burdens  in  a  ratio  some- 
what greater  than  their  population,  we  are 
justified  (see  Chap.  IX.  p.  257.)  in  re- 
garding a  corresponding  increase  on  our 
part  as  not  detrimental  to  our  foreign  trade. 
We  add,  on  this  account,  a  sum  of         -         5,000,000 

The  money  in  which  taxes  were  paid  in  1792 
being,  when  compared  with  our  present 
currency,  as  100  to  130  in  value,  we  make 
a  corresponding  insertion  of  -  10,000,000 

on  the  ground  that,  to  that  extent,  the  ex- 
cess of  our  present  taxation  over  that  of 
1792,  is  nominal. 

Amount  of  burden  which  can  be  borne  by 
us  at  present,  without  greater  disadvantage, 

in  comparison  with  other  countries,   than . 

we  experienced  in  1792  -  £48,000,000 


Our  actual  burdens  are  (see  App.  p.  [84])   64,000,000/. 

We  have  here  assumed  the  increase  of  population  as 
the  measure  of  the  increase  of  national  wealth,  arising  from 
our  various  improvements  in  agriculture,  manufacture,  na- 
vigation, &c.  This  proportion  will  be  deemed  consider- 
ably below  the  mark  by  the  majority  of  those  who  write  or 
think  on  such  subjects,  whether  it  be  the  convert  to  Mr. 


[104]  On  Firiunde.  [Apr. 

Gray's  doctrine,  (p.  221.)  that  in  the  progress  of  society 
individual  income  increases  in  a  larger  ratio  than  popula- 
tion, or  the  practical  observer,  who  founds  his  calculation 
on  the  surprising  improvements  in  agriculture,  manufacture, 
and  productive  industry  generally,  during  the  last  thirty 
years.  These  arguments  rest,  doubtless,  on  a  very  sub- 
stantial basis,  and  nothing  but  the  unfortunate  fluctuations 
in  individual  property,  attendant  on  our  rapid  transitions, 
would  have  prevented  us  from  inserting  a  larger  sum  (pro- 
bably 16  or  18,000,000,  instead  of  11,000,0002.)  as  the 
measure  of  the  increase  of  national  wealth,  arising  from  our 
improvements. 

The  Malt  Tax. — The  hopes  of  the  agriculturists  were  at 
one  time  excited  by  the  expected  repeal  of  a  large  share 
of  the  duty  on  malt;  but,  while  we  sympathize  with  their 
sufferings,  and  anxiously  desire  a  diminution  of  their  tithe 
and  poor-rate,  we  cannot  help  expressing  a  doubt  of  the 
expediency  of  any  great  reduction  of  taxation  on  an  article 
already  so  much  cheapened  by  the  fall  of  the  materials. 
Sudden  changes  are  to  be  avoided  ;  malt  liquor  comes  only 
in  some  respects  under  the  descriptton  of  a  necessary  of  life  ; 
and  the  extended  cultivation  of  barley  that  might  have  been 
prompted  by  a  reduction  of  duty,  would  probably  have  pre- 
vented any  material  rise  in  the  price. 

Prices  of  Commodities  a  Century  ago.  Text,  p.  33S. — In 
comparing  our  present  national  income  with  that  of  the  last 
century,  we  have  assumed  the  power  of  money  in  the  pur- 
chase of  commodities  as  less  at  present  by  30  per  cent,  than 
in  the  reign  of  George  I.  or  in  any  period  of  last  century 
prior  to  1792.  This  allowance  is  ample  when  we  take  into 
account  that  prices  have  fallen  since  1820,  and  that  the 
prospect  of  war,  at  least  of  such  a  war  as  would  be  pro- 
ductive of  general  enhancement,  seems  very  remote.  On 
this  interesting  topic  we  have  given  a  short  table  in  page  [7] 
of  the  Appendix.  Those  who  dissent  from  this  opinion, 
and  who  imagine  money  to  have  been  formerly  of  much 
greater  value,  will  do  well  to  recollect  that  many  manu- 
factures are  now  cheaper  than  in  that  age,  and  that  corn  is 
very  little  dearer.  The  chief  difference,  in  fact,  is  in  pro- 
fessional fees,  salaries,  and  wages,  all  raised  during  the  war, 
and  not  yet  brought  to  a  level  like  the  price  of  produce, 
manufactures,  or  whatever  is  regulated  at  an  open  market. 


App.]  On  Finance.  [105] 

Then  as  to  the  charges  of  house-keeping  in  a  compre- 
hensive sense,  the  difference  between  the  present  time  and 
a  century  ago,  resolves  itself  chiefly  into  a  difference  in  the 
style  of  living ;  not  unlike  the  existing  difference  between 
France  and  England,  in  which,  though  the  prices  of  a 
number  of  articles  are  on  a  par,  the  total  outlay  is  less 
in  France,  in  consequence  of  the  plainer  habits  of  the 
country. 

Historical  Parallel  of  the  Revenue  of  England  and  France, 
in  p.  343.  of  the  Text. — These  sums  exhibit  the  nett  produce 
of  the  taxes,  after  deducting  the  expense  of  collecting  ;  and 
the  latter  years  of  the  column  of  England  include  Scotland 
and  Ireland. 

Backward  State  of  France. 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Mr.  S.  Gray  to  Monsieur  J.  B.  Say? 
printed  in  1817  in  the  Appendix  to  the  volume  entitled 
"  All  Classes  productive." 

"  In  a  visit  which  I  made  to  your  country  last  year,  I 
confess  I  did  not  find  such  striking  or  brilliant  results. 
Travelling  partly  with  a  view  to  ascertain  how  far  the  doc- 
trines, which  I  had  deduced  from  the  facts  around  me  in 
our  island,  as  well  as  from  information,  agreed  with  the 
facts  found  in  so  populous  a  state  as  France,  I  scrutinized 
as  narrowly  as  I  could  the  circumstances  of  the  population. 
Considering  the  extension  of  buildings,  and  an  improvement 
in  their  style,  which  show  the  increase  of  population  com- 
bined with  the  concomitant  increase  of  wealth,  as  the  surest 
symptoms  of  a  thriving  country,  I  paid  particular  attention 
to  your  towns  and  villages  in  these  points,  and  am  sorry  to 
say,  I  saw  no  progress  whatever.  I  have  no  recollection 
of  any  strictly  additional  buildings  :  the  only  new  buildings 
which  I  perceived  were  in  some  villages  that  had  been  partly 
destroyed  in  the  conflicts  with  the  invading  armies.  In 
truth,  though  we  also  are  suffering  from  an  unusual  stag- 
nation, I  found,  at  my  return,  more  new  houses  going  on 
in  the  petty  suburb  of  London,  Camden  Town,  and  its 
neighbourhood,  than  I  had  seen  in  the  whole  of  my  route 
through  France.  Every  town  and  every  village  seemed 
stationary.  I  own,  however,  I  found  much  of  what  I  ex- 
pected, on  my  principles,  from  a  state  so  long  well  peopled. 
There  was  an  appearance  of  wealth,  though,  in  general,  it 
is  true,  but  of  little  capital.  Your  soil  is  almost  universally 
under  cultivation,  but,  with  some  exceptions,  in  a  very  in- 
ferior stvle.     Your  people  are  generallv  emploved  and  busv.; 

M 


[106]  On  Finance.  [App. 

yet  not  very  effectively.  Though  the  population  of  France 
be  to  that  of  England  only  as  about  150  to  230  per  square 
mile,  France  seems  to  be  at  a  still  more  considerable  rate 
behind  our  island  in  capital,  and  the  results  of  active  capi- 
tal. In  several  statistical  points  we  have  got  the  start  of 
a  full  century  before  you." 


THE    EiNI>. 


14  DAY  USE 

TURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

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